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SUMMARY 
 
Despite the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in 
2001, which unequivocally affirmed WTO members’ rights to use compulsory licences and other 
TRIPS flexibilities to access medicines, thirteen years on, developing countries and least 
developed countries are still grappling with access to medicines issues and a high disease burden. 
Despite some well researched and eloquent arguments to the contrary, it is a trite fact that patents 
remain an impediment to access to medicines by encouraging monopoly prices. The WTO 
TRIPS Agreement gives members room to legislate in a manner that is sympathetic to access to 
affordable medicines by providing for exceptions to patentability and the use of patents without 
the authorisation of the patent holder (TRIPS flexibilities). 
This study focuses on access to medicines under the TRIPS Agreement from a SADC 
comparative perspective by interrogating the extent of the domestication of TRIPS provisions 
promoting access to medicines in the SADC region with specific reference to Botswana, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. After establishing that all SADC members, including Seychelles which is 
yet to be a WTO member have intellectual property (IP) laws in their statute books, this study 
confirms that while most of the IP provisions may be used to override patents, they are currently 
not being used by SADC members due to non-IP reasons such as lack of knowledge and political 
will. The study also engages in comparative discussions of topical occurrences in the context of 
access to medicines litigation in India, Thailand and Kenya and extracts useful thematic lessons 
for the SADC region. The study’s overall approach is to extract useful lessons for regional access 
to medicines from the good experiences of SADC members and other developing country 
jurisdictions in the context of a south-south bias. 
The study draws conclusions and recommendations which if implemented will in all likelihood 
lead to improved access to medicines for SADC citizens, while at the same time respecting the 
sanctity of patent rights. The study recommends the adoption of a rights-based approach, which 
will ultimately elevate patient rights over patent rights and urges the region to consider using its 
LDCs status to issue compulsory licences in the context of TRIPS Article 31 bis while exploring 
the possibility of local pharmaceutical manufacturing to produce generics, inspired by the 
experiences of Zimbabwe and current goings on in Mozambique and the use of pooled 
v 
 
procurement for the region. The study embraces the rewards theory of patents which should be 
used to spur innovation and research into diseases of the poor in the SADC region. Civil society 
activity in the region is also identified as a potential vehicle to drive the move towards access to 
affordable medicines for all in the SADC region. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Background to the Study 
In March 2004, the World Health Organisation
1
 estimated that one third of the world’s 
population lacked access to essential drugs.
2
 Further, the WHO estimated that over 50% of the 
people in Africa and Asia had no access to very basic and essential drugs.
3
 On a closely related 
note, five years later, when a comparison was made between access to essential drugs in the 
public and private sectors, the results painted a further negative picture.
4
 In 2011, UNCTAD 
reported that nearly two billion of the world’s population, many of whom live in Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), lacked access to essential medicines.
5
 By 2013, the situation in 
respect of access to medicines had improved marginally and the total number of people without 
access to medicines was estimated to be between 1.3 and 2.1 billion people.
6
 Access to essential 
medicines is important for developing countries particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa as they 
are vulnerable to deaths caused by preventable diseases.
7
  
                                                          
1
 The World Health Organisation (hereafter WHO), an arm of the United Nations, was established on 7 April 1948; 
a day that has now come to be celebrated across the globe as World Health Day. The WHO constitution came into 
force on this date, thus giving the global health organisation its legal existence. Broadly speaking, the mandate of the 
WHO straddles inter alia, providing leadership on global health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting 
norms and standards, articulating evidence-based policy options, providing technical support to countries and 
monitoring and assessing health trends (see WHO website at http://www.who.int/about/en/, last visited 04/04/2009 ). 
2
 See WHO, ‘Equitable Access to Essential Medicines: a Framework for Collective Action’ in WHO Policy 
Perspectives on Medicines (2004) 1 available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2004/WHO_EDM_2004.4.pdf (last 
visited 01 /11/2013). The actual number was estimated to be between 1.2 and 1.3 billion. At the time of writing, 
these were the most recent statistics on the subject. 
3
 Essential medicines are those that satisfy the priority health care needs of the population. They are selected with 
due regard to public health relevance, evidence on efficacy and safety, and comparative cost-effectiveness (WHO 
above at 1). 
4
 According the United Nations report dated 4 September 2008, titled ‘Delivering on the Global Partnerships for 
Achieving the Millennium Development Goals’, available http://who.int/medicines/mdg/en/ (04 /03/2009), in the 
public sector, generic medicines are only available in 34.9% of facilities, and on average cost 250% more than the 
international reference price. In the private sector, those same medicines are available in 63.2% of facilities, but cost 
on average about 650% more than the international reference price. 
5
 UNCTAD Investment in Pharmaceutical Production in Least Developed Countries: A Guide for Policy Makers 
and Investment Promotion Agencies (2011). 
6
 WHO “Essential Medicines and Health Products Information Portal: A World Health Organization Resource” at 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js6160e/9.html  (last visited 13/12/2013). 
7
 Examples that easily come to mind are malaria, cholera, Ebola and avian flu among other diseases that are easily 
curable in an environment where drugs are accessible and available. One other nagging health problem is the issue 
of HIV/AIDS and access to antiretroviral and other immunity -boosting treatment. With specific reference to access 
to medicines in the context of HI/AIDS, see generally Mushayavanhu D, ‘The realisation of access to HIV and 
AIDS – related medicines in Southern African countries: Possibilities and actual realisation of international law 
 2 
 
Access to essential medicines and vaccines depends on specific factors such as rational selection 
and use, sustainable financing, reliable supply systems and affordable prices.
8
 In the context of 
this study, access to medicines also depends on the availability and efficacy of legal instruments 
at the municipal,
9
 regional
10
 and international levels.
11
 
 
Access to medicines, a concept with no clear definition, is generally considered as a collection of 
different dimensions
12
 such as accessibility,
13
 affordability,
14
 acceptability,
15
 and availability.
16
 
In developed nations, over 70% of drugs are publicly funded or reimbursed whereas in Africa,   
50-90% of pharmaceutical expenditure is funded out of pocket.
17
 This is not good news for 
access to medicines, since drug prices in the absence of price regulations create ‘affordability 
barriers’.18 
 
Not being able to access essential drugs and vaccines limits the enjoyment of the right to health 
and by extension the right to life on the part of the citizens of the developing countries.
19
 For 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
obligations’ in Viljoen F and Precious S (eds) Human Rights Under Threat: Four Perspectives on HIV, AIDS and 
the law in Southern Africa (2007) 127 -169. In this study, essential drugs and essential medicines are used 
interchangeably and should be regarded as carrying the same meaning. 
8
 WHO above at 2 – 5. 
9
 In the context of South Africa, legislation such as the Patents Act 57 of 1978 as amended and the Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965 easily come to mind. In Zimbabwe, the relevant municipal instruments 
would be the Patent Act (Chapter 26:03) of 1972 and the Declaration Period of Emergency (HIV/AIDS) Notice, 
2002. 
10
 Good examples in this case would be the Declaration and Treaty of SADC, the SADC Protocol on Health and 
regional intellectual property instruments such as Harare Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs within the 
Framework of the African Regional Industrial Property Organization (ARIPO) of 1984. 
11
 Examples are the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the World Trade Organisation Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property rights (TRIPS). 
12
 Tetteh EK “Providing Affordable Essential medicines to African Households: The Missing Policies and 
Institutions for Price Containment” (2008) 66 Social Science and Medicine at 570. 
13
 Referring to health services coverage. 
14
 This relates to prices and volumes of consumption. 
15
 This refers to quality, safety and efficacy. 
16
 This refers to drug production, procurement and distribution.  
17
 Tetteh above at 570. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 The right to health and the right to life are closely intertwined and are not mutually exclusive. The right to life is 
encapsulated in article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights and most, if not all constitutions of civilised 
nations of the world contain the right to life. For example, section 11 of the South African constitution of 1996 
provides that everyone has the right to life and the applicability of that provision was tested by country’s 
constitutional court in the landmark case of S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 360 (SCA) on 6 June 1995. 
In the case, the majority decision of the court was that the death penalty is inhuman and degrading hence 
unconstitutional. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights indirectly provides for the right to health in article 25 
in which it is stated among other things, that everyone has the right to a standard of living that is adequate for their 
 3 
 
example, to safeguard Zimbabweans’ right to health, the Patents Act20 was amended21 in order to 
“enable the state or a person authorised by the Minister in terms of section 34 of the Act” to 
make or use any patented drug used in the treatment of persons suffering from HIV/AIDS-related 
conditions or import any generic drug to treat HIV/AIDS.
22
 While the right to health has 
traditionally been regarded as a civil and political right,
23
 it has, nevertheless, been increasingly 
applied broadly and has been extended in some instances to cases involving access to 
medicines.
24
 The right to health is one among a range of socio economic rights for which states 
accept an obligation at international law.
25
  
 
The right to life is part of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
26
 while the 
right to health is part of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
27
 It 
may be argued that the separation of the two is artificial and misleading because the right to life 
not only depends on the realisation of the right to health but also on other composite rights such 
as the right to food and nutrition. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
wellbeing and that of the family inclusive of medical care. The right to health is also recognised in article 12(1) of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights while article 16 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights recognises the right of every individual to enjoy ‘the best attainable state of physical 
and mental health’. Other international instruments relevant to the right to health are the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (article 6), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 24), Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (article 12) and the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (art 5). On a related note, see Olowu O ‘Environmental Governance and 
Accountability of Non-state Actors in Africa: A rights –based Approach’ (2007) 32 South African Yearbook of 
International Law 261 at 279. For a general overview of the right to health and in its democratic context, see Hassim 
A, Heywood M, and Berger J (eds) Health and Democracy: A guide to Human Rights, Health Law and policy in 
post-apartheid South Africa (2006). For a comprehensive compilation of essential documents, international 
agreements and treaties pertaining to the right to health, see Bekker G (ed) A Compilation of Essential Documents 
on the Right to Health (2000). 
20
 Chapter 26:03 of 1972. 
21
 This was done by the then Justice Minister, the Honourable Patrick Chinamasa, in terms of sections 34 and 35 of 
the Patent Act and thus General Notice 240 of 2002 was introduced as an emergency measure for six months.  
22
 See paras 2 (a) – (b) of the Declaration of Period of Emergency (HIV/AIDS) Notice, 2002. 
23
 See for instance article 6 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides that the 
right to life shall be protected by law and provides further, that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
24
 Mushayavanhu above at 135. For example, in the case of Odir Miranda v El Salvador cited by the author in 
footnote 26 on page 136, the Inter-American Commission held that El Salvador’s refusal to purchase triple therapy 
HIV medication amounted to a violation of the rights to life and health as provided for in the America Convention. 
25
 See in this regard Evans T, ‘A Human Right to Health?’ (2002) 23 Third World Quarterly 197. 
26
 Per article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
27
 Per article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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Although the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
28
 Protocol on Health
29
 does 
not expressly refer to the right to health, the importance of access to essential medicines for the 
SADC region is highlighted.
30
  
 
The constitutive Act of the African Union
31
 recognises the importance of the right to health by 
providing in Article 3 (n) that one of the African Union’s paramount objectives is to work with 
progressive partners in eradicating preventable diseases and promoting good health in the 
continent.  
 
Notably, lack of access to essential medicines will negatively influence the achievement of 
millennium development goals by countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
32
  
 
                                                          
28
 Current member states of the SADC are Angola, Malawi, Namibia, Mauritius, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, 
Seychelles, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Each member state has a 
responsibility to coordinate a sector or sectors on behalf of others. Angola coordinates energy, Botswana livestock 
production and animal disease control, Lesotho environment and land management, Malawi forestry and wildlife, 
Mauritius tourism, Mozambique transport and communications, Namibia marine fisheries and resources, South 
Africa finance and investment, Swaziland human resources development, Tanzania industry and trade, Zambia 
mining and Zimbabwe food, agriculture and natural resources. For detailed discussion of the SADC institutional 
history and its gradual evolution into a free trade area, see Osode PC, “The Southern African Development 
Community in Legal Historical Perspective” (2003) 28 Journal for Juridical Science 1; SADC Secretariat, The 
Official SADC trade Industry and Investment Review (1997) 5-9, Chipeta C and Mandaza I “The future of the 
SADC” (1998) 11 Southern African Political and Economic Monthly 35; Kamidza R “Is SADC ready For Free 
Trade?” (2000) 14 Southern African Political and Economic Monthly 23; Moyo S, O’ Keefe P and Sill M, The 
Southern African Environment (1993) 28 -36; Jenkins C, Leape J and Thomas L (eds) Gaining from Trade in 
Southern Africa: Complementary Policies to Underpin the SADC free Trade Area (2000) 1-20; and Thomas RH 
“The World Trade Organisation and Southern African Trade Relations” (1999) 3 Law, Democracy and Development 
105 at 105-106. 
29
 The Protocol on Health was approved by the SADC Heads of State in August 1999 and entered into force in 
August 2004. The full text of the Protocol is available at http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/152 (last visited 
12/06/2012) 
30
 See generally Article 29 of the Protocol dealing with pharmaceuticals. 
31
 Adopted in Lome, Togo on 11 July 2000 and entered into force on 26 May 2001. The full text of the Constitutive 
Act is available in Heyns C and Killander M (eds) Compendium of Key Human Rights Documents of the African 
Union (2007) 4 – 12. 
32
 Of paramount importance in this context are goals 4, 5 and 6 that canvass child health, maternal health and 
combating HIV/AIDS respectively. Very specifically, millennium development goal number 8 (global partnership) 
target 4 directly talks to the issue of access to medicines by enjoining members of the United Nations, in cooperation 
with pharmaceutical companies, to provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries. For a full 
list and description of the millennium development goals, see the United Nations site at 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last visited 04/03/2009). The WHO reports that some developing countries 
have made progress in achieving health-related millennium development goals but progress has been slow in       
sub-Saharan Africa. The notable progress recorded is in the reductions of HIV/AIDS infections 
[http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs290/en/index.html (last visited 02/03/2009). 
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In order to facilitate access to essential drugs and medicines, the European parliament passed a 
resolution on the World Trade Organisation
33
 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (hereafter TRIPS Agreement) and Access to Medicines on 12 July 2007.
34
  The resolution 
enjoins the European Union and its membership to take active and deliberate steps in assisting 
developing countries increase their manufacturing capacity of essential drugs by providing 
expertise and funding. On a related note, in October 2007, the African Union, under the auspices 
of the United Nations, adopted an African Union Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for 
Africa,
35
 which seeks to facilitate more production of generic versions of essential drugs through 
the facilitation of a working relationship between the Union, partners and local manufactures of 
domestic drugs. The plan further seeks to assist African countries to make use of the flexibilities 
afforded to them by the TRIPS agreement and the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health.
36
 
 
The two developments in the preceding paragraph show the importance and urgency of accessing 
medicines by the developing countries. 
 
On 14 November 2001, the WTO adopted a Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health.
37
 The declaration recognises the gravity of public health problems afflicting many 
                                                          
33
 Hereafter WTO. Established on 1 January 1995, the World Trade Organisation provides a forum for implementing 
the multilateral trading system, negotiating new trade agreements and resolving trade disputes. The concept of a 
WTO dates back to 1919 when the United States president Woodrow Wilson proposed a ‘World Trade Board’ as 
part of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The ‘Board’ dropped out in a later draft, but the idea did not die. A 
United Nations Conference approved an international Trade Organisation (ITO) in 1948 but the organization never 
eventuated due to opposition in the US Congress. The agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, which 
was signed in Marrakesh, Morocco in 1994, incorporates the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(hereafter GATT), which continues to apply to issues not covered by the more specific agreements negotiated during 
the Uruguay round. The trade rules of this organization are constantly negotiated and broadened to cover a number 
of issues that were not included or anticipated during the signing of the initial agreement. Each negotiation, which 
focuses on specific aspects of international trade such as tariffs or subsidies is called a round and usually assumes its 
name from the place in which it is negotiated. Examples are Geneva (1947); Annecy (1948); Torquay (1950); 
Geneva (1956); Dillon (1960-1961); Kennedy (1964-1967); Tokyo (1973-1979) and Uruguay (19986-1994) rounds. 
The current Round, which has been characterised as the longest and most contentious, is the Doha Round. Some 
authorities have referred to it as the ‘Development Round’ due to its thrust towards developmental issues in 
international trade law. 
34
 Available at http://www.un.org/esa/policy/mdggap/mdggap_matrix_drugs.html (last visited 02/02/2009). 
35
 The full text is available at http://www.pambazuka.org/actionalerts/images/uploads/Pharmaceutical_Plan-
CAMH_MIN._8(III).pdf (last visited 05/06/2009). 
36
  See note 28 below. 
37
 The full text of the declaration is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm  (last visited 04/12/2008). It is 
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developing and least-developed countries and identifies HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria as 
some of the most prominent afflictions.
38
 Further, the declaration acknowledges the importance 
of intellectual property protection in the development of medicines while at the same time 
bemoaning its effects on prices.
39
 Of paramount importance is the fact that the declaration 
unequivocally affirms WTO members’ rights to take measures to protect public health by 
making use of the flexibilities
40
 in the TRIPS agreement that allow each member state to 
determine what amounts to a public health threat and thus act accordingly.
41
 One major 
instrument which can be used to take advantage of the flexibilities in TRIPS would be a 
compulsory licence. Compulsory licensing occurs when a government allows someone else to 
produce the patented product or process without the consent of the patent owner.
42
 It is one of the 
flexibilities on patent protection included in the WTO’s agreement on intellectual property. 
 
 The declaration suggests that the TRIPS agreement should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner that is supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all.
43
 The declaration creates a regime that is sympathetic to the 
cause of least-developed WTO member states because it exempts them from sections 5 and 7 of 
the TRIPS agreement until 1 January 2016 with a proviso for further extension of the grace 
period.  
 
While the above information was received with mixed enthusiasm from developing countries, 
especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, the implementation thereof has been slow if not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
crucial to point out that the declaration sets WTO members the task of agreeing on an appropriate mechanism to 
address the problem of access to medicines by developing and least-developed WTO members. According to 
Mathews D, ‘Is History Repeating Itself? The Outcomes of Negotiations on access to medicines, the HIV/AIDS 
Pandemic and Intellectual Property Rights in the World Trade Organisation’ (2004) 1 Law, Social Justice and 
Global Development 2 – 16 at 2, an agreement on such a mechanism was finally reached on 30 August 2003. 
38
 Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and Public Health, paragraph 1. 
39
 Ibid para 3. 
40
 Some of the flexibilities are outlined in paragraph 5 of the Declaration. They include members’ autonomy in 
granting compulsory licences, the freedom to determine the grounds for the granting of the licence, flexibility in the 
determination of what constitutes a national emergency, and that each member is free to establish its own regime for 
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights without challenge.  
41
 Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and Public Health para 4. 
42
 See WTO, “Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS” at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm (last visited 13/08/2012) 
43
 Ibid. 
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insignificant. The SADC position is guided by the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan,
44
 which 
outlines the TRIPS flexibilities and spells out a concrete plan to take full advantage of the 
flexibilities from 2007 -2013 and beyond.
45
 
 
Developing countries remain in desperate need for access to essential medicines that are patented 
in developed countries. In the SADC region, the need to access essential medicines and drugs, 
especially generic drugs, is made dire by the high disease burden, attributable mainly to 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. With such a dilemma still unresolved, questions about 
improving the efficacy of TRIPS flexibilities for developing countries arise. With specific 
reference to the SADC region, the following questions are relevant and were answered in this 
study: 
 
1. How do we ensure that developing countries in general and SADC members in particular 
make full use of the TRIPS flexibilities without falling foul of the basic tenets of 
intellectual property law? 
 
2. What is the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement, access to medicines and human 
rights? 
 
3. To what extent have the TRIPS flexibilities been incorporated in the SADC members’ 
domestic legislations to advance the cause of access to medicines? 
 
4. What legal and policy interventions are necessary to ensure that developing countries and 
SADC members utilise the flexibilities in their favour? 
 
5. Looking at comparative jurisprudence on litigating access to medicines from other 
developing country jurisdictions, what lessons can the SADC region learn in the context 
of pharmaceutical patents? 
                                                          
44
 Available at 
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Services/PSD/BEP/SADC%20PHARMACEUTICAL%20BUSINESS
%20PLAN%20-APPROVED%20PLAN.pdf (last visited 13/08/12). 
45
 See operational paragraph 4.1.8 of the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan. 
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6. Is it possible to come up with SADC tailored solutions and recommendations for access 
to medicines, premised on the right to life, human dignity and health, which will attempt 
to balance the rights of developing countries to access essential medicines against 
pharmaceutical patentees’ rights to commercially exploit products of their intellectual 
endeavour?  
2. Statement of the Problem 
Despite the adoption of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the 
ultimate Decision of the WTO General Council of 30 August 2003,
46
 patent protection of 
pharmaceutical products still prevents poor countries from having access to essential 
medicines.
47
  
 
Without doubt, developing countries are faced with health problems emanating from the lack of 
access to essential drugs and vaccines occasioned by inadequate manufacturing capacities and 
the exorbitant costs of importing drugs. The cost of patent-protected medicines has long been out 
of reach for many developing countries, partly because of the agreement by their governments to 
abide by the minimum intellectual property guarantees as a condition of membership in the 
WTO.  
 
The problem was partially solved by the adoption of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health,
48
 and the subsequent WTO Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.
49
 The latter actualises the 
instruction of the Ministerial conference to the Council for TRIPS, contained in paragraph 6 of 
the 2001 Decision, whereby WTO members with little or insufficient manufacturing capacity in 
the pharmaceutical sector must be assisted to make effective use of compulsory licences under 
the TRIPS agreement.  
 
                                                          
46
 The WTO General Council Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration of the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htM 
(06/03/2009). 
47
 See WTO, Understanding the WTO (2007) at 44. 
48
 Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and Public Health, paragraph 1. 
49
 See Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htM#asterisk (04/12/2008). 
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Despite the above two positive developments, developing countries still have not improved their 
lot with respect to accessing essential medicines and their intellectual property laws have not 
been amended accordingly to accommodate the flexibilities. Two impediments are identifiable 
here. Firstly, there is a lack of pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity occasioned by a strict 
intellectual property regime. Secondly, there is the question of high costs of essential drugs,
50
 
also occasioned by the continued unjustified adherence to an inflexible intellectual property 
regime.  
 
It is fair at this stage to posit that in order to improve access to essential medicines by developing 
countries, there is a need to actualise the flexibilities introduced by the amendments to the TRIPS 
agreement. This will require a paradigm shift in legal policy by amending existing intellectual 
property laws in the member states and, a reinterpretation of the relevant WTO provisions, which 
have been the subject of litigation in disputes involving pharmaceuticals and access to medicines.  
 
Reviewing WTO and other jurisprudence in this context will entail a critical appraisal of past 
jurisprudential practice and a development of a contextual and more progressive interpretation 
that looks beyond the parameters of the Vienna Convention.
51
  
 
Broadly speaking, there are three approaches to treaty interpretation namely, the textual,
52
 the 
teleological
53
 and the intention of the parties.
54
 It is our submission that revisiting the above 
                                                          
50
 This problem manifested itself in South Africa in the following cases: New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
Tshabalala Msimang N.O and Another and Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa and 6 others v Minister of 
Health and another (4128/04; 4329/04) and Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and 
Others 2006 (8) BCLR 872 (CC). The disputes in the above cases arose because the government of South Africa, in 
a bid to make sure that drugs were affordable to the poor, had asked the Pricing Committee, an administrative arm of 
the health ministry charged with determining prices of medicines and related products, to come up with a viable 
pricing structure. New Clicks, a pharmaceutical company and the Pharmaceutical society of South Africa challenged 
the pricing proposal on the basis that it was unviable and would drive them out of business. 
51
 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1969) ILM 679, hereafter Vienna Convention, was signed on 23 
May 1969 in Vienna, Austria and entered into force on 27 January 1980. According to Dugard J, International Law: 
A South African Perspective 3
rd
 Ed (2005) at 406, the Vienna Convention is viewed as a definitive statement on the 
law of treaties by both signatories and non-signatories. For an overview of the subject of treaties and other 
international agreements, see Mcnair A.D The Law of Treaties (1961), Elias T.O The Modern Law of Treaties 
(1974), Sinclair I The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1984), Slomanson W.R Fundamental Perspectives 
on International Law (2000) 323 – 360, Evans M. D (ed) Blackstone’s International Law Documents 7th Ed (2006) 
129 – 147, Amerasinghe C.F Principles of the International Law of International Organisations (2005) 24 – 61, 
Rosene S Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945-1986 (1989), Klabbers J The Concept of Treaty in International 
Law (1996) and Aust A Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000). 
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interpretive approaches in a context that takes into account the peculiar circumstances of the 
individual WTO members in sub-Saharan Africa may yield positive results for access to 
medicines.  
 
The TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent measures to protect public health; it 
should be interpreted
55
 and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.
56
  
 
There is, therefore, a need to ensure that there is adequate supply of essential medicines to poor 
countries while at the same time maintaining the patent system’s role in providing incentives for 
research and development into new medicines.
57
 Flexibilities, such as compulsory licensing and 
parallel importation, are built into the TRIPS agreement notwithstanding the fact that some 
governments in developing countries are unsure as to how these would be interpreted, and how 
far their right to use them would be respected.
58
  
 
An investigation into the causes of such intransigence and a critical appraisal of the current 
jurisprudential practice is called for in order to improve developing countries’ access to essential 
medicines. In a bid to unravel the jurisprudential problems, there is a need for a critical appraisal 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
52
 Dugard above at 417. The textual approach provided for in Article 31 gives effect to the literal or grammatical 
meaning of the words and is widely favoured by formalists and positivists. 
53
 Ibid. This methodology emphasises the object and purpose of a treaty in the interpretive process. 
54
 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. This approach attempts to give effect to the intention or presumed intention 
of the parties, which the judge infers from the text and the preparatory works (travaux preparatoires) or the 
historical record of the treaty. 
55
 Interpretive problems associated with the TRIPS agreement are likely to occur less frequently if the proposed 
World Intellectual property Organisation’s substantive Patent Law Treaty is adopted. For a full discussion and some 
enlightening arguments against the adoption of the treaty from the point of view of developing countries, see 
Reichman J.H and Dreyfuss R.C, ‘Harmonisation without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive 
Patent Law Treaty’ (2007) 57 Duke Law Journal 86-130. 
56
 Mathews  5. This is further supported by article 66 of the TRIPS agreement, which makes specific mention of the 
unique and precarious position of least-developed WTO members that may require some limited exceptions to the 
strict application of intellectual property rights. The article points out that the countries’ economic, financial and 
administrative constraints necessitate some form of flexibility in order to allow them to develop a sound 
technological base for intellectual property innovation. It was for this reason that article 16 gave least-developing 
WTO members a 10 year grace period before they could be subject to the major provisions of TRIPS.  
57
 Ibid. 
58
 To date, only Rwanda has notified the WTO of its intention to use the WTO notification process to import 
HIV/AIDS medication from Canada [see CRS Report for Congress entitled ‘The WTO, Intellectual Property Rights 
and the Access to Medicines Controversy’, 5 November 2007, available at 
http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL33750.pdf (last visited 03/03/2009)]. 
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of the interpretive cannons employed by the WTO panels and the Appellate Body with the view 
of making future treaty interpretation sympathetic to the access cause to medicines. 
 
This study analysed the relevant TRIPS provisions (flexibilities) and attempted to explain why 
developing countries in general and the SADC region in particular have been reluctant to take 
full advantage of the specific provisions. Ultimately, selected intellectual property legislation in 
SADC member states was analysed and the potential for the inclusion of flexibilities afforded by 
the TRIPS Agreement was explored against the backdrop of a rights-based approach.
59
  
 
In the final analysis, this study came up with recommendations, premised on the rights-based 
approach which, if adopted at the regional level, will solve the problem of lack of access to 
essential medicines and drugs, including generics.  
 
Regrettably, there is a paucity of comparative literature on the human rights approach to the use 
of TRIPS flexibilities from the SADC and the developing countries’ perspective. Only scant 
attention has been given to the potential of regional trading bloc and the developing countries’ 
solutions to the access to medicines problem. Few studies have in fact examined in-depth the 
extent of incorporation and use of TRIPS flexibilities in the SADC region beyond lamenting the 
fact that the flexibilities are currently not being taken advantage of by the SADC member states. 
This study, therefore, proffers home-grown solutions to the SADC access to medicines problem 
through the aid of jurisprudence from other developing countries. This is the gap which this 
study sought to fill.  
 
 
                                                          
59
 For scholarly references to the concept of a rights –based approach, see Olowu above at 261-282 and Olowu O, 
‘Conceptualizing a Rights-based approach to poverty alleviation in Africa: The platform for Social Security (2003) 
43 Indian Journal of International Law 67, UNAIDS Global Reference Group on HIV/AIDS and human Rights, 
‘What Constitutes a Rights – based approach? Definitions, Methods, and Practices’ issue paper, 23-24 August 2004. 
Mary Robinson, the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, suggested an adoption of the 
rights – based approach when she cited the example of intellectual property rules that have led to the exclusion of 
many people from access to medicines. At a panel discussion titled ‘Towards Development: Human Rights and the 
WTO Agenda’, held in Cancun, Mexico on the 12 of September 2003, she succinctly spelt out how such an 
approach could yield positive results for the access to medicines debate. The full text of her submissions to the panel 
discussion is available at www.eginitiative.org/documents/wtocancun.html (last visited 03/03/2009). 
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3. Preliminary Literature Review  
Essentially, the battle for access to medicines revolves around the right to issue compulsory 
licences and to manufacture and export generic versions of well-known branded drugs.
60
 
Intellectual property policy continues to be shaped by asymmetrical power relations, which 
reduce the amount of leeway that poorer states have in devising regulatory approaches that are 
most suitable for their individual needs and stages of development.
61
 This problem has long been 
recognised by developed countries. For example, as early as the late 1990s the United States and 
the European Union revealed some willingness to assist the least developed countries in Africa to 
access drugs to ameliorate the effect of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. However, this was not robustly 
followed up.
62
 There has been a mismatch between the willingness to assist and the actual 
granting of assistance and this has had a negative effect on alleviating the dire need for essential 
medicines in Africa. 
 
Most writings on the subject of lack of access to medicines in the context of sub-Saharan Africa 
have tended to be obsessed with themes discussed immediately below.  
 
Firstly, the recurrent call by developing countries has been that they should be allowed to 
market, import, export and produce generic drug versions that are ‘essential’ not only for 
‘national emergencies’.63  
 
Secondly, there have also been increasing calls for the striking of a balance between the rights of 
developing countries to access medicines and the rights of pharmaceutical companies to continue 
with medical innovations while gaining market-related returns for their intellectual property.
64
 
                                                          
60
 Sell SK “TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines” (2007) 28 Liverpool Law Review 41. 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Hoekman BM and Kostecki MM The Political Economy of the World Trading System: the WTO and Beyond 
(2001) at 298. The authors report that the United States government issued an executive order in May 2000 to help 
make HIV/AIDS-related drugs and medical technologies more affordable and accessible in sub-Saharan African 
countries. 
63
 This could be achieved by making use of compulsory licences by developing and least-developed WTO members, 
in terms of article 31 of the TRIPS agreement. 
64
 See generally, Hanefeld J “Patent Rights v Patient Rights: Intellectual Property, Pharmaceutical Companies and 
Access to Treatment for People Living with HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa” (2002) 72 Feminist Review 84-92. 
See further, Lanaszka A “The Global Politics of Intellectual Property Rights and Pharmaceutical Drug Policies in 
Developing Countries” (2003) 24 International Political Science Review 181 who argues that TRIPS emphasises a 
property rights approach which favours private ‘owners’ of the inventions. This can restrict access on the basis of 
commercial considerations. Hanefeld argues further that the result is higher prices for pharmaceuticals and other 
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This is closely tied to the insistence that pressure should be brought to bear on pharmaceutical 
companies with the view of reducing prices.
65
  
 
The third and last theme has been premised on calls to strengthen public health provisions of 
TRIPS by putting greater emphasis on public health for developing countries.
66
 It should also be 
acknowledged that pharmaceutical companies need to recoup their investment into the 
development of medicine/ the intellectual property right.
67
 
 
One suggested solution to the problem of access to medicines for developing countries has been 
the call for change in the pharmaceutical drug policies in the developing countries.
68
 Such calls 
unfortunately have been conspicuous by their silence on changing the developed countries’ 
pharmaceutical policy in sympathy with their developing and least-developed counterparts. It is 
submitted that an interrogation of policy (WTO and pharmaceutical in developed countries) lies 
at the heart of solving the access to medicines enigma for developing countries.  
 
This study examined whether in adjudicating disputes relating to accessing medicines, more 
emphasis should not be put on WTO policy and TRIPS’ objectives so that the interpretive result 
may become acceptable to all.
69
 
 
Very few studies have focussed on the problem of access to medicines from a human rights 
perspective let alone the SADC perspective. The very first attempt to analyse the problem 
through the lens of the rights-based approach was in 2003.
70
 With specific reference to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
health care inventions. This can prevent low-income consumers in developing countries from obtaining life-saving 
medication and equipment. On a related costs and expenses note, see Rai AK, “The Ends of Intellectual Property: 
Health as a Case Study” (2007) 70 Law and Contemporary Problems 125 at 125. 
65
 According to Ostergard RL “The Measurement of Intellectual Property Protection” (2000) 31 Journal of 
International Business Studies 349 at 350, pharmaceutical companies are a good example of an industry that is 
sensitive to intellectual property regulation hence the call to reduce prices is likely to be met with resistance. 
66
 This is partly addressed by the 2001 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, referred to at note 
16 above. 
67
 See specifically on this point Rawlins MD “Cutting the Cost of Drug Development?” (2004) 3 Nature Reviews 
360 -363 who cites recent studies showing that  the average cost of discovering and developing a new drug is now in 
excess of US $800 million 
68
 Lanaszka above at 182. 
69
 See specifically Articles 7, 8 and 27 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
70
 At a panel discussion entitled ‘Towards Development: Human Rights and the WTO agenda’, scheduled during the 
WTO’S fifth Ministerial held in Cancun, Mexico in 2003, Mary Robinson, the former UN High Commissioner for 
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problem of access to medicines, Mary Robinson emphasised that human rights include the right 
to adequate food, safe water, education and health.
71
 She described her version of the rights-
based approach to trade policy as values-led and likely to increase participation by those affected 
by trade policy (such as those unable to access essential medicines).
72
 Further, she submitted that 
such an approach will result in a trade policy that is not only transparent but also accountable and 
responsive to the needs of the people it purports to serve.
73
 In the end, such a policy will be more 
sustainable and more legitimate.
74
 
 
The main strength of the rights-based approach is that it is based on agreed legal standards 
agreed to by governments.
75
 Since all WTO members are parties to at least one of the six 
principal human rights treaties, they have voluntarily undertaken to enforce trade rules and to 
respect and fulfil human rights.
76
 The rights-based approach is important in determining the 
benefits of the rights holder and identifying the obligations of the duty bearer.
77
 
 
The present study is, therefore, different from other studies done before it because it applied the 
rights-based approach to the problem of lack of access to medicines and use of TRIPS 
flexibilities in the SADC region. This has never been done before in the context of a regional 
trading block like SADC. More importantly, this study offered a rare opportunity for an 
exploration of the problem of access to medicines from an African and more importantly SADC 
perspective. This has never been attempted before as most studies have focused on the problem 
from the perspective of developing countries in general. Therefore, the use of a rights–based 
approach in a SADC context, adds to the uniqueness of this study. Such an approach will add to 
the alternative expertise sought to improve the legal regime in individual SADC member states.
78
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Human Rights and other prominent speakers attempted to infuse the human rights agenda into international trade 
law rules. The discussion offered a unique forum to bring people together to examine international trade rules and 
practice from a human rights perspective. 
71
 Robinson 2. 
72
 Ibid. 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Ibid. 
75
 Robinson 2. 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Olowu above at 281. 
78
 This will go a long way towards strengthening the provisions of the SADC Health Policy Framework, SADC 
Protocol on Health and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). 
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4. Assumptions Underlying the Study    
This study was based on the following assumptions: Firstly, despite advances in medical and 
pharmaceutical technology, the problem of lack of access to medicines for citizens in poor 
countries continues. Secondly, there is a conflict between the intellectual property rights of 
manufacturers of essential medicines in developed countries and the rights of those in dire need 
of medicines and drugs in the developing and least developed countries (LDCs). Thirdly, to solve 
the problem of lack of access to medicines, the views of developing and least developed WTO 
member states must be afforded a sympathetic hearing. Finally, while the TRIPS Agreement 
makes provision for flexibilities which developing and least developing WTO members can take 
advantage of, the African Union (AU) and SADC member states have not taken advantage of the 
flexibilities due to the lack of understanding of the Agreement, lack of interpretive legal 
certainty, and for other reasons such as poverty and TRIPS-plus pressures.
79
  
5. Aims and Objectives of the Study 
5.1 Aims  
This study pursued three aims. The first one was to analyse WTO legal instruments and ascertain 
their adequacy in balancing the right to health and right to intellectual property in the context of 
pharmaceutical patents. The second aim closely related to
 
the first one was to show through an 
examination of international human rights legal documents and other instruments that there is a 
conflict between intellectual property rights and the right to health in the context of access to 
essential medicines in general and for the SADC region in particular. The third one, through an 
analysis of selected SADC members’ intellectual property legislation, comparative law and a 
rights-based approach, proposed viable solutions to the SADC access to medicines problem. 
5.2 Objectives  
To achieve the above aims, this study pursued the following specific objectives: 
 
(a) It outlined the basic tenets of WTO and IP law through exploring the theories of 
intellectual property and legal historical origins; 
                                                          
79
 Channual A Are Affordable Pharmaceuticals within reach for Developing Countries? – Clarifying the access 
situation of today and projecting beyond the Paragraph 6-Agreement (2004) Dissertation submitted in partial 
fulfillment of the Requirements for the LLM degree at the University of Lund, at 34. 
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(b) It outlined and discussed the tenets of the rights-based approach and explained how it 
can be applied to the problem of access to medicines as a human right in order to 
humanise it; 
 
(c) It critically analysed specific regional instruments and SADC Policy documents 
relating to access to medicines and established the extent of incorporation of TRIPS 
flexibilities in SADC member states’ legislation; 
 
(d) It analysed selected SADC members’ intellectual property policies and legislation and 
exposed how each country used some of the flexibilities to improve access to 
medicines for its citizens; 
 
(e) It extracted thematic lessons for other SADC members’ from the practice of select 
SADC members and other developing countries, namely India, Thailand and Kenya; 
and 
 
(f) It proposed solutions to SADC access problems to medicines through making 
recommendations and suggesting areas for further research.  
6. Research Methodology 
This study, which was largely desktop and library-based, relied on primary and secondary 
sources including legislation, treaties, WTO Ministerial Decisions, law reports and academic 
studies on the subject of access to medicines from a wide range of jurisdictions. The study was 
supplemented by both formal and informal face to face interactions and email exchanges with 
members of civil society, academics, public health consultants, legal practitioners, judges and 
officers affiliated with the secretariats of the SADC, COMESA, African Union (AU) and the 
WTO.  
 
The most prevalent research method, which was employed in this study, was the desk-top 
literature study coupled with the historical method and comparative perspective. The researcher 
subscribes to the views of human rights activists who argue that trade rules should be subjected 
to human rights norms and standards. The reasons for such a subscription are discerned from the 
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commentary and analysis engaged in throughout the study. The comparative method was 
employed in the last two chapters.  
 
The forms of literature that were perused are outlined below. 
 
6.1 Legislation and Treaties:  
Treaties and conventions on international human rights law and the right to health, SADC 
protocols, WTO provisions including the TRIPS agreement and the relevant Ministerial 
decisions were examined. Intellectual property laws of most SADC countries were referred to, 
with particular emphasis on the laws of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe. The analysis of 
the intellectual property laws of the last mentioned countries formed the bedrock of the thematic 
lessons for other SADC members in the effective use of TRIPS flexibilities.  
6.2 WTO Disputes and Decisions 
Decisions of the selected WTO Panels and the Appellate Body dealing with access to medicines 
and pharmaceuticals were referred to and cursorily analysed.  Where interpretive gaps not 
furthering the cause of access to medicines were manifest, these were highlighted and 
contextualised in relation to the aims and objectives of the study. 
6.3 Textbooks and Journals 
This study referred to both old and recent textbooks and journal articles on the topic drawn from 
fields as diverse as law, economics and to some extent, political science. However, the bulk of 
the literature consulted in this specific context related to the TRIPS Agreement and access to 
medicines from the legal perspective. However, the paucity of literature on the access to 
medicines debate in the context of the SADC was a major challenge. This study, therefore, relied 
on primary sources of SADC law such as treaties and protocols, and secondary sources such as 
policy documents and declarations.  
6.4 Case law 
The study made extensive reference to case law from within the SADC region and other 
developing countries such as India, Thailand and Kenya. In the SADC region, case law from 
South Africa, a country that has made tremendous inroads in litigating the right to health in the 
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municipal context, was liberally used in this study to show that public interest litigation can in 
actual fact yield positive results towards accessing medicines.  
6.5 Internet Resources 
The global village which we inhabit has largely been made habitable by the presence of the 
internet connectivity. This study was no exception and drew quite liberally from current 
information on the internet. The internet was used to source information from electronic journals 
and other scholarly articles online. Websites of international and regional organisations such the 
United Nations, World Health Organisation, Southern African Development Community, World 
Trade Organisation, African Union and many others proved to be invaluable sources of current 
and up to date information. 
7. Mode of Citation 
The mode of citation of authorities in this study is a slight adaptation of the house style of the 
journal, Law, Democracy and Development, (LDD) published by the University of the Western 
Cape in South Africa.
80
 Thus, the citations in footnotes and bibliography of works cited largely 
mirror the LDD house style. 
8. Justification and Limitations of the Study 
8.1 Preliminary Remarks 
The problem of access to medicines from the perspective of both the developed and the 
developing countries has been discussed ad nauseam. However, the problem remains unresolved 
and continues to evolve with new judicial and treaty-making activity. Notably, much of what has 
been written has tended to focus on the conventional ‘north v south’ approach, ignoring regional 
trading blocs and the human rights dimension. Therefore, a rigorous and unbiased analysis 
specific to a regional trading bloc such as SADC, premised on the rights-based approach, can 
enrich the debate and consequently proffer alternative solutions to the problem. 
8.2 Justification of the Study 
This study was primarily motivated by the general gap in the current law whereby TRIPS 
flexibilities are provided for with the intended beneficiaries making very limited use thereof. I 
have been fascinated by the emotional fervour with which students and legal academics have 
                                                          
80
 The house style is available at  http://www.ldd.org.za/2013-05-29-13-44-23/guidelines-for-authors.html  (last 
visited 13/12/2013). 
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tended to handle the subject of access to medicines whenever they get the opportunity for debate. 
This has always provoked the question, “what will happen if we suspend emotions and confront 
access to medicines objectively?” This then led me to think of a research project that would 
explore the problem from a SADC perspective and come up with a legal model solution 
premised on human rights.  
 
From a teaching-learning point of view, I sincerely hope that the findings in this study will go a 
long way towards adding new knowledge to the access to medicines database and open up new 
academic and intellectual horizons.  
 
The findings in this study are likely to attract the interests of governments and trade policy 
makers in the SADC region. Very little has been written on the subject of access to medicines in 
the SADC region and implications for free trade, especially in the context of SADC having 
acquired free trade area status. It is, therefore, hoped that this study is to some extent an attempt 
at alleviating the paucity of literature on the subject and lays the foundation for further research 
in the specific subject field. 
 
Hopefully, the findings in this study, especially the proposed recommendations, will shape future 
jurisprudence relating to access to medicines in general and in the SADC region in particular. 
The findings on this aspect of the study may also be a useful tool for shaping the SADC trade 
dispute settlement system in intellectual property-related disputes in the access to medicines 
context. 
 
It needs to be noted, therefore, that this subject deserves to be studied, not only for its own sake 
but also for the insights into the rights–based approach towards accessing medicines. Such a 
study can provide the SADC region and the international community at large a partial solution to 
the nagging issue of access to medicines. Because poor citizens of developing and least-
developing countries continue to die from preventable diseases due to lack of medicines, making 
the medicines accessible will not only actualise the rights to health and life but will also ensure a 
better life for all the global citizens and the achievement of the relevant millennium development 
goals. 
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8.3 Limitations  
The study has inherent limitations necessitated by the scope, geographical spread and financial 
resources. Firstly, in terms of scope, the study is confined to the rights–based approach as it 
relates to the issue of access to medicines in the context of selected SADC member states. It 
would have been desirable to cast the net wider and cover the whole of Africa or the SADC 
region but this was not attempted due to the limited time and resources at the disposal of the 
researcher.  
 
The WTO disputes that were referred to in this study are limited to the theme of access to 
medicines under the TRIPS Agreement and do not extend to other WTO agreements. This theme 
may also arise in the context of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) or the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). In this study, however, 
the focus was only on the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
The proposed recommendations for SADC would have been more valuable if they were based on 
a number of free trade areas compared to each other. On the contrary, the focus was only on the 
SADC region due to limitations in scope as indicated earlier on. The fact that the SADC will 
become part of the envisaged Tripartite Free Trade Area (Tripartite FTA) did not raise 
immediate concerns which would have led to a reformulation of the objectives of this study.
81
 
The information ascertained from the findings of this study will in all likelihood feed into 
improving the technical documents and strategies already developed in anticipation of the 
creation of the Tripartite FTA.
82
 An analysis of the provisions of the Tripartite FTA and its 
possible legal ramifications for the access to medicines debate was surely beyond the scope of 
this study. 
 
Due to the geographical spread of the SADC member countries and the paucity of information 
on the individual countries’ legislation relevant to international trade and access to medicines, 
                                                          
81
 For a comprehensive note on the origins, negotiations and current state of the envisaged Tripartite FTA, see 
“COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite: Greater Harmonisation and Cooperation” available at http://www.comesa-eac-
sadc-tripartite.org/intervention/focal_areas/tripartite_fta (last visited 14/08/2012). 
82
 For scholarly critiques and analysis of the Tripartite FTA, see generally Hartzenburg T. et al The Tripartite Free 
Trade Area: Towards a New African Integration Paradigm? (2012) 1 - 138. 
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the research had to rely on readily available information.
83
 Hence, there was an obvious bias 
towards SADC member states whose intellectual property laws were readily accessible in the 
English language. 
9. Ethical Issues 
Despite the fact that this study involved interactions with human subjects through face to face 
discussions and email exchanges, the interactions do not raise serious ethical issues since most of 
the exchanges were collegial and informal. For these reasons, the study is ethical and thus 
complied with the basics of ethical research.  
10. Organisation of the Rest of the Study 
The rest of the study, organised in six other chapters, focuses on the following pertinent issues. 
Chapter two contextualises the study by providing the background on the law of patents, 
exploring the theories of intellectual property, giving an expository account of the salient TRIPS 
provisions relevant to the topic and narrating how the discussions in relation to access to 
medicines  evolved to what they have become today. 
 
In chapter three, access to medicines is discussed from the human rights perspective and the 
concept of a rights-based approach is introduced. The goal of the study was to propose 
recommendations based on a rights –based approach in the SADC context. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to lay the groundwork early by discussing pertinent human rights issues in this 
chapter. 
 
Chapter four focuses generally on the WTO TRIPS flexibilities which SADC members can use 
before briefly contextualising the flexibilities to the laws of specific countries. The chapter 
prepares the reader mentally for the detailed technical discussions to be embarked upon from 
chapter five onwards. 
 
                                                          
83
 Most of the information is contained in old and outdated textbooks and newspaper articles. Generally, the 
newspaper has never been a reliable source of law. Very few SADC member countries government departments 
have an Internet presence. With the exception of South Africa, most SADC government websites contain scanty 
information such as postal and physical addresses and such information is seldom updated. To partly deal with the 
above problem, this study heavily relied on the website www.wipolex.com and other internet sources for current 
information on SADC members’ intellectual property legislation. 
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Chapter Five is a continuation of Chapter Four and becomes more specific. The chapter is 
dedicated to the practical application of the TRIPS flexibilities in individual SADC countries IP 
legislation, focussing on Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. From the selected SADC 
members, the chapter distils thematic lessons for the whole region. 
 
In Chapter Six, case law in the jurisdictions of three developing countries in which TRIPS 
flexibilities were litigated, namely India, Thailand and Kenya is comparatively discussed and 
contextualised to the SADC region. The chapter is in the form of case commentaries on the 
selected disputes which were critiqued. Having narrated and critiqued the cases, thematic lessons 
for SADC are then extracted and highlighted in anticipation of the recommendations in Chapter 
Seven. 
 
Chapters Seven of the study comprises the summary, conclusions, recommendations and areas 
for further research. The chapter concludes the study by making recommendations specifically 
calling for local production of pharmaceuticals, the issuing of a regional compulsory licence in 
terms of Article 31 bis of TRIPS, the use of south-south collaborations, the use of pooled 
procurement and the adaptation of intellectual property laws of individual countries to TRIPS 
flexibilities and specific situations in the region and individual countries. The chapter also 
recommends the use of the rights-based approach and the adaptation of the rewards theory to 
accommodate both the interests of pharmaceutical companies and consumers in dire need of 
affordable essential drugs.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES: CONCEPTS, THEORIES AND LEGAL HISTORICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 
2. Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the access to medicines debate from a conceptual and theoretical point of 
view. Such an approach is appropriate to contextualise the study and explain the specific 
meanings of peculiar terms as they are used in the study. This chapter focusses on the basic 
principles of intellectual property law with specific reference to the law of patents since this 
study deals with the conflict between patent rights and the right to access medicines. Patents are 
defined and the scope of their rights delimited in order to locate the access to medicines problem 
in its correct habitat. The main international agreements dealing with patents in general and 
access to medicines in particular are also dealt with to clearly spell out the currently applicable 
legal regime. This is achieved through discussing the pertinent WTO provisions and aspects of 
the legal regime under the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). After discussing 
the basic patent law principles, an exposition of the theories and rationales for intellectual 
property follows. The theoretical exposition is important because some theories of intellectual 
property actually give prominence to the rights of the holders of pharmaceutical patents almost to 
the total exclusion of patients’ rights. This will not bode well for access to medicines in the 
SADC region as aptly alluded to in a different but related context.
1
 The theoretical exposition, 
therefore, affords the reader the opportunity to view the access to medicines problem from 
different theoretical standpoints and make an informed evaluation. 
 
After the theoretical and legal background, this chapter gives an expository account of the 
international legal historical regime applicable to patents and access to medicines. The main 
focus is on the applicable international conventions, the GATT/WTO state of play and aspects of 
the regime under the WIPO.    
                                                          
1
 See Phiri D.S “Economic Partnership Agreements and Intellectual Property Protection: Challenges for the 
Southern African Development Community Region” (1999) 48 South African Institute of International Affairs 
Occasional Paper at 5. 
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After the exposition of the law, the chapter focuses on the evolution of the access to medicines 
debate through engaging in an analysis of the major medically significant epochs/case studies.   
The main case study covers the anthrax scare cases in the United States of America and parts of 
Europe after the September 11 2001 attacks without discussing the debacle around the 
amendment of the South African Medicines Act
2
. The case studies mentioned in this section of 
the chapter clearly show that despite this study’s focus on access to medicines from the SADC 
perspective, historically, the problem of access to medicines has surely not been confined to the 
developing and least-developed countries. SADC related case studies, mainly around the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic and access to medicines in that context, are discussed in chapter five below. 
 
This chapter is, therefore, aimed at introducing the reader to the theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks underpinning the access to medicines debate in order to assist the reader become 
familiarized with the basic terminology used in the law of patents in that specific context. 
Further, the chapter serves as a contextual bridge that leads the reader to an understanding of the 
full scope of the study through exposing the reader to the terminology, theories, major influential 
historical occurrences and the applicable WTO and international law provisions. 
2.1 Intellectual Property Law: Basic Concepts and Distinctions 
It is important in a study of this nature to explain concepts and lay the necessary conceptual and 
technical groundwork. Intellectual property is implicated in many fields of public interest and 
concern. In the context of this study, the high cost of prescription drugs, many of which are 
protected by patent law, is seriously implicated.
3
 The need for such a backgrounder is premised 
on the reality that access to medicines raises intellectual property law questions, specifically the 
issue of pharmaceutical patents and the rights inherent therein.
4
 At the centre of the alleged 
conflict between the TRIPS Agreement and access to medicines is the often touted claim that 
patents on pharmaceuticals raise prices, thereby reducing accessibility of the drugs.
5
 Therefore, a 
thorough background on patent law, particularly its international aspects, is an indispensable 
inclusion in an analysis of the alleged conflict. 
                                                          
2
 The Amendment was brought by the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997. See a 
discussion of the South African access case in chapter five below. 
3
 Mueller JM An Introduction to Patent Law (2006) at 3. 
4
 Saddiqi A “Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs” (2005) Sanford Undergraduate Research Journal 1 at 1. 
5
 Hestermeyer H Human Rights and the WTO: The case of Patents and Access to Medicines (2007) at 18.  
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For the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement, the areas that constitute intellectual property include 
copyright and related rights,
6
 trademarks,
7
 geographical indications,
8
 industrial designs,
9
 patents 
(my emphasis),
10
 layout designs (topographies) of integrated circuits
11
 and undisclosed 
information.
12
 
 
The TRIPS Agreement does not provide the notion of intellectual property.
13
 Instead, it specifies 
which of the covered rights are, specifically dealt with in sections 1-7 of Part II of the 
Agreement.
14
 The definition of ‘intellectual property’ may be found in the Convention 
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation (1967),
15
 but this definition includes 
subject matter that is in the public domain (scientific discoveries) as well as matters that are not 
deemed, under many national systems as subject to property rights.
16
 Correa has argued that 
                                                          
6
 The specific rights are canvassed in Articles 9 – 14 of the TRIPS Agreement. Copyright, which was described by 
the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in Gallo Africa Ltd v Sting Music (Pty) Ltd 2010 (6) SA 329 (SCA), 
para 19, as a corporeal immovable, protects the material expression of ideas apart from the physical embodiment of 
the work of the work in which they are expressed (per Klopper et al Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 
(2011) at 145). Works eligible for copyright protection may be conveniently grouped into literary works, sound 
recordings, artistic works, programme-carrying signals, musical works, cinematograph films, broadcasts, published 
editions and computer programmes (s1 of the South African Copyright Act 98 of 1978). 
7
 See Article 15 of the TRIPS Agreement. A trademark may be a word, device, symbol or other sign or any 
combination of these used by a trader in relation to his goods or services  to identify and distinguish them from 
similar goods or services of others (Klopper at al at 71). 
8
 Article 22 of the TRIPS Agreement. In terms of the relevant provision of TRIPS, geographical indications are 
indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, 
where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical 
origin (per Article 22.1 of TRIPS). 
9
 Article 25 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
10
 See para 2.1.2 below. According to Burrell TD Burrel’s South African Patent and Design Law (1999) at 450, 
designs are registered in respect of designs applied to articles having features which appeal to or are judged solely 
by the eye (aesthetic design) or to articles having features which are necessitated by the functions which the article 
to which the design is applied, is to perform (functional design). 
11
 These are addressed in Articles 35 -38 of TRIPS. 
12
 Article 1.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. Specifically, the relevant article provides that the term ‘intellectual property’ 
refers to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of part II. 
13
 It does not refer either to ‘industrial property’, the expression used in the Paris Convention in relation to patents, 
utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source, or applications of 
origin and the repression of unfair competition (article 12 of Paris Convention). 
14
 Correa CM Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement 
(2007) at 31. 
15
 Article 2 (viii) of the Convention states that ‘intellectual property’ shall include the rights relating to: literary, 
artistic and scientific works; performances of performing artists, phonograms, and broadcasts; inventions in all fields 
of human endeavour; scientific discoveries; industrial designs; trademarks, service marks, and commercial names 
and designations; protection against unfair competition; and all other rights resulting from intellectual activity in the 
industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields. 
16
 Correa above at 31. In Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, the term ‘intellectual property’ refers to all categories 
of intellectual property that are the subject of sections 1 through 7 of part II namely computer programmes and 
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Article 1.2 of the TRIPS Agreement is poorly worded.
17
 The specific examples of the alleged 
poor wording cited are, firstly, the reference of the article to section 1-7 as covering intellectual 
property while in actual fact the relevant sections do not contain clear cut categories of 
intellectual property.
18
 
 
Secondly, the author argues that it is unclear whether the categories refer to the subject matter or 
to the rights conferred.
19
 If one were to adopt an interpretation that suggests that the categories 
refer to rights conferred, then the implication is that any rights not covered by the TRIPS 
Agreement that are conferred at the national level would be subject to the provisions of the 
Agreement.
20
 It is the present writer’s considered view that WTO members will base their 
intellectual property laws on the TRIPS Agreement within the delimitation in Article 1.2 section 
1-7, and any municipal peculiarities would naturally be included while taking into account the 
hallmarks spelt out in article 1.2.  
 
The interpretation of Article 1.2 of TRIPS in the context of the coverage of the Agreement was 
raised in the Panel case of United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 199821 in 
relation to trade names, which are not specifically mentioned in the Agreement, but are referred 
to in the Paris Convention.
22
 The Panel purported to interpret ‘intellectual property’ and 
‘intellectual property rights’ as delimited in Article 1.2 of TRIPS and concluded that the 
definition was exhaustive.
23
 The implication emanating from this form of interpretation was that 
there were no obligations under those articles in relation to the categories of intellectual property 
which are not set forth in article 1.2, such as trade names.
24
 On appeal, the Panel’s findings were 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
compilations of data, rental rights, sound recordings, trademarks, geographical indicators, industrial designs, patents, 
layout designs and undisclosed information. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Correa cites section 5 of part II which refers to the protection of plant varieties under an ‘effective sui generis 
regime’ but does not elaborate the standards thereto. He doubts if this category should be considered a category of 
intellectual property (at page 31). 
19
Correa above at 32. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 WT/DS176/R, 6 August 2001. 
22
Article 1(2) of the Paris Convention. 
23
Panel report at para 8.26. 
24
Panel report at para 8.26. Apparently, the Panel sought to justify its interpretation by basing it on Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), which provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose. 
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reversed by the Appellate Body which reasoned that the Panel’s interpretation ignored the plain 
words of Article 1.2; which deal not only with the categories of intellectual property indicated in 
each section title, but with other subjects as well.
25
 The Appellate Body further held that the 
Panel’s interpretation of Article 1.2 could not be reconciled with the plain words of Article 2.1.26 
2.1.2 A Short Primer on the Law of Patents 
Patent law is domestic law; hence there is an astonishing variety of national patent laws peculiar 
to each country.
27
 This section gives a general outline of patent law without aligning it to a 
particular jurisdiction. Where there are obvious jurisdictional differences, they are briefly 
highlighted to reassure the reader that the writer is aware of the peculiarities.  
 
A patent can be granted for 20 years to an inventor, or the first person to file for a patent,
28
 for 
products that are new,
29
 involve an inventive step
30
 and are capable of industrial application,
31
 by 
disclosing the invention to the patents office in a way that a person skilled in the art will be able 
to carry out the invention.
32
  For access to medicines, the requirements for patentability are 
important in preventing a proliferation of ever green patents that may stifle the growth of the 
generic drug industry.
33
 The importance of novelty as a requirement for patentability can be 
traced back to the 16
th
 century in England as exemplified by the leading case of Darcy v Allen.
34
 
                                                          
25
United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act of 1998, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS176/AB/R, 2 
January 2002, paras 54-55. 
26
Ibid para 336. 
27
Hestermeyer above at 19. 
28
 Whether patents should be granted to the first to file, or the first person to invent is one of the raging patent law 
debates. The United States used to grant patents to the first person to invent (Hestermeyer at 19). However, this 
position has since changed with effect from 16 March 2013 when  United States Code Title 35 – Patents was 
amended by the new section 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) of the same code (source: United States Patents and Trademark 
Office, available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/index.jsp (last visited 05/07/2013). The new law now provides 
for a “first-inventor-to file” doctrine implying that the priority date for a patent application will now be the date on 
which the application for a patent was filed with the relevant office. This position is now similar to the one obtaining 
is South Africa (see section 31 of the South African Patents Act 57 of 1978). 
29
 New patents are those that have the attribute of being ‘non-obvious’ such as was aptly explained in the case of 
Roman Roller CC and Another v Speedmark  Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1995 BP 199 (A) 212-221. The issue of 
obviousness will generally be determined by the Court as held in the cases of Gentiruco AG v Firestone South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd 1971 BP 58 (A) at 92 and Ensign-Bickford (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd and Others v AECI Explosives and 
Chemicals Ltd 1998 BIP 271 (SCA) 281C-D. 
30
 The US Patents Act requires the invention to be non-obvious. 
31
 The South African Patents Act requires that the invention must be capable of being used or applied in trade, 
industry and agriculture (s 25 of Act 57 of 1978). 
32
 See generally section 25 of the South African Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
33
 Problems associated with ever greening are discussed further in chapters five and six below. 
34
(1603) 72 Eng. Rep 830; 74 Eng. Rep 1131; 77 Eng. Rep 1260. The products at stake were playing cards. 
 28 
 
In this case, it was held that patent monopolies were only to be granted where the product was 
previously unknown in England. It was further held that the patent monopolies posed the danger 
of the patentee demanding unreasonably high prices for the product.
35
 The Statute of 
Monopolies,
36
 widely regarded as the first statutory expression of English Patent law, lasted 200 
years after establishing the rudiments of patentability which continue to inform intellectual 
property laws of the world to date.
37
 
 
In South Africa, the term of a patent granted under the current Patents Act of 1978 is 20 years 
from the date on which the complete specification is lodged at the Patents Office, subject to the 
payment of the prescribed renewal fees.
38
 The term of patent granted under South Africa’s 
repealed Patents Act
39
 of 1952 was 16 years from the date on which the complete specification 
was lodged at the Patents Office,
40
 but an extension of that term was possible on application to 
the Commissioner of Patents
41
 on the ground of inadequate remuneration and/or war loss during 
the normal term.  
 
The typical application for a patent consists of a description of the invention (specification) and 
of language claiming precisely the technology that was invented and that will be the subject of 
the patent rights – the claims.42 The claims are for the purposes of defining the patentee’s rights 
and not for instructing the public; the latter function being that of the body of the specification.
43
 
                                                          
35
 Darcy v Allen at 831. 
36
 English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1 c. 3. The full text of the legislation as originally passed is 
available at http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/English_Statute1623.pdf (last visited 07/03/2012). 
37
 The Venetian Enactment of March 19, 1474 which appeared years before the English Statute of Monopolies 
established the foundation for the world’s first patent system (Mueller 8). 
38
 Burrell TD Burrell’s South African Patents and Design Law, 3rd Ed (1999) 3. This is specifically provided for in 
section 46 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978.  
39
 Act 37 of 1952. 
40
 Repealed Patents Act 37 of 1952 s 28. 
41
 Patents Act 57 of 1978 s 45. 
42
 Klopper H et al Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa (2011) at 293. 
43
 See the following South African cases Moroney v West Rand Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd 1970 BP 452 (T); 
Letraset Ltd v Helios Ltd 1972 BP 243 (A); Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Schadlings bekampfung MB v Coopers 
(South Africa) (Pty) Ltd 1973 BP 447 (CP) and Selas Corporation of America v The Electric Furnace Company 
1982 BP 442 (A). 
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The claim or claims must relate to a single invention, must be clear and must be fairly based on 
the matter disclosed in the specification.
44
 
 
Patent offices are, generally, national institutions.
45
 They usually examine whether the 
requirements for patentability under their national laws are fulfilled,
46
 grant the patent if that is 
the case, and publish the patent application.
47
 
 
Product patents confer the right to prevent third parties not having the patentee’s consent from 
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes the patented product.
48
 
Similarly, process patents confer the right to prevent third parties not having the patentee’s 
consent from using the process and using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these 
purposes a product obtained directly by the patented process.
49
 Patent rights shall be enjoyable 
without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products 
are imported or locally produced.
50
 Anyone engaging in one of the proscribed activities with 
respect to product and process patents in the manner claimed in the patent faces damages and 
injunctive relief.
51
 
 
Process patents
52
 may be granted for a patentable process.
53
 Such patents similarly confer the 
right to prevent third parties not having the patentee’s consent from using the process and using, 
                                                          
44
 Section 32(4) of the South African Patents Act 57 of 1978. In terms of section 10 (4) South Africa’s repealed 
patents Act 37 of 1952, in addition to being ‘clear’, the claims were additionally required to be ‘succinct’, despite 
the obvious tautology.   
45
 There are currently three major regional patent offices that grant patents that are treated like national patents of the 
member states after they have been granted: the European Patent Office (EPO), the African Regional Industrial 
Property Organisation (ARIPO), and the Organisation Africaine de la Propriete Intellectuelle (OAPI). 
46
 Not all countries provide for such examination. Some, like South Africa, have registration systems that only 
examine the formal compliance of the application with the requirements for patentability; with the process of 
objecting to the patentability of the invention opening after the patent has been published in the Patents Journal. The 
examination system is common in the US, Germany and the European system. 
47
 Commonly, the application is usually published a certain time after filing, whether by that time the patent has 
been granted or not. 
48
 Hestermeyer above at 19. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
51
 Hestermeyer above at 20. 
52
 Burrell above at 38-39.  
53
 There previously used to exist in the United States of America, a misguided notion, fuelled by the dictum in the 
often cited case of Cochrane v Deener 94 US 780, 788, 24 L ed 139 (1877) cited in Burrell at 36 and 39, that in 
order for a process to be patentable, it must act on a substance.  
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offering for sale, selling or importing for these processes a product obtained directly by the 
patented process.
54
 
 
Product patents are more desirable for the patentee than process patents, because product patents 
grant the patentee market exclusivity for the product, whereas the owner of a process patent faces 
competition from others producing the same product by a different process.
55
 
 
Infringement of product patents
56
 would be easier to prove than the process
57
 ones because the 
patentee can see and point out the infringing product which is produced without his 
authorization.
58
 The corollary of the above reasoning is that an inventor of a product will easily 
identify the same or similar products that adopted the main integers of the original invention 
without the inventor’s prior authorization. The burden would, therefore, be on the inventor to 
prove that the impugned product infringes on his existing patent. However, in process patent 
suits, the courts shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain 
an identical product is different from the patented process.
59
 The burden of proof in these 
specific circumstances will, therefore, be reversed.
60
 
 
Some countries impose local working requirements as a condition precedent to the granting of a 
patent.
61
 This requirement compels the inventor to manufacture the product or use the process 
                                                          
54
 Article 27.1 of TRIPS. 
55
 It is also easier to prove the infringement of a product patent, as anyone selling the product without license from 
the patentee is clearly infringing. Many countries resolve this difficulty for process patent holders by reversing the 
burden of proof; so that the defendant will have to prove that it is using a different process (see Article 34 of the 
TRIPS Agreement). However, the strong possibility remains that patentees might be reluctant to commence a 
lawsuit, because they are uncertain whether the defendant makes use of the patented process.  
56
 In terms of Article 28.1 (a) of TRIPS, where the subject matter of a patent is a product, the patent owner shall 
have the right to prevent others from the acts of making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing the product. 
57
 Article 28.1 (b) of TRIPS provides that where the subject matter of a patent is a process, the patent owner must be 
conferred the exclusive rights to prevent others from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, 
offering for sale, selling or importing the product obtained directly by the process.  
58
 Article 34 of TRIPS read together with Article 28 of same. 
59
Article 34.1 of TRIPS. 
60
 See Articles 1.2 and 1.3 of TRIPS read together with the two antecedent conditions listed in Article 1 (a) and (b) 
of TRIPS. 
61
 See generally Halewood M “Mandatory Working and Compulsory Patent Licensing” (1997) 35 (2) Osgoodehall 
Law Journal 244 -284 at 245 and the countries cited at footnote 3. The author convincingly argues that such 
mandatory requirements are TRIPS compliant.  
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within the country that grants the patent.
62
 The local working requirement as a concept allied to 
the process of granting patents has its origins in French law.
63
 The commercial exploitation of 
certain inventions may be prevented by WTO Members in order to protect public order or 
morality, protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment; provided such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited 
by municipal law.
64
  
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (now GATT 1994) makes express 
reference to intellectual property rights by providing that trade restrictions may be imposed if 
they are necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the GATT.
65
 Such laws include those relating to the protection of patents, trademarks, 
copyrights and deceptive practices.
66
 A similar provision, couched in almost identical language, 
is found in the SADC Protocol on Trade,
67
 which provides that members may adopt and enforce 
measures that are necessary to protect intellectual property rights, or to prevent deceptive trade 
practices (emphasis added).
68
  
 
Despite patents giving the inventor a 20 year monopoly over the invention, it is, however, 
possible to use a patent without the authorization of the right holder.
69
 This is achieved through 
the issuance of what are called compulsory licenses.
70
 Compulsory licenses are very important in 
this study,
71
 and may generally be used sparingly and only in situations where there are no other 
alternative ways of improving access to medicines. Where the patentee wishes to gain 
                                                          
62
 See on a related note, Champ P and Attaran A “Patent Rights and Local Working under the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement: An Analysis of the US-Brazil Patent Dispute” (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law at 365. 
63
 Specifically the French Patents Act of 1791 and supplemented by a Regulation dated 25 May 1791, obliging the 
patentee to work his invention in France within two years of the patent grant, failing which the patent could be 
revoked.  
64
Article 27.2 of TRIPS. 
65
 Article XXIV (d). 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 SADC Protocol on Trade, original text signed in Maseru, Lesotho, August 1996, available at 
http://www.sadcstan.co.za/Secure/downloads/protocol.pdf (last visited 09/07/2013). 
68
 Per Article 9 (d) of the SADC Protocol on Trade. 
69
 See Article 31 of TRIPS. 
70
 See the conditions for the grant of such licenses as categorized in paras (a) – (l) of the TRIPS Agreement. In South 
Africa, compulsory licenses are regulated by the provisions of sections 55 and 56 of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
71
 See chapter five below. 
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commercial advantage by allowing others to use his invention with permission, then voluntary 
licenses may be granted to those who seek them.
72
 
2.2 Theories and Rationales for Intellectual Property 
2.2.1 Preliminary Remarks 
Theories of intellectual property generally seek to establish and justify the basis for the 
protection of intellectual property rights. Broadly speaking, the theories fall into four specific 
categories. The first category is utilitarian and it specifically posits that when law makers 
legislate in the field of intellectual property, the end result ought to be the maximisation of social 
welfare. There is, therefore, a need to strike a balance between encouraging invention or 
innovations and ensuring that social welfare is not relegated to backburner status. The second 
category is the natural rights theory which is premised on the use by the inventor of goods that 
are unowned or ‘held in common’; hence he has a natural property right to the fruits of his 
endeavour. The premise of the third approach, derived from the writings of Kant and Hegel, is 
that private property rights are crucial to the satisfaction of fundamental needs; hence 
policymakers should strive to create and allocate entitlements to resources in a fashion that best 
enables people to fulfil those needs. The last of the four approaches derives from the premise that 
property rights in general and intellectual property rights in particular, can and should be shaped 
so as to foster the achievement of a just and attractive culture.  
 
Proponents of the fourth approach draw their inspiration from political and legal theorists such as 
Jefferson,
73
 the old Marx,
74
 legal realists,
75
 and the various proponents of classical republicanism 
(both new and old).
76
 
                                                          
72
Article 28.2 of TRIPS. 
73
 The views of Thomas Jefferson, a former United States president and leading intellectual property legal scholar of 
his time are aptly captured in Mutsuura J.H Jefferson vs. The Patent Rolls: A Populist Vision of Intellectual Property 
Rights (2008) at 154. 
74
 See generally Harris M Works of Frederick Engels 1884 – The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the 
State (2010) available at  http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1884/origin-family/index.htm (last visited 
09/07/2013). 
75
 According to the Free Legal Dictionary, available at http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Legal+Realism 
(last visited 9/07/2013), legal realism, which originated in the United States in the 1880s and flourished in the 1920s 
and 1930s, sought to challenge the orthodox view that law is an autonomous system of rules and principles that 
courts can logically apply in an objective fashion to reach a determinate and apolitical judicial decision. The most 
famous brand of legal realism is American realism, which was founded by Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841-1935). 
Other famous American realists are Jerome Frank, the most radical of them all and Karl Llewellyn, who views the 
function of law in society as the performance of certain ‘law jobs’ which result in social control and cohesion. On 
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Because theories seek to justify why intellectual property rights are protected and enforced, some 
authorities have characterized them as rationales for intellectual property rather than theories.
77
 
In this study, therefore, no deliberate attempt was made to distinguish between a theory and a 
rationale hence the expressions were used interchangeably, the one substituting the other in the 
specific context. 
2.2.2 The Public Goods Theory 
In terms of this theory, in order to encourage innovation and avoid underproduction of new 
inventions, inventors must be given adequate incentives. If incentives are not given, then a 
‘market failure’ will result and create a public goods problem. Intellectual property rules are, 
therefore, introduced to exclude free riders.
78
 Free riders will be those people who desire to enjoy 
the benefit of the good without paying for it.
79
 If free riding is allowed, it will likely lead to 
underproduction.
80
 Therefore, if the right relates to a patent, the government conveys to an 
inventor a time-limited property right in the invention.
81
 The right implies the prevention of 
others (including the free riders) from making, selling, offering to sell, importing or even using 
the patented invention in the patent-granting country during the patent term.
82
 
 
However, it should be noted that exceptions to the general rule abide in free market economies 
and their variants.
83
 Imitation of a competitor’s product is allowed as long as the competition is 
not deemed to be legally unfair.
84
 In terms of this theory, intellectual property rights must be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the subject of legal realism and intellectual property, see specifically Cohen F “Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach” (1935) 35 Colombia Law Review at 814 -817. 
76
 Classical Republicanism is modelled after the Roman Republic, where the government provides its citizens with 
liberty under government and stresses the common good, or what is best for the society as a whole (see Bellamy R 
Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (2007) at 67.  
77
 See in this specific regard Mueller at 3 – 40. 
78
 Hettinger E.C “Justifying Intellectual Property” (1989) 13 Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 – 52 at 32. 
79
 Mueller above at 7. 
80
 Lemley M.A “Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding” (2005) 83 Texas Law Review at 1031. See further 
on a related note, discussing the subject from the perspective of copyright infringement, Demuijnck G “Is P2P 
Sharing of MP3 Files an Objectionable Form of Free Riding?” in Gosseries A, Marciano A and Strowel (eds) 
Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice (2008) at 141-159. 
81
 The time limit for patents is generally 20 years, see the ‘primer’ in para 2.1 above and Article 33 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
82
 See Article 28.1 of TRIPS. 
83
 For example, voluntary and compulsory licenses may be granted, in violation of the specified rights but as an 
exception to the general rules (TRIPS Agreement Arts. 30-31). 
84
 Mueller above at 7. 
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understood to be carefully limited exceptions to the general rule of free and open competition 
through imitation.
85
 
2.2.3 Natural Rights Theory 
This theory has been characterized as a deontological justification which has been heavily 
influenced by intellectual property laws of continental Europe.
86
 The main proponent of the 
theory is John Locke, who developed ‘a labour theory of property’.87 Locke argued that every 
man has a natural right to the fruits of his work, thus rooting patent law in natural law.
88
 Locke 
believed that God gave people the earth in common, and that all people have property interests in 
their own bodies and labour. When a person’s labour is mixed with the objects found in the 
common, this becomes the mixer’s property, and anyone who takes away the property will be 
guilty of theft.
89
 The labourer must also hold a natural property right in the resource itself 
because, as Locke believed, exclusive ownership was immediately necessary for production. 
This submission was criticised by Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
90
 who convincingly argued that the 
natural right argument does not extend to resources that one did not create. Both philosophers 
hold that the relation between labour and ownership pertains only to property that was unowned 
before such labour took place.
91
 
 
The person mixing his labour with common goods must not appropriate all common goods; this 
is because private ownership depends on leaving some for others. The theory further has a ‘no 
waste’ condition which implies that one must not take more than what they require. This theory 
has found wide and easy application in copyright law and not the law of patents. 
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 Mueller above at 7. 
86
 Morrissey M An Alternative to Intellectual Property Theories of Locke and Utilitarian Economics (2012) MA 
Thesis, Louisiana State University 1-52 at 2. 
87
 See in this specific regard Hettinger EC “Justifying Intellectual Property” (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 31 and Hughes J “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property” (1988) 77 Georgetown Law Journal 287. 
88
 See Locke J. “An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government” in Hutchins RM (ed) 
Great Books of the Western World (1952) 25 -30.  
89
 This sounds like a veiled reference to patent infringement. 
90
 Rousseau Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right (1762) Book I translated in 1782 by 
Cole G.D.H available at http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm (last visited 09/07/2013). 
91
 Epstein R “The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law” (1989) 12 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 
713 at 733-34 
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2.2.3.1 Criticism of the Theory                       
This theory has been criticized on the following grounds. Firstly, the theory seems to provide for 
perpetual property rights with no passage into the public domain. This theory is not easily 
applicable to patent law because inventors have to endure administrative procedures instead of 
having automatic rights to the invention as simplistically suggested.
92
 Other occurrences that 
interfere with the inventor’s exclusive enjoyment of the patent are loss of rights due to parallel 
inventors once patent is granted to another person and the time limitation on the life of the 
patent. This theory, however, does have an appeal in human rights law and will in all likelihood 
be readily embraced by human rights activists.
93
 
 
The theory does not address the question of balancing proprietary rights against the enhancement 
of the public domain. Further, the theory does not grapple with the allocation of efforts by 
multiple inventors. This criticism is premised on the axiom that the invention process is 
generally cumulative due to the work of an inventor building on the work of earlier inventors.
94
 
2.2.4 Theory on the Reward for Services Rendered 
One of the major proponents of this theory was Adam Smith.
95
 This theory and the natural rights 
one discussed above is premised on fairness and fundamental justice to inventors. In terms of the 
theory, once an inventor has invented something, a reward in the form of the recognition and 
protection of intellectual property rights is necessary. The theory posits that inventors render a 
useful service to society and in return, society must reward them for it. Therefore, the inventor 
has a right to receive a reward while society has a moral duty to give the reward for services of 
the inventor in proportion to their (services of the inventor) usefulness to society.
96
 
2.2.4.1 Criticism of the Theory                                    
The theory has been criticized on a number of grounds. Firstly, the theory does not make it clear 
whether the reward is for the use of the invention or the inventor’s effort. Secondly, assuming 
that the reward is for the effort of the inventor; how does one justify such a reward in cases of 
accidental inventions as opposed to conscious effort and hard work? Thirdly, the price the 
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 Hestermeyer above at 30. 
93
 Ibid. 
94
 Hestermeyer above at 27. 
95
 Smith A An Enquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol III, 11
th 
Ed (1805) 41. 
96
 This may be the main reason why utility is a major requirement for patentability of an invention in most 
jurisdictions with intellectual property laws.   
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inventor gets for the invention may not be a measure of the invention’s usefulness to society.97 
The price may be influenced by the fact that the inventor is the only source of the product 
(monopoly) or the presence or absence of competition.
98
 Sometimes inventions may be created 
before their time and be regarded as not that useful at the time of their inception but may later 
turn out to be useful and even time saving.
99
  
 
For such inventions, therefore, at the time when they are invented, the ‘reward’ society pays for 
them will not be reflective of the inventions’ intrinsic value; hence this theory is flawed in this 
specific regard. Further and on a related note, some inventions may be overvalued by the market 
place well beyond their intrinsic value to society. Fourthly and finally, it is common cause that 
most inventions do not take place in a vacuum but draw heavily on the work of others. If this 
truism is accepted, the morality of the ‘reward’ is, therefore, cast in serious doubt. The reward 
offered to the inventor for the invention is rarely proportional to the social value of the invention. 
2.2.5 The Prospect Theory 
According to the prospect theory, patents provide the patentee with the necessary legal security 
to investigate market opportunities and search for venture capital. Patents allow for further 
research and prevent duplication of similar efforts by others.
100
 Patents lay a foundation for 
future inventions and interested parties will know who to turn to for licenses. The patent itself is 
an incentive to the inventor to make further investments to maximize the value of the patent.
101
 
2.2.5.1 Criticism of the Theory                        
Like the other theories discussed and critiqued above, this theory has also not been spared of 
criticism. One of the major criticisms laid against it has been that it does not appreciate the 
possibility of researchers working on the same research (in some form of competition) but 
contributing useful ideas. This surely cannot be considered a waste of resources. In some areas in 
which technology changes almost daily and such change is desired, such as in software research 
and biotechnology, a non-proprietary ‘innovation commons’ is desired , unhindered by the 
                                                          
97
 Shavell S and van Yepersele T “Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights” (1999) National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper 1-35 at 3. 
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 Shavell and van Yepersele above 4. 
99
 Ibid.  
100
 Hestermeyer above at 33. 
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 Kitch EW “The Nature and Function of the Patent System” (1977) 20 Journal of Law and Economics 260 at 275. 
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presence of patent rights. According to Hestermeyer,
102
 allowing patents to dictate the pace of 
research would lead to a situation similar to that which befell would-be plane makers after the 
Wright brothers, the first inventors of the modern airplane used their patent on a feature of 
airplanes that was no longer in use to impede the efforts of other inventors such as Curtis to 
improve planes. So frustrating was the action of the Wright brothers that a representative of 
Curtis had to remark that, ‘a man has to have ten years in law school before he has had a chance 
of becoming an aviator’.103 
2.2.6 Exchange for Secrets Theory 
This theory posits that had it not been for the incentive to disclose that the patent system 
provides most innovations and inventions would remain a secret. The patent system, therefore, is 
a quid pro quo for inventing. The inventor is then conveyed a time-limited right to exclude others 
from exploiting his invention in exchange for disclosing how to make and use the invention by 
all once the patent expires. This sounds too simplistic and does not accord with reality.  
2.2.6.1 Criticism of the Theory                               
The most notable criticism levelled against this theory has been the fact that it does not take into 
account the ‘ripeness of time’ concept in innovation. If inventors working independently do not 
disclose an invention to the public, in due course, one of them surely will. The reason for the 
disclosure may be due to the ‘incentive’ alluded to in the tenets of the theory but surely other 
reasons may spur the disclosure. For instance, an inventor may disclose the invention motivated 
by the desire to be famous, or the time may be ripe for the invention to be disclosed because the 
market is ready for it. 
 
It can, therefore, not be confidently stated that the patent system is needed to guarantee the 
disclosure of inventions that would otherwise be kept secret. Surely, other reasons for disclosure 
as outlined above may exist. The patent system is, therefore, a sufficient economic incentive to 
overcome the attractions of trade secrecy, thus facilitating the disclosure of new inventions in 
exchange for a time-limited right to exclude others. 
 
                                                          
102
 Hestermeyer above at 34. 
103
 Hestermeyer above at 35 citing Schulman S Unlocking the Sky: Glen Hammond Curtis and the Race to Invent the 
Airplane (2002) at 57. 
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2.2.7  Contractual Theory 
This theory became popular in the English and American courts and some of its features prevail 
to this day. The contractual theory is based on Rousseau’s concept of a social contract in terms of 
which citizens are supposed to undertake to serve the State and the State to protect the 
citizens.
104
  When the theory is applied to intellectual property, it is argued that: 
(a) a creator of a new mental product must undertake to disclose its creation to the 
community at large and he is then;  
(b) deemed to have ceded all rights in respect of the creation to the State; in return for which;  
(c) the State undertakes to allow the creator a sole right to exploit it for his sole benefit, for a 
limited period; and 
(d) at the end of the period, the creator loses such rights and the State becomes the sole 
owner.   
2.2.7.1 Criticism of the Theory                              
The contract theory is prone to the following points of criticism: Firstly, it has been convincingly 
argued that no such contract (express/implied) exists in reality and citizens are unlikely to 
acknowledge its existence. Secondly, public disclosure takes place in terms of statutes governing 
such rights, for the purpose of informing the public of the latest developments in ‘the art’, 
facilitating new inventions and not to effect a cession. Thirdly, it has been argued that there is no 
cession to the State or recession to the creator; the rights are created by formal compliance with 
statutes and they fall away in terms of the relevant statutory provisions, after which any member 
of the public may exercise them.  
2.2.8 Theory of Immaterial Property Rights 
The originator of this theory, Josef Kohler, explained for the first time in 1875, that the object of 
patents or copyright should be sought in the product of the author or inventor's mind rather than 
his personality.
105
 Kohler  agrees with  Gierke
106
 that, as long as a creation only exists as an idea 
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 Jean Jacques Rousseau’s widely acclaimed work, The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right (1762) is 
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in its creator/inventor's mind it belongs to (and the creator's activity does not extend beyond) the 
domain of his personality.
107
 Therefore, it is essentially a personality right, since thoughts cannot 
be the objects of rights on their own, the underlying right being a personality right.
108
 The theory 
resonates with Gierke’s reference to the vague concept of ‘mental product’. Further, it should be 
mentioned that not all the products of the mind are necessarily worthy of protection. For 
example, it is not the idea how to play a game that is patentable, but the apparatus used to play 
it.
109
 Copyright for instance, only exists on an idea if it is reduced to a document or book form.
110
 
 
Only after the idea assumes an individual character or is materially expressed in an outwardly 
perceptible form,
111
 can it assume an individual and independent character, acquire an economic 
value and be stolen.
112
 
2.2.8.1 Criticism of the Theory                           
The main criticism against this theory is that it fails to explain the relationship, the similarities or 
distinctions between accepted objects of intellectual property inter se, for example, between 
goodwill (which is a product of business tactics rather than a mental product) and a trade mark. 
The two are in a sense linked to each other.  A link also exists between an invention and a 
design, or between copyright and other intellectual property rights. Traditionally, only the well-
known four categories of subjective rights were recognised, that is, real rights, personal rights, 
personality rights and intellectual property rights.
113
  Legal objects such as creditworthiness, 
earning capacity, goodwill and others were acknowledged to have elements of both intellectual 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to one's good reputation that is never separable from the inventor's personality. This premise is unconvincing in that 
it fails to acknowledge that such rights, once the underlying idea is materially expressed, can exist separately from 
their creator.   
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112
 See Generally Haupt t/a Soft Copy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd and Others 2006 (4) SA 458 
(SCA). 
113
 See Kruger H and Skelton A (eds) The Law of Persons in South Africa (2010) 12-19 and Boezaat T Law of 
Persons 5
th
 Ed (2010) 2. 
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property (they have economic value) and personality (they do not really exist separately from the 
person concerned).  
 
Neethling and others
114
 argue that another category must be recognised, namely personal 
immaterial property rights, which unlike personality rights have economic value and do not 
automatically, come into existence with a person's birth.  The holder must first build up a 
professional or business reputation and these rights can have an economic value but they cannot 
like personality rights, be transferred/bequeathed to others, or be attached. 
 
Contrary to Neethling’s argument, other authorities argue that these are only aspects of a person's 
personality, but Neethling and his colleagues unswervingly argue that these rights can be 
infringed, without necessarily infringing the holder's personality, for example, on the destruction 
of a lawyer's library, or a person's computer containing essential information. 
2.3 Theories of Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines: A very Brief Contextual and 
Preliminary Evaluation
115
 
From the discussion of the theories or rationales above, an impression is created that utilitarian 
theories aim at the maximization of social welfare. This implies that there is a need to strike a 
balance between encouraging invention or innovation and ensuring that social welfare is not 
compromised. The approach is likely to be attractive to access activists, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and governments in the developing countries which are grappling with 
access issues.  
On the other hand, the natural rights theory which is premised on the use by an inventor of goods 
that are unowned or ‘held in common’, gives the inventor a natural property right to the fruits of 
his endeavour. This argument is likely to appeal to big pharmaceutical companies obsessed with 
profit maximization when they sell their patented drugs. Access arguments, like the proposals to 
introduce parallel imports and compulsory licences on equity grounds, are less likely to convince 
pharmaceutical companies with ‘natural rights’ to the drugs to sell to the poor at affordable 
                                                          
114
 Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Law of Personality (2005) at 5. 
115
 My evaluation and contextualization of the theories against the research objectives is brief here because it       
pre-empts my proposed possible solutions, forming the bedrock of the thesis in Chapter Seven below. This 
evaluation therefore continues in its proper context in Chapter Seven  
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prices. There will, therefore, be a need to weigh the pharmaceutical companies’ rights to their 
intellectual property and the poor consumers’ rights to affordable essential medicines.  
The third group of theories, derived from the writings of Kant and Hegel, emphasize that private 
property rights are crucial to the satisfaction of fundamental needs; hence policymakers should 
strive to create and allocate entitlements to resources in a manner that best enables people to 
fulfil those needs. This theoretical approach may be used to justify the continued existence of 
patents on essential medicines on the basis that banning patents would be an anathema to social 
welfare. A counter argument, based on the same theoretical approach can be raised on behalf of 
those lacking access to essential medicines namely, that the state must ensure an equitable 
allocation of resources taking into account the citizens’ ability to pay.116  
The last of the four approaches is rooted on the premise that property rights in general and 
intellectual property rights in particular, can and should be shaped so as to foster the achievement 
of a just and attractive culture. Proponents of the fourth approach draw their inspiration from 
political and legal theorists such as Jefferson, the old Marx, legal realists, and the various 
proponents of classical republicanism. The approach is also relevant to access to medicines from 
the perspectives of both access activists and pharmaceutical companies. A ‘just and attractive 
culture’ may be achieved through allowing pharmaceutical companies to recoup their Research 
and Development (R&D) costs by charging market related costs for patented medicines.
117
 This 
recoupment does somewhat amount to a reward to the pharmaceutical company for engaging in 
the research that culminates in the production of the patented drug.
118
 On a simplistic analytical 
level, allowing for such rewards will lead to justice for the pharmaceutical companies. 
On the other hand, viewed from the perspective of those in dire need of access to medicines, 
such a form of ‘justice’ will, in all likelihood, amount to a travesty of justice.119 Rather than just 
reward the development of a new drug through the granting of patents, it has been argued that the 
development of a new drug ought to be rewarded in proportion to its impact on the global disease 
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 See generally Dietsch P “Patents on Drugs – The Wrong Prescription?” in Gosseries A, Marciano A and Strowel 
A (eds) Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice (2008) at 230-245. 
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 Pogge TW “Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Programme” (2005) 36 Metaphilosphy at 182-209. 
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 Shiffrin SV “The Incentives Argument for Intellectual Property Protection” in Gosseries A, Marciano A and 
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burden, and not through monopoly rents.
120
 Such a version of the rewards theory would lower 
the prices of drugs and stimulate pharmaceutical research into currently neglected diseases 
affecting the poor,
121
 including those in the SADC region. Despite possible implementation 
challenges that are likely to accompany the employment of such an approach, if carefully 
thought through, the ‘new’ rewards approach is likely to lead to positive access results. 
From the brief discussion above, it is evident that I subscribe to the Lockean perspective wherein 
human beings take what nature provides and mix it with their own labour so that it becomes their 
property.
122
 This perspective will work well when blended with incentives and rewards to create 
some form of social contract. Once human beings have mixed what nature provides with their 
own labour, patents may then be granted to protect the effort in the form of rewards/incentives. 
For equitable results, such rewards/incentives must be viewed from both a pharmaceutical 
industry
123
 and access to medicines perspective. This will, therefore, call for a blended theory
124
 
or theories that take into account the reality presented by TRIPS flexibilities and the situation 
obtaining in the SADC region, wherein more than half of the membership consists of poor Least 
Developing Countries (LDCs). 
It is axiomatic that the above discussion does somewhat point to the need for an exploration of 
other theories that can be blended for the developing world and SADC in particular. A hybrid 
model that includes some of the relevant elements of selected discussed theories can be 
suggested for this purpose.
125
 SADC Member States may also pursue policies that facilitate intra-
regional access to medicines. This may take the form of a regional common binding legal or 
policy agreement, based on any of the prominent TRIPS flexibilities.
126
 Compulsory licenses are 
hereby suggested as a common regional access vehicle, and their importance is discussed in 
chapters four, five, six and seven below.  
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 Pogge above at 182. 
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 Morrissey M An Alternative to Intellectual Property Theories of Locke and Utilitarian Economics (2012) MA 
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2.4 International Patent Law in the Context of Patents and Access to Medicines 
2.4.1 Preliminary Remarks 
At the international level, patents are regulated by the rules encapsulated in international 
conventions such as the Paris Convention and the general WTO rules under the GATT 1994 and 
the TRIPS Agreement. The aim of this section of the study is to explore the applicable 
international legal regime applicable to the study in the context of access to medicines by 
identifying the salient provisions of the WTO and TRIPS directly relevant hereto. Before delving 
into the specifics of international patent law in the context of access to medicines, it is 
appropriate to first render a historical account of the patentability of pharmaceutical products. 
This is important because this study deals with access to patentable pharmaceutical products in 
the context of the TRIPS Agreement. An account of the historical patentability of pharmaceutical 
products will, therefore, be very appropriate at this stage to further contextualize the study, after 
the theoretical exploration and critique rendered in the preceding discussion above. 
2.4.2 Historical Patentability of Pharmaceutical Products 
Although many developed countries and some ex-colonies had patents on medicines by the 
1960s, a large number of developing countries in Europe and many developing countries did not 
provide patents for pharmaceutical products. Many countries did not start providing for 
pharmaceutical patents voluntarily until the 1980s and involuntarily after the passage of the 
TRIPS Agreement.  
 
The first statutes defined explicitly what was eligible for patentability.
127
 The Patent of 
Monopolies
128
 allowed patents for ‘the sole working or making of any matter of new 
manufacture’.129 This was interpreted by the courts to include patents on ‘substances formed by 
chemical and other processes’.130 Meanwhile, the United States Patent Act131 had allowed patents 
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 In this study, the English Statute of Monopolies and the United States Patent Act of 1790 are regarded as one of 
the key first statutes.  
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 Passed on 25 May 1624. 
129
 Section VI of the Statute of Monopolies.  
130
 See Boulton v Bull, Court of Pleas and Exchequer Chamber, 1795 126 Eng. Rep 651, 660. Later, the term ‘other 
process’ was extended to cover the processes themselves.  
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organized. Before then, each State had its own peculiar patent laws [source Devaiah V ‘A History of Patent Law at 
http://www.sarai.net/research/knowledge-culture/critical-public-legal-resources/historyofpatentlaw.pdf (last visited 
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for the invention of ‘any useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement…’132 The modern United States patent law133 allows patents on ‘any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof.
134
 The whole section which is relevant in this instance is reproduced 
below: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
135
 
 
The composition of matter mentioned in the above cited provision of the legislation, therefore, 
will cover pharmaceuticals. 
 
The fear of public health effects of patents on pharmaceuticals led some countries to adopt a 
cautionary approach to pharmaceutical patents. The French Patent Act
136
 for example, excluded 
‘[L]es compositions pharmaceutiquesouremedes de touteespece’, (my emphasis) that is, 
pharmaceutical compositions or medicines of all kinds from protection.
137
 The Act banned 
patents on pharmaceutical products and their pharmaceutical composition but not the process of 
fabrication of a pharmaceutical substance.
138
 The ban remained until 1959 when an ordinance 
was passed providing that patents would be granted for pharmaceutical products with the 
possibility of issuing compulsory licences in the case of insufficient quantities and abnormally 
high prices. To date, methods of surgical or therapeutic treatment and diagnostic methods are 
still not patentable under French law due to their alleged lack of industrial application.
139
 The 
reluctance to grant pharmaceutical patents and chemical ones was not only confined to England, 
the US and France. Many industrialised countries maintained this form of ban until specific 
periods in their history.
140
 The other approach to pharmaceutical patents and public health, 
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Section 1 of the US Patents Act 1790. 
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 35 U.S.C § 101. 
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 French Patent Act, adopted on 5 July 1844. 
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adopted by some countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada was to grant compulsory 
licenses
141
 in pharmaceutical products until the early 1990s.
142
 
 
It is, therefore, inevitable that given the initial resistance to the patentability of pharmaceuticals 
as outlined in the preceding paragraphs, adherence to an international harmonized legal system 
was necessary. This harmonization, despite its inherent limitations did come in the form of 
TRIPS in 1994. This had been preceded by the Paris Convention and the GATT of 1947. It is 
now appropriate, therefore, to turn our discussion to the international legal regulatory regime 
applicable to pharmaceutical patents under the most important international instruments.  
2.4.3 International Intellectual Property Law before TRIPS 
2.4.3.1 Preliminary Issues                         
An increase in international trade in cross border trade necessitated patent protection in other 
countries and national patent laws of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries were very disparate.
143
 Some 
laws did not allow patent protection of foreign products while others prevented patents on 
already patented products, on the basis that there was no novelty.
144
 The problem was further 
compounded by the different laws, languages, stringent time frames and other impediments 
unique to the international context with the publication of a patent specification in one country 
destroying novelty.
145
 
2.4.3.2 The Paris Convention                                   
At the international level, intellectual property used to be regulated by a small number of treaties, 
chief among which was the Paris Convention.
146
 The adoption of this Convention was preceded 
by the international conference on patent rights in 1873, in Vienna, Austria. Initially, the US 
inventors contemplated not attending the conference because they feared that the conference 
would result in the loss of protection and copying of their inventions. At the conference, the US 
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 See chapters five and six below. 
142
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143
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stance was to conceive patents as property rights
147
 than instruments of public policy.               
By 1 January 1995 when the TRIPS came into being under the auspices of the WTO, the Paris 
convention had already been ratified by 129 states.
148
 Developing countries were reluctant to 
sign the Paris Convention.
149
 This was partly due to the fear that innovation and creativity in 
developing countries would be arrested by the liberalisation of intellectual property in the 
absence of technical assistance being afforded to the developing countries.
150
  
 
Correa and Yusuf report that despite embracing TRIPS norms in 1990 through the proposal 
submitted to the TRIPS’ Council by a group of 14 developing countries, concerns about the 
availability, scope and use of intellectual property lingered on.
151
 In the context of this study, 
these concerns were partially addressed later through the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
agreement and public health
152
 and the WTO General Council decision amending the TRIPS 
Agreement.
153
 These important legal developments are discussed in their proper context in 
chapter four below. 
 
The Paris Convention sets up a union for the Protection of Industrial Property with a secretariat 
to carry out administrative tasks for the Union.
154
 The convention, which recognizes and applies 
the obligation of national treatment, did improve cross-border patenting. It simplifies the patent 
application process by allowing a patentee who filed a first patent application in a member state a 
12 month priority period to file in other states.
155
 The convention has substantive rules on 
compulsory licensing
156
 and revocation.
157
 Under the convention, the forfeiture of a patent is 
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possible if a compulsory license would not be sufficient
158
 and may not be the consequence of 
mere importation by the patentee of the patented product into the country of the patent grant. The 
1970 Patent Cooperation Treaty facilitates obtaining normal patents from national and regional 
patent offices under their laws.
159
 
2.4.3.3 The GATT/WTO                     
Intellectual property was basically considered in the GATT context as an ‘acceptable obstacle’ to 
free trade at least until the Tokyo round.
160
 Most intellectual property protection negotiations in 
this round hovered around counterfeits.
161
 During the WTO Uruguay Round of negotiations,
162
 
industrialised countries did not want to undermine the WIPO, with the United States particularly 
regarding negotiation on trade-related intellectual property as a condition precedent to the 
launching of the Uruguay Round.
163
 This was motivated by the United States’ desire to find a 
market for its burgeoning patents and innovation industry then.  On the other hand, developing 
countries were vehemently opposed to the inclusion of intellectual property issues in the 
negotiations, due to the apprehension that they would later amount to a protectionist tool and an 
obstacle to free trade.
164
 Despite the resistance from the developing countries, in the Uruguay 
Round, intellectual property was included as an express item for negotiation.
165
 Towards the end 
of the Round, intellectual property ranked together with agriculture as the issues that could make 
or break the round.
166
 
 
Under GATT, intellectual property was a permissible impediment to trade.
167
 A few exceptions 
such as Articles III,
168
 XXII and XXIII,
169
 IX, XX (d),
170
 XII: 3 (c), XVIII: 10 and IX are worth 
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noting in this regard. The United States – Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies171 
dispute is widely regarded as the first patent infringement case in the GATT history.
172
 In 
another GATT dispute involving the US government,
173
 the Panel made it clear that in light of 
article XX (d), the substantive patent law of a contracting party could probably not be challenged 
under GATT, but contracting parties were enjoined to enforce their patent laws in a manner that 
was not inconsistent with GATT provisions. Therefore, in terms of the US – Section 337 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930,
174
 contracting parties are allowed to adopt protectionist policies which may 
restrict international trade in goods in order to protect intellectual property. Contracting parties’ 
individual, national and intellectual property laws would, therefore, grant the right to block the 
entry of infringing goods into the customs territory in order to protect intellectual property rights. 
 
It is, therefore, possible for developed countries to retaliate for GATT or General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) violations by suspending obligations under the TRIPS Agreement or 
any other similar agreement. Indeed, there are instances when developed countries resorted to 
unilateral pressure when multilateral negotiations failed.
175
 The implications for fair and just 
trade in this context are dire as countries with the political and economic wherewithal bully the 
weaker ones into submission.  
 
Unilateralism of this nature would in all likelihood lead to negative access to medicines results as 
the South African Medicines Act example, narrated briefly below showed.  
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The 1968 Stockholm conference adopted the revised Berne and Paris Conventions and created 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in 1970.
176
 The history of TRIPS, 
discussed below, starts with GATT
177
 through to the Uruguay Round that gave birth to the WTO. 
 
2.4.4 International Intellectual Property Law under TRIPS 
2.4.4.1 Preliminary Remarks         
The preamble to the TRIPS Agreement
178
 expressly spells out the objectives negotiating parties 
sought to achieve during the negotiations, which are said to have been one of the most difficult 
both politically and economically.
179
 The preamble spells out six important issues/objectives.
180
  
 
Firstly, the need for a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with 
international trade in counterfeit goods is recognized.
181
 Secondly, intellectual property rights are 
recognized as private rights.
182
 Thirdly, the underlying public policy objectives of national 
systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological 
objectives are recognized.
183
 Fourthly and very importantly for this study, the agreement 
recognizes the special needs of the least-developed country members in respect of maximum 
flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to 
create a sound and technological base.
184
 Fifthly, the importance of avoiding and reducing 
tensions is given prominence by committing to the resolution of trade-related intellectual 
property issues through multilateral procedures, thus limiting the impact of unilateralism and its 
accompanying pejoratives and other unintended ills.
185
 Finally, the preamble spells out clearly 
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the objective to establish a mutually supportive relationship between the WTO and WIPO as well 
as other relevant international organisations.
186
 
 
While the above stated objectives generally reflect plural views, it has been argued that 
substantially they are protectionist and in line with the United States’ and developed countries’ 
protectionist stance on intellectual property generally.
187
  This study subscribes to this view and 
opines that in its context, had the TRIPS not been heavily influenced by the entrenched 
developed countries’ views on intellectual property,188  the access to medicines problem could be 
less acute today.  
 
The example that clearly shows that developed countries and the United States’ views prevailed 
is the fact that during the negotiations, pharmaceutical patents were discussed and their inclusion 
on the IP list was strongly resisted by the developing countries on public health grounds.
189
 This 
argument, despite its logical and reality based appeal, was rejected and the developed countries’ 
views, and principally the views of the United States prevailed, hence the access to medicines 
mess we have to date.
190
 It is heartening, however, to write that the position is not as gloomy as 
one would imagine since the developing countries found their voices during the negotiation of 
the Agreement on TRIPS and Public Health by establishing a coalition and had it maintained 
throughout the negotiating process thus preventing being outmanoeuvred by the EU-US block.
191
 
 
The basic assumption for the negotiation of the TRIPS is encapsulated in the preamble’s 
chapeau.
192
 The wording of the chapeau is entirely drawn from the Punta Del Este Ministerial 
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Declaration that launched the Uruguay round.
193
 The chapeau puts a lot of emphasis on 
‘effective’ and ‘adequate’ IP protection. On this very point of adequate and effective protection 
of IP, Correa submits that the national standards of IP protection consistent with the TRIPS 
obligations are to be considered ‘effective’ and ‘adequate’.194 If this submission is pursued to its 
logical conclusion, then ‘TRIPS-plus’ IP protection may, therefore, be justified on this basis as 
effective or adequate as may be the case in some regional integration arrangements (RIAs).
195
 
 
In summary, the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated to address problems of unauthorised copying, 
unauthorised imports for domestic sale, disincentives created by inadequate protection (from the 
perspective of investors and inventors), the use of IP to discourage imports in favour of local 
production and disparities in the protection of IP in different jurisdictions.
196
 It lays down 
mandatory minimum standards of IP protection and enforcement, based on pre-existing 
international conventions.
197
 The TRIPS establishes positive regulatory objectives for the 
members.
198
 
2.4.4.2 Nature and Scope of Obligations under TRIPS                         
The TRIPS enjoins members to give effect to the provisions of the Agreement.
199
 Such a 
statement is a restatement of the vital pucta sunt servanda principle of international law which is 
based on the doctrine of good faith.
200
 Despite all this, Article 1.1 does not specify how such 
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Elektroniese Regstydskrif available at http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v14i4.10(last visited 18/04/2012). 
196
 Van Den Bossche P The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text, Cases and Materials (2008) at 
748. See further, Drahos P “Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting” (2002) 5 
Journal of Intellectual Property at 765 -789 and Gervais D The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis 
(2003) at 8. 
197
 Van Den Bossche above at 742. 
198
 Ibid. 
199
 Per Article 1.1 of TRIPS. 
200
 The legal and other principles underpinning the pacta sunt servanda concept are exposed and discussed in 
context by Lukashuk I I “The Principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda and Nature of Obligation under International Law” 
(1989) 83 American Journal of International Law 513 -518.  
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obligations are to be implemented. Members will inevitably give effect to the TRIPS’ obligations 
in the context of their jurisdictions by passing TRIPS compliant legislation. Article 1.1 also 
allows for diversity in the methods of implementing the agreement through relevant legislation, 
in the absence of which the pertinent TRIPS provision will have to be considered as               
self-executing. This is very important in the context of this study which seeks to domesticate or 
municipalise TRIPS flexibilities to SADC members’ legislation so that access to medicines may 
be improved.
201
 IP refers to all the categories of intellectual property that are the subject of 
sections 1-7 of part 2 of TRIPS.
202
 
 
Implementation of the TRIPS is problematic for the developing countries due to asymmetries in 
technological, economic and other spheres.
203
 The often cited submission that the TRIPS lays 
down minimum standards of IP protection is an inaccurate statement with no textual basis in the 
agreement itself.
204
 While the adoption and use of TRIPS-plus protection has been resorted to 
before for reasons other than altruistic, the route largely remains facultative.
205
 The reason for 
this submission is that TRIPS provides that no member is obliged to implement in its national 
law ‘more extensive protection than is required in this agreement’.206 
 
                                                          
201
 The domestication of TRIPS provisions will depend on whether a particular country adopts a dualist or monist 
approach to international law. For a detailed note on the differences between monist and dualist approaches, see 
Dugard J “International Law and the South African constitution” (1997) 8 European Journal of International Law at 
77; Olivier ME  “The Status of International Law in South African Municipal Law: Section 231 of the 1993 
Constitution (1994) 19 South African Yearbook on International Law at 5; Olivier ME , “Interpretation of the 
Constitutional Provisions Relating to International Law” (2003) 6 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal  at 26 and 
Scholtz  W “A Few Thoughts on s231 of the South African Constitution” (2004) 29 South African Yearbook on 
International Law at 202.  
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The list includes copyright and related rights, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits and 
industrial information. See further the US – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/R, 6 
August 2001, para 8.26 on the interpretation of the terms ‘intellectual property’ and ‘intellectual property rights’ in 
Article 1.2 of TRIPS. 
203
Correa above at 23. 
204
Gervais above at 286. 
205
 Ibid. 
206
 It has been submitted by some authorities such as Gervais above at 286 and Correa above at 24 that the cited 
portion is probably based on article 20 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(1896) as revised and amended variously until 1979.Article 20 deals with ‘Special Agreements among Countries of 
the Union’. The full text of the Berne Convention is available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html (last visited 19/04/2012). 
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The TRIPS is subject to the WTO principles that ensure non-discrimination, namely the national 
treatment and the most favoured nation principles.
207
 In the next section, the two major pillars of 
non-discrimination are outlined seriatim and contextualized to access to medicines.
208
 
2.4.4.3 National Treatment and TRIPS                  
The TRIPS is subject to a whole system of rules and disciplines incorporated into the GATT 
1994 despite its sui generis status in the WTO.
209
 In terms of TRIPS, members shall accord 
nationals of other States treatment no less favourable than that accorded to nationals with regard 
to the protection of IP.
210
 It is important to note that national treatment here, unlike in the GATT 
1994 context of trade in goods, is targeted at the treatment of nationals (my emphasis) and not 
goods or products.
211
 Whereas GATT, on the one hand talks of ‘like products’, TRIPS on the 
other hand, talks of ‘like persons.’212 The concept of ‘nationals’ is very crucial as spelt out by the 
panel report on EC – Protection of Trademarks,213 wherein the panel opined that ‘nationals’ of a 
member and the other member need to be defined.
214
 Who the nationals are can be determined by 
reference to the principles of public international law.
215
 The most important principles in this 
context are domicile and real and effective industrial or commercial establishment.
216
 
 
Exceptions do, however, exist, specifically in situations where such exceptions are necessary to 
secure compliance with laws and regulations which are not consistent with TRIPS provisions.
217
 
                                                          
207
 The most favoured nation treatment is provided for in article I of GATT 1994 while national treatment is 
provided for in article III of same.  
208
 See paras 2.3.4.3 and 2.3.4.4 below. 
209
 See specifically in this regard India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
WT/DS50/R 1998, para 7.19. 
210
Article 3.1 of TRIPS. 
211
 In the context of GATT 1994, imported goods originating from other members’ customs territories  shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use as provided for 
in Article III:4 of GATT. 
212
 See relatedly Article XVII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which refers to ‘like service 
sectors’. 
213
 For a scholarly analysis of this dispute, see Martin S “Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual 
Property Rights? WTO Panel Reports Shed Light on the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in 
Patent and Trademark Law” (2006) 37 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law at 407-
438. 
214
EC-Protection of Trademarks, panel Report, WT/DS1741R, 15 March 2005, para 7.150. 
215
 Ibid. 
216
 Van Den Bossche P The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text, Cases and Materials 2
nd
 Ed 
(2008) at 757. See further Footnote 1 of Article 1 (3) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
217
Article 3.1 of TRIPS. 
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National treatment was common even in pre-TRIPS international conventions on intellectual 
property rights.
218
 
 
The way the national treatment obligation is couched in TRIPS leaves great flexibility to design 
intellectual property laws since it does not commit states to a provision of certain levels of 
protection.
219
 Other pre-TRIPS Conventions include both national treatment and an important set 
of standards to be used.
220
 Incorporation of the national treatment in the TRIPS implies that it 
will now be applied in WTO disputes in the context of WTO jurisprudence.
221
 
 
Discrimination that violates the national treatment principle in the TRIPS context can either be 
de facto or de jure.
222
 De jure discrimination may come about as a consequence of rules in the 
national law formally according more favourable treatment to nationals vis-à-vis foreigners in the 
same factual and legal context. However, not all such forms of de jure discrimination will be 
actionable since it has already been pointed out that exceptions do exist.
223
 On the other hand, 
rules that formally treat on an equal footing nationals and foreigners, but the effect of which may 
be deemed discriminatory, result in de facto discrimination. For example, such a situation may 
arise when copyright collecting societies distribute revenue to national authors only, in instances 
where there are no reciprocal arrangements with other countries.
224
 In Canada – Patent 
                                                          
218
 In United Sates – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act 1998, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS176/AB/R, 2 
January 2002 para 241, the Appellate Body observed that national treatment had been the cornerstone of the Paris 
Convention and other international IP agreements. 
219
Correa above at 52. 
220
 For example, Article 5 A (1) of the Berne Convention provides that, ‘[A]uthors shall enjoy, in respect of works 
for which they are protected under the convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the 
rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals as well as the rights specially 
granted by this convention’ (my emphasis). The Rome Statute provided in Article 2(2) that national treatment was to 
be subject to the protection guaranteed, and the limitation specifically provided for in that convention. 
221
 In United Sates – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act 1998, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS176/AB/R, 2 
January 2002, para 242, it was held that the jurisprudence of Article III: 4 of GATT will be instrumental in in 
interpreting Article 3 of TRIPS; see also European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indicators for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs WT/DS290/R, 15 March 2005 para 7.135. 
222
 See Correa 53 -59 for an exposition, examples and pertinent WTO jurisprudence.  
223
 An example would be action taken in compliance with judicial administrative procedures as spelt out in Article 
3.1 of TRIPS. See also United States – Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act, Appellate Body Report WT/DS160/R, 
15 June 2000 wherein the Appellate Body relied on GATT jurisprudence in United States – Section 337 of the Tariff 
Act 1930, Panel Report, BISD36S/345, adopted 7 November 1989. 
224
Correa above at 54. 
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Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
225
 the Panel noted that claims for both formal and 
practical discrimination are possible under the TRIPS.
226
 
 
Because national treatment in the TRIPS Agreement requires that foreign nationals be given 
treatment ‘no less favourable’ than nationals, it is therefore possible that foreigners may be given 
treatment more favourable than nationals.
227
 The pre-TRIPS era provided that foreigners be 
given the same treatment as nationals.
228
 The term ‘less favourable’ was addressed by the Panel 
in EC – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products, 
wherein the Panel held that an examination of ‘less favourable’ would hinge on a close scrutiny 
of the ‘fundamental thrust and effect of the measure itself’.229 
2.4.4.4 Most Favoured Nation Treatment under TRIPS                                 
The most favoured nation (MFN) principle traditionally applied to trade in goods under the 
GATT 1994.
230
 In the strict trade-in-goods context under GATT, Article I thereof deals with 
customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with the importation or 
exportation of goods and also the method of levying such duties and charges.
231
 The article 
enjoins a WTO member giving any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country to immediately and unconditionally extend to the 
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other members the same 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity. Therefore, the most favoured nation principle in this 
context operates to preclude a WTO member from discriminating against or between WTO 
Members in respect of all matters pertaining to the import or export of goods. 
It is important to point out that the MFN principle was absent from pre-TRIPS international 
Conventions.
232
 In the specific context of TRIPS, the MFN’s application is limited to the rights 
delimited by sections 1 – 7 of TRIPS, as spelt out in Article 4. The relevant Article provides that 
                                                          
225
Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Panel Report WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000. 
226
Ibid para 7.176. 
227
Correa above at 56. 
228
 See Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention and Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention. 
229
EC – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, Panel 
Report WT/SS174/R, 15 March 2005, para 7.136. The Panel relied heavily on WTO case law, namely US – FSC 
(Article 21.5 – EC) para 215. 
230
Correa above at 66. In the GATT, this principle is provided for in Article I. 
231
 More specifically Article I: 1 of GATT 1994. 
232
Correa above at 67. 
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with specific regard to intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by a Member to the national of any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the nationals of all the other Members.
233
 However, the following advantages, 
privileges, favours are excepted: advantages premised on international agreements on judicial 
assistance;
234
 advantages accorded in terms of the Berne (1971) and Rome Convention;
235
 
advantages in respect of the rights of performers, producers of phonographs
236
 and advantages 
deriving from intellectual protection before the advent of TRIPS.
237
 
The MFN principle has been described variously as a fundamental cornerstone of the world 
trading system.
238
 The implication is that the MFN ensures that nationals of the members receive 
the best treatment accorded to a member to nationals of other countries.
239
 
2.4.4.5 The TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Rights Conventions         
It is important in a study of this nature, which deals with the application of an international legal 
regime such as TRIPS, strongly rooted in past legal practices based on international IP law, to 
spell out, albeit briefly, the role the pertinent international conventions still play and will 
continue to play. 
Initially, negotiators of TRIPS wanted it to comply with the main international conventions on 
intellectual property.
240
 All members are obliged to comply with substantive provisions of the 
Paris Convention as well as the rules governing ‘special agreements’ and with substantive 
provisions and the Appendix of the Berne convention as revised in 1971.
241
 Current WTO 
members
242
 were not necessarily members of the Paris Convention.
243
 However, Article 2.1 of 
                                                          
233
Article 4 of TRIPS. 
234
Article 4 (a) of TRIPS. 
235
Article 4 (b) of TRIPS. 
236
Article 4 (c) of TRIPS. 
237
Article 4 (d) of TRIPS. 
238
US – Havana Club, WT/DS160/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, 15 June 2005, para 297. 
239
Correa 66. 
240
 Correa 44 specifically notes that the European Communities in particular advocated the incorporation of existing 
IP Conventions by reference. 
241
 Article 1.1 of TRIPS refers to the Paris Convention and Article 2.2 to other Conventions such as the Berne, Rome 
and the Treaty on IP in respect of Integrated Circuits and such a differentiation must be noted. Article 2.2 also does 
refer to the Paris Convention thus emphasizing the need to comply with its obligations and making it clear that 
nothing in Article 1.1 shall derogate from existing obligations under the Convention.  
242
 As of 10 February 2011, WTO membership stood at 153 members (source 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm , last visited 19/04/2012). 
243
 The current Paris Convention membership stands at 185 member states (source http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ 
last visited 19/04/2012). 
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TRIPS is formulated in the form of a positive mandate
244
 and, therefore, it must be complied 
with even by members who are not contracting parties to the Paris Convention.  
In the 1970s, many developing countries were reluctant to accept what they considered to be 
provisions restrictive to their freedom to regulate industrial property; hence they did not join the 
Paris Convention.
245
 The Appellate Body had the opportunity to interpret Article 2.1 in the      
US – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act246 dispute, in which it was held by the Appellate 
Body that Article 6 of the Paris Convention
247
 as well as other specified provisions of the 
convention have been incorporated by reference in the TRIPS, and thus, the WTO Agreement.
248
 
The Appellate Body further noted that members, whether of the Paris Union or not are obliged 
under the WTO Agreement to implement those specified provisions of the Paris Convention that 
are incorporated into the WTO.
249
 
The wording of Article 1.2 of TRIPS (…‘members shall comply with’…) suggests that Articles 
of the Paris Convention mentioned therein override the TRIPS. Such an interpretation of the 
specific provision accords with the Vienna Convention, which provides that ‘when a treaty 
specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or 
later treaty, the provisions of that treaty prevail.’250 Article 2.2 confirms the currency and 
continued application of the conventions mentioned therein,
251
 and ensures that members do not 
apply TRIPS in a manner that leads to a violation of the obligations under the mentioned 
conventions.
252
 Therefore, the implication from Article 2.2 is that in areas not covered by the 
TRIPS such as utility models, contracting parties continue to be bound by the previous 
conventions they have adhered to. In the case of ‘convention minus’ issues,253 it does not mean 
                                                          
244
 The pertinent provision is couched in peremptory language and provides in Article 2.1 that, ‘In respect of Parts II, 
III and IV of this Agreement,  Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris 
Convention (1967)’. 
245
Correa above 47. 
246
United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act of 1998, Appellate Body Report, paras 124 -125. 
247
Paris Convention of 1967. 
248
United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act of 1998, Appellate Body Report, paras 124 -125. 
249
Ibid. 
250
 Article 30 (2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969. See also Correa 46 and Article 19 
of the Paris Convention.  
251
 Correa above at 46. 
252
 The Patent Law Treaty in Article 15 (2) (a) also contains similar provisions when it states: ‘Nothing in this treaty 
shall derogate from the obligations that contracting parties have to each other under the Paris Convention.  
253
 A good example is moral rights covered by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. 
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the WTO members who were party to the Paris Convention are now exempt from the specific 
obligations in question.
254
 
In the context of this study, Correa argues that since Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention 
recognizes the right of a contracting party to grant, under certain circumstances compulsory 
licences, other parties cannot challenge such a granting if it is consistent with the provisions of 
the Convention.
255
 The United States challenged Brazil’s compulsory licensing system requiring 
a local working obligation for patented inventions; arguing that it was in breach of Article 27.1 
of TRIPS, thereby discriminating against imported products. The matter did not go through the 
full Panel process but Brazil could easily have relied on Article 5 (A) (2) of the Paris Convention 
which allows a member ‘the right to take legislative measures which provide for the granting of 
compulsory licences to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive 
rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.
256
 Given the linkage between TRIPS 
and the Paris Convention,
257
 then such compulsory licences are arguably not challengeable under 
the TRIPS.
258
 In the Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products dispute,259 the 
Panel noted that apart from looking at the text, preamble and annexes of TRIPS in the 
interpretation thereof, the panel may have recourse to provisions of international instruments on 
intellectual property incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement, as well as other agreements 
between parties relating to the agreement.
260
 
On a related interpretative note of the TRIPS in light of international intellectual property 
agreements, in the United States – Section 110 (5) of the US Copyright Act, the Panel supported 
its interpretation by reference to the interpretive history of the Berne Convention that has become 
part of the TRIPS Agreement.
261
 In the case of United States – Section 211 Omnibus 
                                                          
254
 See European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to 
Arbitration by the European Communities under Art 22.6 of DSU, Decision by the Arbitrators, 
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para 149.  
255
Correa above at 47. 
256
Correa above at 47. 
257
 As established by Article 2.1 and 2.2 of TRIPS read together with Article 19 of the Paris Convention.  
258
Correa above at 48. 
259
 WT/DS/14/R, 17 March 2000 paras 7.70 -7.72. 
260
Ibid. Such an interpretation was said to be within the meaning of Article 31 (2) of the Vienna Convention. 
261
 See also United States – Section 110 (5) of the US Copyright Act, Appellate Body Report WT/DS160/AB/R, 5 
June 2005 para 6.18. 
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Appropriations Act of 1998,
262
 the Panel had referred to and used preparatory work of the Paris 
Convention in its analysis of the dispute while the European Communities had objected to such 
an approach on the basis that Article 32 of the Vienna Convention could not apply because none 
of the conditions for that application of that rule were present in the case.
263
 Furthermore, it was 
submitted that the history of the Paris Convention failed to provide a clear indication of what the 
negotiators intended. On appeal, the Appellate Body relied on the negotiation history of the Paris 
Convention in order to confirm its own interpretation of the relevant provision of the Paris 
Convention
264
 and found that section 211(1)(a) was not inconsistent with the Paris 
Convention.
265
 Therefore, Panels and the Appellate Body do have recourse to the negotiating 
history of the applicable international intellectual property conventions to establish TRIPS’ 
obligations and the scope of violations. However, such an approach may not be favourable to the 
developing countries that were not party to the negotiations and were, therefore,                      
non-members.
266
 However, some aspects taken from conventions to which the developing 
countries were not party may be favourable to the same complaining countries. For example, 
Article 5A of the Paris Convention has often been cited as a basis for legitimising the granting of 
compulsory licences due to the lack or insufficient local working of a patented invention.
267
 
The other important consideration in the context of contextualizing this study has been the 
question of whether or not other conventions (whether pre or post TRIPS) not incorporated by 
reference in the TRIPS may be used to interpret TRIPS. It has been argued that the adjudicator 
should seek a fit between his readings of the specific provisions of WTO law and his 
                                                          
262
 Dispute DS176, panel report of 2 August 2001 available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds176_e.htm (last visited 12/04/2011) 
263
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties allows for a recourse to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
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interpretation according to article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable. The full text of the Convention is available at 
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264
Paris Convention Art. 6quinquies A (1). 
265
 See Appellate Body report WT/DS176/AB/R, 2 January 2002, paras 145-146. 
266
Correa above at 49. 
267
 This is very relevant to the present study (see chapter four and five). See further, the submission by the Africa 
Group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela IP/C/W/296, 20 June 2001entitled “TRIPS and 
Public Health”. In the submission, compulsory licenses are proposed as an essential tool for Governments to carry 
out public health policies, as they may facilitate access to medicines through prevention of abuses of rights, 
encouragement of domestic capacities for manufacturing pharmaceuticals and in cases of national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, or of public non-commercial use. The full submission is available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/paper_develop_w296_e.htm [last visited 12/04/2012] 
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construction or imagination of the entire international legal system.
268
 Relatedly, Howse argues 
that the adjudicator must take into account pre-existing and evolving international law to reach 
an equitable decision.
269
 On a related note, it was held by the Appellate Body in United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products that, ‘certain terms in the WTO 
Agreement are not static but evolutionary’.270  
Correa argues against the above evolutionary approach on the premise that it will deepen 
imbalances already evident in TRIPS and gravitate towards broader and higher levels of 
protection with advances in new technology.
271
 A further radical argument against the 
evolutionary approach is that such an interpretation panders to the whims of ‘big pharma’ in the 
developed world.
272
 
Possible safeguards against the evolutionary approach outlined in the preceding paragraph may 
be gleaned from the mandates of the TRIPS Council and a contextual historical approach to 
interpretation. The TRIPS Council is mandated to review the TRIPS Agreement in light of any 
relevant new development which may warrant modification or amendment of the Agreement.
273
 
This mandate, therefore, implies that at all material times, TRIPS provisions must reflect 
contemporary happenings so that the Agreement is continuously relevant. This will indeed be a 
better approach than being too evolutionary in interpreting the TRIPS. The mandate of the 
TRIPS Council should be read as complementary to the evolutionary approach. In the contextual 
historical approach, Panels and the Appellate Body must confine themselves to the meaning of 
the terms as understood at the time of their adoption. This is necessitated by the axiom that there 
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 See Mitchell AD ‘The Legal Basis for Using Principles in WTO Disputes’ (2007) 10 Journal of International 
Economic Law at 795 – 835. 
269
 Howse R “The jurisprudential achievement of the WTO Appellate Body: a Preliminary Appreciation” available 
at http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/HC2003.Howse.pdf (last visited 12/04/2011). 
270
United States – Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 
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extended meaning of the term exhaustible natural resources was acknowledged and applied in the case of United 
States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, panel report and Appellate body report, adopted 20 
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271
Correa above at 50. 
272
 Ibid. ‘Big pharma’ is a common and widely used pejorative term referring to big pharmaceutical companies. 
273
Article 71 of TRIPS. 
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is a real danger of an evolutionary approach leading to an imposition of obligations not 
negotiated and adopted during specific negotiations, such as the Uruguay Round.
274
 
Having rendered an expository account of the basic aspects of intellectual property law, theories 
of intellectual property, international intellectual property, conventions and aspects of the TRIPS 
Agreement, it is now appropriate to conclude this chapter by focussing on case studies which 
highlight the vicissitudes of the access to medicines debate.  
2.5 The Legal Historical Evolution of the Access to Medicines Debate – Access to Medicines 
Narratives
275
 
 
General 
It is now safe to posit that the access to medicines debate is essentially a conflict between WTO 
law and human rights.
276
 The conflict pits patent law obligations under the TRIPS against access 
to essential medicines. The debate was essentially triggered and fuelled by the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa and some parts of the developing world.
277
 The first medication 
targeting HIV/AIDS was produced by publicly funded institutions,
278
 but a British private 
company, Boroughs Wellcome obtained a patent on the use of the drug in several countries and 
priced the drug out of the reach of many.
279
 However, it is important to highlight that the access 
to medicines issue is not limited to HIV/AIDS only.
280
 
2.5.1 HIV/AIDS 
281
 and the Pharmaceutical Price Wars 
In the 1980s, a rare skin disease was discovered among US homosexuals, later the disease spread 
to all other people. A Catholic Development Commission sponsored study in Zaire found that the 
                                                          
274
 In Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, the Panel examined the status of the legislation 
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Hestermeyer 1. See also on a general note, Hassim A, Heywood M and Berger J Health and Democracy: A Guide 
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 For an overview picture on the origins of the HIV/AIDS scourge, see Sharp PM and Hahn BH “Origins of HIV 
and the AIDS Pandemic” (2011) 1 Cold Spring Harbor Perspectives in Medicine at 1 -23.  
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disease was already prevalent there, and the publication of the results of the study led to the 
realisation of the HIV/AIDS phenomenon worldwide.
282
  
In May 1983, scientists at Institut Pasteur isolated the human immunodeficiency virus and 
developed tests for the new disease.
283
 The US Cancer institute isolated a virus too, mass 
produced it and developed a test for anti-bodies.
284
 The patent on an anti-body test kit was 
awarded to the US Company Gallo, to the chagrin of Institut Pasteur.
285
 The virus had been 
identified but no AIDS medication was available. 
Before even HIV/AIDS was discovered, one public institution, US Detroit Institute for Cancer 
Research, synthesized a chemical entity called Azidothymidine (AZT) to stop malignant cells in 
1964 (the scientist responsible for this was Horwitz).
286
 The compound failed and was never 
patented by Horwitz and thus fell into the public domain.  
Ten years later, Ostertag, a scientist employed by Max Planck Instutut fur Experimentell 
Medizin, a publicly funded German institute, experimented with AZT and found that in some 
instances, AZT could treat retroviruses.
287
 A decade later, a British company, BW (Borrough 
Wellcome) obtained a patent for AZT in the United Kingdom and the United States claiming 
inter alia ‘[a] method of treating a human having acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
comprising the oral administration of AZT’.288 For many years, AZT was to remain the only 
drug for HIV treatment. 
Because AZT was the only available drug for HIV/AIDS for a desperate population, BW set the 
retail price for a year’s supply for one patient at US$10 000.289 The exorbitant price did not go 
down well with HIV/AIDS patients, who began to set up highly activist groups to fight the price 
                                                          
282
Hestermeyer above at 2. 
283
 See Barre –Sinoussi et al ‘Isolation of a T-Lymphotropic Retrovirus from a Patient at Risk for Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)’ (1983) 220 Science at 868. 
284
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 The patent was awarded and registered under US Patent No: 4520, 113 – Serological Detection of anti-bodies to 
HTLV-III in sera of patients with AIDS and pre-AIDS conditions. 
286
 Herstermeyer above at 3. 
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Herstermeyer above at 4. 
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and improve access.
290
 The outcry reached the ears of the US Congress and the pricing decision 
was scrutinised. BW attempted to justify its price on the basis of the cost of research, 
development, synthesizing, marketing of the drug and the need to generate revenue in light of the 
likelihood of new therapies coming soon.
291
 
The access to medicines debate had been ignited and the world was suddenly seized with the 
matter and action, albeit belatedly had to be taken in the context of intellectual property law 
reform under the auspices of the TRIPS. From an African country’s perspective, the access 
debate was highlighted and publicized by the Treatment Action Campaign in the South African 
Medicines Act debacle in 1998.
292
 The South African Medicines Act debacle highlighted the 
access problem in the context of accessing HI/AIDS vaccines. However, the access debate also 
raged fiercely in other areas apart from the HIV/AIDS context as shown immediately below.
293
 
2.5.2 The Access Debate in Other Areas: The Anthrax Scare Case 
2.5.2.1 Preliminary Remarks             
The HIV/AIDS prevalence and spread necessitates that the conflict between patents and access 
to medicines be largely around this theme. This disease, therefore, is the single most important 
example of the conflict as illustrated in paragraph 2.5.2 above. However, other disease examples 
do exist in other areas such as the case of Novartis’ cancer drug, Glivec and Tami flu for the 
treatment of avian influenza or ‘bird flu’.294 
2.5.2.2 Bayer’s CIPRO              
In October 2001 after the September 11 twin towers’ attacks in the United States; mysterious 
letters containing anthrax were sent to prominent politicians and media houses. Bayer, a German 
company was the sole producer of the only medication approved to treat anthrax in the United 
States. The medication in question was the anti-biotic Cipro. The drug had initially been patented 
in the United Kingdom and the UK patent had expired but was still current in the US and Canada 
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 Despite the chances of bird flu spreading to humans being rare, the fear of the virus mutating and enabling 
human-to-human transmission led to stockpiling of Tamiflu. Similarly, Roche’s drug had to be produced under sub-
licensing schemes for fear of the imposition of compulsory licenses.  
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which were additional jurisdictions in which Bayer had also registered the same patent. Demand 
for the drug skyrocketed due to individual and government fears of biological warfare from 
militants and terrorists. Bayer could not meet the demand required by the US government for 
drug supplies to last 12 million people in 60 days. Demand outpaced the supply despite an 
increase in the drug production volumes. 
 
Meanwhile, an Indian company Cipla, which had been producing a generic version of Cypro for 
a decade at a fraction of the cost offered to supply the US government. The offer prompted Bayer 
to announce that it would triple production to 200 million tablets over three months, because the 
US government would not disregard patent rights. However, Canada was interested in 
purchasing the generics from Cipla and offered to buy 900 000 tablets at half the price. Bayer 
capitulated to Canadian pressure and offered the patented drug to Canada at a very cheap 
price.
295
 The US government was aggrieved by Bayer’s concession to the Canadians and 
threatened to disregard patent rights and resort to generics if Bayer did not extend the price 
concession to the US as well. Because Bayer’s options were very limited in the specific context 
and the threat of resorting to generics by the US was a real one, the pharmaceutical giant made a 
concessionary offer of 100 million tablets at $0.95 per tablet with the option for an additional 
200 million tablets. 
 
In this access to medicines narrative, the US position starkly contrasts with its pro patents rights 
approach in the South African medicines case and smacks of duplicity.
296
 Despite the Cypro 
case, the US has stridently remained an ardent defender of stringent patent protection in 
sympathy with its pharmaceutical industry. From the case studies narrated above, it becomes 
very clear that the access to medicines problem was triggered by public health concerns of the 
two countries. In South Africa, the real fear that the young population could be decimated by the 
HIV/AIDS scourge spurred the government to Act.
297
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In the United States, on the other hand, the government was apprehensive of the fact that there 
was a real possibility of a biological war being waged by the so called terrorists. In both 
instances, there was a dire need for life-saving drugs which were in the hands of big 
pharmaceutical companies who enjoyed exclusive monopolies in terms of patent rights.  
 
Irrespective of the outcome of the case in each of the above case studies, what is evident is that 
patient rights were likely to be trumped by patent rights had concessions not been struck. 
Furthermore, the conflict between patent rights and human rights, specifically the right to health, 
is evident in the narratives. It is, therefore, aptly appropriate that the next chapter focuses on 
access to medicines as a human right.
298
  
Conclusion 
The conceptual and theoretical framework underpinning the access to medicines discourse, 
outlined above, which dates back to the 1980s, clearly mirrors the issues and concerns that 
underlie access to medicines.  The recurrent themes in the debate include but are not confined to 
the definition of intellectual property and the monopolistic nature of the attendant rights 
specifically in the context of patents; theories that best explain the relationship between the 
patentee’s rights vis-à-vis third parties; intellectual property rights in the context of the relevant 
international conventions and World Intellectual Property Organisation; intellectual property in 
the GATT/WTO state of play and the evolution of the access debate to medicines as exemplified 
by the selected case studies.  
 
The thesis of this study hinges on the premise that TRIPS allows for flexibilities that may be 
used by members to improve their lot in the context of accessing medicines. It is this study’s 
contention that SADC member states can take full advantage of the flexibilities through legal and 
policy reforms that encapsulate the flexibilities and anticipate the need to access patented 
medicines for the region’s citizens. It is envisaged that the law reform will incorporate human 
rights principles, discussed in the next chapter and a blended theoretical approach, briefly 
broached in this chapter as a possible solution to the access problem, and discussed in detail in 
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Chapter seven as a lasting solution for the SADC region. For obvious reasons, the WTO 
provisions dealing with the flexibilities are not discussed here because they are discussed in their 
proper context in chapters four and five below. It is now appropriate, therefore, to introduce the 
concept of access to medicines as a human right for further contextualization of this study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
3. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we focused on basic concepts, distinctions and theories of intellectual 
property. The chapter also touched on aspects of international patent law under the auspices of 
the World Trade Organisation TRIPS Agreement and the World Intellectual property 
Organization (WIPO) and access case studies to medicines. The foregoing chapter’s main aim 
was to contextualize the study and this contextualization continues in this chapter albeit with a 
different focus.  
In this chapter, the access to medicines debate is pursued from a different conceptual and 
normative perspective and the human rights dimension is introduced and its potential 
applicability to resolving the access problem explored. The conflict between intellectual property 
rights and human rights, namely the right to health, is explored against the backdrop of both an 
international and SADC dimension. The main question which this chapter seeks to answer is 
whether the access to medicines problem for the SADC region may not be resolved through the 
adoption of the rights-based approach. It is appropriate to explore the link between human rights 
and intellectual property so that the TRIPS flexibilities as potential solutions to the access 
problem may be viewed in their proper context in chapter four below. 
For the foregoing reasons, this chapter explores the nature of intellectual property rights and lays 
bare some of the theoretical arguments that seek to equate intellectual property rights to 
mainstream human rights. Secondly, intellectual property rights are juxtaposed with the right to 
health and the main international human rights provisions dealing with the right to health are 
analysed and linked to the problem of access to medicines. Thirdly, the concept of a rights-based 
approach is exposed and its potential applicability to resolving the access problem cursorily 
pursued. Finally, African and SADC regional instruments that have been identified are analysed 
in order to explore the potential of their deployment to resolving the access problem using the 
right to health as a legal normative tool.  
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It is envisaged that once a strong case for the link between human rights and intellectual property 
has been made in the context of access to medicines, it will then be appropriate to pursue an 
access solution for the SADC region through the deployment of TRIPS flexibilities outlined in 
chapter four below. Some of the documented flexibilities, namely compulsory licenses, parallel 
importation and differential pricing, initially proffered as possible solutions to the SADC access 
problem in chapter four, influenced the direction of this study in chapters five, six and seven. 
The solutions that have been proffered in chapter seven have taken into account human rights 
norms. Hence, laying the human rights foundation and establishing a rational link is an 
indispensable inclusion in this chapter.  
3.1 Establishing the Link between Human Rights and Intellectual Property Law 
3.1.1 Conceptual linkages 
Intellectual property law and human rights law share a related Western European societal 
developmental origin.
1
 Therefore, in the context of this study, intellectual property rights which, 
together with other access barriers continue to militate against access to medicines are western 
impositions which remain an access encumbrance to be dislodged through the deployment of a 
rights-based approach. Dogmatically speaking, intellectual property law is based on private law 
while human rights, addressing primarily states, are of a public law nature.
2
 If one accepts that 
the right to property is a human right,
3
 it is surely doubtful that the right to property can routinely 
outweigh the rights to life and health. 
The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), United Nations Human Rights Council, 
the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) are now aware of the human rights dimension 
of intellectual property.
4
 Some governments, courts and public interest non-governmental 
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 See Grosheide W, “Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights: Related Origin and Development” in 
Grosheide W (ed) Intellectual Property and Human Rights: A Paradox (2010) at 3. Grosheide submits that the 
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4
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organisations view intellectual property protection as implicating potential violations of the right 
to life,
5
 health, food, privacy, and freedom of expression and the enjoyment of the benefits of 
scientific progress.
6
  
Applied directly to the aims and objectives of this study, the implication of the above submission 
by Helfer and Austin is that ‘the denial of access to essential drugs threatens the enjoyment of 
the right to life’,7 protected in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).
8
 Furthermore, the denial of access to essential drugs militates against the right 
to ‘the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’,9 as spelt out in the pertinent 
provision of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
10
 
Both legal fields originated and grew quite apart out of social developments which were not 
interrelated.
11
 However, the modern contemporary reality is that the relationship between 
intellectual property rights and human rights has now evolved into a problematic one.
12
 The 
problematic aspect is exemplified, on the one hand, by the view that intellectual property rights 
and human rights are in conflict since the legal protection of private intellectual property rights is 
considered incompatible with community-based human rights; with human rights on the other 
hand viewed as legal instruments that limit and restrict the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.
13
 If this view is pursued to its extreme ends, then human rights must always trump 
intellectual property rights. Applied to the context of this study, the implication would be that the 
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 The fact that most countries must protect pharmaceutical patents, yet they are also required to protect the right to 
life renders the relationship between patents and human rights paradoxical (Helfer and Austin at 2). 
6
 Helfer and Austin above 2. 
7
 See Joseph S “Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The ‘Fourth Wave’ of the Corporate Human 
Rights Scrutiny” (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 425 – 452 at 430. 
8
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N GAOR, 
21
st
 Sess.,Supp. No. 16, U.N Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). The Human 
Rights Committee, the monitoring Body under the ICCPR, has confirmed that Article 6 requires measures to be 
taken to combat epidemics (see UN doc.HRI/GEN/1/REV.5, 26 April 2001 at 115 –General Comment 6, originally 
adopted in 1982). 
9
 Per Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). On the other 
hand, Article 15 (1) (c) of the ICESCR guarantees authors rights to commercially exploit, among other things, their 
scientific inventions. 
10
 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 
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 Grosheide above at 5. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. In the context of this study, such an argument is likely to be attractive to developing countries in countering 
the predominant view of the developed countries that intellectual property rights are sacrosanct.  
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problem of access to medicines would be easily resolved if intellectual property rights were to 
give way to human rights. However, matters are not that simplistic as the next paragraph shows. 
The other opposing view is that intellectual property rights and human rights are compatible 
because they pursue the same aim. Therefore, intellectual property rights are embodied in human 
rights.
14
 In the access to medicines context, this view requires striking a balance between the 
protection of intellectual property rights and access to medicines. The major question that 
remains in the context of the aims of this study is: How should a proper balance be struck 
between the protection of intellectual property rights and access to products of intellectual 
property, namely medicines? I have attempted to answer this question cursorily in this chapter 
and in detail from chapter four to chapter seven.
15
 
3.1.2 Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the International Context 
Human rights protect the fundamental rights of individuals and groups.
16
 ‘Fundamental rights 
can be defined as entitlements that belong to all human beings by virtue of their being humans’.17 
This is in direct contrast to property rights (like intellectual property rights), which can always be 
ceded in voluntary transactions.
18
 While human rights are said to be universal (exist irrespective 
of implementation), there seems to be two categories of human rights emerging namely, 
fundamental rights and non-fundamental rights.
19
 Whether a right is classified as fundamental or 
non-fundamental largely depends on whether the classifier thereof is a positivist or a naturalist.
20
 
Whether viewed through the eye of a naturalist or positivist, the whole concept of human rights 
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 The thesis of this work is that patents are a major barrier to access to medicines hence a solution that 
accommodates both the rights of patent holders and those of patients in the SADC region has to be found within the 
legal framework provided for by the TRIPS Agreement. 
16
 Cullet P “Patents and Medicines: the relationship between TRIPS and the human right to health” (2003) 79 
International Affairs 139 – 160 at 140. 
17
 See Nussbaum MC “Capabilities, Human Rights and the Universal Declaration” in Weston BH and Marks SP 
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18
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immutable values that endow standards norms with a universal validity. 
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is a fruit of western thinking which does not concur in every respect with non-western thinking.
21
 
If the Western thinking is pursued to its extreme end, the implication for access to medicines will 
be that governments of poor countries must protect intellectual property rights at all costs, even 
when upholding such “universal” rights will result in extinguishing the right to life for citizens. 
This will be inequitable and will militate against access to affordable medicines for those in dire 
need of it hence it is this study’s thesis that a departure from this conception of human rights and 
IP rights is called for.
22
 
Conceptualising something as a human right signifies its importance as a social or public good.
23
 
Rights focus on the dignity of persons, equality and non-discrimination.
24
 Rights imply 
entitlement and are almost never absolute and may be limited, such limitation being subject to 
strict scrutiny.
25
 A right ‘trumps’ many other claims or goods.26 Health issues, especially issues 
around access to medicines are, therefore, important to warrant categorisation as rights, hence 
health may be regarded in this context as a ‘social good’.27 The fact that the right to health is 
recognized locally and internationally gives legal and political legitimacy to the claims for its 
enjoyment.
28
 Rights only have a meaning if it is possible to enforce them.
29
 
Human rights constitute the basic framework guiding state actions on the domestic and 
international levels.
30
 Human rights are the ‘rights a person has by simply being born.’31 Human 
rights are minimum standards understood to be necessary for individuals to live in dignity.
32
 In 
terms of the United Nations Charter,
33
 the United Nations shall promote universal respect for and 
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observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion. The Charter is important in that human rights which were once only a 
matter of domestic concern have now been elevated to a subject of international treaty 
obligations.
34
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
35
 enumerates the basic rights of the 
individual and was the first international legal instrument to do so.
36
 It took almost two decades 
to move the aspirational concepts laid out in the UDHR into legally binding obligations.
37
 The 
‘right to freely participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in 
the scientific advancement and its benefits is the most relevant to intellectual property generally 
and to this study in particular.
38
  
It is important to highlight that the UDHR was passed by the General Assembly as a resolution 
with no force in law because it was never intended to create binding legal obligations.
39
 Notably, 
it was not signed because it was never intended to be signed.
40
 Today, however, the UDHR 
imposes some legal obligations on nation states.
41
 There is legal uncertainty over whether all 
rights proclaimed in the UDHR are binding and under what circumstances. Furthermore, there is 
no settled legal position on whether the obligatory character of the UDHR derives from its status 
as an authoritative tool for interpreting human rights as contained in the Charter or its status as 
customary international law.
42
  
Be that as it may, there are specific covenants which have been passed with the aim of 
transforming the general principles in the UDHR into binding treaty obligations.
43
 The covenants 
also seek to establish the international machinery to ensure governmental compliance. Very 
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pertinent to this study is the fact that the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights guarantees the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health.
44
 The realisation of the right, however, has to take place progressively within the 
limits of the state’s available resources.45 This provision is directly relevant to access to 
medicines. 
Historically, the protection of intellectual property rights was viewed in the context of the 
territorial, international and global periods.
46
 The territorial period was inward looking and the 
protection of intellectual property rights remained largely a matter for domestic legislation 
through statutes. Therefore, the protection of rights did not extend beyond the borders where the 
rights had been granted in the first place.
47
 On the other hand, the international period was 
characterized by growing interest in cooperation between nation states in the domain of 
intellectual property law.
48
 This period saw the introduction of the required international legal 
regulatory framework such as the Berne and Paris Conventions.
49
 The global period was driven 
by a bid to transform the existing international framework for intellectual property law into a 
harmonized intestate regulatory regime in sympathy with international commercial 
interdependency of the developed world.
50
 The move from the international to the global period 
saw a proliferation of international intellectual property regimes leading to harmonization in 
specific areas.
51
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The Berne
52
 and Paris
53
 conventions are silent on human rights and this may be due to human 
rights having been a non-issue at the time of signing the conventions.
54
 The TRIPS Agreement 
generally does not “expressis verbis” refer to either any human rights law instrument or any 
human right in particular.
55
 However, in the preamble to the TRIPS, reference is made to 
protections granted to authors and inventors as ‘rights’ (‘recognising that intellectual property are 
private rights’). If intellectual property rights are regarded as property rights as implicated in the 
preamble of TRIPS, they would then fall under article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights
56
 and article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
57
 The International Covenant on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
58
 establishes one’s right to:  
(a) take part in the cultural life,  
(b) the protection of moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author, as 
(c) a human right.59 
Rights granted under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 15 of the ICESCR converge with the 
objectives of the WTO Agreement to which the TRIPS Agreement is an annex; more specifically 
with reference to the emphasis put on the public interest rationale of intellectual property 
protection.
60
 The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights reflected 
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on Article 15.1 (c) of the ICESCR and produced General Comment no. 17,
61
 wherein intellectual 
property rights were cited as different from human rights due to their general temporary nature 
which can be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else.
62
 Human rights do not have the 
above characteristics and are timeless expressions of fundamental interests of the human 
person.
63
 
Focusing specifically on the TRIPS Agreement, it does not reflect the fundamental nature and 
indivisibility of human rights, including the ‘right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications’.64 Hence, there is an apparent conflict between the intellectual 
property rights regime embodied in TRIPS, on the one hand, and international human rights law 
on the other.
65
 The attention of the human rights system was first drawn to the TRIPS Agreement 
in 2000.
66
 The debate led to the adoption of the Resolution on Intellectual Property and Human 
Rights.
67
 The resolution is critical of the TRIPS Agreement and states that ‘actual or potential 
conflict exists between the implementation of’ the treaty ‘and the realization of economic, social 
and cultural rights’.68 Specific areas causing the conflict include inter alia, transfer of technology 
to developing countries, the right to food and plant variety rights, genetically modified 
organisms, bio-piracy, reduction of commercial control over own genetic and natural resources 
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and restrictions on access to patented pharmaceuticals and implications for the enjoyment of the 
right to health (my emphasis).
69
 
To resolve the conflict, the Sub-Commission urged states, inter-governmental organisations and 
NGOs to recognize that human rights have ‘primacy….over economic policies and 
agreements’.70 However, it is disheartening that Sub-Commission resolutions are by their very 
nature non-binding. Hence, they do not impose immediate legal consequences.
71
  
In the decade since the resolution’s adoption, the overwhelming positive responses it has elicited 
have been reflected in numerous resolutions,
72
 reports,
73
 comments
74
 and statements
75
 relating to 
TRIPS and intellectual property protection more generally. The most important reaction which 
goes to the core of this study was the publication in 2008, of Human Rights Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines.
76
 The publication urges 
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pharmaceutical companies to ‘make and respect a public commitment not to lobby for more 
demanding protection of intellectual property interests than those required by the TRIPS’.77 
The Council for Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR)
78
 and the First Protocol thereto, are both silent on intellectual property.
79
 
However, there is one notable case of the European Commission on Human Rights dealing with 
intellectual property as a right.
80
 In this case, a patent right is recognized as a property right in 
the context of the ECHR. There is likely to be a practical legal enigma if a corporation can be 
regarded as an owner of intellectual property and hence an enjoyer of human rights.
81
 
In the European Union (EU) context, the recently adopted Charter of Fundamental Rights
82
 
provides that intellectual property shall be protected. However, the provision falls short of 
introducing the human right to intellectual property rights because it is addressed to institutions 
of the EU rather than the right holders.
83
 
Constitutional and related legislations of many countries pay attention to acknowledging and 
securing the promotion and protection of creativity and innovation in various ways.
84
 However, 
in the constitutional context, what is contemplated is the vertical application and enforcement of 
the intellectual property rights against the state rather than the horizontal application of the rights 
between citizens.
85
 
3.1.3 Intellectual Property and Human Rights in Legal Literature: Some Problematic Areas 
Having briefly traced the background to the relationship between intellectual property law and 
human rights above, it is now appropriate to give a brief overview of the converging and 
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diverging scholarly views on the problematic relationship. Many scholars have made incisive 
and telling contributions that attempt to unravel the conceptual and paradoxical relationship 
between intellectual property rights and human rights. In the following paragraphs, a summary of 
some of the leading views is given. 
Intellectual property rights are instrumental in promoting and protecting human rights, hence 
they need to be implemented into domestic law.
86
 Human rights can be used as instruments to 
deflect the moral appeal of certain affirmative rights of intellectual property holders by, for 
example, justifying compulsory licences in the interest of public health.
87
 This submission would 
make more sense when viewed against Chapman’s analysis of Article 27 (2) of the UDHR and 
Article 15.1 (c) of the ICESCR, wherein he opines that participating states are under an 
obligation to develop intellectual property law regimes that have an explicit human rights 
orientation.
88
 
Intellectual property rights are not first and foremost ‘economic commodities’ but have an 
intrinsic value as an expression of human dignity and creativity.
89
 An understanding of 
intellectual property as a human right is lacking in the WTO and by extension in the TRIPS 
Agreement.
90
 There is, therefore, a need to take a non-uniform view of intellectual property since 
not all intellectual property rights can be considered as human rights.
91
 The imposition of    
WTO-wide minimum standards for intellectual patent protection has been contested on the basis 
that public health concerns require weaker or more flexible patent protection in the 
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pharmaceutical field.
92
 This argument has often been advanced by or on behalf of developing 
countries.
93
  
If corporations are bound by human rights norms, then pharmaceutical companies would be 
bound by the right to access medicine, if it exists (see below) and thus be held accountable where 
their pricing violates the obligations imposed under the right.
94
 However, it will be difficult to 
attribute state-like attributes to corporations in the absence of an express categorization of human 
rights obligations in light of the fact that international law traditionally binds states.
95
 
Fundamental rights would not only serve as a guide for the application of intellectual property 
law but also for the reorganization of intellectual property law in future.
96
 
If intellectual property is viewed as a ‘right to benefit’, due to the intellectual property system 
having been established as the primary means by which to access this ‘benefit’, then, intellectual 
property rights are in effect aligned with human rights.
97
 This view and the others expressed 
before it sharply contrasts with Drahos’ view in which he argues that intellectual property rights 
are universally recognized notwithstanding the fact that this does not make them universal 
human rights, since they depend on legislative declaration and are for a limited time (usually 20 
years). It is notable, therefore, that they do not belong to all human beings and also that not all 
intellectual property rights protect personal interests of their originators.
98
 
While the UDHR recognizes intellectual property as a human right,
99
 promoting universal 
intellectual property protection is incompatible with the promotion of human physical 
wellbeing.
100
 Indeed, if intellectual property is regarded as a guaranteed human right, developing 
countries would be put at a disadvantage, both in developing policies to sustain economic growth 
and in increasing global markets.
101
 It is submitted that in the same way as there is a hierarchy of 
laws, there is also a hierarchy of human rights hence it should be conceded that some human 
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rights take priority over other human rights. In the context of this study, it would seem likely that 
the right to physical wellbeing (read medicines) will have to trump intellectual property rights. 
For developing countries generally, and specifically those in the SADC region, recognising that 
this hierarchy exists will go a long way towards resolving the access to medicines enigma.  
There is a need to protect everyone who is likely to be negatively affected by strengthened 
intellectual property rights standards (like Ostergard) and also to consider the broader question of 
the role of science and technology in a human rights framework.
102
 The ability of WIPO and the 
WTO to infuse human rights into the intellectual property legal regime they promote is in serious 
doubt.
103
 The main reason for this could be due to the fact that both organisations have been 
established to promote the facilitation of international commerce at the behest of the private 
sector in the West rather than to promote human welfare in the world, especially in the South. 
On the other hand, characterizing intellectual property as a human right implies construing the 
right to enjoy monopoly right and rent as a human right even if it is at the expense of society at 
large.
104
 This goes against the basis of Article 15.1 (c) of the ICESCR which talks of striking the 
balance between intellectual property and human rights. Viewed in this light, intellectual 
property rights and human rights are incompatible because intellectual property rights get in the 
way of countries seeking enforcement of human rights.
105
 
The above outline highlights the problematic relationship between intellectual property and 
human rights and summarizes some of the major juridical views on the subject.  It is generally 
not desirable to highlight problems without proposing solutions thereto. Therefore, the following 
section continues outlining the major writings on intellectual property and human rights but with 
a bias towards offering solutions to the problematic relationship. Where possible, the solutions 
are contextualized to the access to medicines problem, in order not to blur the focus of the study. 
3.1.4 Intellectual Property and Human Rights in Legal Literature: Some Possible Solutions 
According to Grosheide,
106
 there are three possible approaches that may be adopted in order to 
resolve the problematic relationship between intellectual property and human rights. The first 
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possible approach is to reshape the existing national and international intellectual property law so 
that the apparent tensions between the law and human rights would fall away.
107
 This would 
entail infusing human rights norms into intellectual property law.  
The other solution the author suggests would require governmental intervention which would 
focus on an instrumental approach aimed at introducing a ‘human rights framework for the 
execution of intellectual property rights’.108 The crux of this solution is that human rights should 
be used to restrict intellectual property rights in a horizontal fashion, and intellectual property 
law should be instrumental in the implementation of human rights.
109
  
Thirdly, a solution that differentiates human rights qualities of individual intellectual property 
rights is suggested.
110
 This approach is dubbed the application of a ‘human rights hierarchy’ and 
will result in some intellectual property rights acquiring a human rights status while others will 
not. There is a positive outlook to this proposed solution, namely that if intellectual property is 
given a human rights face, this may positively lead to the protection of cultural expressions.
111
  
If the foregoing approach is adopted, stressing the human rights quality of intellectual property 
rights, which stands in the way of patented medicine, will be overcome.
112
 This proposed 
solution, which is quite pertinent to the objectives of this study, will be welcomed by developing 
countries grappling with access issues. It is submitted that intellectual property law will have to 
be reshaped through a concerted effort by WIPO and the WTO, and expanding the way in which 
human rights law may be applied horizontally and the execution of intellectual property rights 
between private parties will be a less drastic action.  
Rights language in relation to intellectual property runs through many international 
instruments.
113
 The paradox arises when one human right is pitted against another such as when 
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intellectual property rights are used to restrict access to information that could, at no cost to the 
developer, satisfy human needs.
114
  
Elevating intellectual property rights to human rights has unfortunate pragmatic consequences.
115
 
Using the human rights approach will ensure that the benefits of an invention can be distributed, 
without the patentee’s authorization only to meet social needs classified as universal.116 This 
approach may clash with the utilitarian goal of limiting protection from free riders as a means of 
encouraging the advancement of knowledge.
117
 It is submitted that access to medicines is too 
closely tied to the fundamental right to health.
118
 The implication thereof is that limiting it in this 
context would amount to a violation of the right. 
Patent law anticipates a human rights welfare maximising approach at the international level.
119
 
Although the TRIPS’ objectives are cast in utilitarian rather than human rights terms, the rights 
must be balanced against social welfare concerns ‘in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations’.120 Rights talk creates an adversarial climate 
in which each side ups the ante, further limiting access to important developments, and 
interfering with the proper operation of the system as a whole.
121
 
The utilitarian perspective, therefore, remains a viable solution which allows policy makers to 
use available tools to make law responsive to changes in innovation and align the system with 
other social interests including but not limited to those deemed fundamental.
122
 
Similarly, Brinkohof
123
 recommends the adoption of the utilitarian approach as far as possible 
but when it comes to infringement cases, adopts a human rights approach to granting an interdict 
to users.
124
 The recommendation is inspired by a provision of the Dutch Civil Code, which 
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allows a judge to refuse an injunction (interdict) where the acts leading to the injunction are 
viewed as tolerable because of some interest which is fundamental to society.
125
 If this view is 
followed, it can bring relief to countries seeking access, which may issue compulsory licenses 
without going through the whole cumbersome TRIPS process and justify this on the basis that 
the compulsory license must be tolerated because it will bring social welfare and a healthy nation 
(‘important societal interest’).126  
Because law is not a human right but an instrument of economic policy,
127
 it is indefensible in 
law to claim that an entitlement to patent protection is a human right.
128
 While there is mention 
of intellectual property rights and in some specific instances patent rights in international human 
rights instruments,
129
 the overall tenor of the human rights provisions thereof is extremely vague 
as to what might be understood to form part of the content of the ‘right to protection’.130 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in Europe
131
 provides that intellectual property shall be 
protected but does not refer to inventors being entitled to patents; neither is there any reference 
saying that patents are to be considered as human rights.
132
 Patents which have been granted will 
in all likelihood qualify as property and therefore enjoy the protection of fundamental human 
rights.
133
  
The question immediately arising out of the foregoing submission is: If the granted patents are 
property and enjoy the rights normally associated with property, can they be expropriated using 
domestic legislation or principles applicable to appropriation of alien property in terms of 
sovereignty over natural resources? If one were to go pedantically legalistic, the answer will be 
in the affirmative. With specific reference to local patents, this approach may be useful in partly 
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resolving the access problem through expropriation of patent rights and justifying this on the 
basis that property may be expropriated for a public purpose and accompanied by prompt and 
adequate compensation.
134
 Expropriation could then be justified on the basis of rights, with 
specific reference to the right to health and life.  
While patent rights are not fundamental human rights, patent law is subordinate to human rights 
and should a conflict arise between the two, patent law must give way.
135
 This interpretive 
submission is to be welcomed in light of its potential for increasing and improving access to 
essential medicines.  
If patent rights are elevated to fundamental rights, patent rights may be expanded against the 
desires of impoverished peoples to manufacture and distribute inexpensive versions of patented 
drugs.
136
 When the poor claim the right to human health
137
 and to share in the scientific progress 
by being allowed access to cheap patented medication (either through compulsory licenses, 
parallel importation or differential pricing), this may be countered by reference to an imagined 
right to patents by pharmaceutical companies.
138
 Therefore, it is undesirable to equate patent 
rights to fundamental human rights. Pharmaceutical companies, being corporations, have rights 
which under positive existing law are of a different nature and not protected at the level of 
human rights.
139
 Human rights must inevitably provide external limitations to the exercise of 
intellectual property rights.
140
 Intellectual property law must be viewed as designed to fulfil 
human rights’ objectives; hence human rights and intellectual property are compatible and can 
co-exist.
141
 Both intellectual property and human rights aim at enhancing welfare and the benefit 
for society.
142
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3.2 Access to Medicines in the Context of the Right to Health 
3.2.1 Preliminary Remarks 
In general, human rights are legally guaranteed by international, regional and national human 
rights law, protecting individuals and groups against actions that interfere with fundamental 
freedoms and human dignity.
143
 Most human rights are interdependent and as a good example of 
such interdependence, the right to health is closely associated with the right to life and is 
indispensable for the exercise of most other human rights.
144
    
The right to health includes ‘underlying determinants of health such as access to safe and 
portable water and adequate sanitation, adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, 
healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and access to health-related education and 
information’.145 Additionally, the right to health requires the availability and accessibility of 
‘functioning public health and health-care facilities, goods and services, as well as 
programmes’.146 Access to medicines is conceptualized as a sub-component of the broader right 
to adequate health.
147
 
In this section of the chapter, aspects of the right to health are discussed by linking them with 
access issues from an international and regional perspective. The specific provisions talking 
directly to the right to health are identified and their potential for resolving access to medicines 
issues, specifically from a developing world and SADC perspective is explored.  
3.2.2 An Overview of regional and International activity on the Right to Health and Access to 
Medicines 
A number of human rights institutions and actors have played a critical role in the development 
of human rights norms in the context of the right to health.
148
 These include treaty bodies such as 
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the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
149
 intergovernmental bodies such as the 
U.N Human Rights Council (formerly the Commission on Human Rights);
150
 and special 
procedures and individual office holders such as the U.N Commissioner for Human Rights,
151
 
and the U.N Special Rapporteurs on the right to health and food.
152
 
Regional
153
 and domestic actors are also increasingly involved in the development and 
implementation of human rights norms as they relate to access to medicines. At the regional 
level, these include the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
154
 and the African 
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of the Highest Standard of Physical and Mental Health, 61
st
 Sess., U.N Doc.A/61/338 (2006); U.N Special 
Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental 
Health, Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines, U.N 
Doc/A/63/263 (11 August 2008) (prepared by Paul Hunt) (addressing human rights obligations of pharmaceutical 
companies); U.N Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Report to U.N General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/64/170 
(23 July 2009) (prepared by Olivier De Schutter) (addressing the interaction between human rights and intellectual 
property); U.N Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Right to Food, Report to 
Commission on Human Rights, U.N.Doc E/CN.4/2004/10, para 39 (9 February 2004) (prepared by Jean Ziegler) 
(addressing the interaction between human rights and intellectual property). 
153
 In the specific context of this study, see SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan 2007 -2013, published by the 
SADC Secretariat on 27 June 2007, and the more recent Draft SADC Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential 
Medicines and Health Commodities 2013-2017, published by the SADC Secretariat in September 2012. 
154
 See for example, Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez and Others v El Salvador, case 12.249, Report No. 29/01, 
OEA/Ser. L/V/II.111 Doc. 20 Rev. at 284 (2000) in which an HIV infected individual claimed inter alia, that the El 
Salvador government had violated the right to life  and health by failing to provide antiretroviral drugs. The Inter-
American Commission issued a precautionary measures order and declared the complaint admissible, but the case 
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Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.155 Domestically, a number of courts have played a 
critical role in translating these norms into tangible rights and benefits.
156
 
3.2.2.1 The Right to Health and Access to Medicines in Specific International Human Rights 
Instruments 
The right to health was not developed until the end of the Second World War when the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), a specialized agency of the United Nations,
157
 was established.
158
 
The constitution of the WHO, which came into force on 7 April 1948, was the first international 
legal document to contain an explicit right to the ‘enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health’.159 Health was defined, rather idealistically, as a ‘state of complete physical, mental and 
social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’.160  It is not easy to find a 
clear and simple definition of health because the concept is very complex, encompassing many 
facets of human life and a variety of dimensions, such as health care and health conditions.
161
  
Therefore, ‘the right to health embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote 
conditions in which people can lead a healthy life’.162 It was further provided that the ‘enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being 
without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition.’163 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ended in a friendly settlement after the El Salvadorian Supreme Court ordered that drugs be provided in a similar 
case.  
155
 See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on Access to Health and Needed Medicines 
in Africa, ACHPR/Res.141 (XXXXXIIII) 08 (24 Nov. 2008), available at 
http:www.achpr.org/sessions/44
th/resolutions/141 (last visited 12/11/12). The resolution urges states to ‘guarantee 
the full scope of access to needed medicines’ and calls upon states to fulfil their duties by promoting, protecting and 
fulfilling access to medicines. 
156
 See for example the South African case of Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) (2002) 5 SA 
721 (CC), in which it was held that the South African government’s restrictions on the distribution of antiretroviral 
drugs to pregnant women amounted to a violation of the constitutional right to health; Lopez Glenda yatros v 
Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros Sociales (IVSS) s/ accion de amparo Expediente 00-1343. (1999 Venezuelan 
Constitutional Court) in which the Venezuelan government was ordered to provide antiretrovirals on a regular and 
reliable basis to a group of individuals living with HIV/AIDS and the Argentinian case of Viceconte, Mariela v 
Estado Nacional (Ministerio de Salud y Ministerio de Economia de la Nacion) s/ Accion de amparo, (1998) Causa 
no. 31.777/96 in which the Argentinian Federal Administrative Court of Appeals found a violation of the right to 
health under Art 12 of the ICESCR and ordered the Argentinian government to produce and distribute a vaccine. 
157
 See Article 57 of the U.N Charter. 
158
 Hestermeyer above at 84. 
159
 Ibid. See preamble thereto. 
160
 Preamble to the WHO Constitution. 
161
 Riedel above 6. 
162
 General Comment No. 14 above. 
163
 Preamble to the WHO Constitution. 
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With few exceptions, the relationship between health and human rights was not subject to close, 
serious examination until the 1990s.
164
 The human right to health is now incorporated in many 
global
165
 and regional
166
 human rights agreements and two thirds of national constitutions.
167
  
The most basic document in the sphere of human rights is the UDHR which stipulates that 
‘everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate to the health of himself and his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and social services’.168 When it was adopted, 
the UDHR was somewhat legally non-binding but has since assumed the status of customary 
international law for most of its provisions.
169
 Since the adoption of the UDHR, a number of U.N 
institutions and conferences have dealt with or addressed issues of health and have adopted 
various principles and declarations.
170
 Of the eight U.N Millennium Development Goals 
(MGDs), three have a direct health care dimension while target 17 of MDG number 8 calls for 
cooperation with pharmaceutical companies in order to provide access to affordable essential 
drugs in developing countries.
171
  
                                                          
164
 See Human Rights Council Fourth Session Item 2 of the Provisional agenda Implementation of General Assembly 
Resolution 60/251 of 15 MARCH 2006 Entitled Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapoteur on the Right 
of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, A/HRC/4/28 (17 
January 2007. 
165
 For a comprehensive list of international instruments, see Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health E/C.12/2000/4 (hereafter General Comment No. 14) para 2 
available at http://www.unchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4.En (last visited 30/11/12). Apart from the 
provisions of the UDHR and the ICESCR, other international instruments like Article 5 (e) (iv) of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965; Articles 11.1 (f) and 12 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAWO) of 1979 and Article 24 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognize the right to health. 
166
 Several regional human rights instruments also recognize the right to health such as Article 11 of the Revised 
European Social Charter of 1961; Article 16 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; and Article 10 
of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights of 1988. Similarly, the right to health has been proclaimed by the Commission on Human Rights in 
its Resolution 1989/11, as well as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993. 
167
 Kinney E.D and Clark B.A “Provisions for Health and Health Care in the Constitutions of the Countries of the 
World” (2004) 37 Cornel International Law Journal at 291.  
168
 Per Article 25 (1) of the UDHR. 
169
 See Riedel E “Health, Right to, International Protection” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (2007) at 2. 
170
 For example, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the Vienna World Conference on 
Human Rights (1993) alludes to the right to health in its repeated acknowledgement of the importance health care 
and protection; also the U.N Millennium Declaration, adopted on 8 September 2000 by the  U.N General Assembly 
stresses the importance of health care and prevention of disease by committing to the improvement of maternal and 
child health and the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.  
171
 The SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan was conceived in this specific context and this study aims at making a 
modest contribution towards the actualization of target 17 of MGD number 8. It has been widely reported that most 
SADC members will not be able to achieve the MGDs by the 2015 target (see specifically Sikuka K “A more 
Positive approach as Africa Prepares for Post-2015 Development Agenda” (2013) 15 SADC Today). 
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Additionally, other U.N instruments mention health in various contexts.
172
 All these instruments 
and several others relevant to health have either been adopted or approved by the U.N General 
Assembly although they have no legally binding effect on states/governments.
173
 The 
instruments, however, form an important component within the international movement to 
promote and protect the physical and mental health of human beings throughout the world.
174
 
In addition to the U.N based Charter system outlined above, there is a robust international treaty 
based system featuring several conventions which state legally binding provisions for their 
respective signatories.
175
 The most important treaty in this specific regard is the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which states that: 
The state parties to the present covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health. 2. The steps to be taken by the state parties to the present 
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: (a) The provision for 
the reduction of the stillbirth –rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child; (b) 
The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, treatment and 
control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would 
assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.
176
 
 
In the context of this study, with the possible exception of sub-paragraph (b), medicines can be 
needed for all the aspects of health policies mentioned in paragraph 2.
177
 The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
178
 interprets Article 12 as attributing to states 
                                                          
172
 See the following U.N General Assembly Resolutions: Resolution 48/104 of 20 December 1993 (refers to the 
right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental health); Resolution 46/91 of 16 December 1991 
(stresses the importance of access to adequate health care ‘to maintain or regain the optimum level of physical, 
mental and emotional well-being and to prevent or delay the onset of illness’); Resolution 46/119 of 17 December 
1991 (focuses on mental health care as one aspect of the right to health); Resolution S-26/2 OF 27 June 2001 
(promotes international awareness regarding HIV/AIDS) and Resolution 45/111 of 14 December 1990 and the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners of 1977 include many other references to health care and 
protection. 
173
 Riedel above at 3. 
174
 Ibid. 
175
 Ibid. 
176
 Article 12 of ICESCR. 
177
 See Niada L (Niada 1) “The Human Right to Medicine in Relation to Patents in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some 
Critical Remarks” (2011) 15 The International Journal of Human Rights 700 – 727 705. 
178
 The CESCR’s pronouncements are not binding per se but can be considered ‘authoritative interpretations’ of the 
Covenant, see for example, Skogly S.I and Gibney M “Transnational Human Rights Obligations” (2002) 4 Human 
Rights Quarterly 791. The Committee has been active in elaborating General Comments on various  ICESCR 
provisions and on how to better implement the Covenant; issuing reporting guidelines for the ICESCR Parties, 
relating to issues and policies on which states have to focus their attention; analysing states’ implementation of the 
Covenant and expressing ‘concluding considerations’ on them [Niada L (Niada 2) “Hunger and International Law: 
The far Reaching Scope of the Right to Food” (2006) 22 Connecticut Journal of International Law 149]. CESCR 
comments are also considered by national courts in some instances, see for example Government of South Africa v 
Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) SA BCLR 1169 (CC) at paras 11-13. 
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obligations with regard to medicines.
179
 The ICESCR clearly identifies the provision of essential 
medicines as one of the measures to be taken under sub-paragraph (d) that the Committee 
maintains, ‘includes the provision of equal and timely access to basic preventive, curative, 
rehabilitative health services and…the provision of essential drugs…180  
Article 12 of the ICESCR can be violated by the ‘adoption of legislation or policies which are 
manifestly incompatible with pre-existing domestic or international legal obligations in relation 
to the right to health.’181 It is, therefore, relevant in the context of this study to argue that strong 
patent laws may constitute such incompatible legislation.
182
 Similarly, the failure to 
appropriately regulate non-state entities such as private pharmaceutical companies ‘so as to 
prevent them from violating the right to health of others’ may also amount to a breach of Article 
12.
183
 Some authorities have argued that the failure to cap big pharmaceutical companies’ (‘big 
pharma’) prices may be an example of such a culpable omission.184 
The ICESCR provides the main foundation for legal obligations in the field of health.
185
 The 
ICESCR lists a number of steps to be taken by State Parties to achieve the full realisation of the 
right to health, including the right to: maternal, child and reproductive health, healthy natural and 
workplace environments; prevention, treatment and control of diseases; and ‘the creation of 
conditions which would make it possible for indispensable medical service and medical attention 
to be given in the event of sickness’.186  
The right to health implies, like other economic and social rights, that there is an obligation to be 
respected, protected and have that right fulfilled.
187
 Therefore, states are urged to refrain from 
interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right; furthermore, states should take 
                                                          
179
 ICESCR Article 12. 
180
 General Comment no. 14 para 17. 
181
 Joseph S “Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The ‘Fourth Wave’ of Corporate Human Rights 
Scrutiny” (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 425 -452 438.  
182
 Ibid. 
183
 General Comment no.14 para 51. 
184
 Joseph above at 439. I do not entirely agree with this submission because it is possible that current government 
action which facilitates patents and high prices may be justifiable in international human rights law as a necessary 
means of ensuring on-going innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.  
185
 Hogerzeil above at 372. 
186
 Article 12.2 of ICESCR. 
187
 Cullet above at 148. 
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measures to prevent third parties from interfering with the guarantees provided.
188
  With specific 
reference to actions states can take internally to ensure the enjoyment of the right to health, they 
are further enjoined to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures ‘towards 
the full realization of the right’.189  
It is important to point out that the implementation of the ICESCR, a treaty that is binding to its 
membership of over 150 State parties, is monitored by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights which regularly issues authoritative but non-binding comments to clarify the 
nature and content of individual rights and state obligations.
190
 Therefore, the ICESCR has made 
a significant contribution to the codification of the human right to health and demarcated its 
scope.
191
  
In General Comment no.14,
192
 the Committee stated that the medical service mentioned in the 
pertinent provision of the ICESCR
193
 incudes the provision of essential drugs ‘as defined by the 
WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs’.194 The notion of ‘the highest attainable standard 
of health,
195
 which is elaborated upon by General Comment no.14, takes into account both the 
individual’s biological and socio-economic preconditions and the state’s available resources.196 
In that vein, therefore, the ICESCR thus generally requires that member states take all feasible 
steps to the maximum of their available resources to progressively achieve the full realization of 
the protected rights.
197
  
Progressive realisation of the Right to health ‘means that States parties have a specific and 
continuing obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full 
                                                          
188
 Cullet above at 148. 
189
 Ibid. 
190
 Hogerzeil above at 372. 
191
 Cullet P above at 139. 
192
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 
11/08/2000/4, CESCR, para 12 (a). 
193
 Namely Article 12.2 (d) thereof. 
194
 According to Hogerzeil, the first Model List of Essential Medicines of 1977 preceded the famous 1978 
Declaration of Alma Ata on health for all. The author further opines that essential medicines are those that satisfy 
the priority health care needs of the population are selected with due regard to disease prevalence, evidence on 
efficacy, safety and comparative cost effectiveness.  
195
 Per Article 12.1 of the ICESCR. 
196
 General Comment no. 14 above at para 9. 
197
 Cullet above at 148. 
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realization of Article 12’.198 The resource dependency of the fulfilment of the right to health 
undermines the universality of the right and leaves states with insufficient implementation 
guidelines.
199
 The covenant also recognizes that the full realisation of the rights may require 
more than domestic measures. Hence, it provides that these measures should be taken by 
individual states and through international assistance and cooperation.
200
 
The right to health in all its forms and at all levels contains specific interrelated and essential 
elements, namely: availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality.
201
 It has been argued that 
states could ensure that medicines are available by making use of compulsory licenses as 
provided for under the TRIPS.
202
 This will guarantee the availability of sufficient quantities of 
medicines within individual countries.
203
 Supporting research and development of drugs to 
address diseases that place a particular burden on the developing countries could be another way 
of making drugs available.
204
 Taking into account the state’s developmental level, the presence 
of functioning public health and health-care facilities, goods and services, as well as 
programmes, will be an indicator of the availability leg of the right to health.
205
 
Accessibility, which has four overlapping dimensions, namely non-discrimination,
206
 physical 
accessibility,
207
 economic accessibility
208
 and information accessibility,
209
 must be afforded to 
everyone within the jurisdiction of the state party.
210
 Calls for both availability and accessibility 
                                                          
198
 General Comment no. 14 above para 31. 
199
 Meier BM and Mori LM “The Highest Attainable Standard: Advancing a Collective Human Right to Public 
Health” (2005) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 101 at 114. 
200
 Cullet above at 148. 
201
 See generally para 12 of General Comment no.14. 
202
 Narula above at 6. 
203
It must be noted that patents are not the only factor hampering access because even cheaper generic versions of 
drugs may not be affordable for people below the poverty line (Cullet above 143). 
204
 Narula above at 6. 
205
 General Comment No.14 para 12 (a). 
206
 General Comment No.14 para 12 (b). Health facilities, goods and services must be accessible to all, especially the 
most vulnerable or marginalized sections of the population, in law and in fact, without discrimination on any of the 
prohibited grounds. 
207
 General Comment No. 14 para 12 (b). The implication is that health facilities, goods and services must be within 
a safe physical reach for all sections of the population especially the vulnerable or marginalized groups. 
208
 Economic accessibility simply refers to affordability in that health facilities and services must be affordable for 
all and that equity demands that poorer households should not be disproportionately burdened with health expenses 
as compared to richer households (General Comment No. 14 para 12 (b).  
209
 This entails the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas concerning health issues. If information is 
accessible, then individuals can use the information as a basis for making informed decisions about the medicines 
they are taking (Narula above 7). 
210
 General Comment No.14 para 12 (b). 
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have been especially pronounced in the face of various global pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and tuberculosis.
211
 
On the issue of acceptability, all health facilities, goods and services must be respectful of 
medical ethics and be culturally appropriate. The cultural appropriateness entails a health 
programme that is respectful of the culture of individuals, minorities, peoples and communities 
and sensitive to gender and life cycle requirements, as well as being respectful of confidentiality 
in order to improve the health status of those concerned.
212
  
Finally, it is almost obvious that states must ensure that medicines are of a good quality.
213
 To 
ensure the availability of good quality medicines, skilled medical personnel, scientifically 
approved and unexpired drugs and hospital equipment, safe and portable water, and adequate 
sanitation must be present.
214
 
While the ICESCR allows for a ‘progressive realisation’ of the rights contained therein, 215 State 
parties have an immediate obligation to ensure non-discrimination in the provision of social, 
cultural and economic rights; and to take immediate steps towards the realization of these 
rights.
216
 Furthermore, states may not engage in conduct that causes this realization of human 
rights to regress.
217
 Since the ICESCR and the General Comment emphasize so much on the 
right to health and how it may be enjoyed in the context of accessing medicines, the next 
pertinent issue to consider is whether or not there is a right to have access to medicines, and if so, 
what the best approach towards realizing this right would be. The next section responds briefly to 
the two issues. 
3.3 Is there a Right to Have Access to Medicines?  
While there is almost universal consensus that access to drugs is one of the fundamental 
components of the human right to health,
218
 it is not very clear whether there is a corresponding 
                                                          
211
 Narula above at 7. 
212
 General Comment No. 14 para 12 (c). 
213
 General Comment No.14 para 12 (d). 
214
 Ibid. 
215
 Article 12 of the ICESCR. 
216
 Narula above at 9. 
217
 Ibid. 
218
 Cullet above 142. See further, Van Gulik C “The Impact of TRIPS on Access to Medicines and the Right to 
Health of Children” (2004) Lawanddevelopment.org series 9. 
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human right to access medicines or not.
219
 Accessibility of medicines is a critical component not 
only of the right to health, but also the rights to life, non-discrimination, an adequate standard of 
living, benefits of scientific progress and many others.
220
  
Some authors have, however, boldly referred to how ‘the human right to medicines can be, in 
practice, operationalized and implemented in sub-Saharan Africa with regard to the protection of 
patent rights’.221 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights recently issued a 
resolution on access to medicines, which inter alia, recognizes that ‘access to needed medicines 
is a fundamental component of the human right to health and that States Parties to the African 
Charter have an obligation to provide where appropriate needed medicines, or facilitate access to 
them’.222  
In terms of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 179 of 2003,
223
 access to 
medication in the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS,
224
 tuberculosis and malaria is a 
fundamental element of the right to health. The Resolution calls upon states to pursue policies 
that would promote availability, accessibility and the quality of pharmaceutical products or 
medical technologies used to treat such pandemics or the most common opportunistic 
infections.
225
 
Consequently, the obligation to respect access to medicines as part of a human right to health, 
culminating in the respect of the ‘human right to medicines’ are identifiable in international 
customary law.
226
  
The provisions relating to access to medicines as a human right are, however, imprecise and 
international instruments such as the Alma Ata Declaration on Primary health Care
227
 and the 
                                                          
219
 Health is a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human rights (General Comment 
No.14 para 1).  
220
 Yamin AE “Not Just a Tragedy: Access to Medication as a Right under International Law” (2003) 21 Boston 
University International Law Journal 326-343 338. 
221
 Niada above at 702. 
222
 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2008, Resolution on Access to Health and Needed 
Medicines in Africa, OAU Doc.ACHPR/Res. 141 (XXXXIIII) 08, 24 November 2008, preamble, para 5 available at 
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 UN General Assembly Resolution 179 (2003), UN Doc.A/RES/58/179, para 1. 
224
 In the acute context of HIV/AIDS, access to medicines is a crucial factor to ensure health and life for millions 
who are now infected (Van Gulik above 9). 
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 Niada above at 708. 
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U.N General Assembly Resolution (2003) 
228
 explicitly commits state parties to the promotion of 
access to medicines as part of human rights law.
229
 Jonathan Mann,
230
 cited in Heywood
231
 is 
said to have once argued that the ‘contribution of medicine to health, while undeniably important 
(and vital in certain situations), is actually quite limited’. However, side by side with the 
foregoing observation, when one looks at the emergence of ‘treatable pandemics (HIV/AIDS), 
the resilience of others (TB), breakthroughs in some crucial areas of medicine and paralysis in 
others,’ access to drugs as part of the right to health remains extremely crucial. 
In the context of the WTO Agreement, at the first WTO Ministerial meeting in Doha, the 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (hereafter Doha Declaration) clarified certain aspects of 
the TRIPS Agreement that were believed to be in conflict with human rights law thus affirming 
the primacy of the right to health in implementing intellectual property rights as follows:
232
 
“We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to 
protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS agreement, we affirm 
that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”233 
In light of the submissions by the authorities cited above, it is indeed appropriate to underline 
that there is no textual basis for the right to access to medicines but rather a universal right to 
health of which access to medicines constitutes an important subset. Because this study is biased 
towards using the human rights approach to solve the access problem for the SADC region, it is 
now appropriate to briefly explore the tenets and content of the rights-based approach and 
tentatively explore its possible application to the resolution of the access to medicines problem. 
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 Declaration of Alma Ata 1978 available at 
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/113877/E93944.pdf (last visited 12/03/13), provides 
in Article I that Health is a fundamental human right [my emphasis] and that the attainment of the highest possible 
level of health is a most important world-wide social goal whose realization requires the action of many other social 
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 Mann J, Gruskin S, Grodin M and Annas G (Eds), “Medicine and Public Health, Ethics and Human Rights” in 
Mann J Health and Human Rights: A Reader (1999) 439 -452. 
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 Heywood M “Drug Access, Patents and Global Health: ‘Chaffed and Waxed Sufficient’” (2002) 23 Third World 
Quarterly 217 – 231 at 220. 
232
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(2002) 3 Chicago Journal for International Law 39 – 67. 
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(last visited 12/03/13) 
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3.4 The Rights-based Approach and its Potential Utility in Resolving the access Problem 
3.4.1 Preliminary Remarks 
Since I have established elsewhere in this chapter that access to medicines is an important 
component of the right to health, it is appropriate to prescribe the right-based approach as a 
possible solution to resolving the access problem. If, despite the lack of consensus over whether 
or not there is a right to access medicines, human rights norms are infused into access to 
medicines policy and legislation, access to medicines may improve. 
3.4.2 What is a Rights-Based Approach? 
It is asserted that ‘there is no source that neither defines human rights-based approaches nor is 
there a uniform approach’ in this regard.234 The definition varies depending on whether it comes 
from an NGO, donor government, UN Agencies and organisations.
235
 The definitions of human 
rights approaches are generally based on international human rights norms (taken from the 
UDHR and international human rights treaties) but concepts from other discourses are also 
imported. Examples of fields from which concepts have been imported are ethics,
236
 good 
governance,
237
 development and social justice.
238
 
The rights–based approach239 is about claims, bringing about a ‘root cause’ approach, focusing 
primarily on matters of state policy and discrimination.
240
 In this approach, ‘the move from needs 
to rights, and from charity to duties, also implies an increased focus on accountability.’241 In the 
relevant context, the promotion and protection of human rights appears to be articulated more 
through the notions of good governance, democratization, inclusion and participation.
242
  
The human rights approach argues that any process of change that is being promoted through 
development assistance ought to be participatory, accountable and transparent with equity in 
                                                          
234
 UNAIDS Global Reference Group on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights “Issue Paper: What Constitutes a         
Rights – based Approach? Definitions, Methods, and Practices” 4th Meeting 23 -25 August 2004. 
235
 Ibid. 
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237
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238
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239
 For a comprehensive account of the general background reading on the ‘rights-based approach’, see Olowu D 
“Environmental Governance and the Accountability of non-state Actors in Africa: A Rights-Based Approach” 
(2007) 32 South African Yearbook of International Law 261 -282 and the authorities cited therein in footnote 94 at 
280. 
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 Uvin P “From the Right to Development to the Rights –Based Approach: How ‘Human Rights’ Entered 
Development” (2007) 17 Development in Practice 597 -606 602. 
241
 Ibid.  
242
 UNAIDS Global Reference Group on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights above 2. 
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decision-making and ‘sharing of the fruits or outcome of the process.’243 The rights-based 
approach remains largely a theoretical concept which is confined to mainstream development 
discourses.
244
 This, however, does not imply that the important concept cannot be applied to the 
right to health and access issues. At the moment, it would seem that human rights-based 
approaches are concerned with internationally ‘agreed human rights’.245 The evolving 
understanding of the rights and advocacy, such as ‘the right to access lifesaving treatment’ must 
be part of the rights-based framework/strategy.
246
 The contention of this study is that the      
rights-based approach will go a long way towards bridging the gap between patents and human 
rights and thus ensure more access to medicines.  
The rights-based approach is underpinned by the realization that the processes by which 
development aims are pursued ‘should themselves respect and fulfil human rights’.247 If one 
were to consider pharmaceutical companies as having rights to intellectual property as patent 
holders, the granting of the patents and the exercise of the monopoly should not be pursued in a 
manner that does not respect and fulfil human rights, especially the right to access life-saving 
medicines. It needs to be reiterated, therefore, that the important aspects of the rights-based 
approach are that it ought to be participatory, accountable and transparent with equity in 
decision-making and sharing of the fruits or outcome of the process.
248
  
The rights-based approach may be associated with the risk that it may amount to making ‘nice 
statements of intent regarding things that would be nice to achieve, or duties that we would like 
the world to assume one day, without setting out concrete procedures for actually achieving 
those rights’.249 It is submitted that the attitude of this study is that the rights-based approach will 
be appropriate and relevant if we consistently remind ourselves that access to medicines is part 
of the right to life, a fundamental right which WTO Members must fulfil; and in some instances, 
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the fulfilment of the right may clash with other subservient rights such as the rights of a patent 
holder.
250
 
The rights-based approach, whether in the context of development or access to medicines as is 
the case in this study, advocates for the empowerment of marginalized groups, challenging 
oppression and exclusion, and changing power relations; a task lying outside the legal arena but 
falling squarely in the political realm.
251
 This observation is quite apt in the present study 
because the rights-based approach to access to medicines is likely to work in the presence of both 
the legal and political will. Hence, it is suggested as a solution mainly in the specific context 
indicated above.  
Some commentators have contrasted the ‘rights-based’ with the ‘needs-based’ approach and 
came to the conclusion that the needs-based approach focuses on securing additional resources 
for the delivery of services to particular groups while the rights-based approach calls for existing 
resources to be shared more equally and assist marginalized populations to assert their rights to 
those resources.
252
 In the context of this study, the marginalized people would be those in the 
developing countries grappling with access issues to medicines. Notably, needs may be 
motivated by charitable intentions while rights are always based on legal obligations.
253
 When 
big pharmaceutical companies donate some needed drugs to poor countries to alleviate access 
problems, the motivation is needs-based rather than rights-based. A rights-based approach is 
likely to give priority to gross or severe types of human rights violations even if these affect only 
a small segment of the population.
254
  
Under international law, the state is the principal duty-bearer with respect to the human rights of 
the people living within its jurisdiction.
255
 By stipulating an internationally agreed set of norms, 
backed by international law, the rights approach provides a stronger basis for citizens to make 
claims on their states and holding states to account for their duties to enhance the access of their 
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citizens towards the realization of their rights.
256
 The most important aspect of the human rights 
approach is that it foregrounds the accountability of policy makers and other actors whose 
actions have an impact on the rights of people.
257
 Rights imply duties, and duties demand 
accountability.
258
 
A human rights approach to health is critical in addressing the growing global health 
inequalities.
259
 Human rights approaches can include holding states and other parties 
accountable, developing policies and programmes consistent with human rights and facilitating 
redress for victims of violations of the right to health.
260
  
In order to address conditions that create vulnerability, a human rights approach must seek to 
give voice to those who are vulnerable and enable them to improve their decision making scope 
to change their conditions of vulnerability.
261
 The most common conception of the human rights 
approach is one where the human rights framework is used to hold government accountable.
262
 
Activities supporting accountability may be public critiques and litigation, and most others 
usually assume an adversarial mode.
263
 Therefore, a human rights approach offers a framework 
for pro-active development of policies and programmes so that health objectives can be 
operationalized in ways that are consistent with human rights.
264
 Additionally, human rights 
provide a much more powerfully normative set of criteria by which to judge right and wrong.
265
 
From the above brief narration of the human rights approach in the context of access to 
medicines, it is clear that social movements can utilize the fact that governments have 
obligations in terms of recognized international human rights standards and pressurize the 
governments to prioritise access to medicines because it is a human right. If pharmaceutical 
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companies insist on their rights to patents and their sacrosanct nature, governments can look to 
international human rights law and the TRIPS flexibilities and proceed to make it possible for 
their citizens to enjoy the ‘benefits of scientific progress.’ 
Because this study is biased towards access to medicines in the context of the SADC region, it is 
appropriate that the pertinent African and SADC provisions on access to medicines are explored 
next. In the following paragraphs, therefore,
266
 I give a critical expository account of access to 
medicines as a human right in terms of the pertinent African and SADC regional instruments.  
3.5 The Right to Health and Access to Medicine in Africa and the SADC Region 
3.5.1 The Right to Health and Access to Medicines in Africa 
In the African regional context, the main instrument binding sub-Saharan African countries to 
human rights prescriptions concerning access to medicines as part of the right to health is the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).267 The ACHPR was ratified by all 53 
members of the African Union.
268
  With specific regard to health and medicines, the ACHPR 
provides as follows: 
Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health. States 
Parties are obliged to take the necessary measures to protect the health of their peoples and to ensure that 
they receive medical attention when they are sick.
269
 
Notably, the ICESCR outlines the comprehensive notion of health by describing the human right 
to health as the ‘right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’.270 For the 
comparability of the relevant ACHPR and ICESCR Article formulations, one must consider that, 
according to the ACHPR,
271
 international instruments can be used by the African Commission in 
order to interpret the Charter. Therefore, the availability of the ‘right to enjoy the best attainable 
state of physical and mental health’ to citizens in ACHPR Member states will be guided by the 
provision and interpretation of the right to health in the context of the ICESCR. 
Access to medicines is necessary for the realization of the objectives spelt out in the pertinent 
provision of the ACHPR relating to health as pointed out above notwithstanding the fact that the 
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Charter does not make direct reference to access to medicines. In fact, the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter African Commission), the Charter’s treaty body,272, 273 
has recently issued a resolution on access to medicines; which inter alia, recognises that ‘access 
to needed medicines is a fundamental component of the human right to health and that state 
parties to the African Charter have an obligation to provide, where appropriate needed medicines 
or facilitate access to them’.274 The resolution has been widely welcomed by NGOs and other 
rejoinders as being timely and contemporaneous.
275
 
In summary, the following key points about the resolution are worth reiterating. The human right 
to medicines entails three types of duties namely, to respect, protect and fulfil.
276
 While the 
African Commission defines the first set of duties in relation to access to medicines as 
‘promotion’, substantively, it refers to negative actions of respect (emphasis added) by 
‘refraining’ from certain actions.277 The resolution urges states to ensure that everyone has access 
to medical care while at the same time reiterating that ‘access to needed medicines is a 
fundamental component of the right to health’; hence state parties have a mandate to promote 
‘the realization of the right to medicines for all’.278  
Intellectual property is mentioned among the duties to respect access to medicines in that states 
are urged to refrain from ‘implementing intellectual property policies that do not take full 
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advantage of all flexibilities in the WTO’.279 Entering into ‘TRIPS-plus’ free trade agreements is 
singled out as an impugned measure that is likely to defeat the access objective and state parties 
are discouraged from entering into such arrangements.
280
 Nevertheless, the African Commission 
calls on states to stimulate intellectual property in order to promote access to medicines.
281
 
The Resolution on Access to Health and Needed Medicines in Africa is an important African 
instrument which binds all the African Union member states and will in all likelihood be 
frequently cited in both municipal and regional courts by access advocates. The resolution makes 
it clear that access to medicines is a human right which state parties must respect. Having 
canvassed the Africa-wide position on the subject thus far, it is now appropriate to turn to the 
SADC position. 
3.5.2 The Right to Health and Access to Medicines in the SADC Region 
The most important documents in the SADC context relating to access to medicines and human 
rights are the SADC Protocol on Health,
282
 SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan
283
 and the Draft 
SADC Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential Medicines and Commodities.
284
 The three 
documents are identified as crucial in the enhancement of regional integration in the context of 
health and have been developed to underpin the implication of the SADC health programme.
285
 
The health programme has been developed taking into account the global and regional health 
declaration and targets.
286
 
It is disheartening to write that in none of the three SADC instruments is the right to health 
mentioned directly, the closest the instruments come to mentioning the right to health is when 
they refer to the right as a fundamental principle underpinning regional integration in terms of 
the SADC treaty.
287
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In the following paragraphs, I give an expository account of the content of each of the pertinent 
SADC instruments in the context of access to medicines and come to the conclusion that access 
issues are also given prominence by SADC despite the fact that they are not couched in the 
human rights language.  
3.5.2.1 The SADC Protocol on Health 
In the SADC Protocol on Health, health is not defined and neither is there express reference to 
access to medicines.
288
 Instead, the Protocol talks about ‘coordinating and supporting individual 
and collective efforts of the Member States to attain an acceptable standard of health for all their 
people’289 and to promote health care for all ‘through better access to health services’290 (not 
medicines!). The most logical implied message in this context would be to regard access to 
medicines as subsumed in ‘better access to health services’. The preamble to the Protocol begins 
by acknowledging that SADC member states are aware that a healthy population is a prerequisite 
for sustainable human development and increased productivity.
291
 Furthermore, the preamble 
points out clearly that rendering coordinated and comprehensive health services in a concerted 
manner is a prerequisite for the improved health status of the people in the region in the 21
st
 
century and beyond.
292
 
SADC Member States are urged to cooperate in addressing health problems and challenges 
facing them through effective regional collaboration and mutual support for the purpose of 
identifying and supporting those initiatives that have the potential of improving the health of the 
population within the region;
293
 promoting education, training and effective utilization of health 
personnel and facilities;
294
 foster cooperation and coordination in the area of health with 
international organisations and cooperating partners;
295
 develop common strategies to address the 
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health needs of women,
296
 children and other vulnerable groups;
297
 and to progressively achieve 
equivalence, harmonization and standardization in the provision of health services in the 
region.
298
 
It is noteworthy that the SADC Protocol on Health does not refer to intellectual property rights in 
general terms; neither does it refer to the flexibilities provided by the WTO TRIPS Agreement. 
However, the only instance in which intellectual property rights are mentioned is in the context 
of the establishment of a regional databank of traditional medicines and attendant procedures 
which will ensure that the protection of medicinal plants is in accordance with the regimes and 
related intellectual property rights (emphasis added) governing genetic resources, plant varieties 
and biotechnology.
299
 The fact that intellectual property rights relating to pharmaceuticals 
specifically are not mentioned in this Protocol remains a serious omission. The reason for the 
seriousness of the omission is simple. Health is usually synonymous with medicines or 
medication, produced by pharmaceutical companies holding patents (intellectual property rights) 
over the medicines.  
The most relevant and pertinent provision of the Protocol to this study is the one dealing with 
pharmaceuticals.
300
 The Protocol calls upon member States to explore and share experiences 
with others in the process of searching for additional financial resources to acquire medicines, 
technology and other resources needed by the citizens in the respective States.
301
  
Very specifically, the highlights of the pharmaceutical provision of the Protocol are as follows: 
State parties shall cooperate and assist one another in the various ways ranging from the 
production, procurement and distribution of affordable essential drugs;
302
 development of an 
essential drugs’ programme and the promotion of the rational use of drugs;303 establishing 
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quality assurance mechanisms in the supply and conveyance of vaccines, blood and blood 
products
304
; conducting research and documenting aspects of traditional medicine and its 
utilisation
305
 and establishing a regional databank of traditional medicines.
306
 
The SADC Protocol on Trade spells out in general terms the envisaged health outcomes for the 
region. The Protocol recognises that close cooperation in the area of health is essential for the 
effective control of communicable and non-communicable diseases and for addressing common 
health concerns.
307
The specifics are later laid down in more detail in later instruments, namely 
the Pharmaceutical Business Plan and the Draft Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential 
Medicines, discussed immediately below. 
3.5.2.2 The SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan 2007 – 2013  
The business plan was launched against the background of the need to develop and implement a 
pharmaceutical programme in line with the SADC Protocol on Health and SADC health 
policy.
308
 The purpose of the programme is to enhance the capacities of the Member States to 
effectively prevent and treat diseases that are of major concern to public health in the region.
309
 
The Pharmaceutical business plan identifies priority areas, objectives and major activities that 
will be implemented both at the regional and national levels to improve access to quality and 
affordable essential medicines including African Traditional medicines.
310
 This point is very 
relevant to this study and the business plan seems to be making the right ‘access to medicines 
noises’ which resonate with the pertinent provisions of the ICESCR and the 2008 Resolution of 
the African Union Commission on Access to Health and Needed Medicines in Africa. At least the 
Business plan resonates well with the pertinent access instruments to medicines instruments, 
despite having been passed earlier than the ACHPR resolution. The overall goal of the Business 
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Plan is to ensure availability of essential medicines including traditional medicines in the region 
in a sustainable way.
311
 
In order to achieve its objective of improving access to quality and affordable essential 
medicines, the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan will adopt the following strategies:
312
 
(a) Harmonising standard treatment guidelines and essential medicine lists; 
 
(b) Rationalizing and maximizing the research and production capacity of the local and 
regional pharmaceutical industry of generic essential medicines and African traditional 
medicines; 
 
(c) Strengthening regulatory capacity, supply and distribution of basic pharmaceutical 
products through ensuring a fully functional regulatory authority with an adequate 
enforcement infrastructure; 
 
(d) Promoting joint procurement of therapeutically beneficial medicines of acceptable safety, 
proven efficacy  and quality to the people who need the most at affordable prices; 
 
(e) Establishing a regional databank of traditional medicine, medicinal plants and procedures 
in order to ensure their protection in accordance with the regimes and related intellectual 
property rights governing genetic resources, plant varieties and biotechnology; 
 
(f) Developing and retaining competent human resources for the pharmaceutical programme; 
 
(g) Developing mechanisms to respond to emergency pharmaceutical needs of the region; 
and 
 
(h) Facilitating the trade in pharmaceuticals within the region. 
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In summary, the Pharmaceutical Business Plan emphasizes harmonization of the treatment 
guidelines and the essential medicines lists. Secondly, it aims to maximize research and the 
capacitation of the pharmaceutical industry in the region so that essential generic medicines and 
their traditional counterparts may be produced. Thirdly, the plan seeks harmonization in the 
regulatory infrastructure applicable to pharmaceuticals so that there will be a positive 
improvement in the supply and distribution chain of pharmaceuticals. Fourthly, and very 
importantly in the context of access to medicines, the Pharmaceutical business plan will strive to 
promote joint procurement of essential medicines in the region where necessary; and fifthly, the 
development of a pharmaceutical databank on traditional medicines and the respect of 
intellectual property rules will be one of the key objectives of the business plan. The SADC 
Pharmaceutical Business Plan also aims to develop and retain human resources while at the same 
establishing mechanisms to respond to regional pharmaceutical emergencies. Finally, the plan 
aims to facilitate intra-regional pharmaceutical trade. 
It is important to point out that the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan forms part of the broad 
SADC health programme, which takes into account global health declarations and targets.
313
 In 
the context of access to medicines that cure common epidemics in the SADC region, the business 
plan is very specific in that it seeks to enhance the capacities of the Member States to effectively 
prevent and treat diseases that are of major concern to public health in the region.
314
 The specific 
diseases are HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other communicable and non-communicable 
diseases.
315
 
With specific reference to access to medicines in the context of this study, the business plan 
identifies ‘outdated medicine laws and intellectual property laws which are not TRIPS 
compliant’ as a major weakness of SADC countries’ pharmaceutical regulatory framework.316 To 
address this major weakness, the plan acknowledges that the TRIPS Agreement does contain 
flexibilities which allow countries to ‘import or manufacture pharmaceuticals that are still under 
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patent without the consent of the patent holder’. The plan urges Member States to take advantage 
of this opportunity which has been exploited before by three SADC Member states.
317
 The other 
window of opportunity that the plan urges SADC Member States to take advantage of is the fact 
that more than half of SADC members are least developed countries (LDCs); such economic 
blocks are allowed to trade in pharmaceuticals within the block without restrictions.
318
 These two 
opportunities are specifically identified as possible effective ways of improving accessibility 
thereby lowering medicine prices in the region.
319
 
The suggested methodology for taking advantage of and coordinating the implementation of the 
TRIPS flexibilities to improve access to medicines within the SADC region will involve a three-
pronged approach.
320
 Firstly, a regional assessment of intellectual property and medicines 
legislation in SADC countries will be conducted to determine their TRIPS compliance and 
adaptability.
321
 After the regional assessment of the legal and policy regime, specialized legal 
resources from within and outside the SADC region will be identified to give reliable and 
specialized legal advice.
322
 A roster of legal and other experts, who are able to offer technical 
assistance on TRIPS, will be maintained.
323
 Finally the SADC region will collaborate with 
regional development partners in order not only to be enabled to protect and take advantage of 
TRIPS flexibilities but also to be assisted in bilateral trade negotiations to conclude agreements 
that are not detrimental to public health.
324
 
The other weakness identified by the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan, which weakness has 
a direct bearing on access issues, is the fact that the region has an acute overdependence on 
imported medicines, both patented and generics.
325
 The overdependence may be alleviated by 
enhancing the ‘regional capacity for pharmaceutical manufacturing as well as conducting 
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research in medicines and other pharmaceutical products including African Traditional 
Medicines.’326  
In light of the foregoing discussion, I find the SADC Pharmaceutical Business to be quite an 
ambitious but realistic document that correctly problematizes SADC access issues to medicines 
and proffers honest and plausible strategies as solutions. The Pharmaceutical Business Plan 
provides the priorities and focus for the SADC pharmaceutical programme.
327
 To further 
actualize some of the objectives in the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan, namely, the 
harmonization in the pharmaceutical procurement field, the Draft SADC Strategy for Pooled 
Procurement of Essential Medicines and Health Commodities was adopted in September 2012. 
In the following section, I briefly highlight the salient aspects of the strategy and contextualize 
them within the broad framework of access to medicines advocated by this study. 
3.5.2.3 The SADC Draft Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential Medicines and Health 
Commodities 2013 – 2017 
The Draft SADC Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential Medicines and Health 
Commodities (Pooled Procurement Strategy) is a response to the objective of improving 
‘sustainable availability and access to affordable, quality, safe, efficacious essential medicines’, 
as provided for in the SADC Pharmaceutical Business plan.
328
 Therefore, the Pooled 
Procurement Strategy is an important step in the pursuit of the achievement of the objective of 
improving access to ‘affordable, quality, safe, and efficacious essential medicines’. The pertinent 
question to ask at this stage will be: How does the Pooled Procurement Strategy purport to 
improve access to medicines? 
According to the Pooled Procurement Strategy, if harmonization can be achieved by the SADC 
Member States on issues such as pharmaceutical procurement, supply chain management as well 
as procedural issues such as quality assurance and public procurement, then access to safe, 
quality and efficacious medicines may be improved.
329
 The Pooled Procurement Strategy argues 
that there are positives in adopting a regional approach to the procurement of pharmaceuticals 
including the application of ‘good practices’ in the pharmaceutical procurement and supply 
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management systems.
330
 One of the cited advantages of pooled procurement, also called joint 
procurement or procurement cooperation,
331
 is that it can result in considerable savings made 
through information and work sharing by procurement agencies in the Member States.
332
 If 
savings are made, then more funds become available for procurement. This will, in turn, increase 
availability of and access to essential medicines and health commodities. 
The Pooled Procurement Plan envisages the establishment of an entity called the SADC 
Pharmaceutical Procurement Services, which will manage the implementation of the strategy 
relying on guidance from the relevant SADC structures for policy development, monitoring and 
evaluation functions, general oversight and implementation processes.
333
  
In summary, the main objective of the pooled procurement strategy is to achieve regional 
integration
334
 in the procurement of essential medicines, a practice which will, in addition to 
fostering deeper integration, also facilitate the adoption of a uniform pharmaceutical 
procurement strategy, which will in the long run ensure access to essential medicines in the 
region. This overall objective should be applauded as a regional initiative which will work 
alongside the actualization of the TRIPS flexibilities, discussed in chapter four below. 
The SADC Pooled Procurement Strategy identifies a number of access issues/concerns which are 
directly relevant to this study.
335
 I highlight briefly some of the issues below and contextualize 
them in relation to the study’s objectives as spelt out in chapter one above.  
Information on pharmaceutical procurement is not easily accessible in the SADC region due to 
different and disparate transparency levels in the private and public pharmaceutical sectors.
336
 
The above implies that the availability of essential medicines will vary between countries of the 
                                                          
330
 Executive Summary of the Pooled Procurement Strategy para para 3. 
331
 Pooled procurement (or joint procurement or procurement cooperation) is defined as ‘the overarching term for 
procurement where part of all of the procurement process of different procurement entities (agencies or departments 
of bigger entities) are jointly executed by either one of those procurement entities or a third party procurement 
entity’ (see “Definition of terms”) in the Pooled Procurement Strategy document viii. 
332
 See ‘Executive Summary’ of the Pooled Procurement Strategy para 3 v. 
333
 Pooled Procurement Strategy ‘Executive Summary’ para 4 v. 
334
 The SADC common agenda  includes the promotion of sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-
economic development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication, enhance the 
standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through 
regional integration [emphasis in the Pooled Procurement Strategy original 1]. 
335
 See generally “Situational Analysis” in the Draft SADC Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential Medicines 
and Health Commodities 2013 – 2017 3 – 9. 
336
 Pooled Procurement Strategy para 2.2.1 – 2.2.2 at 3. 
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region with serious access implications.
337
 In light of the above challenges, pooled procurement 
would be a possible solution in addressing access challenges and lack of uniformity in the 
relevant sectors.  
As if the compilation of the Pooled Procurement Strategy data on pharmaceutical budgets and 
expenditure was hard to obtain, there was a further additional challenge in that most SADC 
Member States rely for a considerable part on donor support for the purchase of essential 
medicines especially in relation to HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.
338
 It is submitted that 
while reliance on donor support is inevitable when due consideration if given to the fact that 
more than 50% of SADC Member States are least developing countries (LDCs),
339
 this continued 
reliance on donors will frustrate access to medicines in the region in the long run because TRIPS 
flexibilities will not be taken advantage of and the development of in-country pharmaceutical 
capacity will be arrested. Once again, with specific reference to the problem outlined briefly 
above, pooled procurement may be the panacea in resolving the access problem in the specific 
context. 
The SADC Pooled Procurement Strategy also bemoans the fact that four Member States do not 
have a medicines regulatory authority responsible for regulating the quality of medicines in the 
market with five countries not actively registering medicines.
340
 Therefore, in the region, the 
capacity and capability of the Member States’ regulatory authorities, responsible for the 
assessment and approval of medicines, are severely limited.
341
 The global implication of the 
foregoing observation is that medicines allowed in one Member State will not automatically be 
allowed to be used in other SADC Member States. It is envisaged that once the region adopts 
pooled procurement as suggested in the Draft Strategy, regulatory variations and inconsistencies 
will be things of the past and access to medicines will be significantly enhanced. 
The other pertinent observation made by the Draft Strategy is that there was no information that 
was provided by the countries on their use of TRIPS flexibilities in the national legislation to 
                                                          
337
 Despite the fact that It would be simplistic to expect a uniform availability of essential medicines across the 
SADC, in an ideal world, the expectation would be that the basic medicines are available across the region.  
338
 SADC Pooled Procurement Strategy, para 2.2.4 at 4. 
339
 SADC Member States which are classified as LDCs are Zambia, Malawi, Angola, Mozambique, Seychelles, 
Swaziland, Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania. 
340
 See para 2.2.6 of the SADC Pooled Procurement Strategy at 4. The five countries, all of whom are LDCs are 
Angola, Lesotho, Seychelles, Democratic Republic of Congo and Swaziland.  
341
 Ibid. 
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increase access to essential medicines.
342
 This is a noteworthy observation in light of the 
pertinent provisions of the SADC Protocol on Health and the Pharmaceutical Business Plan
343
 as 
well as the objectives of this study. 
On a positive note, the Draft SADC Pooled Procurement Strategy observes that despite the 
shortcomings identified above, national policy regulations are fairly similar in all SADC 
Member States. Additionally, all member states have a national medicines policy and an 
essential medicines list in place; and all but South Africa have a public procurement Act.
344
 
From the situational analysis made in the Draft Pooled Procurement Strategy, it is clear that 
progress has been registered across the region towards improving access to essential 
medicines.
345
 However, the identified progress is hampered by limited resources, lack of 
standardization in the public sector procurement practices, and lack of regional pharmaceutical 
market intelligence.
346
 For pooled procurement to succeed in the SADC context, information and 
work sharing must be prioritized with the progressive move towards group contracting across 
Member States to reach the minimum standards of good practice.
347
 I agree with the submission 
and add that the achievement of such an option should be taken as a long term rather than short 
term goal and its full realization will depend on whether technical assistance is forthcoming from 
fellow WTO members and other development partners.  
The common thread running through all the three SADC instruments is that access to essential 
medicines’ cries for regional attention and the solution to the access problem lies in taking 
advantage of the TRIPS flexibilities in the context of pharmaceutical regional integration. It is 
very clear that all the three instruments are aware of the existence of the TRIPS flexibilities but 
as to why SADC Members are reluctant to take advantage of the flexibilities in an access to 
essential medicines context remains a mystery. An attempt to unravel the mystery is made in 
chapters four and five below. 
                                                          
342
  SADC Pooled Procurement Strategy at para 2.2.8. 
343
 See Article 29 of the SADC Protocol on Health and para 2.3 VI of the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan.  
344
 Draft SADC Pooled Procurement Strategy para 2.3.1 at 4. 
345
 Ibid para 3 at 5. 
346
 Ibid. 
347
 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the existing and implied conflict between intellectual property rights and 
human rights. It established the legal historical relationship between the two concepts and came 
to the inescapable conclusion that these fields need each other. Both intellectual property rights 
and human rights as legal fields originated and grew quite apart out of social developments 
which were not interrelated. However, the modern contemporary reality is that the relationship 
between the legal disciplines has now evolved into a problematic one. The problematic aspect is 
exemplified by the view that intellectual property rights and human rights are in conflict since 
the legal protection of private intellectual property rights is considered incompatible with 
community-based human rights; with human rights viewed as legal instruments that limit and 
restrict the enforcement of intellectual property rights. If this view is pursued to its extreme ends, 
then human rights must always trump intellectual property rights. 
Intellectual property rights were discussed in light of patients’ rights to health and access to 
essential medicines pitted against pharmaceutical inventors’ rights to their intellectual property, 
namely patents. The chapter advocates that if inventors have any right to their intellectual 
property, then such rights must be subordinated to patients’ rights to health and by extension, the 
right to access essential medicines. The right to health is a fundamental right identified in the 
UDHR, the Declaration of Alma Ata; UN General Assembly documents, African and other 
regional instruments and the SADC region; hence it must trump intellectual property rights.  
This chapter looked at the rights-based approach as a possible solution to the access to medicines 
problem, which can be resolved in the SADC context by taking into account the provisions of the 
SADC Protocol on Health, the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan and the Draft SADC 
Strategy on Pooled Procurement, instruments which shout loudly for the utilization of the TRIPS 
flexibilities against the backdrop of regional integration. The SADC Pooled Procurement 
Strategy, which calls for a common regional pharmaceutical procurement legal and policy 
framework, is a unique proposition for the resolution of the access problem to essential 
medicines. It should be celebrated as a legal and policy tool in the right direction; which may be 
used in conjunction with other solutions proffered by the WTO TRIPS Agreement, other regional 
instruments and international human rights law. The call made by the three SADC instruments 
resonates quite well with the pertinent provisions of the Resolution on Access to Health and 
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Needed Medicines in Africa, issued on 28 November 2008 by the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. If the relevant TRIPS flexibilities, discussed in chapter four below, 
are carefully studied and contextualized to the SADC region, the access to essential medicines 
problem may partially be solved. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF WTO TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES AVAILABLE FOR USE BY SADC 
MEMBER STATES 
4. Introduction  
The previous chapter established that despite the right to access medicines seemingly not having 
an express textual basis in most legal instruments perused, using the rights-based approach to 
confront the problem of access to medicines may be a viable solution. The source of rights in this 
particular context would be constitutional provisions in individual SADC Member states’ 
constitutions entrenching the right to health. However, providing for the right to health in a 
constitution would not be an effective tool on its own in the absence of legislative provisions that 
domesticate TRIPS’ provisions relating to overriding patents in specific instances. While the 
TRIPS Agreement
1
 enjoins WTO Members to protect patents in their respective territories, the 
Agreement does have provisions catering for derogation from patents in specific contexts in 
order to facilitate access to medicines. The permissible derogations are now characterised as 
TRIPS flexibilities and are outlined in this chapter and contextualized to the SADC regional 
situation.  
Overall, this chapter shows that the use of TRIPS flexibilities such as compulsory licences, 
parallel imports, the paragraph six system, government non-commercial use, research and bolar 
exceptions and limits on data protection among others, can promote access to medicines in the 
SADC countries.
2
 Since the TRIPS Agreement generally requires member states to increase 
intellectual property protection, for example, that patents be protected for 20 years, SADC 
Member states are not excepted from this obligation.
3
 However, at the time of adopting the Doha 
                                                          
1
 The TRIPS Agreement was adopted as part of the final Act of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations in Marrakech, in Morocco on 15 April 1994. For a full text of the Agreement see WTO The Legal 
Texts the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1999) 321-353. 
2
 See also chapter 5 below for an overview picture of the use and implementation of TRIPS flexibilities in selected 
SADC Member states.  
3
 Osewe PL, Nkrumah YK and Sackey EK Improving Access to HIV/AIDS Medicines in Africa: Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Flexibilities (2008) at 11 correctly point out that in terms of the transitional 
arrangements, developed countries were expected to have been fully compliant with TRIPS by January 1996 while 
developing countries would have to do so five years later in the year 2000 and least developed countries (LDCs) in 
2006. With specific reference to pharmaceutical products, developing countries were expected to recognize and 
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Declaration, the WTO membership also recognized that for many of them, it remained difficult 
to make effective use of these flexibilities as a public health policy tool.
4
 For example, paragraph 
6 (six) of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
5
 acknowledged that while 
developing countries had the right to issue compulsory licences, they nevertheless faced 
difficulties in making effective use of this policy due to the lack of or insufficient manufacturing 
capacity.
6
 This is not the only constraint that developing countries including SADC member 
states face at the international level in their efforts to use TRIPS flexibilities.
7
 Other challenges 
that have been identified include: lack of technical expertise to effectively implement TRIPS 
flexibilities; insufficient technical and infrastructural capacities for medicines’ regulations; 
bilateral and other pressures not to use the TRIPS flexibilities for public health purposes; 
difficulties in regulating anti-competitive practices and abuse of patents rights.
8
 This study does 
acknowledge the existence of the above mentioned challenges and discusses some of them in 
their proper SADC context in the subsequent chapters.  
The above policy flexibilities embodied in the TRIPS must be used effectively by developing 
countries in general and the SADC countries in particular to protect and promote public health 
despite the attendant challenges. 
In addition to the TRIPS flexibilities, there are other flexibilities that SADC Member states may 
use. The flexibilities include those developed and adopted by the SADC Member states’ trading 
partners such as the United States, the European Communities (EC) and Canada. Individual 
SADC member states may elect to use the latter flexibilities.
9
 These flexibilities are, however, 
beyond the scope of the present study. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
protect patents in this sector by 2005 while LDCs do not have to do so until 2016. LDCs in SADC are Angola, 
DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. 
4
 Musungu SF, Villanueva S and Blasetti R Utlilising TRIPS Flexibilities for Public Health Protection Through 
South-South Regional Frameworks (2004) 2. 
5
 World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health WT/MIN 
(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M 755 (2001) [hereafter Doha Declaration], available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_eminist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm (last visited 07/09/2013). 
6
 Paragraph 6 provides inter alia that: 
 “We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical  
Sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement”. 
7
 Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti above note at 3. 
8
 Ibid.  
9
 For a scholarly note on the EU and Canadian flexibilities and their implications in the developing country context, 
see generally, Sibanda O.S “Comparative analysis of access to patented HIV/AIDS pharmaceutical medicines 
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After outlining each of the TRIPS flexibilities, contextual reference is made to the SADC region 
through examples or specific legislative provisions in the SADC member’s laws. This then sets 
the background for the contextualisation of the actual use of the flexibilities in selected SADC 
Member states, reserved for discussion and analysis in Chapter Five. 
4.1 Preliminary Remarks on WTO TRIPS Flexibilities Generally 
It must be stated right from the onset that before the public health TRIPS flexibilities introduced 
after the Doha Declaration in 2001 and the subsequent August 2003 decision, the TRIPS 
Agreement did provide for exceptions to patentability.
10
 These exceptions form the core of what 
has generally come to be characterized in access to medicines parlance as ‘TRIPS flexibilities’. 
The TRIPS Agreement, which is binding on all member states of the WTO, obliges all members 
to provide for patent protection for inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, including pharmaceuticals.
11
 In the context of this study, it is important to note that 
currently all the SADC members except Seychelles
12
 are members of the WTO and, therefore, 
have to incorporate the TRIPS Agreement in their national legislation.
13
 This position is 
confirmed by the SADC Protocol on Trade which aptly provides that: 
Member states shall adopt policies and implement measures within the Community for the protection of 
intellectual property rights, in accordance with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property rights.
14
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
through the Canadian and EU TRIPS flexibilities measures: are they efficacious or overly burdensome and 
ineffective measures?” (2012) 15 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 521 – 569. 
10
 See Arts 30 and 31 of TRIPS. Article 30 provides for exceptions to rights conferred in general terms by providing 
for limited exceptions when patents may be overridden provided such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with 
a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, 
taking into account interests of third parties. On the other hand, Article 31provides for ‘other use without 
authorization of the right holder’ in the context of issuing compulsory licenses and government use orders. 
11
 Article 27 (1) of TRIPS. 
12
 At the time of writing, Seychelles was still in accession talks with the WTO, and will formally be required to 
comply with TRIPS upon acquiring formal membership. Seychelles applied for accession to the WTO on 31 May 
1995 [WTO “Accession Seychelles” at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_seychelles_e.htm , (last 
visited 10/09/2013)].   
13
 As previously indicated in note 3 above, TRIPS requires that all developing countries, other than those designated 
as LDCs, must have complied with the minimum standards if intellectual property protection by 1 January 2000 (see 
Arts. 65(1) and 65(2) of TRIPS). LDCs were initially given until 1 January 2005 to comply, but the period was 
subsequently extended to December 2013, before being recently extended to 1 July 2021 [see “The Least developed 
get eight years more leeway to Protect Intellectual Property” at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/trip_11jun13_e.htm (last visited 03/10/2013)]. However, with 
reference to pharmaceuticals and agricultural products, the due date for compliance by LDCs, which was has 
extended by the Doha Declaration to 2016 (see Art 66 (1) of TRIPS), has not changed. 
14
 Article 24 of the SADC Protocol on Trade, 1996.  
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Before the advent of the TRIPS Agreement, a number of developing countries did not recognize 
or protect pharmaceutical patents, and those countries that did limited patent terms to less than 
20 years and this enabled the generic market not only to develop but also to thrive.
15
 The TRIPS 
Agreement aims to “contribute to the promotion of technological innovation” as well as aid “the 
transfer and dissemination of technology”.16 This balance has, however, been difficult to achieve 
due to competing interests of the pharmaceutical companies and the developing countries in 
desperate need of affordable drugs.
17
  
The basic nature of the TRIPS Agreement, which seeks to ensure a balance between the rights of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) holders, on the one hand, and consumers on the other, is 
buttressed by the principles of the TRIPS.
18
 The relevant Article allows WTO Members, in 
formulating or amending their intellectual property (IP)-related laws and regulations, to adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and promote the public interest in sectors vital to 
their socio-economic and technological development.
19
 Therefore, social objectives allow for 
exceptions to the patent holder’s rights when it is necessary to protect public health.20 Members 
of the WTO may make an exception to patents during certain circumstances, one of these being a 
national emergency.
21
 The implication here is that the provision allows WTO Members to draft 
their laws in a manner that would maximally protect their citizens’ rights to health. This maximal 
protection could take the form of a compulsory licence or a provision allowing for government 
use in the case of public health emergency.
22
 
However, the exception may only be used “provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably 
conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the patent owner”.23 If the envisaged prejudice does materialize, then other 
                                                          
15
 Pfumorodze J “The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Access to Medicines in Southern Africa” (2011) 13 Botswana 
Law Journal 87 at 89. 
16
 Article 7 of TRIPS. 
17
 Cotter C “The Implications of Rwanda’s Paragraph 6 Agreement with Canada for Other Developing Countries” 
(2008) 5 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 177 at 181. 
18
 The principles of TRIPS are encapsulated in Article 8. 
19
 Osewe, Nkrumah and Sackey above at 9. 
20
 Article 8 of TRIPS. 
21
 Shoell S “Why Can’t the Poor Access Life-Saving Medicines? An Exploration of Solving the Patent Issue” (2002) 
4 Minnesota Intellectual Property Review 151 at 160.  
22
 See para 4.2 below. 
23
 Shoell above at 160. 
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Members may enforce their IP protection through resorting to the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism.
24
 
While the TRIPS Agreement enjoins Members to provide patent protection in all fields of 
technology,
25
 whether for processes or products, there are, however, provisions in the same 
Agreement for exceptions from patentability.
26
 In general, the TRIPS Agreement requires 
Members to increase patent protection, which shall be extended to 20 years from the filing 
date.
27
 It will be recalled that despite some notable  pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in 
the SADC region,
28
 SADC Member states are all net importers of patented medicines and this is 
likely to make medicines more costly and adversely affect access to medicines (as lower priced 
generics are no longer allowed).
29
 
The TRIPS Agreement also confers extensive rights on the patent holder, including exclusive 
marketing rights for the entire patent duration.
30
 Another TRIPS-imposed obligation which has 
serious implications for access to medicines is the requirement that member states protect 
undisclosed data against unfair commercial use.
31
 
The net effect of the permissible flexibilities in interpreting the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement and the specified limitations to the obligations under the Agreement form the basis of 
what are often referred to as the ‘TRIPS Flexibilities’ discussed in detail from 4.2 below. In the 
same vein, the Doha Declaration reiterates that the TRIPS Agreement can and should be 
interpreted in a manner that supports the members’ right to protect public health specifically by 
                                                          
24
 Shoell above at 160. 
25
 Article 27 (1) of TRIPS. 
26
 See for instance Article 31 of TRIPS, providing for compulsory licenses.  
27
 Article 33 of TRIPS. 
28
 For a bird’s eye view of pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in the Africa and the SADC region, see 
specifically SEATINI, CEHURD, TARSC “Overcoming Barriers to Medicines Production through South-South 
Cooperation in Africa” (2013) 34 EQUINET Policy Brief 1-2. 
29
 However, generic production through a compulsory license on any one of the grounds listed in Article 31 of 
TRIPS may still be possible.  
30
 See article 28 of TRIPS. However, this is subject to Article 30, which limits rights of patentees to exclusively 
exploit benefits arising out of patents. 
31
 Article 39 (3) of TRIPS.  
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ensuring access to medicines for all.
32
 The same Declaration also clarifies the permissible 
interpretation of certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
33
 
The flexibilities may, therefore, be viewed as the balancing criteria which the developing 
countries were able to achieve in order to address their specific concerns over patents and access 
to medicines within the WTO.
34
 It is, however, prudent that any analysis of the usefulness of the 
flexibilities in protecting public health must take into account the ability of the developing 
country member states of the WTO to implement them.
35
 This is the major reason why this study 
was embarked upon in the first place – to explore the extent of the use of the flexibilities by the 
SADC Member states and thence make recommendations that factor in current legal policy and 
other challenges.  
The thesis of this study is that, barring obvious challenges, TRIPS flexibilities do allow member 
states to mitigate the negative impact of the TRIPS Agreement on matters of national importance 
such as access to medicines.
36
 In the context of this study and indeed in the SADC region, in 
addition to general TRIPS flexibilities,
37
 the main flexibilities which may be benefitted from by 
the SADC countries can better be understood if read together with the TRIPS provisions relating 
to technical cooperation, temporary derogations for the developing countries and LDCs, the 
Doha Declaration and the August 2003 Decision, later incorporated mutatis mutandis, as the 
TRIPS amendment of December 2005.
38
 
The following section renders an expository account of the available TRIPS flexibilities, starting 
with the Doha Declaration and the subsequent August 2003 Decision which has now become a 
                                                          
32
 Para 4 of the Doha Declaration.  
33
 See para 5 of the Doha Declaration. These include the right to grant compulsory licenses, the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licenses may be granted; the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency and circumstances of extreme urgency and the freedom of Member states to choose which regime of 
exhaustion of IPRs they wish to establish. 
34
 Osewe, Nkrumah and Sackey above at 10. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Other matters of national importance may be national security and economic development spurred by intellectual 
property and innovation in certain high technology areas.   
37
 Such as, among others, compulsory licensing, government use, parallel imports, research exceptions and limits on 
data exclusivity. 
38
 See Kingah SS, Smis S and Soderbaum F “How Countries of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Can use the World Trade Organization and the European Community Flexibilities for Better Access to 
Affordable HIV/AIDS Medicines” (2008) Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook 14. 
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permanent amendment of the TRIPS Agreement.
39
 Technical cooperation and temporal 
derogations for poor countries under TRIPS are discussed next, followed by an exposition of the 
general TRIPS flexibilities, including parallel importation and compulsory licensing.  
The use of the above outlined flexibilities and others that are discussed in subsequent paragraphs 
was affirmed and confirmed by the Doha Declaration in 2001 and subsequently by the August 
2003 Decision, which has become a permanent amendment to the TRIPS Agreement. It is, 
therefore, appropriate now to turn to the provisions of the Doha Declaration and the August 2003 
Decision.  
4.2 Public Health, the Doha Declaration
40
 and the August 2003 Decision 
4.2.1 Background to the Doha Declaration and the August 2003 Decision 
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health may be regarded as an important step 
towards making the TRIPS Agreement more developmentally friendly.
41
 The Declaration was 
the outcome of the WTO Ministerial meeting which was held in the United Arab Emirates in 
November 2001.
42
 Although the Declaration made specific statements on various issues, the 
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and public health was so highly contested that it 
warranted elucidation in a separate Declaration.
43
 The Declaration was initiated by the African 
group within the TRIPS Council.
44
 The African group and other third world countries wanted to 
ensure that the Ministerial Conference in Qatar became an opportunity to demonstrate the 
                                                          
39
 According to the WTO website http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e.htm (last visited 
09/09/2013), WTO members on 6 December 2005 approved changes to the TRIPS Agreement making permanent a 
decision on Patents and Public Health originally adopted in 2003. The permanent amendment is set to formally take 
full effect once two thirds of the WTO members have ratified it. At the time of writing, only 73 WTO members out 
of more than 159 members, including seven African countries (Zambia being the only SADC member to have 
ratified) had ratified the amendment to TRIPS. WTO members have up to the end of December 2013 to ratify, and 
there is a strong possibility, that the period for ratification, which has been extended three times thus far, may be 
extended again! 
40
 For scholarly accounts of the legal and other implications of the Declaration on access to medicines in the 
developing world, see Abbott F.M “The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection 
of Public Health” (2005) 99 The American Journal of International Law 317 – 358 and Attaran A “Assessing and 
Answering Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: The Case for Greater 
Flexibility and a Non-Justiciability Solution” (2003) 17 Emory International Law Review 744 – 778. 
41
 Elbeshbishi AN “TRIPS and Public Health: What Should African Countries Do?” (2007) ATPC Work in Progress 
no.49 at 3. 
42
 Ministerial conference, Fourth Session, Doha 9-14 November 2001, adopted on 14 November 2001. 
43
 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, adopted on 14 November 2001 
(the Doha Declaration). 
44
 Kingah, Smis and Soderbaum above at 16. The spokesperson for the African group at that time was the 
representative of Zimbabwe, ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku, who was also the chairperson of the TRIPS 
Council. 
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members’ commitment and contribution in preventing further deaths and saving lives through 
facilitating easier access to medicines at affordable prices.
45
 The gist of the African group’s 
proposal was that the TRIPS Agreement should not prevent members from taking measures to 
protect public health.
46
 The bulk of the proposal would later be adopted in Doha, Qatar as the 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.  
Specifically, the Doha Declaration states that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not 
prevent members from taking measures to protect public health, and in particular, to promote 
access to medicines for all.
47
 The Declaration also explicitly recognises the flexibility within 
TRIPS to grant compulsory licences and the rights of the members to determine the grounds for 
the granting of such licences.
48
 The passage of the Declaration was considered a major victory 
for the developing nations.
49
 The Declaration also extended the deadline for developing countries 
to comply with the TRIPS’ provisions relating to pharmaceutical patents until 2016.50 
Very importantly, the Declaration noted that members will reserve the right to determine what 
constitutes national emergency or a case of extreme urgency
51
 with the understanding that 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics may come under such a 
narrow category.
52
  
In summary, the Declaration is important in that it gave the members the leeway to use TRIPS 
flexibilities for public health purposes including: giving transition periods for laws to be TRIPS 
compliant; providing for compulsory licensing; providing for parallel importation and exception 
from patentability and providing for the early working (bolar exceptions) of patents.
53
 
                                                          
45
  Kingah, Smis and Soderbaum above at 16 
46
 Ibid.  
47
 Doha Declaration, para 4. 
48
 Doha Declaration, para 5 (b). 
49
 Watson AG “International Intellectual Property Rights: Do TRIPS Flexibilities Permit Sufficient Access to 
Affordable HIV/AIDS Medicines in Developing Countries?” (2009) 32 Boston College International & 
Comparative Law 143 at 146. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 For critical perspectives on alternatives to determining and defining national emergency, see generally Manne 
above at 349-379. 
52
 Doha Declaration, para 5 (c). 
53
 Mabika A and Makombe P “Claiming our Space: Using the Flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement to Protect 
Access to Medicines” (2006) 16 SEATINI Policy Series 1 at 1. 
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However, there was a problem which the Doha Declaration identified and proposed a solution 
therefore.
54
 The problem was caused by the fact that while Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement 
provides for the possibility of using a patent without the consent of the patent holder, such use 
must only be for the predominant supply of the domestic market.
55
 The implications of this 
Article for access to medicines are likely to be dire for developing countries with limited or no 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. Countries that have the capacity to manufacture 
generics, through the issuance of compulsory licences, such as India and Brazil, can only do so 
for the overall predominant supply of the domestic market. Exports of such generics to countries 
in dire need would be very much limited.
56
 
The above mentioned problems, commonly known as ‘the paragraph six problem’, had to be 
addressed if the ground breaking provisions of the Doha Declaration were to be effective at all. 
The first step was for the members to recognize and acknowledge the fact that contracting parties 
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector could face 
difficulties in making effective use of the compulsory licensing provisions of TRIPS.
57
  
The solution to the problem came in August 2003 in the form of a Decision of the General 
Council to implement paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.
58
 The Paragraph 6 Decision 
addressed the practical legal deficiency identified in paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration by 
creating a waiver for Article 31(f) of TRIPS, thus allowing member states to export generic 
drugs to poorer nations.
59
 Canada was the first country to issue a compulsory licence
60
 under the 
                                                          
54
 See paragraph 6 of the Declaration. 
55
 The Council for TRIPS was asked to find an expeditious solution before the end of 2002, but the solution did 
come later, in fact a year later in the form of the August 2003 Decision.  
56
 See generally, Scherer FM and Watal J “Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing 
Countries” in Maskus K (ed) The WTO, Intellectual Property Rights and the Knowledge Economy (2004) 355-381. 
57
 Generally provided for in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
58
 See the 30 August 2003 Decision of the General Council implementing paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr.1, at para 2, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm (last accessed 18/09/2013) [hereafter Paragraph 6 
Decision].  The 2003 Decision is frequently referred to as the Paragraph 6 Decision because the sixth paragraph of 
the Doha Declaration specifically identified the manufacturing capabilities issue. The Decision will become a 
permanent amendment to the TRIPS Agreement once two thirds of the WTO membership sign it, in the meantime, 
the waiver will apply. 
59
 Para 2 of the Paragraph 6 Decision. The very first country to use the paragraph 6 system was Canada when it 
sought to supply cheap HIV/AIDS medicines to Rwanda.  
60
 On compulsory licenses, see para 4. 3.3 below. 
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system for the production and export of generic AIDS medicine to Rwanda.
61
 The licence was 
issued in October 2007. 
4.2.2 Important Provisions of the Doha Declaration  
The Doha Declaration, which contains seven paragraphs, was the major WTO Decision to call 
for an interpretive regime that is sympathetic to access to medicines for developing countries.
62
 
The Declaration did recognize the gravity of public health problems afflicting developing 
countries especially problems resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics.
63
 The Declaration also did acknowledge that the TRIPS Agreement was part of the 
wider national and international action to address the public health problem.
64
 The Declaration 
also recognized the importance of intellectual property for the development of new medicines 
but at the same time noted the potential adverse effects of intellectual property (IP) on 
medicines’ prices.65 Therefore, WTO members were equally cognizant of the importance of 
maintaining the balance of interests in the IP system.
66
 
The pith and marrow of the Declaration, which has often been cited as one of the most important 
and potentially revolutionary WTO provision impacting on access to medicines, is worth citing 
and is hereby reproduced verbatim: 
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to 
protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm 
that the Agreement can and should be interpreted  and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all (my 
emphasis).
67
 
The above cited provision was further buttressed by the reaffirmation of the WTO Members’ 
right to use to the full the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which provide flexibility for the 
purpose of accessing medicines for all.
68
 
                                                          
61
 See Cotter C “The Implications of Rwanda’s Paragraph 6 Agreement with Canada for Other Developing 
Countries” (2008) 5 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 177-189. 
62
 Doha Declaration at para 1. 
63
 Doha Declaration para 1. The specific diseases mentioned herein are not a closed list. The specified diseases affect 
most SADC member states and are quite relevant in the context of this study.  
64
 Ibid at para 2. 
65
 Ibid para 3. 
66
 Kingah, Smis and Soderbaum above at 17. 
67
 Doha Declaration at para 4. See on a related note Ferguson IF “The WTO, Intellectual Property and the Access to 
Medicines Controversy” (2007) CRS Report for Congress at 2. 
68
 Doha Declaration para 4. The specific flexibilities are discussed from paragraph 4.3 below.  
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Paragraph five of the Declaration, which elaborates on the right identified in paragraph four, is 
also equally important because it gives more detail on what the flexibilities are and how they 
ought to be interpreted.
69
  
Members are urged to apply the customary rules of interpretation of public international law and 
read each provision of the TRIPS Agreement in light of the object and purpose of the Agreement 
as expressed in TRIPS’ objectives and principles.70  
Very importantly for access to medicines, the Declaration affirms each member’s right to grant 
compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are 
granted.
71
  
The Declaration gives each WTO member the right to determine what constitutes national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency and reiterates that public health crises are 
not limited to those identified in paragraph one.
72
 Therefore, the Declaration made it very clear 
that situations of ‘national emergency’ or of ‘extreme urgency’ are not limited to short-term 
crises.
73
 Additionally, by giving members the right to determine for themselves what an 
emergency is, the burden of proof shifts to the complaining party to show that an emergency 
does not in fact exist.
74
 This legal position is different from the one obtaining under the general 
exceptions of Article XX of GATT 1994 and Article XIV of the GATS.
75
 The reversal of the 
burden of proof is likely to be favourable to the plight of developing countries and SADC 
members as they will no longer have the herculean and onerous task of proving that a measure 
taken in the interest of public health falls within the meaning of emergency or extreme urgency.  
                                                          
69
 See generally, para 5 of the Doha Declaration.  
70
 Doha Declaration para 5 (a). The object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement are spelt out in “GENERAL 
PROVISIONS AND BASIC PRINCIPLES”, part 1, Articles 1 – 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
71
 Doha Declaration para 5 (b). Compulsory licenses, which are provided for in Article 31 of TRIPS, will be 
discussed in detail in para 4.3 below and their use or potential use by SADC member states will be discussed in 
chapter five below. 
72
 Doha Declaration para 5 (c). On the subject of interpretive alternatives to “national emergency”, see Manne C 
above at 369 – 378. 
73
 Van den Bossche P The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text, cases and Materials (2008) at 
790. 
74
 Ibid. 
75
 See further on this point, Correa C.M “The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries” in Macrory PFJ, 
Appleton AE and Plummer MG (eds) The World Trade Organisation: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis 
(2005) at 441. 
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Further, in the context of TRIPS flexibilities generally and this study in particular, the 
Declaration acknowledges that the effect of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are relevant 
to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights by leaving each member free to establish its own 
regime for such exhaustion
76
 without challenge, subject to the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN)
77
 
and national treatment
78
 provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
79
 
What would easily be considered as the strongest point of the Doha Declaration is the 
acknowledgement that compulsory licensing as provided for in the TRIPS Agreement
80
 will not 
be easy to implement for WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector.
81
 It is common cause that this lack of manufacturing capacity abounds in 
developing and least developing WTO members. The Council for TRIPS was, therefore, asked to 
come up with a solution to the problem posed by paragraph six and the solution came in the form 
of an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement to be fully passed once ratified by two thirds of the 
WTO membership.
82
 Paragraph six is widely considered as a positive development for 
developing countries and the successful use of compulsory licenses will hinge on it.  
The last paragraph of the Doha Declaration deals with two important issues for developing 
countries – the commitment of the developed countries’ members to provide incentives to their 
enterprises and institutions to encourage technology transfer to LDCs
83
 and the exemption of 
LDCs from protecting pharmaceutical patents until 2016.
84
 
Writing in early 2003, Samantha Shoel correctly opined that the Declaration was not legally 
binding since it was neither an amendment nor a modification.
85
 This submission is, however, no 
longer legally valid with specific reference to the plight of countries without manufacturing 
                                                          
76
 In this study, the meaning and implications of exhaustion regimes are discussed in para 4.3 below under parallel 
importation. 
77
 The most-favoured nation treatment in the context of TRIPS is provided for in Article 4 of TRIPS. For detailed 
discussion of the MFN and national treatment provisions, see chapter two above. 
78
 The TRIPS Agreement provides for national treatment in Article 3 thereof. 
79
 Doha Declaration para 5 (d). 
80
 See generally Article 31 of TRIPS. 
81
 Doha Declaration paragraph 6. 
82
 See 4.2.3 below. 
83
 The obligation arises pursuant to Article 66 (2) of TRIPS. 
84
 The exemption is so important that it is discussed in this chapter as a TRIPS flexibility. The 2016 exemption of 
pharmaceuticals from patentability for LDCs should be read together with the recent 2021 exemption relating to 
TRIPS Agreement generally. 
85
 Shoel above at 175. 
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capabilities to use compulsory licensing. This submission is based on the fact that on 6 
December 2005, WTO members agreed to incorporate the 2003 Decision as an amendment and 
Annex to TRIPS.
86
 It is now appropriate to turn to a discussion of the salient provision of the 
Decision. 
4.2.3 Important aspects of the Paragraph 6 Decision (now Article 31bis of TRIPS) 
As has previously been recorded, the August 2003 Decision was passed in order to remedy the 
nagging problem in the TRIPS Agreement
87
 which requires that compulsory licences be used 
‘predominantly’ for a member’s supply of the domestic market. Because WTO members have 
agreed to incorporate the 2003 Decision into the TRIPS Agreement permanently, my discussion 
of the detailed aspects of the Decision is based on the text that is intended to permanently amend 
TRIPS.
88
 The amendment
89
 has thus far been ratified by only 73 members out of a possible 159, 
including the United States and the European Union.
90
 Therefore, the two-thirds threshold will 
be reached if 106 countries ratify the amendment. African countries in particular, are 
conspicuous by their reluctance to officially accept the amendment.
91
 
The important provisions of the amendment are outlined below. 
The following brief outline focuses on the five main paragraphs of the Annex to the Protocol 
amending the TRIPS Agreement
92
 together with the attendant conditions spelt out in the Annex 
to the TRIPS Agreement. 
Article 31 bis of TRIPS was introduced by the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement.
93
 
According the Gamble, the relevant Article was introduced to address the limitations and 
                                                          
86
 Furgusson above at 3. 
87
 This problem is to be found in Article 31(f) of TRIPS. 
88
 The permanent amendment will come into force when two-thirds of WTO members ratify it. The ratification was 
originally expected to occur by the end of 2007, but when it did not materialize, the General Council extended the 
period up to the end of 2009, and further until 30 November 2011. Because the expected ratification did not 
materialize in 2011, the period has been extended again and ratification is now expected to happen by 31 December 
2013 (see note 89 below). 
89
 The amendment is captured as Article 31 bis of the TRIPS Agreement. 
90
 See WTO “Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement” at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last visited 03/10/2013). The EU ratified the 
amendment as a block (28 countries in all). 
91
 Only 8 0ut of 40 African WTO members have ratified Article 31 bis of TRIPS (see note 89 above). 
92
 Full texts of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, Annex to the Protocol Amending the TRIPS 
Agreement and Annex to the TRIPS Agreement are available in Taubman, Wager and Watal (2012) above at 360 – 
366. 
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confusion surrounding TRIPS Article 31(f),
94
 which had hitherto allowed compulsory licences 
only for the predominant supply of the domestic market. 
The Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, which is drafted in preambular language, makes 
it very clear that once the Protocol enters into force
95
 upon being appropriately ratified,
96
 the 
TRIPS shall accordingly be amended by inserting Article 31 bis after Article 31 and the Annex 
to the TRIPS Agreement after Article 73.
97
 Very importantly, the Protocol makes it clear that no 
reservation may be entered against any of its provisions in the absence of the consent of the other 
members of the WTO.
98
  
The essence of Article 31 bis is captured in the first paragraph of the Annex to the Protocol 
Amending the TRIPS Agreement
99
 which explicitly suspends the obligations of an exporting 
member under Article 31(f) of TRIPS for the granting of a compulsory licence as long as such a 
licence is necessary for the production of pharmaceutical products to be exported to eligible 
importing members according to set conditions.
100
 An eligible importing member is defined as 
any LDC and any other member that has made a notification to the Council for TRIPS of its 
intention to use the system availed by Article 31 bis.
101
 An exporting member on the other hand, 
is a member using the system to produce pharmaceutical products for, and export them to, an 
eligible importing member.
102
 
The conditions have been cited as impediments to access to medicines despite the positive 
aspects of Article 31 bis.
103
 In order to use the system as an eligible importing member, 
notification must be made to the Council for TRIPS covering the following issues: Firstly, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
93
 See Taubman, Wager and Watal above at 360 – 361 for a full text of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
94
 Gumbel M “Is Article 31bis Enough? The Need To Promote Economies Of Scale In The International 
Compulsory Licensing System” (2008) 22 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 161 at 170. 
95
 The Protocol shall enter into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article X of the WTO Agreement. 
96
 The Initial date for such ratification was 1 December 2007. 
97
 See paragraph 1 of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement. 
98
 Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, para 2. This provision implies that the chances of such a reservation 
being raised are now very slim, considering that the major players in international economic relations – the United 
States, the EU, Japan and China have ratified Article 31 bis. 
99
 Article 31 bis paragraph 1. 
100
 The conditions are spelt out in paragraph 2 of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. 
101
 See paragraph (b) of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. 
102
 Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, paragraph (c). 
103
 See for instance Palombi L “The Role of Patent Law in Regulating and Restricting Access to Medicines” (2009) 
6 Scripted 394 at 404 wherein he correctly submits that the conditions may amount ‘disincentives for the right kind 
of drugs’. 
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importing member must, in the notification, specify the names and expected quantities of the 
product needed
104
 and secondly, confirm that the member has insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the relevant product (s) in question.
105
 This last 
requirement will not apply if the importing member is an LDC.
106
 Thirdly, if the product is 
patented in its territory, and the eligible importing member has granted or intends to grant a 
compulsory licence in accordance with Article 31 of TRIPS and 31 bis, this must be 
confirmed.
107
 
The above narrated conditions do not at face value seem to be onerous; however, there are 
further conditions that a compulsory license issued by an eligible exporting member must 
comply with. 
Firstly, the amounts to be manufactured are limited to those required by the importing member 
that has notified the Council for TRIPS of its need.
108
 This reads almost like the old Article 31 of 
TRIPS which has similar restrictions albeit in a slightly different context. The second condition 
applicable to a compulsory licence issued by an eligible exporting member is that products 
produced under such a licence shall be clearly identified as such through labelling or marking, 
special packaging, special colour or shape, as long as the distinction is feasible and does not have 
a significant impact on price.
109
 Thirdly, before the products are shipped to the importing 
country, the licensee must post on the website (WTO or own website) information relating to the 
quantities being supplied to each destination and the distinguishing features of the products.
110
  
The last general condition relating to the exporting member is that it must notify the Council for 
TRIPS of the granting of the licence including the conditions attached to it.
111
 The information 
provided shall include the name and address of the licensee, the product (s) for which the licence 
                                                          
104
 Paragraph 2 (a) (i) of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. The notification will be made available publicly by the 
WTO secretariat through a page on the WTO website dedicated to the system. 
105
 Paragraph 2 (a) (ii) of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. 
106
 Ibid. 
107
 Paragraph 2(a) (iii) of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. 
108
 Paragraph 2(b) (i) of Annex to The TRIPS Agreement. 
109
 Paragraph 2(b) (ii) of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. 
110
 Paragraph 2(b) (iii) of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. 
111
 The information will be published on the WTO website. 
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has been granted, the quantities for which the licence has been granted, the countries to which 
the products are destined and the duration of the licence.
112
 
Other important considerations which fit very well into the scope of using compulsory licences 
in the context of the first paragraph of Article 31 bis cover diverse but important issues such as 
the requirement that importing members establish administrative measures
113
 to ensure that there 
is no trade diversion through re-exportation of products imported through the system.
114
 
Additionally, members are required to have in place effective legal means to prevent importation 
into, and sale in, their territories of the products produced under the system.
115
 Further, to aid and 
abet the transfer of technology in the pharmaceutical manufacturing sector, eligible importing 
members and exporting members are urged to use the system in such a manner that transfer of 
technology and capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector are enhanced.
116
 Finally, the 
Council for TRIPS shall review annually the functioning of the system with the view of ensuring 
its effective operation and report annually to the General Council of the WTO.
117
 
Having exhaustively dealt with the salient provisions of the first paragraph of Article 31 bis and 
the attendant conditions, it is now appropriate to move on to the remaining four paragraphs.  
A compulsory licence issued by an exporting member in terms of Article 31 bis shall be 
accompanied by adequate remuneration in terms of Article 31(h) of TRIPS, and such 
compensation shall be paid to that member taking into account the economic value to the 
importing member of the authorized use.
118
 However, in a context quite relevant to LDCs and the 
SADC region, if the compulsory licence is granted for the same products in the eligible 
importing member, then the obligation to pay adequate compensation does not arise.
119
 However, 
I submit that the above cited provision is problematic and does not augur well for access to 
                                                          
112
 Paragraph 2(b) (iii) of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. 
113
 If an importing member is an LDC or developing member that is unable to establish the relevant administrative 
structure, then it may be assisted by its developed counterparts, who on request must provide technical and financial 
assistance.  
114
 Paragraph 3 of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. 
115
 Paragraph 4 of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. 
116
 Paragraph 6 of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. 
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 Article 31 bis para 2. 
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medicines. Firstly, ‘adequate remuneration’ is not defined, neither is ‘the economic value to the 
importing member’. These issues require further clarification.  
The provision of Article 31 bis that I consider as very important and likely to solve access issues 
in the context of LDCs and the developing countries in the SADC region is the one dealing with 
harnessing economies of scale for the purposes of enhancing purchasing power for the 
facilitation of the local production of pharmaceuticals.
120
 Very briefly, this paragraph provides 
that Article 31(f) will not apply if a compulsory licence is issued by a developing or LDC 
member which is party to a regional trade agreement in which at least half of the membership 
consists of LDCs, in order to export the product to fellow members of the regional group that 
share the health problem in question.
121
 The provision of this paragraph must be read together 
with those in the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, calling for the facilitation of local production 
of pharmaceutical products through regional patents.
122
 It is recommended that the SADC 
countries take advantage of this flexibility and consider a regional compulsory licence or 
regional pharmaceutical manufacture of targeted medicines.
123
 It is, however, important to 
mention that this proposal will not see the light of day if no technical capacity is forthcoming 
from developed WTO members and other intergovernmental organisations, such as WIPO.
124
 
It is important as a valedictory remark to a discussion of Article 31 bis to refer to the fact that 
members shall not challenge any measures taken in conformity with the provisions of the Article 
and the Annex to the TRIPS in terms of the WTO dispute settlement system.
125
 Such a provision 
will leave members free to apply the pertinent provisions of the Article without the fear of 
possible litigation. 
This Article and the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement are without prejudice to the rights 
obligations, and flexibilities that members have under the general provisions of TRIPS. It is now 
appropriate, therefore, to turn our discussion of the available flexibilities to TRIPS flexibilities 
generally. 
                                                          
120
 Article 31 bis para 3. The provisions of this paragraph are discussed in detail in chapter seven below and 
establishing regional manufacturing capacity in the SADC area is proposed as a viable access solution. 
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 Article 31 bis para 3. 
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 Paragraph 5 of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. 
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 See on a closely related note, chapter seven below. 
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 This issue is specifically acknowledged in paragraph 5 of the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement. 
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 Article 31 bis, paragraph 4. 
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4.3 Public Health and General TRIPS Flexibilities in Detail 
4.3.1 Technical Cooperation and Temporal Derogations for Poor Countries under TRIPS 
The main provisions of TRIPS, which may be viewed as sympathetic to the needs of developing 
countries including SADC member states refer to technical cooperation
126
 and transitional 
provisions.
127
  
The TRIPS Agreement requires developed countries’ members to provide, on request and on 
mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of the 
developing and the least-developed countries’ members.128 Such cooperation shall include, and 
will not be limited to the preparation of laws and regulations on the protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights as well as the prevention of the abuse of such rights.
129
 
Additionally, the prevention of abuse of IPRs also includes the provision of support by the 
developed countries regarding the establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices or agencies 
relevant to TRIPS matters, including the training of personnel.
130
  
Therefore, SADC member states may ask their developed countries’ counterparts to comply with 
the obligation imposed by Article 67 so that access to medicines for the poor may be realized. 
This is so notwithstanding the traditionally polarized positions of the developed and the 
developing countries relating to the rationale and utility of IP.
131
 Some developing countries still 
view IP as publicly good while developing countries view intellectual property as encompassing 
the same rights as physical property.
132
  
The SADC could conceive the request for technical assistance as a block or individual countries 
may ask for assistance severally. The preparation of the laws to be compliant with TRIPS may be 
one example of such technical assistance. SADC members would in this specific context be 
                                                          
126
 Article 67 of TRIPS, this should be read together with the provisions of Article 66 (2) of TRIPS, which imposes 
on developed members the obligation to transfer technology to LDCs and developing countries. See on a related 
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349 at 357. 
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urged to restrict themselves only to the incorporation of the minimum required under TRIPS into 
their legislation.  
The other form of assistance that is relevant to access to medicines may be to assist the SADC 
member states, jointly or severally, to domesticate TRIPS flexibilities such as compulsory 
licences. This would be in accord with one of Article 67’s major objectives which is to prevent 
the abuse of intellectual property rights by pharmaceutical companies. The only reservation that 
may be expressed about Article 67 is that while developed WTO members have an obligation to 
provide technical assistance, such assistance can only be rendered on request and on mutually 
agreed terms and conditions.
133
 The implication for access to medicines therefore will be that the 
assistance may be desperately needed but the developing countries and the LDCs may not have 
the technical capacity to conceive their own requests for assistance. To their detriment, LDCs 
may be arm-twisted by the developed countries into accepting assistance which may not 
immediately be in their best interests – such as providing for pharmaceutical patents.134 
The WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) have thus far been 
cooperating in disseminating information in the field of IP to some third world countries.
135
 
Information on the technical cooperation and training activities of the WTO Secretariat can be 
found on the Technical Cooperation and Training page.
136
 It should be noted that many of the 
general technical cooperation activities of the WTO Secretariat also cover intellectual 
property.
137
 
The WIPO Intellectual Property Technical Assistance Database (IP-TAD) contains information 
on technical assistance activities undertaken by the Organization where one or more of the 
beneficiary countries were either developing or the least developed countries or countries in 
transition.
138
 Such form of assistance has been on-going.  
                                                          
133
 Article 67 of TRIPS. 
134
 LDCs are now exempt from providing for pharmaceutical patents in their domestic legislation until 2021. 
135
 Kingah, Smis and Soderbaum above at 16.  
136
 See WTO “Technical Cooperation in the TRIPS Area” at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel9_e.htm (last visited 10/09/2013). 
137
 Ibid. 
138
 For a complete picture of the extent of the technical assistance thus far, see WIPO “Technical Assistance 
Database” at http://www.wipo.int/tad/en/ (last visited 10/09/2013). 
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Some developed countries have been consistent in supporting the developing countries and the 
LDCs to put into place the necessary infrastructure needed to bolster the protection of IPRs. 
Countries such as Canada, Norway and some EC members have provided reports to the WTO 
Secretariat on their activities in this regard. 
Despite technical assistance and cooperation having consistently not been cited as one of the 
major TRIPS flexibilities in most of the access literature perused,
139
 it is submitted that it ought 
to be regarded as such since implementing it may result in improved access to medicines. 
Secondly, technical assistance is provided for and built into the TRIPS Agreement in order to 
help developing and least developing WTO members to comply with TRIPS and by implication, 
benefit from its provisions. This, therefore, makes the provision relating to the granting of 
technical assistance to a TRIPS’ flexibility when viewed in this context. SADC countries should 
and can take advantage of the technical assistance provisions of TRIPS to specifically ask for 
assistance in areas that will ensure access to medicines, such as adapting patent laws to 
incorporate the minimal TRIPS flexibilities.  
4.3.2 Transition Periods 
Closely related to the provisions relating to technical assistance in the TRIPS Agreement are 
those provisions talking to temporary derogations from complying with TRIPS through transition 
periods. The periods generally allow WTO members to comply with TRIPS in a staggered 
manner; with the developed countries being expected to comply first, followed by the developing 
countries while the LDCs would be the last ones to be fully compliant.
140
 
It will be prudent to point out from the onset that the preamble to the TRIPS Agreement states 
that members recognize the special needs of their least-developed counterparts in respect of the 
                                                          
139
 Most authorities, notably Musungu SF and Oh S “The Use of TRIPS Flexibilities by Developing Countries: Can 
they Promote Access to Medicines?” (2005) 20 CIPIH Study Paper 4C at iv – vii do not include technical assistance 
provisions as aspects of the flexibilities. The commonly mentioned flexibilities are transition periods, compulsory 
licenses, public non-commercial use, parallel importation, exemptions from patentability, limits on data protection, 
bolar exception, use of competition law and limits on data protection.  
140
 At the time of writing, LDCs were initially exempt from complying with TRIPS provisions relating to 
pharmaceutical and agricultural patents until 2016, there was a heightened expectation among academics and access 
activists that this period was likely to be extended, and it has since been extended to 2012 for other IPRs except 
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maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of law and regulations in order to enable 
them to make a sound and viable technological base.
141
 
In addition, the TRIPS Agreement states that the LDCs will have ten years to implement general 
TRIPS provisions.
142
 However, the TRIPS Agreement does expressly state that the ten-year 
period may be extended by the Council for TRIPS if the request is made by an LDC member.
143
 
Such an extension was granted and the LDCs were, therefore, expected to fully implement their 
TRIPS obligations in 2013 (and 2016 for pharmaceutical products) and not in 2005 as originally 
envisaged.  
The developing countries were expected to have complied with the TRIPS Agreement by the 
year 2000,
144
 but this was subsequently extended to 2005. While this staggered implementation 
of the TRIPS provisions may be lauded as having been sympathetic to the economic conditions 
and developmental challenges obtaining in the developing countries and the LDCs, whether they 
are good for access to medicines depends on how they have been taken advantage of. It is quite 
ironic that by the end of 2013, almost 18 years after the TRIPS Agreement was concluded, no 
single SADC member had taken advantage of this flexibility for its development.  
This flexibility has tremendous potential for enhancing access to medicines in the SADC region. 
This fact notwithstanding, it appears that African countries in general and the SADC members in 
particular are not taking optimal advantage of the opportunity. More than half of the SADC 
members are LDCs and the 2016 initial deadline, together with its recent extension for 
pharmaceutical compliance with TRIPS must be understood as being mainly for the benefit of 
SADC, with more than 50% of its membership being made up of LDCs. 
SADC LDC members should use technical assistance from WIPO, WTO and regional IP bodies 
such as ARIPO and OAPI to amend their domestic IP laws to take into account the transitional 
provisions by specifically excluding patent applications for pharmaceuticals. It has been argued 
that while one is mindful of the fact that LDCs will eventually have to implement TRIPS in any 
                                                          
141
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142
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event, it may be futile to surmise what will eventually come to pass.
145
 Such a view sounds a bit 
too pessimistic if not cynical when one considers how Brazil and India grew their generic
146
 
pharmaceutical industries.
147
 LDCs could negotiate with generic manufactures and even 
governments of the countries with superior pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity to set up 
manufacturing plants in LDCs which are not expected to grant pharmaceutical patents until 2016. 
It is heartening to report that Brazil is setting up a pharmaceutical plant in Mozambique, an LDC 
to manufacture HIV/AIDS drugs.  
To show that LDCs in the SADC region have not taken advantage of their LDC statuses, Malawi 
may be used as an example of how not to take advantage of this flexibility.
148
  
In implementing its antiretroviral therapy (ART) programme, the government of Malawi 
purported to rely on the Doha Declaration. The government sought to use the 2016 extension in 
order to procure the fixed dose combination drug Triomune, produced by Cipla, an Indian 
generic company.
149
 However, two components of the drug combination had been patented in 
Malawi
150
 before the Doha Declaration, while no changes had in the meantime been made to the 
Malawian patent law to override or cancel these patents. The implication here is that while 
Malawi was generally expected not to recognize the patents involved in the drug combination in 
terms of the relevant transitional provision, technically, it could not take advantage of the 
transitional provision because its legislation provides for pharmaceutical patents way ahead of 
the 2016 deadline. Fortunately, the products were subsequently supplied to Malawi, despite the 
palpable potential violation of its domestic patent laws, because the patentee did not object.
151
 
In closing, the transition periods are important both positively and negatively. On a negative 
note, the expiry of the 2005 deadline has had serious implications for the future supply and 
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availability of generic versions of patented medicine,
152
 the bulk of which has traditionally been 
imported by SADC members from India. The implication is that India and Brazil will no longer 
be able to produce generic versions of drugs patented after the deadline and this will in turn 
impact on the prices and affordability for SADC countries.
153
 Although this impact is not 
expected immediately, it is foreseeable that this will affect the generic drug industry in the 
producing countries and also in those that are dependent on the generic drug and active 
ingredients from the producing countries.
154
 
The transitional period relating to LDCs remains important and relevant until 2016, and may be 
beyond. From a public health perspective, the extension is of significant importance to the LDCs. 
The extension is an important acknowledgement of the possible negative implications of patent 
protection for public health.
155
 As shown in the Malawian example above, there is a need for 
SADC countries to take advantage of this flexibility relating to the LDCs by implementing it in 
their domestic legislations. As for the uncertainty relating to patents already granted, it is 
recommended that the LDCs prospectively suspend the operation of their patent, test data and 
market exclusivity schemes with respect to medicines until 2016, and if an extension to the 
transition period is granted, until that new date.
156
 
While it is not the intention of this study to encourage the invasion of patent rights with impunity 
in the LDCs with no patent laws, at the minimum, the absence of a patent will ensure that patents 
rights do not become an obstacle to the supply of generic medicines.
157
 However, this study is 
alive to the fact that the absence of patent protection may or may not encourage the 
establishment and growth of the local pharmaceutical industry. Eastern and Southern African 
(SADC) LDCs can, therefore, take advantage of this flexibility by simply not protecting patents 
on pharmaceuticals that are deemed essential for public health up to 1 January 2016.
158
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4.3.3 Compulsory licenses  
It is important as a preliminary remark to clearly state that there is no express reference to the 
term ‘compulsory licence’ in the TRIPS Agreement. Compulsory licences are now considered to 
fall under the general category of ‘other use without authorization of the right holder’, provided 
for in Article 31 of TRIPS. However, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and the 
Ministerial Declaration of 2003 do expressly refer to compulsory licences.
159
 The most relevant 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which are relevant to compulsory licences are Articles 7,
160
 
8,
161
 31
162
 and 40;
163
 while Article 5 of the Paris Convention is also very relevant.
164
 
According to Baker, a compulsory licence, which may be viewed as some kind of permission 
from the government, has the effect of extinguishing patent exclusivity and permits the licensee 
to use the patent without the patentee’s consent subject to payment of royalties.165 At the 
international law level, it is a requirement that if a compulsory licence is granted, the patent 
holder must be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into 
account the economic value of the authorization.
166
 The issuance of a compulsory licence is 
subject to a number of other conditions in addition to the remuneration requirement,
167
 and 
additionally, a member state may have its own peculiar conditions prescribed in domestic law.
168
 
Among the conditions set out for the granting of compulsory licences in Article 31 of TRIPS, the 
following are important in the context of the Paragraph 6 Decision, discussed above:
169
 
(a) the grantee must first have made efforts, for a reasonable time, to negotiate authorization 
from the right holder, on ‘reasonable commercial terms and conditions’;170 
                                                          
159
 In the Doha Declaration, the concept is mentioned for the first time in paragraph 5(b) while in the 2003 Decision, 
compulsory licenses are mentioned for the first time in 2 (a) (iii). 
160
 Objectives. 
161
 Principles. 
162
 Other use without authorization of the right holder. 
163
 Control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licenses. 
164
 Article 5 A (2) of the Paris Convention succinctly provides that , each country for the Union ‘shall have the right 
to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result 
from the exercise of exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work’.  
165
 Baker above 14. 
166
 Article 31(h) of TRIPS. 
167
 See for instance TRIPS Article 31 (a) – (l). 
168
 For example, Section 56 of the South African Patents Act 57 of 1978 lists grounds for compulsory licences 
including patent abuse generally or in the context of competition law. 
169
 The following list draws largely from Abbott F.M and  Van Puymbroeck R.V “Compulsory Licensing for Public 
Health A Guide and Model Documents for Implementation of the Doha Declaration Paragraph 6 Decision” (2005) 
World Bank Working Paper No. 61 at 7. 
 139 
 
(b) Members may dispense with this requirement, however, in the case of a ‘national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
commercial use.’171 
 
(c) the use authorized by the compulsory license must be ‘predominantly for the supply of 
the domestic market’172 and 
 
(d) adequate remuneration must be paid to the right holder.173  
 
The requirement that the compulsory licence must be used for the predominant-supply-of-the-
domestic-market does not apply if the compulsory licence is granted to remedy anti-competitive 
practices.
174
 Therefore, when an exporting member grants a compulsory licence to remedy an 
anti-competitive practice it does not act under the 2003 Decision because it does not take 
advantage of the waiver of Article 31(f) established by the Decision.
175
 Instead, it acts under a 
pre-existing right in the TRIPS Agreement to authorize exports to address anti-competitive 
practices. In such cases, the importing Member does not need to comply with the notification and 
other requirements set out in the Decision. 
Critiquing the very existence of the above conditions, Reichmann argues that the conditions  
only magnify the legitimacy of every complying government’s right to resort to compulsory 
licensing whenever its domestic self-interest so requires.
176
 Compulsory licences may be granted 
to third parties for their own use and use by or on behalf of government without the authorization 
of the right holder.
177
 In the context of this study, compulsory licences may be granted to address 
public health emergencies by ensuring access to cheaper drugs.
178
 It is possible that the granting 
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of one or more of such licences will force process down, thus furthering consumer welfare.
179
 
Because compulsory licences must be non-exclusive, this means that licences to use a patent may 
be given to more than one company.
180
 
To the extent that compulsory licences would reduce the prices of the patented product and the 
expected profits of the patent holder, pharmaceutical companies have argued that the granting of 
such licences would undermine the incentives to engage in future research and development 
(R&D).
181
 This submission is flawed when the results from studies that attempted to examine the 
effect of compulsory licences on R&D are taken into account.
182
 To emphasise the fallacy of the 
view that compulsory licences have a negative effect on R&D, Tandon notes that generally, 
firms spend a lot of R&D money on efforts to ‘invent around’ the patents of their competitors.183 
With generalized compulsory licences, these expenditures would be unnecessary and thus 
increase the welfare benefits.
184
 It is also important to record that compulsory licences will 
ensure that cheaper generic drugs are available and boost the local pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacity irrespective of how modest this would be.
185
 
It is noteworthy that although the TRIPS Agreement gives several grounds
186
 meriting the grant 
of compulsory licences, when read together with the pertinent provision of the Doha 
Declaration,
187
 there is no limit in any way on the capacity of governments to grant compulsory 
licences or undertake government use.
188
 The absence of restrictions on the purposes for which 
compulsory licenses may be granted is quite a significant achievement for the developing 
countries and is now considered “as a major policy instrument in attenuating the adverse effects 
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of strong patent protection”.189 The TRIPS Agreement, therefore, gives considerable room to 
policy makers in the developing countries to come up with their own grounds so that the eleven 
conditions given by Article 31 do not become restrictions.
190
 Therefore, SADC members may 
include other grounds for compulsory licences and clearly spell out in simple language, peculiar 
situations, including the inability to access medicines due to exorbitant prices, which may trigger 
the application for and the granting of a compulsory licence. 
Domestic legislation of most countries in Africa,
191
 and in the SADC region,
192
 has provided for 
compulsory licences. To date, the following African countries have used compulsory licences to 
access medicines, particularly in the context of HIV/AIDS: Cameroon (2005), Ghana (2005), 
Guinea (2005), Eritrea (2005), Mozambique (2004), Swaziland (2004), Zambia (2004) and 
Zimbabwe (2001).
193
 In South Africa, a compulsory licence on the basis of abuse of a patent in 
the context of competition law was on the verge of being issued in 2003 but the parties 
negotiated and settled for a voluntary licence, with positive results for access to medicines.
194
 
The government of Mozambique in 2004 attempted to locally manufacture the fixed-dose 
combination of lamivudine, stavudine and nevirapine under a compulsory licence issued to a 
local pharmaceutical company, Pharco Mozambique, but the effort failed because active 
pharmaceutical ingredients were expensive, thus rendering local production economically 
unviable.
195
 This problem highlights the fact that TRIPS flexibilities on their own cannot resolve 
the access problem; effective policy instruments and an enabling local environment are 
prerequisites.  
The other problem that has been identified with specific reference to the potential viability of 
compulsory licences as an access tool in the SADC region relates to the requirement to pay 
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adequate compensation.
196
 Legislation in most SADC countries lacks clear provision for the 
determination of the level of ‘adequate remuneration’ to be paid once a compulsory licence has 
been issued.
197
 Additionally, there are no specific provisions in the countries’ laws allowing a 
waiver of the payment of royalties by the importing country, as sanctioned by the 2003 
Decision.
198
 
It will, therefore, be important to clarify in national laws the different circumstances when an 
importing country would be exempted from the payment royalties;
199
 this is based on the fact 
that most countries in the SADC region, except South Africa, lack pharmaceutical production 
capacity. 
Compulsory licences as a TRIPS flexibility offer unique advantages for WTO members 
especially the developing countries and the LDCs. Their main advantage lies in the fact that they 
can be used to meet the local market demand, to reduce medicine prices and facilitate research 
and development of new medicines provided the pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity 
exists.
200
 However, despite the advantages, compulsory licences will be problematic to use in the 
SADC context because their use will be limited to small quantities of imports to deal with the 
specific problem. Secondly, due to the lack of pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, SADC 
countries are likely to use the licences as importers, thus retarding the development of domestic 
manufacturing capacity.
201
 
However, despite the above highlighted reservations, compulsory licences and parallel imports 
remain important TRIPS flexibilities for the SADC in the context of access to medicines under 
the Doha Declaration and the 2003 Decision. This study, therefore, largely based its search for 
access solutions on the use of these two flexibilities.
202
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4.3.4 Parallel Importation 
Because compulsory licences are based on a complex procedure prescribed by the TRIPS 
Agreement and in some instances may only be judicially sanctioned, SADC members will be 
reluctant to rely on them as an access to medicines tool. Additionally, unless the member is an 
LDC, which does not have patent legislation on its statute books, if a compulsory licence is to be 
utilized, issues of the payment of ‘adequate’ remuneration to the patent holders will arise. 
The foregoing remarks then call for an alternative flexibility which is less complex to implement 
and for which the payment of remuneration to the patent holder does not arise. Parallel 
importation squarely fits the description of such an alternative.  
Parallel importation, just like compulsory licensing, is not directly mentioned in the TRIPS 
Agreement but arises in the context of the international exhaustion of rights.
203
 The TRIPS 
Agreement disclaims any limitation on the members’ freedom to regulate international 
exhaustion of rights in intellectual property rights.
204
 International exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights will make it possible for a patented product to be legally imported into a country 
after the product has been legitimately put on the market in a foreign market.
205
 
The relevant TRIPS provision (Article 6) leaves the determination of when exhaustion may be 
deemed to have occurred to each individual member to decide.
206
 Exhaustion may be applied at 
the national level,
207
 regional level
208
 and international level.
209
 International exhaustion is 
important for developing countries which will be free to import cheap drugs from wherever they 
have been placed by the patent holder, without breaching any obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement.
210
 The TRIPS and the Declaration, therefore, allow members to choose the 
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exhaustion regime suitable for their individual circumstances and be in a position to import 
patented products without the authorization of the title-holder, using a practice generally known 
as ‘parallel importation’. 
Parallel importation may aptly be defined as “the import and resale in a country, without the 
consent of the patent holder, of a patented product that has been legitimately put on the market of 
the exporting country under a parallel patent”.211 Therefore, parallel importation may be 
beneficial to developing countries that will be able to import patented products from countries 
where they are sold at lower prices than those at which they are sold in the importing country.
212
  
One reason why patented products may be cheaply available in other countries could be 
differential pricing,
213
 explored as a possible solution to the SADC access problem in Chapter 
seven below. One writer has characterized differential pricing, which is now seriously considered 
as a solution to the high drug prices occasioned by the existence of patents, as an ‘imperfect 
solution’.214  The reality of parallel importation is that governments will be allowed to import, 
without the right holder’s consent, patented products into their territories from other countries 
where such products have been placed on the market at a lower price.
215
 It does not matter 
whether or not the products have been placed on the market with or without the right holder’s 
consent.  
To convincingly illustrate the advantages and access to medicines’ potential in respect of parallel 
importation as a TRIPS flexibility Mabika and Makombe
216
 used the price of the drug Amoxil in 
1999 and the table shown on the next page is an attestation to this effect. 
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US$ price of Amoxil   
Pakistan          $8 
Canada          $14 
Italy           $16 
New Zealand          $22 
Philippines          $29 
Malaysia          $36 
Indonesia          $40 
Germany          $60 
(Source: Mabika A and Makombe P (2006:2) 
From the table above, it is axiomatic that the drug is the cheapest in Pakistan and most expensive 
in Germany. Germany can import the drug from wherever it is cheap, notably Pakistan and Italy 
without resort to the right holder. This of course will depend on what exhaustion regime 
Germany subscribes to. The rationale for parallel importation is the promotion of ‘pricing equity 
by allowing importation of patented products marketed more cheaply in another country’.217 
Applied to the SADC countries, parallel imports may be useful in procuring cheap medicines 
from other countries where the product has been placed on the market at a cheaper price. 
Sometimes right holders can place their products cheaply in certain markets due to prior 
negotiations or a desire to establish a foothold and business presence in the specific country. This 
will be possible if the SADC member’s legislation provides for parallel importation. It is 
important to highlight that LDCs with no intellectual property laws whatsoever, can chose to 
resort to parallel import without any hindrance whatsoever; at least until 2016 with respect to 
pharmaceuticals and until 2021 with regard to the other IP forms. It is heartening to note that in 
the SADC region, all members except Angola, Botswana Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia provide for parallel imports in their domestic 
laws.
218
 To maximally take advantage of parallel importation, SADC members must move away 
from national and regional exhaustion and include international exhaustion regimes in their 
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domestic legislation. On the African continent, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe are 
good examples of countries that provide for the international exhaustion of rights.
219
 However, 
with respect to South Africa, parallel importation is not provided for in the Patents Act but in the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act.
220
 Parallel importation is provided 
for in Article 15C of the Act.
221
 
It is appropriate to end this discussion of parallel importation as a TRIPS’ flexibility by referring 
to the inherent challenges. The major challenge as outlined in the foregoing paragraph is that 
most SADC members have not adapted their domestic laws to allow for the international 
exhaustion of rights as mandated by TRIPS and the Doha Declaration. This problem becomes 
acute when one factors in the reality that about 50% of SADC members are considered 
developing nations which have to align their laws with the TRIPS Agreement. The deficiency in 
the laws leaves SADC members unable to shop around for cheaper drugs in other markets 
through parallel importation. Considering the disease burden in the region, incorporating an 
international exhaustion regime into domestic laws could go a long way towards fulfilling SADC 
citizens’ right to health, and by the extension access to medicines.  
4.3.5 The Research and Early Working or Bolar Exception 
The TRIPS Agreement specifies exclusive rights
222
 that a patentee is entitled to and additionally, 
outlines general bases for exceptions to such exclusive rights.
223
 The general rule of law is that 
exceptions to the patent rights must be limited;
224
 not unreasonably conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the patent;
225
 and not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
holder,
226
 taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties.
227
 Apart from the above 
broad outline, Article 30 of TRIPS does not define the scope or nature of the permissible 
exceptions.
228
 This leaves WTO members with a lot of interpretive freedom. Consequently, 
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exceptions crafted to achieve objectives related to the transfer of technology; the prevention of 
abuse of intellectual property rights; as well as the protection of public health is justifiable and 
desirable.
229
 
It is conceivable that the testing and establishment of the bioequivalence
230
 of a generic version 
of a drug before the expiry of the patent may be done in pursuit of research and 
experimentation.
231
 The research and experimental use exception is aimed at ensuring that 
scientific research generating knew knowledge is fostered and not impeded by patents.
232
 This 
exception is longstanding and is justifiable on the basis that one of the main aims of patent laws 
is to facilitate the dissemination of knowledge, promote innovation and facilitate the 
advancement of science.
233
 This exception, which is in actual fact a TRIPS flexibility, is likely to 
be useful in spurring pharmaceutical technological progress when pharmaceutical companies and 
research institutes experiment with a patented medical invention in order to improve it or 
evaluate it to establish if it works.
234
 There is a lot for SADC countries to gain if they include the 
research exception in their individual patent laws because the flexibility is sanctioned by the 
TRIPS Agreement.
235
 
The early working or bolar exception may be regarded as one of the desirable ones that is 
acutely relevant to access to medicines for SADC countries. The exception is a useful 
mechanism for facilitating the production and accelerated introduction of generic drugs when 
patents expire. The existence of this exception, which allows members to permit generic 
medicine manufacturers to undertake and complete the task of obtaining regulatory approval 
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from national regulatory authorities for generic versions before original patents expire, was 
confirmed by the WTO in a panel ruling pitting Canada against the European Union.
236
  
This exception is important because it ensures that generic versions of the patented product are 
available on the market immediately or within a reasonable time after the expiry of the patent.
237
 
It has been reported that the actual implementation of this exception differs from country to 
country. In Zimbabwe for instance, early working of an invention is allowed as early at six 
months before the expiry of the patent.
238
 In Kenya, something similar to the Zimbabwean 
situation obtains with the net result being that the life of the patent is not extended.
239
 In the 
United States, on the other hand, the relevant legislation introduced this exception while 
allowing patent holders an extended period of protection.
240
 
Because the bolar exception is important for technology transfer and local manufacturing, it is 
advisable that SADC countries include it clearly and unambiguously in national laws. Although 
African countries and SADC members have limited capacity for the production of 
pharmaceuticals, there is demonstrated effort in countries such as Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe and Nigeria.
241
 In the SADC region, noticeable pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacity exists in South Africa, the DRC, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia in that order.
242
 
Other SADC countries with some pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity are Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles and Swaziland.
243
 The incorporation of the early working 
system into national laws, as has been done in South Africa
244
 and Zimbabwe
245
 is, therefore, 
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worth emulating as a crucial step towards the eventual production and distribution of essential 
medicines in the region.
246
 
Even where countries are not likely to be producers of pharmaceuticals, the UK Commission on 
Intellectual Property has recommended that developing countries incorporate a bolar-type 
exception within their domestic laws, in order to make it possible for generic products of a 
foreign company to gain regulatory approval and to enter the market soon after the expiry of the 
patent.
247
 
4.3.6 Public non-Commercial Use of Patents (government use) 
Just like in other instances when patents may be overridden in a legally sanctioned manner,
248
 
government’s use of patents, while taking into account the interests of the society and third 
parties, has not been considered to be unreasonably prejudicial to the interests of patent right 
holders.
249
 
The right of the state to use a patent without the consent of the patent holder for public health 
purposes is considered to be an important public health safeguard by many countries.
250
 
Although the TRIPS Agreement sets out the conditions governing both government use and 
compulsory licences, one important difference is that government’s use of patents may be ‘fast 
tracked’ because of the waiver of the requirement for prior negotiations with patent holders.251 
Although the term ‘government’ is not defined in the TRIPS Agreement, the use is limited to 
public rather than private non-commercial use.
252
 “Public commercial purposes” is also not 
defined in the TRIPS Agreement, hence this leaves developing and SADC countries with ample 
policy space to interpret the concept.
253
 The major distinction between government-use 
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provisions and compulsory licences lies primarily in the nature or purpose of the use of the 
patent.
254
 In the case of government’s use, it would be limited to “public non-commercial 
purposes” while compulsory licences would also cover private and commercial use.255 
Therefore, in the thematic context of this study, the purchase of anti-retroviral drugs for 
distribution through public hospitals without commercial profit would fall under the scope of this 
flexibility.
256
 It has been recommended that those developing countries with no legislation on 
government use of patents should incorporate this flexibility into their domestic legislation.
257
 
Additionally, it has further been recommended that the incorporated provisions must be no less 
broad than those currently applicable in the United States and United Kingdom (UK) 
legislation.
258
 
4.3.7 Exemptions from Patentability 
The general rule on patentable subject matter under the TRIPS Agreement is that, subject to 
exceptions set out therein, patents shall be available for all inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new and involve an inventive step 
and are capable of industrial application.
259
  
However, an invention is not defined in the TRIPS Agreement and this leaves WTO members 
with the flexibility to define the scope of the concept of invention under their national laws.
260
 
This flexibility may have both good and bad implications for access to medicines. On a positive 
note, the absence of a definition may make it possible for WTO members to exclude new uses of 
drugs from patentability under national laws.
261
 However, on a negative note, WTO members 
may take advantage of the absence of a definition and use it to frustrate access to medicines by 
granting patents to new and sometimes minimally improved uses of drugs. Standards should, 
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therefore, be set to avoid the granting of patents for “evergreen” or “me-too drugs” that extend 
patent duration without an improvement to the drugs’ efficacy.262  
The proponents of new use patents justify them on the basis that the discovery of a new use may 
require the same level of investment like what obtained with the first patent.
263
 According to 
Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti,
264
 the forms of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry for 
which patents may be claimed varies from breakthrough discoveries to minor modifications of 
existing medications. The authors cite examples from a recent study that was conducted by the 
National Institute of Healthcare Management Research and Educational Foundation which 
showed that in the United States, the market with the largest number of pharmaceutical patents, 
in the 12 year period from 1989 to 2000, of the 1035 new drugs approved by the Federal 
Regulatory Agency, only 35 per cent of them contained a new active ingredient.
265
 From the 
cited report, during the 12 year period, only 15 per cent of the medicines were highly innovative 
drugs.
266
 The logical conclusion based on the study, therefore, is that the bulk of new medicines 
are modified versions of older drugs, which ironically cost more than the original ones on which 
they are based.  
To raise the standards in the SADC region, patent examiners have to be trained to interpret 
patentability requirements strictly before granting pharmaceutical patents.
267
 On a related note, 
India has raised the criteria for patentability so as to prevent evergreen patents from being 
registered.
268
 In the specific Indian context, applicants are made to establish to a high degree of 
certainty that the medication for which an application for a patent has been made is more 
effective than (emphasis added) those already used for the same condition.
269
 Avenues should be 
provided for patent opposition proceedings during the patent application process because the 
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Random House. 
 152 
 
court process is tedious and likely to be expensive.
270
 In India for instance, the relevant law
271
 
allows members of the public to bring evidence which may lead to patent rejection to the 
attention of the patent controller.
272
 The existence of this remedial measure made it possible for 
the Indian Network of People living with HIV/AIDS and the Manipur Network of Positive 
People to successfully oppose GSK’s patent application for zidovudine and lamivudine in 2006 
on the basis that the patent claim in the specific instance was not for a new invention.
273
 
South Africa, a SADC member with one of the highest HIV/AIDS infection rates in the world, 
does not have provisions in its patent laws dealing with pre-grant opposition to patents as a 
condition precedent for the granting of a patent.
274
 Such an omission does not augur well for 
access to medicines and deserves a legal administrative rethink. Therefore, patent offices must 
push for high standards of disclosure in order to discourage the filing of bogus patent 
applications meant to serve a gate-keeping function thus deterring the entry of generics on the 
market.
275
 Patent Offices in the SADC region may, therefore, consider dealing with this problem 
by requesting technical assistance to amend their laws so that patent examination becomes 
mandatory.
276
 
In closing, the implication of this flexibility for SADC members is that the TRIPS Agreement 
does not prevent them from denying the patentability of new uses of drugs for lack of novelty, 
the involvement of an inventive step and lack of industrial applicability.
277
 Developing countries 
and SADC member states would be within their rights if they exclude new uses of known 
products including diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods from patentability.
278
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4.3.8 Limitations on Data Protection 
The TRIPS Agreement allows each WTO member to determine how to protect test data in the 
public interest.
279
 The pertinent provision reads as follows: 
Members, when requiring as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or 
agricultural products which utilise new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or 
other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against 
unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except 
where necessary to protect the public or unless steps are taken to ensure that such data are 
protected against unfair commercial use.
280
 
The most important aspects of the provision that may be emphasized for ease of comprehension 
may be summed up as follows: Firstly, the provision relates to data relating to new chemical 
processes which are aimed at the production of new chemical products.  
Secondly, the origination of the data must involve a considerable effort.
281
  
Thirdly, the data must be protected from unfair commercial use (my emphasis), and nothing 
more.  
It appears that two possible defences against a charge of disclosure of the data do exist.
282
 Firstly, 
a member can admit that the data was indeed disclosed, to the chagrin of the complainant but 
such disclosure was done to safeguard and protect public health. Secondly, data may have been 
disclosed because non-disclosure thereof has been rendered superfluous by the fact that concrete 
steps have been taken to protect the data against unfair commercial use.  
Therefore, there is no textual basis for a submission that pharmaceutical test data must be 
protected against disclosure all the time (data exclusivity).
283
 The protection must only address 
the possibility of unfair commercial use of the test data. Interpreting Article 39 (3) of TRIPS as 
demanding data exclusivity rather than data protection against unfair commercial use has the 
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potential of blocking access to generic versions of new medicines.
284
 Since the WTO does not 
require “data exclusivity”, a generic producer, which is given permission, for example, under a 
compulsory licence to sell or produce a generic version of a patented drug, can make use of that 
data when it seeks safety approval from the drug regulatory authority.
285
 In so far as generic 
competition lowers prices and increases availability and access to essential medicines, it is in the 
public interest to limit the extent of test data protection.
286
 
The data refers to test data which is submitted to drug regulatory authorities to demonstrate the 
safety and quality of products.
287
 During the subsistence of the test data protection, drug 
regulatory authorities are not allowed to rely on the originator’s test data to approve other 
registrations during the entire period of data protection.
288
 Most countries in Africa do not have 
specific provisions with respect to data protection and where such provisions exist the authorities 
protect the data against disclosure to a third party for “unfair commercial use”.289  
In some developed jurisdictions, such as the United States and the European Union, the pertinent 
regulations provide for exclusive use of the test data by the originator company for a limited 
period of time.
290
 
It is, therefore, recommended that SADC member states clearly stipulate in their domestic laws 
the extent of data protection that accords with the TRIPS Agreement so that drug regulatory 
authorities can effectively register generic medicines. From a public health policy standpoint, it 
is vital that policies that ensure competition, such as limitations on data protection be adopted in 
order to ensure a timely entrance of generic medicines to ameliorate the access enigma to 
medicines. SADC members are not exempt from this important requirement.  
4.3.9 Exceptions based in Competition Law 
The TRIPS Agreement envisages a balance between the promotion of technological innovation 
and the transfer of technology, in addition to a balance in the enjoyment of the benefits accruing 
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to the users and producers of technology.
291
 The most relevant principle upon which the balance 
may be achieved is one allowing members to adopt appropriate measures to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by rights holders or their resorting to practices that unreasonably 
restrain trade or adversely affect international transfer of technology.
292
 
Members are not obliged to apply the provisions of Article 31(b)
293
 and (f)
294
 of the TRIPS 
Agreement if intellectual property rights are abused in the context of anti-competitive 
behaviour.
295
 Patents may, therefore, be overridden and compulsory licences issued if it can be 
proved that the right holder is engaged in anti-competitive conduct, such as abusing dominance 
in a market by charging excessively high prices for pharmaceuticals. In this case, the need to 
correct anti-competitive behaviour may be taken into account in determining the amount of 
remuneration as compensation.
296
 This remedy may be resorted to after going through a judicial 
or administrative process,
297
 which a member seeking to rely on such a remedy must have in 
place. Article 31 (k) of the TRIPS Agreement is, therefore, a flexibility which SADC member 
states may use if their domestic legal regime provides for the redress of anti-competitive 
behaviour. 
Additionally, the TRIPS Agreement does acknowledge that some licensing practices or 
conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights may restrain competition and impede the 
transfer of technology,
298
 thus compelling an affected member to enter into consultations with its 
trading partner in order to stem the abuse of intellectual property rights.
299
 Examples of 
contractual practices that may restrain competition are the use of terms such as exclusive grant 
back clauses which are clauses that preclude challenges to the validity of the patent and coercive 
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packaging.
300
 Such practices must be prohibited in order to improve competition and reduce the 
concentration of market power in one country or specific geographical region.  
WTO members are, therefore, allowed within the purview of the TRIPS Agreement to pass 
domestic legislation specifying the specific licensing practices or conditions that may constitute 
an abuse of intellectual property rights with adverse effects on competition in the relevant 
market.
301
 Such domestic legislation has extra-jurisdictional application.
302
 The reason for such a 
submission on extraterritoriality is that the pertinent provision refers to a request for consultation 
directed at a WTO member by a fellow member on the basis that anti-competitive conduct 
complained of violates a provision in the complaining state’s domestic legislation.303            
Anti-competitive practices or conditions adversely affecting trade and the dissemination of 
technology and the use of competitions law can be an effective mechanism to check medicine 
pricing abuses on the markets.
304
 However, for competition law and policy to work favourably 
for the access cause to medicines, the two must be viewed as complementary to other TRIPS 
flexibilities, specifically those highlighted by the Doha Declaration.
305
 
Competition law and policy have been used as a tool to improve access to medicines in the 
SADC region. In South Africa this is best exemplified by two cases whose finalization by the 
relevant authorities was eye-opening for the region.
306
 Taking a cue from South Africa, SADC 
member states that do not have competition legislation
307
 and institutions to check anti-
competitive practices need such regulatory frameworks. The enforcement of the competition law 
and policy are likely to succeed in an environment with robust civil society activity and NGOs 
that keep government on its feet. In the context of South Africa, the actions of the Treatment 
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Campaign and other groups forced the pharmaceutical companies to agree to voluntary 
settlements.
308
 
Conclusion 
The most relevant TRIPS flexibilities for the developing countries, especially the SADC 
members include transition periods, compulsory licenses, public non-commercial use of patents, 
parallel importation, exceptions from patentability and limits on data protection, bolar exception 
and use of competition law. Although the SADC Protocol on Trade enjoins all SADC members 
to implement TRIPS flexibilities in their legislation, it must be recalled that LDCs do not have to 
worry about such an obligation until 2016 for pharmaceuticals
309
 and 2021 for all other IP forms. 
This chapter has identified the above flexibilities and contextualized the relevance of each to the 
SADC region, with examples drawn from SADC members’ legislation where applicable. The 
overall picture is that the inclusion of these flexibilities in individual SADC members’ legislation 
is not systematic but random. In addition, where a flexibility such as compulsory licensing is 
included in a country’s legislation, the provisions thereof are complex or the grounds for the use 
of the flexibility are narrowly spelt out.  
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health together with the August 2003 waiver and 
the subsequent introduction of Article 31 bis of TRIPS are very crucial developments which 
remain potentially useful arsenal for the developing countries and the LDCs to use in their access 
war. While the Doha Declaration has received significant praise for its bold statements on access 
to medicine and providing interpretive clarity, it did not solve all the problems associated with 
the protection of intellectual property rights and the bourgeoning health problems.
310
 This 
chapter gave a detailed exposition of the pertinent provisions of the Doha Declaration and Article 
31 bis and came to the conclusion that the legal developments will yield positive results for 
access to medicines. The most important aspect of the legal developments is the provision for an 
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exemption of regional agreements in which 50% of the members are LDCs from complying with 
the restrictive procedure applicable to compulsory licences in terms of Article 31 of TRIPS.
311
 
The SADC, the EAC and ECOWAS would all satisfy this 50% LDCs membership requirement. 
This provision is explored in detail later in this study and is proposed as a major part of the 
solution to the access to medicines problem in the SADC region.  
This chapter also established that in order to be able to take maximum advantage of the 
flexibilities, SADC members must legislate for the various forms of intellectual property rights 
including patents. Apart from the TRIPS flexibilities, the TRIPS Agreement itself does have 
provisions which SADC members may take advantage of in order to and improve access to 
medicines. These provisions include but are not limited to abuse of patent rights, limits on new 
use patents, the use of transitional periods and provisions obliging developed countries to offer 
technical assistance to developing countries and LDCs. These provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement play a complementary role to the TRIPS flexibilities narrated above.  
Having outlined, narrated and contextualised the salient contents of the TRIPS flexibilities, albeit 
briefly, in the SADC region, it is now appropriate to focus on the actual implementation of the 
flexibilities in selected SADC countries. The next chapter, therefore, deals with the specifics of 
the actual implementation of the TRIPS flexibilities in the selected SADC members emphasising 
parallel imports and compulsory licensing.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE ACTUAL USE OF TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES IN SELECT SADC COUNTRIES 
5. Introduction  
Because the exposition of TRIPS flexibilities in Chapter Four above did not go into a very 
detailed discussion of the actual implementation of the flexibilities in individual countries’ IP 
policy and legislation, it is appropriate that the curiosity aroused by the narrative in Chapter Four 
be satiated with a detailed exposition in this chapter.  
This chapter focuses on three major themes. Firstly, it outlines the SADC legal policy regime on 
the implementation of TRIPS flexibilities as provided for in the Treaty and accompanying 
Protocols. Secondly, the chapter gives an overview picture of the extent of the domestication of 
TRIPS flexibilities in SADC members’ laws and IP Policy instruments. Lastly, the chapter closes 
with a detailed exposition and analysis of case studies on the use of TRIPS flexibilities in select 
SADC countries namely, Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa and extracts useful lessons for 
the region from the case studies. 
Botswana, a developing middle-income SADC member, recently completed reviewing her patent 
law in order to take full advantage of TRIPS flexibilities by drafting a new Industrial Property 
Act and accompanying Regulations. Despite some flaws in the new law which this study will 
expose, Botswana is included here as an example of best practice in the SADC region.  
Zimbabwe, which is a developing country, is chosen as a case study here not for the introduction 
of the recent IP law reform. On the contrary, its inclusion has been prompted by the fact that it 
was the first SADC member to issue a government compulsory licence for the manufacture of a 
combination of patented HIV/AIDS drugs post the Doha Declaration. Zimbabwe’s use of TRIPS 
flexibilities is, therefore, sketched out before focusing on how it made use of a government use 
order to effectively issue a compulsory licence in 2002. 
In retrospect, the access debate to medicines was sparked by South Africa’s Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997, which led to acrimonious litigation in the 
High Court in Pretoria in 1998 before the matter was settled out of court.  Using the 1998 
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pharmaceutical dispute as a point of departure, the South African case study first outlines South 
Africa’s use of TRIPS flexibilities before briefly discussing its use of competition law to access 
medicines. Additionally, because South Africa recently published a Draft IP Policy,
1
 the salient 
aspects of the Draft IP Policy are also briefly discussed.  
From the case studies, the chapter distils thematic lessons for other SADC member states and 
anticipates the future direction of regional SADC IP law reform aimed at improving access to 
medicines. It is hoped that the thematic lessons will complement those to be extracted from other 
developing country jurisdictions, such as India, Thailand and Kenya, discussed later in Chapter 
Six below. 
5.1 The Use of TRIPS Flexibilities: Brief Overview of Pertinent SADC Instruments 
In brief, the Southern African  Development Community (SADC) was preceded by the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) formed in Lusaka, Zambia on 1 April 
1980.This came after the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration
2
 by nine founding member states.
3
  
 
The Declaration and Treaty of the SADC, which has replaced the Coordinating conference was 
signed at the summit of the heads of state or government on July 17, 1992, in Windhoek, 
Namibia.
4
 SADC was transformed “to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and 
socioeconomic development”.5 A major aspect of SADC’s socioeconomic agenda has been 
health and health-related issues, especially in light of the high disease burden imposed by the 
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high prevalence of both communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and 
non-communicable diseases such as diabetes, hypertension and cancer.
6
  
 
The most important instruments in the SADC context of access to medicines are the SADC 
Protocol on Health,
7
 complemented by the Implementation Plan for the SADC Protocol on 
Health,
8
 SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan
9
 and the Draft SADC Strategy for Pooled 
Procurement of Essential Medicines and Commodities.
10
 The above instruments are identified as 
crucial in the enhancement of regional integration in the context of health and have been 
developed to underpin the implication of the SADC health programme.
11
 The health programme 
has been developed taking into account global and regional health declaration and targets.
12
 
The most basic instrument relating to health matters in the SADC region is the Health Sector 
Policy Framework Document (Policy Framework Document), developed by SADC Health 
Ministers in Grand Bie, Mauritius.
13
 In terms of the policy framework, regional cooperation is 
crucial for addressing health problems of the region.
14
 One of the main objectives of the policy 
relevant to this study was to “harmonise legislation and practice regarding pharmaceuticals, 
including their registration, procurement, and quality assurance”.15 With specific reference to 
pharmaceuticals, the policy identified the following issues as crucial: maximizing the production 
capacity of local and regional firms in producing affordable generic essential drugs; promoting 
                                                          
6
 Executive summary of the Implementation Plan for the SADC Protocol on Health at 3. 
7
 SADC Protocol on Health (1999), signed in Maputo, Mozambique on 18 August 1999 and came into force on 14 
August 2004. 
8
The Implementation Plan provides an overall framework for effecting the provisions of the SADC Protocol on 
Health and is available at 
http://www.sadc.int/index.php?cID=1&bID=1283&arHandle=Sidebar&ccm_token=1383736029:41bfb778708ee17
dc30b95e83826bc93&btask=passthru&method=signmeup  (last visited 06/11/2013. 
9
 SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan 2007 – 2013, published by the SADC Secretariat on 27 June 2007. 
10
 Draft SADC Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential Medicines and Health Commodities 2013 – 2017, 
published by the SADC Secretariat in September 2012. 
11
 See executive summary of the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan para 2 at 3. 
12
 Ibid.  
13
 The policy document was approved by the SADC Council of Ministers in September 2000 and published by the 
SADC Health Sector Coordinating Unit, then administered by the Republic of South Africa, which provided the 
Secretariat to coordinate activities. 
14
 Policy Framework Document at 4. 
15
 Ibid at 5. This is likely to have led to the adoption of the Strategy on Pooled Procurement of Essential medicines.  
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joint procurement of therapeutically beneficial medicines and responding to pharmaceutical 
needs of regional health programmes.
16
 
The main objectives,
17
 priorities,
18
 strategies
19
 and indicators of success
20
 of the Policy 
Framework Document are echoed in the SADC Protocol on Health, Pharmaceutical Business 
Plan and the strategy on Pooled Procurement.
21
 
The SADC Protocol on Health
22
 may be regarded as the first SADC health instrument to directly 
refer to TRIPS flexibilities in the context of health matters because it enjoins member states to 
adopt policies and implement measures within the Community for the protection of intellectual 
property rights, in accordance with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights.
23
 Pharmaceuticals are very crucial in terms of the Health Protocol 
and are dealt with in a separate Article.
24
 The Protocol calls on state parties to cooperate and help 
each other in registering pharmaceuticals,
25
 distributing affordable essential drugs,
26
 promoting 
the rational use of drugs,
27
 quality assuring the supply and conveyance of vaccines
28
 and 
researching and documenting traditional medicine and its utilization.
29
  
The adoption of policies and measures for the protection of intellectual property rights in line 
with the TRIPS Agreement is further repeated in the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan of 
2007.
30
 In its situation analysis of pharmaceuticals in the SADC region, the Pharmaceutical 
Business Plan acknowledges that all countries in SADC are members of the WTO, and this 
makes them automatic signatories to the TRIPS Agreement.
31
 Secondly, the Pharmaceutical 
                                                          
16
 Policy Framework Document at 98. 
17
 Ibid at 98. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid at 99. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 See the paragraphs following immediately below. 
22
 SADC Protocol on Health (1999) signed in Maputo, Mozambique on 18 August 1999 and came into force on 14 
August 2004. 
23
 Article 24 of the SADC Protocol on Trade, 1996.  
24
 See generally, Article 29 of the SADC Protocol on Health. 
25
 SADC Protocol on Health, Article 29(a). 
26
 Ibid at Article 29 (b). 
27
 Article 29(c). 
28
 Article 29(d). 
29
 Article 29(e). 
30
 The Plan covers the period 2007 – 2013. 
31
 See para 2.1 subparagraph vi of the Pharmaceutical Business Plan. This statement is inaccurate because 
Seychelles is still in accession talks with the WTO hence it is not yet a member of the WTO.  
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Business Plan cites “outdated medicine laws and intellectual property laws which are not TRIPS 
compliant”32 as a major weakness that cuts across most SADC countries. Citing prior use of 
TRIPS flexibilities in favour of access to medicines in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the 
Pharmaceutical Business Plan encourages SADC members to take full advantage of the 
flexibilities including the opportunity presented by the August 2003 paragraph 6 Decision which 
took the form of a waiver.
33
 
Finally, the SADC Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential Medicines and Health 
Commodities, taking its cue from the Pharmaceutical Business Plan, restates the important step 
towards the achievement of the objective of improving “sustainable availability and access to 
affordable, quality, safe, efficacious essential medicines”.34 
The Pooled Procurement Strategy argues that there are positives in adopting a regional approach 
to the procurement of pharmaceuticals including the application of ‘good practices’ in the 
pharmaceutical procurement and supply management systems.
35
 One of the often cited 
advantages of pooled procurement, also called joint procurement or procurement cooperation,
36
 
is that it can result in considerable savings made through information and work sharing by 
procurement agencies in member States.
37
  
Therefore, the Strategy on Pooled Procurement will prioritize the movement of essential 
medicines and health commodities in the region by bringing together issues of trade (such as 
customs procedures and tariffs) relevant legislation, procurement, finance and investment in the 
pharmaceutical sector.
38
 While the Pharmaceutical Business Plan is about harmonization of 
pharmaceutical regulation and law reform in sympathy with TRIPS, the Strategy on Pooled 
Procurement targets a seamless movement of essential medicines within SADC. The Strategy 
will in all likelihood enhance economies of scale and enable SADC members to consider and 
                                                          
32
 Para 2.2 (i) of the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan. 
33
 See para 2.3 (vi). 
34
 See para 1 of the executive summary of the SADC Strategy on Pooled Procurement of Essential Medicines and 
Health Commodities at v. This objective was first highlighted in the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan in 2007. 
35
 Ibid para 3. 
36
 Pooled procurement (or joint procurement or procurement cooperation) is defined as ‘the overarching term for 
procurement where part of all of the procurement process of different procurement entities (agencies or departments 
of bigger entities) are jointly executed by either one of those procurement entities or a third party procurement 
entity’ (see “Definition of terms”) in the Pooled Procurement Strategy document viii. 
37
 See ‘Executive Summary’ of the Pooled Procurement Strategy para 3 v. 
38
 SADC Strategy on Pooled Procurement at 2. 
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possibly establish a regional manufacturing plant within the region as permitted by the August 
2003 waiver. 
After rendering an expository account, albeit briefly, of the SADC legal and policy instruments 
aimed at enhancing access to medicines in the region, it is now appropriate to turn to an 
exposition of individual countries’ patent laws and how they deal with pharmaceutical patents.  
5.2 Availability of Patents for Pharmaceuticals and New use Patents in SADC 
In this specific context, there are two issues to take note of. The first one is that all SADC 
members have provisions in their laws allowing for the granting of pharmaceutical patents.
39
 A 
sizable number of SADC members allow patents for new uses of known medicines,
40
 mostly 
through legislation that allows for the granting of patents generally without express reference to 
the prohibition of new uses of known substances. Only three countries, namely, Malawi,
41
 
Namibia
42
 and Zambia,
43
 have provisions in their relevant legislation specifically prohibiting the 
patenting of new use forms of substances in the pharmaceutical context.
44
 
The second issue is that while more than 50% of the SADC members are LDCs, which are not 
obliged to comply with TRIPS requirements for the patenting of pharmaceuticals, virtually all of 
the SADC LDCs permit pharmaceutical patents.
45
 The sad reality here is that SADC LDCs have 
not taken advantage of the opportunity provided to them by the extension of the transition period 
given to them by the TRIPS Council.
46
 
The situation narrated in the two foregoing paragraphs is summarised in the tabular form below. 
                                                          
39
 This may be by virtue of specific provisions in the pertinent patents legislation or membership of the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty and the ARIPO Harare Protocol.  
40
 Musungu above note 4 at 8. 
41
 Section 18 of Malawi’s Patents Act, Chapter 49:02 excludes the patenting of inventions ‘capable of being used as 
food or medicine’ which are ‘a mixture of known ingredients possessing only the aggregate of the known properties 
of the ingredients’. 
42
 Sections 17 (1) (j) – (k) and 17 (2) of the Industrial Property Act of 2012 exclude the patenting of new uses of 
patents.  
43
 The Zambian Patents Act, last amended in 1987, generally does not exclude new uses except in cases where the 
invention is capable of being used as food or medicine in the similar prohibitory context as provided for in 
Malawian law [see section 18(1)(c) of the Zambian Patents Act]. 
44
 Musungu above note 4 at 8.  
45
 Ibid.  
46
 The pertinent decision of the TRIPS Council was passed on 27 June 2002 as contained in WTO document 
IP/C/25. 
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5.2.1 Summary of SADC IP Laws and Pharmaceutical patents Protection 
 Country  Domestic 
Legislation/s 
Patents 
available for 
Pharmaceutical 
Products? 
Exclusion 
of new 
use/second 
use Patents 
Pre and post-
grant Patent 
Opposition? 
1. Angola

 Industrial 
Property 
Law No.3/92 
of February 
28, 1992 
No  No No  
2. Botswana Industrial 
Property Act 
no.8 of 2010 
Yes  No specific 
exclusion. 
However 
due to 
ARIPO 
membership, 
Botswana 
may grant 
patents for 
such use. 
Yes, in sections 
21 – 22 of the 
Industrial 
Property Act 
2010. 
3. Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Law No. 82-
01 of 1982 
Yes  Yes- 
inventions 
relating to 
medicine 
will only be 
patented if 
the subject 
matter is a 
product, 
substance or 
compound 
presented for 
the first time 
as 
constituting 
a medicine. 
No 
4. Lesotho The 
Industrial 
Property 
Order (IPO), 
as amended 
in 1997 
Yes No. But 
membership 
in ARIPO 
implies that 
Lesotho 
grants 
No  
                                                          

 Denotes Least Developing Country (LDC) status with no current legal obligation to grant pharmaceutical patents 
until 2016; and other forms of IP, not until 2021. 
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patents for 
such use. 
5. Madagascar  Ordonnance 
No. 89-019 
instituant un 
regime pour 
la protection 
de la 
propriete 
industrielle 
en 
Republique 
democratique 
de 
Madagascar, 
de juillet 
1989 (Titre I) 
(Art 3 a 54) 
(JO D’ aout 
1989) 
Yes-after 1996 No  No  
6. Malawi Patents Act, 
1992, Draft 
IP Policy 
currently 
under 
consideration 
Yes  Yes – but 
Inventions 
‘capable of 
being used 
as food or 
medicine’ 
which are ‘a 
mixture of 
known 
ingredients 
possessing 
only the 
aggregate of 
the known 
properties of 
the 
ingredients’ 
are excluded 
on a 
discretionary 
basis. 
Yes for pre-grant 
opposition (see s 
22)  and no for 
post-grant 
opposition 
7. Mauritius  The Patents, 
Industrial 
Designs, and 
Trademark 
Act No. 25 
Yes  No No 
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of 2002 
8. Mozambique Industrial 
Property 
Code: 
Decree 
No.4/2006 
Yes  No  No  
9. Namibia Patents, 
Designs, 
Trade Marks 
and 
Copyright 
Act 9 of 
1916, as 
amended in 
South in 
April 1978 
(only the 
portions of 
this Act 
relating to 
patents and 
designs 
remain in 
force in 
Namibia). 
Yes  No  No  
10. Seychelles  Patents Act 
Chapter 156 
of 1991 
Yes  No  Pre-grant 
opposition (see 
s11 of Act) but no 
for post-grant 
opposition. 
11. South Africa Patents Act 
of 1978 as 
variously 
amended in 
1997, 2002 
and 2005; the 
Medicines 
and Related 
Substances 
Control Act 
as amended, 
Draft IP 
Policy 
published in 
Sept. 2013 
currently 
Yes  No  No 
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under 
consideration 
12. Swaziland Patent, 
Utility 
Models and 
Industrial 
Designs Act 
No.6 of 1997 
Yes  No  No  
13. Tanzania(excluding 
Zanzibar, with a 
separate Patent Law) 
Patent Act 
1987 as 
amended by 
Acts No.s 13 
and 18 of 
1991 
Yes  No  No  
14 Zambia Patents Act, 
last amended 
in 1987, draft 
Patents Bill 
passed in 
2012 
Yes  Generally no 
exclusion. 
However 
inventions 
which are 
‘capable of 
being used 
as food or 
medicine 
which is a 
mixture of 
known 
ingredients 
possessing 
only the 
aggregate of 
the known 
properties of 
the 
ingredients’ 
are excluded 
from 
patentability. 
No  
15 Zimbabwe  Patents Act, 
1978 as last 
amended in 
2002 
Yes   Generally 
no 
exclusion. 
However, 
where an 
application 
claims as an 
invention a 
substance 
Section 17 
provides for pre-
grant opposition 
while post-grant 
opposition is not 
provided for. 
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capable of 
being used 
as food or 
medicine 
which is a 
mixture of 
known 
ingredients 
possessing 
only the 
aggregate of 
the known 
properties of 
the 
ingredients 
or that it 
claims as an 
invention a 
process 
producing 
such a 
substance by 
mere 
admixture, a 
patent for 
such will not 
be allowed 
[s32 (a) read 
together 
with s13 (1) 
(c) of the 
Patents Act]. 
 
Source: Adapted from Musungu S.F (2007:16 – 20) and updated by the researcher.  
 
 
 
 
 
 170 
 
5.3 An Overview of the use of TRIPS Flexibilities in SADC Member States’ Laws 
 
Preliminary Remarks 
All SADC members, except Seychelles, are members of the WTO and subject to available 
exceptions, will have to comply with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
47
 In addition to 
TRIPS, many SADC members are also parties to other regional and international IP treaties such 
as those administered under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO).
48
 Since the adoptions of TRIPS in 1994, many SADC countries have reviewed their IP 
laws or updated them in order to be TRIPS compliant.
49
  
5.3.1 The actual Use of Selected TRIPS Flexibilities in SADC Members States  
In the context of access to medicines post the Doha Declaration, a number of SADC countries 
have taken various efforts to domesticate TRIPS flexibilities in the context of access to 
medicines.
50
 The most common flexibilities that have featured in the SADC IP legislative reform 
agenda have been parallel imports; redefining patentable subject matter; exceptions to patents 
based on research and experimental use; regulatory (bolar) exceptions; compulsory licences; 
government use of patents; and limitations on test data.
51
  
On the issue of patentable subject matter,
52
 it has been previously stated that only three countries, 
namely, Malawi, Namibia and Zambia have provisions in their relevant legislations specifically 
prohibiting the patenting of new use forms of substances in the pharmaceutical context.
53
  
Since patents may only be granted for inventions that are novel and involve an inventive step and 
are capable of industrial application,
54
 the impression thus created is that new uses of known 
substances are unlikely to be patentable. Additionally, the three criteria are not defined, leaving 
SADC members with ample legal and policy space to interpret their meanings. Member states 
                                                          
47
 Notable exceptions will be those relating to exemptions from pharmaceutical patents for LDCs until 2016 and in 
all other fields, until 2021. 
48
 These would include the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention), the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) as well as the Harare Protocol on Patents and Designs (Harare Protocol) under ARIPO.  
49
 For example, South Africa purported to do this through the Patents Amendment Act 58 of 2002 while Zimbabwe 
introduced amendments in the form of the Patents Amendment Act 9 of 2002.  
50
 Musungu above note 4 at 6. 
51
 See Musungu above at 6 – 8. 
52
 The nature of patentable subject matter is clearly spelt out in Article 27 of TRIPS. 
53
 See 5.2 above. 
54
 Article 27 of TRIPS. 
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can then interpret the meanings of the three criteria in such a manner that it will not be easy to 
grant weak patents. This will make more medicines to be available in generic form in a 
competitive market, and this is likely to have a positive impact on prices by lowering them and 
improving access to medicines. Many SADC member states’ IP laws are, therefore, inadequate 
in the specific regard because they promote ever greening of pharmaceutical patents.
55
 Ever 
greening does not augur well for access to medicines and SADC members are urged to amend 
their laws to signal their non-tolerance of new-use patents.  
Parallel importation will enable SADC members to shop around for cheaper drugs in the region 
and beyond. In terms of the TRIPS Agreement issues relating to parallel imports may be 
addressed exclusively by the member in the context of the exhaustion of rights.
56
 Exhaustion of 
rights refers to the point at which the IP right holder “loses legal control over a protected [sic] 
product by virtue of selling or otherwise releasing it onto the channels of commerce”.57 In the 
context of access to medicines, using parallel importation allows procurement agencies and third 
party importers to source medicines from other countries where the prices are lower than in the 
SADC member’s domestic market.58 
With reference to SADC members’ IP laws, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia have no explicit provisions on parallel imports. The implication 
is that the specified countries will not be able to take advantage of the pertinent flexibility 
permitting parallel imports in order to procure cheaper drugs after comparative shopping. 
Botswana,
59
 Madagascar,
60
 Mauritius,
61
 Mozambique,
62
 Namibia,
63
 South Africa,
64
 Tanzania
65
 
                                                          
55
 At least South Africa has reacted to this criticism by coming up with a Draft IP Policy that seeks to limit the 
patentability of new uses of known substances including pharmaceuticals.  
56
 Article 6 of TRIPS. 
57
 Musungu note 4 above at 7 
58
 Ibid. For an exhaustive discussion of the exhaustion doctrine from a different context from access to medicines, 
see the US topical case of Bowman v. Monsanto Co. et al case No. 11–796, argued February 19, 2013 and decided 
by the Supreme Court of the United States on 13 May 2013, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-796_c07d.pdf (last visited 15/11/2013). 
59
 Section 25 (a) of the Industrial Property Act of 2010. 
60
 Article 30 (2) of Ordonnance No.89-019 of 1989. 
61
 Section 21 (4) (a) of the Patents, Industrial Designs, and Trademark Act No. 25 of 2002. 
62
 Article 68 (b) of the Industrial Property Code: Decree No. 4/2006. 
63
 Section 43 (1) (a) of the Industrial Property Act No.1 of 2012. 
64
 Section 45(2) of the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
65
 Section 38 (2) of the Patents Act of 1987 as amended in 1991. 
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and Zimbabwe,
66
 on the other hand, have explicit IP legislative provisions relating to the 
exhaustion of patent rights.
67
 However, in Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania, the 
exhaustion regime is national, hence it prohibits parallel imports. Such a state of affairs is 
unfortunate. The other five SADC members (Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa
68
 and 
Zimbabwe) apply an international exhaustion regime for parallel imports. This is a positive 
development for access to medicines since the domestication of parallel importation provisions 
will remain a potential tool for use by each country when the need arises.   
The TRIPS flexibility based on research and experimental uses of patents is very important for 
technological transfer and innovation. Under this exception, researchers are allowed to use 
patented inventions for research in order to test their chemical compositions and understand the 
underlying structure of the inventions. Patents should not hinder research and the advancement 
of knowledge. In the pharmaceutical context, this exception may be used by researchers to 
improve the effectiveness of drugs or produce medical products suited for the local environment. 
In terms of the relevant TRIPS provision, the research exception can be used to foster both 
commercial and non-commercial activities.
69
 
A number of SADC members have provisions in their laws allowing for the research exception. 
Botswana,
70
 the DRC,
71
 Lesotho,
72
 Madagascar,
73
 Mauritius,
74
 Mozambique,
75
 Namibia,
76
 
Swaziland
77
 and Tanzania
78
 provide for research exception, either directly or indirectly. An 
example of an indirect provision on research is that obtaining in Madagascar, whose relevant law 
provides that patent rights will be available only for industrial and commercial purposes.
79
 
                                                          
66
 Section 24A of the Patents Amendment Act of 1978 as amended in 2002 and 2005. 
67
 It must be noted that the relevant provisions are not specific to pharmaceuticals but apply to inventions in other 
fields of technology generally.  
68
 South is peculiar in that the Patents Act (section 45) contemplates national exhaustion while on the other hand, the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act (section 15(c)) provides for an international exhaustion 
regime. 
69
 See TRIPS Article 30. 
70
 Section 25(c) of the Industrial Property Act 2010. 
71
 Article 49 of the Law No. 82-01 of 1982. 
72
 The Industrial Property Order (IPO) as amended in 1997 exempts Acts done for scientific research. 
73
 Article 30 of Oddonance No. 89-019. 
74
 Section 21(4) (d) of the Patents, Industrial Designs, and Trademarks Act No. 25 of 2002.  
75
 Article 68(a) of the Industrial Property Code Decree No.4/2006. 
76
 Sections 43(1) (c) and 43(1) (d) of the Industrial Property Act No.1 of 2012. 
77
 The law provides that patents rights shall only extend to acts done for Industrial or commercial purposes.  
78
 Section 62 of the Patents Act 1987. 
79
 See note 70 above. 
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Mauritius’ laws, on the other hand, directly provide for the research exception by explicitly 
stating that acts done for scientific research and experimental purposes qualify as an exception to 
patents.
80
 
Closely linked to research and experimentation exception is the regulatory early working (bolar) 
exception which some of the SADC members seem to be much aware of and have incorporated 
in their respective domestic laws. As previously explained in Chapter Four above, this exception 
allows generic companies to make use of patented inventions whose terms are about to come to 
an end so that generic drugs may be introduced as soon as the patent lapses upon expiry of the 20 
year period. The existence of this exception, which allows members to permit generic medicine 
manufacturers to undertake and complete the task of obtaining regulatory approval from national 
regulatory authorities for generic versions before original patents expire, was confirmed by the 
WTO in a panel ruling pitting Canada against the European Union.
81
   
Despite the importance of the early working exception in the pharmaceutical sector, only three 
SADC members have domesticated the exception in their laws. The specific members are 
Botswana,
82
 Namibia
83
 and Zimbabwe.
84
 Other SADC members do not have clear provisions on 
the exception and do not bother mentioning it at all in their pertinent laws.  
Compulsory licences and government’s use of exceptions are important tools which may be 
employed to access medicines and they have a lot of potential to be effectively used by SADC 
members. WTO rules are very liberal as they do not limit the grounds for the granting of 
compulsory licences, neither are there limitations on the scope of diseases.
85
 Additionally, there 
is no requirement that compulsory licences be limited to cases involving health and 
pharmaceutical problems only.
86
 
 
                                                          
80
 See note 71 above. 
81
 See Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R 17 March 2000, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf (last visited 04/11/2013).  
82
 Section 25(h) of the Industrial Property Act 2010. 
83
 Section 43(2) of the Industrial Property Act No.1 of 2012. 
84
 Section of the Patents Amendment Act of 1978 amended in 2002. 
85
 Love J “Recent examples of the Use of Compulsory Licenses on Patents” (2007) 2 Knowledge Ecology 
International at 2. 
86
 Ibid.  
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Generally speaking, a compulsory licence will be resorted to if the patentee unreasonably refuses 
to grant the applicant a voluntary licence.
87
 Additionally, the issuance of a compulsory licence 
must be accompanied by the payment of adequate compensation.
88
 However, in cases of public 
emergency or extreme urgency, the obligation to negotiate with the patent holder first may be 
waived, for obvious reasons.
89
  
A Compulsory licence may also be issued to remedy anti-competitive conduct on the part of the 
patentee.
90
 The TRIPS Agreement also sanctions government non-commercial use of inventions 
in certain circumstances.
91
 
All SADC members provide for compulsory licences and government use in their legislative 
provisions. Therefore, as legal access tools to medicines, compulsory licensing and government 
use are the most widely available in SADC members’ laws. However, the big question as to what 
extent SADC members have used the two flexibilities to improve access to medicines for their 
citizens remains unanswered. The picture is not very positive because all other members with the 
exception of Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia, which have issued either a compulsory 
licence or a government use order, have not put the flexibilities to the practical test of actual 
use.
92
 
Compulsory licences must also be viewed in the context of the 30
th
 of August 2003 Decision and 
Article 31 bis amendment to the TRIPS Agreement. The Decision and Article 31 bis have key 
elements (about six of them) that members may incorporate into national legislation.
93
 To 
incorporate the relevant laws, SADC members will have to amend their specific laws on 
                                                          
87
 TRIPS Article 31(a). 
88
 TRIPS Article 31(h). 
89
 The assumption is that in a situation of emergency or extreme urgency, there is likely to be no time to negotiate 
first, the negotiation may be attended to after the emergency has been dealt with. 
90
 Article 31 (k) of TRIPS. 
91
 See TRIPS Article 31 introductory part and 31 (b). 
92
 See para 2.3 (iv) of the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan 2007-2013 at 12. 
93
 The important elements would include definitions; grounds for issuing compulsory licenses; modification of 
compulsory licensing provisions implementing Article 31 (f) of TRIPS; modification of compulsory licensing 
provisions implementing Article 31 (h) of TRIPS; rules for re-export of products imported under Article 31 bis; and 
provisions on notifications (Musungu note 4 above at 9). 
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compulsory licences, and to date, it is disheartening to report that no single SADC member 
except Botswana
94
 has taken the initiative to incorporate the pertinent provisions. 
The above observation is important in this study because one of the study’s recommendations95 
is that SADC members must take advantage of economies of scale and consider regional 
production of generic drugs in light of the permissible nature of Article 31 bis towards regional 
production and pooled procurement. However, to take advantage of Article 31 bis, members 
must ratify the amendment protocol
96
 and domesticate it in their laws. Taking advantage of 
Article 31 bis is very relevant to the objective of facilitating pharmaceutical trade in the SADC 
region including pooled procurement,
97
 and member states are urged to domesticate the 
provision in their relevant laws as this can only be in their best interests. 
Finally, with specific reference to test data, the TRIPS Agreement allows members to protect 
data relating to new chemical processes from unfair commercial use.
98
 If there is a blanket 
protection of test data against all forms of use including non-commercial use, this will in all 
likelihood frustrate access to medicines. The situation obtaining in the SADC region relating to 
test data is unclear. Mauritius, for example, has a data exclusivity approach (a pejorative 
approach from an access to medicines perspective), which prevents the regulatory authority from 
using test data for licensing generic drugs for at least five years subject to the Minister’s 
discretion.
99
 South Africa, on the other hand, has general confidentiality provisions in the 
common law, Medicines and Related Substances Control Act
100
 and the Fertilizers, Farm feeds, 
Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act.
101
 SADC members are urged to legislate for 
data protection rather than data exclusivity as is the case with Mauritius.  
From the above exposition and discussion, it is clear that most SADC countries provide for 
pharmaceutical patents even though the majority of them, characterized as LDCs, are not obliged 
                                                          
94
 Botswana has in fact domesticated Article 31 bis in Article 31 (3) of the Industrial Property Act of 2010 by 
providing as follows: 
 “The exploitation of the patented invention under subsection (1) shall be for the supply of the domestic market in Botswana only,  
except where paragraph 1 or 3 of Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement (my emphasis) applies”. 
95
 See Chapter Seven below. 
96
 Thus far, only Mauritius and Zambia have ratified the amendment Protocol but are yet to domesticate it to bring 
the TRIPS amendment into effect.  
97
 Musungu note 4 above at 9. 
98
 Article 39.3 of TRIPS.  
99
 See section 9 of the Protection Against Unfair Practices Act 2002. 
100
 Act 101 of 1965. 
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 Act 36 of 1947. 
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to do so in terms of TRIPS. The most widely domestically legislated TRIPS flexibilities are 
compulsory licences and government use. However, the two flexibilities have had little practical 
application in individual SADC countries due to reasons, such as lack of political will (non-IP 
reasons) than IP ones.  
Some SADC members have good laws incorporating the flexibilities while others have 
incorporated TRIPS provisions to an insufficient extent. Some members have made use of 
TRIPS flexibilities in favour of access to medicines in a manner that should be brought to the 
attention of other members as a lesson on how to take advantage of the specific flexibilities. 
In the following sections of this chapter, I isolate three SADC members and delve into specific 
aspects of their relevant legislation in order to highlight useful lessons other members may learn 
from the experience of the members under focus. Botswana is chosen as a model on legislative 
reform which is sympathetic to access to medicines while Zimbabwe provides a useful example 
of how to effectively use government use orders to boost local pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacity and earn World Health Organisation (WHO) generic manufacturing facility approval. 
Finally, the South African example highlights the effective use of compulsory licences in the 
context of competition law.  
5.4 Domesticating TRIPS Flexibilities: The Case of Botswana 
In the context of the law of patents, it is important to record that Botswana is a party to the 
following international/regional agreements: Berne Convention;
102
 Harare Protocol (of 
ARIPO);
103
 Lusaka Agreement (ARIPO);
104
 Paris Convention;
105
 Patent Cooperation Treaty;
106
 
and the WTO/TRIPS Agreement.
107
 
The current Patent law of Botswana is encapsulated in the Industrial Property Act (the Act), 
108
 
which was assented to by the president on 26 April 2010 and came into operation on 31 August 
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 Act No.8 of 2010. 
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2012.
109
 The Act as a very recent law is expected to be very compliant with TRIPS and 
incorporate most of the relevant flexibilities. This, however, is not necessarily the case as the 
expository account below shows. 
The legislation provides for the patentability of new inventions involving an inventive step and 
capable of industrial application. Further, such inventions may relate to both products and 
processes.
110
 The Act differentiates between an invention and a patent in its interpretation section 
and defines an invention as an idea of an inventor which in practice may be used as a solution to 
a specified problem.
111
 On the other hand, a patent simply means the document issued to protect 
the invention under the Act.
112
 Patents may be granted for 20 years
113
 from the date of filing an 
application.
114
 The Act provides for general exclusions from patentability such as methods of 
treatment of the human or animal body, therapeutic equipment and diagnostics.
115
 Also excluded 
from patentability are inventions the exploitation of which is necessary to protect public order or 
morality, including the protection of human or animal health, plant life or to avoid prejudice to 
the environment.
116
 New uses of patents are not specifically excluded in the Act and one may, 
therefore, conclude that the legislation is unfortunately silent on this aspect. 
From an access to medicines perspective, the delimitation of patentable subject matter and 
exclusions does not raise any major concerns; the law is robust enough in the specific regard to 
prevent the patenting of undeserving patents.  
It is noteworthy that the Act provides for pre-grant opposition
117
 to patents and the examination 
of patents for technical quality.
118
 Once a patent application has been published in the patents 
                                                          
109
 See Industrial Property Act (date of commencement) Order 2012, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=277945 (last accessed 06/11/2013). 
110
 Section 8(1) – 8(2).  
111
 Section 2 of the Act. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Section 28(1) of the Act. 
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 Section 20 of the Act provides that the filing date is the date of application. 
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 Section 8 (1) (a) of the Act. This is based on Article 27 (3) of TRIPS. 
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 Section 8 (1) (b) of the Act. 
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 See section 21 of the Act 
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journal,
119
 members of the public, including those with the technical know-how of the field to 
which the patent relates, may oppose that grant of the patent on a number of listed grounds.
120
  
On a related positive note for access to medicines, the Registrar of Patents is enjoined to cause a 
patent to be examined for compliance with the requirements of the Act.
121
 If this provision of the 
Act is read in isolation, one is left with the disappointing impression that the examination 
contemplated therein relates to formal compliance with the Act. However, a further reading of 
the Act in the following subsection makes it clear that a formal technical examination, which 
may be outsourced to persons or institutions (such as universities) appointed by the registrar, is 
contemplated.
122
 The requirement that the Minister may in certain circumstances through 
regulations, prescribe the categories of inventions in respect of which an examination shall not 
cover the requirements of novelty and inventive step is retrogressive. The net effect of this 
provision is to condone weak patents and introduce ever greening via the back door. 
Coming to TRIPS flexibilities that may yield positive results for access to medicines, it is gladly 
noted that the Industrial Property Act incorporates almost all the important flexibilities.
123
 
On the exhaustion of patent rights and the use of parallel importation, Botswana adopts the 
international exhaustion of rights regime which allows parallel imports.
124
 Very specifically, the 
pertinent provision regards acts in respect of articles that have been put on the market in 
Botswana or abroad by the patentee or another person acting with the patentee’s consent as 
exceptions to rights conferred by a patent.
125
 The implied message here is that Botswana is 
permitted by its law to import cheap medicines from international and regional markets as long 
as the product has been placed on such markets by the patentee himself or by someone acting on 
                                                          
119
 Section 21 (a) of the Act. 
120
 Section 21 (5) (a) – (c). One of the grounds relevant to access to medicines may be that the invention does not 
meet the requirements of patentability as specified in the Act. 
121
 Section 22(1) of the Act. 
122
 Section 22(2) provides that the Minister may exempt some inventions from enquiries/examinations relating to 
novelty and inventive step. This creates the impression (correctly so) that examinations will under normal 
circumstances where Ministerial intervention is not contemplated, cover technical issues relating to novelty and 
inventive step. 
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 As will be elaborated upon in ensuing paragraphs, the Act provides for parallel imports, research exceptions to 
patentability, early working (bolar exceptions), private non-commercial use of patents, compulsory licenses as some 
aspects of Article 31 bis of TRIPS. 
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 Section 25 of the Act. 
125
 Section 25(1) (a) of the Act. 
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behalf of the patentee with his or her permission. In lay terms, the provision allows for 
comparative shopping which is likely to yield positive access to medicines results for 
Botswana’s poor citizens in need of affordable essential medicines.  
Patents may also be used for research purposes
126
 by non-right holders as long as the acts done 
are for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention as well as acts done 
solely for academic, scientific research and educational and teaching purposes.
127
 Acts done for 
private non-commercial purposes are also allowed as exceptions to the rights conferred.
128
 
Private non-commercial players in the context of access to medicines may be civil society 
organisations, churches, foundations and donors like the Bill and Melinda gates Foundation or 
NGOs such as Doctors without Borders. The provision for private non-commercial use as an 
exception to patent rights is a welcome inclusion and a first for the SADC region.  
The bolar and regulatory exceptions are implicated in the provision dealing with acts done in 
respect of the patented invention for purposes of compliance with regulatory marketing approval 
procedures for pharmaceutical, veterinary, agrochemical or other products subjected to such 
procedures.
129
 These procedures are correctly characterized as permissible exceptions to 
patentability.  
Finally, the Act has very extensive provisions on compulsory licences. Broadly speaking, 
compulsory licences may be issued for: public interest or for competition,
130
 importing patented 
products in the context of TRIPS Article 31 bis,
131
 to remedy a failure to exploit the patent
132
 and 
to deal with dependent patents.
133
  
Public interest grounds for the issuance of compulsory licences include national security, 
nutrition, health, development and other vital sectors of the Botswana national economy.
134
 In 
any of the above instances, the Minister may, without the patentee’s consent but after hearing 
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him/her, authorize a government agency or another person to exploit the patent subject to the 
payment of adequate remuneration to the patentee.
135
 If the compulsory licence is issued in 
response to anti-competitive practices,
136
 the determination/calculation of the remuneration will 
have to take into account the economic value of the exploitation of the patent.
137
  It is also 
important to take note of the fact that in terms of Botswana’s patent law, in cases of national 
emergency or circumstances of extreme urgency (which is not defined), there is no need for the 
applicant for a compulsory licence to have requested a voluntary licence on reasonable terms 
first.
138
  
It is very interesting that Botswana has made a modest attempt at domesticating the August 2003 
Decision and the waiver thereto, now encapsulated in Article 31 bis, which Botswana is yet to 
ratify. To show that the drafters of the patent law were aware of the existence and importance of 
Article 31 bis, when compulsory licences are issued in the public interest,
139
 the “exploitation of 
the patented invention….shall be for the supply of the domestic market in Botswana only, except 
where paragraph 1 or 3 of Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement applies”.140 Additionally, the 
government of Botswana may issue a compulsory licence to a third party to import patented 
products such as pharmaceutical generic drugs (my emphasis) from any legitimate source 
without the approval of the patentee for public interest or in situations of a failure to supply the 
market.
141
 In this context, the importation of the product shall be solely for the public non-
commercial use within Botswana, except where paragraph 1 or 3 of Article 31bis of the TRIPS 
Agreement applies.
142
 Therefore, the whole section 32 of the Industrial Property Act of 
Botswana domesticates the provisions of Article 31 bis and this should be welcomed by access 
activists and regarded as a valuable lesson for fellow SADC members. 
On a negative note, the major weakness of the Industrial Property Act is the provision dealing 
with offences and penalties.
143
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 Section 31(1) of the Act. 
136
 Section 31(1) (b). 
137
 Section 31(2) of the Act. 
138
 Section 31 (10) of the Act. 
139
 Under section 31 (1) (a). 
140
 Section 31 (3). 
141
 Section 32 (1) (a)-(b). 
142
 Article 32 (2).  
143
 Generally provided for in section 134 of the Act. 
 181 
 
The Act proscribes acts of intentionally or wilfully performing any act which constitutes an 
infringement as defined in the Act.
144
 Additionally, any person who “commits an offence shall be 
sentenced, on conviction, to a fine of not less than P2 000 but not more than P5 000, or to 
imprisonment for a term of not less than six months but not more than two years, or to both”.145 
To add to the chilling effect of the provision, if a person commits an offense or unlawful conduct 
for which no penalty has been specified, that person shall be sentenced to a fine of between      
P2 000 and P5 000, or to imprisonment for at least six months but not more than two years, or to 
both.
146
 
Criminalizing patent infringement, whether wilful or not, does not augur well for access to 
medicines. The criminalization will in all likelihood have a chilling effect which will stifle and 
kill the spirit of research into new drugs based on existing patented ones (generics). The 
provision criminalizing patent infringement is TRIPS-plus and uncommon and discourages 
innovation and flexible procurement of drugs due to the fear of criminal law. The provision is, 
however, sanctioned by the TRIPS agreement in cases of ‘wilful infringement on a commercial 
scale’147 and therefore, the criminalization of patent infringement does have a textual basis in the 
TRIPS Agreement. While the legislation provides for exceptions to patent rights based on 
research and regulatory (bolar) exceptions as outlined elsewhere in this chapter, these provisions 
will be rendered useless by the penalty provisions criminalizing patent infringement. If the 
Botswana parliament is considering amending the Industrial Property Act, section 134 is a proper 
candidate for amendment. Section 134 is bad law from an access to medicines perspective and 
fellow SADC members are discouraged from following Botswana in this specific respect. 
5.4.1 What Can Other SADC Members Learn From Botswana? 
Fellow SADC members can learn from both the good and bad aspects of Botswana’s Industrial 
Property Act and then position themselves accordingly.  
                                                          
144
 Section 134 (6). This will cover infringing the rights conferred by patents as outlined in section 24 subject to 
exceptions to the rights conferred as outlined in section 25. Additionally, with reference to other IP forms, the 
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On a positive note, Botswana’s Industrial Property Act and the Regulations148 domesticate 
almost all TRIPS flexibilities that matter. The specific flexibilities are compulsory licences, the 
adoption of an international exhaustion regime that permits parallel imports, provisions allowing 
pre-and post-grant opposition to patents, patent examinations (both formal and technical) and a 
list of exclusions from patentability such as diagnostics, therapeutic equipment and methods of 
treatment. Botswana did take the initiative of evaluating its laws in light of the TRIPS 
flexibilities at a workshop which was held in Gaborone from 25 -27 March 2013 and compiled a 
list of the flexibilities
149
 together with an honest evaluation of the country’s prospects. 
The recommendations from the workshop are reiterated here as lessons for other SADC 
countries due to their relevance and practical nature.  
According to the government of Botswana, the new law (encapsulated in the Act and the 
Regulations) is good in many respects.
150
 The provisions on exclusions from patentability, the 
patentability criteria, patent opposition, compulsory licences, and the use of competition law 
border measures and the criminalization of patent infringement are cited and self-critiqued.
151
 
The exclusions from patentability
152
 provisions of Botswana’s Industrial Property Act are based 
on the text of the TRIPS Agreement,
153
 which excludes new uses of known substances.
154
 
However, the Industrial Property Act is not explicit enough to prevent ever greening.
155
 The 
Registrar of patents will, therefore, have to develop practical guidelines to ensure that patents are 
examined when applications for additional patents on the same subject matter are submitted.
156
 
This will limit ever greening. It has been reported elsewhere that many SADC members provide 
for exclusions from patentability in their laws. SADC members can, therefore, learn from 
Botswana’s omission by including guidelines that ensure the exclusion of evergreen patents. 
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The second lesson that SADC members can learn from Botswana’s experience and                  
self-evaluation is on the subject of patentability criteria and what amounts to a patent.
157
 In its 
self-evaluation, Botswana observes quite correctly that while her laws provide for acceptable 
patentability criteria,
158
 it may not be possible to examine some patents for compliance with the 
requirements for patentability because of the Ministerial exclusion,
159
 which has been 
characterized earlier as militating against access to medicines.
160
 Once again, fellow SADC 
members may learn from Botswana that the exclusion of certain patents from fulfilling technical 
requirements relating to novelty and an inventive step through a Ministerial decree is undesirable 
and counterproductive for strict patentability criteria for patent examination. Such an approach 
does not limit frivolous patents and ever greening, hence it should be avoided.
161
 While SADC 
members are encouraged to introduce patent examinations in their legal systems, technical and 
financial capacitation of the office of the patent examiner will be required.
162
 This again is an 
important lesson for fellow SADC members intending to reform their patent laws in that specific 
regard.  
While Botswana’s law provides for pre-and post-grant patent opposition,163 the Regulations do 
not have provisions detailing the procedure to be adopted when these forms of opposition are to 
be used.
164
 As matters stand, the law on this aspect (pre-and post-grant opposition) is a paper 
tiger and will not be possible to enforce in the absence of guiding Regulations. Pre- and         
post-grant patent opposition measures should be done in a fast, accessible and cost-efficient 
manner
165
 in order to maximize on the use of TRIPS flexibilities for the benefit of access to 
medicines. The lesson for fellow SADC members here is that they should not just incorporate 
TRIPS flexibilities in their legislations for incorporation’s sake, rather, the law must be given 
‘the teeth with which to bite’ in a practical context so that statute books are not populated with 
paper laws. Some SADC members, especially LDCs, have passed IP laws prematurely and the 
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laws have tied their hands when it comes to accessing cheap generics. This premature 
promulgation of the law may be due to pressure imposed by international organisations like 
WIPO, trading partners, the donor community and even ill-informed knee jerk reactions to 
international developments.
166
 SADC members should resist these forms of pressure and 
legislate in the interest of the people rather than other stakeholders such as those mentioned 
above. This takes us to the next point which is closely related to this one and is identified by 
Botswana’s evaluation report as requiring immediate attention.  
The self-evaluation report notes with concern that while one of the major recommendations of 
the workshop
167
 was that the country should not negotiate TRIPS flexibilities away in free trade 
agreement negotiations, it is quite ironic, if not paradoxical that Botswana is a party to the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) negotiations in her capacity as a member of the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU).
168
 The Agreement commits SACU members and EFTA 
countries to continue trade liberalization including harmonization in IP matters.
169
 If Botswana 
were to sign the EFTA-SACU agreement, then this would reverse the gains made under the 
Industrial Property Act because EFTA countries apply IPR laws with TRIPS-plus 
commitments.
170
 This matter should be brought to the attention of fellow SADC members as a 
lesson on how not to negotiate in Free Trade Agreements. South Africa, like Botswana, has made 
its position clear and will in future not sign TRIPS-plus Free Trade Agreements;
171
 the country 
has taken this commitment further by pledging to discourage other African countries from 
signing such agreements.
172
  
Compulsory licences and government use orders are well provided for in the Industrial Property 
Act
173
 and this should be lauded as a positive development. The grounds for the granting of 
compulsory licences are broad enough to capture almost all the eventualities, such as public 
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health issues, non-working of patents, anti-competitive behaviour, dependent patents, and abuse 
of patent rights and situations of national emergency or extreme urgency. Very importantly, the 
Act makes provision for the granting of compulsory licences in the context of the August 2003 
Decision and the waiver, now captured under Article 31 bis of the TRIPS Agreement. The 
expanded grounds for the granting of compulsory licences and the domestication of the 
provisions of Article 31 bis into the Industrial Property Act provide eye-opening lessons for 
SADC members. SADC members are urged to elaborate on and expand the grounds for the 
granting of compulsory licences. Very importantly, they are urged to domesticate Article 31 bis 
of TRIPS and accede to it using the formal WTO process.  
On another positive note, while Articles 51-60 of TRIPS provide for border measures for 
suspected patent infringement, it is noteworthy that the Industrial Property Act does not provide 
for any border measures; in other words, it is silent on the issue. Border measures are prone to 
abuse by patent holders and not legislating for them is a positive omission. Fellow SADC 
members must seriously consider a cautious approach to incorporating border measures in their 
legislation, or not incorporate them at all in order to avoid the seizure of essential generic 
medicines at ports of entry by patentees or their representatives.  
Finally, the TRIPS Agreement provides for the use of competition law by WTO members to 
remedy anti-competitive practices.
174
 In the case study involving South Africa below, this TRIPS 
flexibility is explored in its proper context.
175
 While Botswana’s Industrial Property Act provides 
for compulsory licences to combat abuse of patents,
176
 the Competition Act
177
 unfortunately 
creates blanket exclusion against the application of any of its provisions to IPR issues. While this 
exclusion does not in any way imply that anti-competitive conduct in patents will go 
unpunished,
178
 it is expected that the Competition Act ought to be the primary piece of 
legislation that can address such issues. Botswana’s position is, therefore, clumsy and anomalous 
and should be remedied through an appropriate amendment of the relevant law.  
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All SADC member states except the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Angola and 
Mozambique who have competition legislation and policies, are encouraged to learn from 
Botswana’s omission and not exclude competition legislation from applicability in IPR matters. 
While the above expository account of Botswana’s law highlighted both positive and negative 
lessons for other SADC members, Botswana’s praiseworthy legislation has never been tested 
practically in an access to medicines context. It is now appropriate to turn our discussion to an 
examination of how selected TRIPS flexibilities (the use of a government compulsory license in 
Zimbabwe and competition law in South Africa) were applied in practice in the SADC region.  
5.5 Government Issued Compulsory Licenses as an Access Tool: The Case of Zimbabwe 
In terms of Zimbabwe’s Patents Act (the Patents Act),179 an invention is defined in a 
circumlocutory way as follows: 
“ ‘invention’ means any new and useful art, whether producing a physical effect or not, or process, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter which is not obvious or any new and useful improvement 
thereof which is not obvious, capable of being used or applied in trade or industry and includes an alleged 
invention.”180 
From the definition above, it is clear that the law allows for both process and product patents and 
new uses of patented products (…“or any new use and useful improvement thereof…”) and 
includes an alleged invention (my emphasis). While new use patents are not prohibited in terms 
of the definition, their patentability is qualified by the fact that such new uses must not be 
obvious and must be capable of application in trade and industry. This qualification is likely to 
prevent ever greening especially if it is coupled with an examination system.
181
 Diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans and animals are excluded from 
patentability alongside biological processes and plants and animals.
182
 Additionally, the Registrar 
of Patents may refuse certain patents in some circumstances, namely, an alleged invention that: 
claims something as an invention contrary to well established natural laws,
183
 is not patentable in 
terms of the exclusions in sections 2A,
184
 endangers public order or public safety,
185
 encourages 
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offensive, immoral or anti-social behaviour,
186
 endangers human, animal or plant life or health
187
 
or promotes serious prejudice to the environment.
188
 
From the above exclusions from patentability, the ones that are relevant for access to medicines 
are those relating to the endangering of human, animal and plant health and those pertaining to 
section 2A. Very importantly, aside from the definition and exclusions, a patent may be refused 
if “it claims as an invention a substance capable of being used as food or medicine which is a 
mixture of known ingredients possessing only the aggregate of the known properties of the 
ingredients…”.189 This provision is important for access to medicines because although the law 
allows the patenting of new uses of known substances, such new uses are expressly prohibited if 
they relate to food or medical products that are mixtures rather than compounds. The prohibition 
of these mixtures is a very potent tool against evergreen food and medical patents.  
A patent, which means letters patent for an invention granted for Zimbabwe under section 
twenty-one,
190
 is granted to an inventor for 20 years from the date of lodgement of the 
application for a patent
191
 and is binding against the state and individuals.
192
 
The Zimbabwean system provides for the formal examination of patent applications by an 
examiner
193
 in order to establish compliance with the provisions of the Act
194
 and to check if 
there is congruence between the final specification, the provisional specification and the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty specification.
195
 An examination does not warrant the validity of a patent, 
hence no legal action thereto may be pursued against the Minister, Registrar or the patent 
examiner.
196
 The provision for an examination system will go a long way towards eliminating 
weak and evergreen patents and for this reason it favours access to medicines.  
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The granting of a patent may be opposed within 3 months of the publication of a complete 
specification in the patents’ journal but before it is accepted in terms of section 16.197 Any 
interested person including the state may oppose the granting of a patent and the application for 
opposition may be submitted to the Registrar who will deal with it after hearing the patentee.
198
  
There are 14 listed grounds that may be raised to oppose the granting of a patent but not all of 
them are relevant for access to medicines. The ones I regard as relevant for access to medicines 
are those relating to inventions that are not useful;
199
 inventions that are obvious and involve no 
inventive step having regard to the state of the art;
200
 and those brought to the attention of 
Registrar through an application form containing a material misrepresentation.
201
 Inventions that 
are not useful or do not involve an inventive step do not qualify as inventions because they do 
not satisfy the requirements for patentability as delimited in section 2 of the Act. Allowing such 
inventions would be counterproductive and deceitful. The same goes for inventions that contain a 
material misrepresentation and claiming the state of the art as an invention would in all 
likelihood amount to a material misrepresentation.  
Zimbabwean patent law, just like its Botswana counterpart incorporates most of the well-known 
but least used TRIPS flexibilities such as the international exhaustion
202
 and parallel imports,
203
 
bolar-type exceptions,
204
 compulsory licences,
205
 anti-competitive provisions and government 
use of patents including use during a state of emergency. 
Because the intention of this section is to show how Zimbabwe managed to make use of 
compulsory licences effectively, it is appropriate that compulsory licences in the Zimbabwean 
context be dealt with separately from all the other flexibilities.  
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5.5.1 Compulsory Licenses under Zimbabwean Patent Law
206
 
In terms of the relevant Zimbabwean law, compulsory licences are provided for in sections       
30-35 of the Patents Act. The various instance that may trigger the application for a compulsory 
licence may be based on anyone of the following grounds: to deal with dependent patents;
207
 to 
curb patent abuse and non-use of patents;
208
 to deal with inventions relating to food, medicine or 
other commodities;
209
 to deal with the use of patented inventions for the service of the state;
210
 
and to deal with government use of patents during periods of emergency.
211
  
The provisions dealing with dependent patents, which are patents the working of which will be 
impossible without infringing an existing patented invention,
212
 are not discussed in any detail 
here because they do not raise any serious access questions relating to medicines. In the context 
of dependent patents, once a voluntary licence has been unreasonably denied, the fairest remedial 
action would be to grant a compulsory licence.
213
  
In terms of the provisions dealing with compulsory licences for abuse and the non-working of 
patents, the following issues are worth highlighting. In the first instance, a compulsory licence 
may be sought and granted in a situation where six months after the applicant sought a voluntary 
licence from the patentee on the grounds that “the reasonable requirements of the public with 
respect to the invention in question have not been or will not be satisfied”,214 but the voluntary 
licence has been unreasonably refused by the patentee. Indicators of the non-satisfaction of the 
‘reasonable requirements of the public…’ include the following: non-working on a commercial 
scale of the invention in Zimbabwe where the capability for such working exists and there is no 
satisfactory reason for such non-working;
215
 if the local working of the invention is prevented by 
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importation of the product at the behest of the patentee or his nominees;
216
 if the demand for the 
patented article in Zimbabwe is not being met to an adequate extent and on reasonable terms;
217
 
if the trade or industry of Zimbabwe or any other person is being prejudiced and it is in the 
public interest that a compulsory licence be issued;
218
 and if the trade or industry is affected by 
unfair conditions imposed by the patentee.
219
  
If the compulsory licence is granted by an administrative tribunal in the context of                  
anti-competitive practices, then the requirement that the applicant should have applied for a 
voluntary licence first will not apply.
220
 The compulsory licence granted in the context of section 
31 will be granted subject to conditions imposed by the Patents Tribunal.
221
 The licensee will 
have to pay the patentee reasonable royalty amounts which are compatible with the successful 
working of the invention within Zimbabwe on a commercial scale and at a reasonable profit.
222
 
This provision is important because it clearly explains how the royalty amounts may be 
calculated. A failure by the licensee to pay royalties may lead to a revocation of the licence.
223
  
With specific reference to inventions or certain commodities, the Patents Tribunal may grant an 
applicant a compulsory licence, if the applicant has made a prior attempt to obtain a voluntary 
license, and if the patent relates to a substance capable of being used as food or medicine or used 
in the production of food or medicine.
224
 This provision extends to processes for the production 
of the categorized products and the patentee is entitled to remuneration. It is also noteworthy that 
the licence shall be granted for the predominant supply of the Zimbabwean market and if the 
compulsory licence is sought on the basis of anti-competitive conduct on the part of the patentee, 
the requirement to predominantly supply the Zimbabwean market falls away and the products 
may be exported.
225
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In settling the terms of a licence under this section, the Tribunal is required to make sure that 
food, medicines, surgical, curative and environmental devices are available to the Zimbabwean 
public at the lowest prices “consistent with the patentees deriving a reasonable advantage from 
their patent rights”.226 This provision is important and unique and other SADC members may 
consider amending their laws similarly in order to maximize access to medicines. This 
submission is premised on the fact that this study is about patents making medicines expensive 
and frustrating access thereto. Therefore, a provision in the law expressly stating that prices of 
foodstuffs and medicines must be kept at their lowest is welcome.  
The Patents Act also makes provision for the use of inventions by “any department of the State 
or any person authorized in writing by the Minister” for the service of the state.227 For the 
specific government use of the patent under the relevant section, the permission must be granted 
by the Minister in writing
228
 subject to terms and conditions of use that will be agreed upon 
between the Minister and the patentee with approval by the Minister of Finance.
229
 The authority 
by the Minister to use the invention may be granted before or after the patent has been granted
230
 
and the patentee will be informed of such use as soon as is practicable after the use has begun,
231
 
unless it will be contrary to  public interest to do so.
232
 Such government use contemplates the 
use by the government of Zimbabwe for the service of a foreign state if the patented articles are 
to be used for the defence of the foreign government.
233
 Government use contemplated in this 
section shall be permitted to remedy a practice determined after a judicial or administrative 
process to be anti-competitive.
234
 
Compulsory licences issued under this section may be useful in resolving access to medicines if 
the administrative process prescribed is followed to the letter. The provisions are elaborate and 
clear and provide for appropriate remedies to the patentee. This again is an opportunity from 
which other SADC members may learn and incorporate similar provisions in their domestic 
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patent laws. In all likelihood, the provisions sanctioning government use through another person 
or entity supplement those relating to state use during an emergency, discussed in the paragraph 
following immediately below.
235
 
During an emergency, a person or government department may be authorized by the state to 
make, use, exercise or vend an invention without the patentee’s prior authorization. In this 
specific context of national emergencies, the authorization may be granted in the following 
circumstances relevant to access to medicines: for the maintenance of supplies and services 
essential for the life of the community;
236
 for the promotion of productivity of industry, 
commerce or agriculture;
237
 for ensuring that whole resources of the community are available for 
use, and are used in a manner best calculated to serve the interests of the community;
238
 and for 
assisting the relief of suffering and the restoration of and distribution of essential supplies and 
services in any part of Zimbabwe or any foreign country that is in grave distress because of 
war.
239
 
A period of emergency covers “any period beginning on such date as may be declared by the 
Minister, by a statutory instrument, to be the commencement and ending on such date as may be 
so declared to be the termination of a period of emergency.”240 Because disputes are likely to 
arise when the state uses a patented invention for an emergency situation, the relevant law 
provides that such disputes will be dealt with by the Patents Tribunal,
241
 which shall also have 
the power to consider a number of external issues and make an order as to the appropriate 
remedy. Additionally, the Tribunal will consider any benefit or compensation which that 
applicant or any person from whom he derives title may have received or may be entitled to 
receive, directly or indirectly, from any department of the State in respect of the invention in 
question.
242
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The following section narrates and exposes how the government of Zimbabwe successfully used 
the “special provisions as to State use during emergency”243 in its Patents Act in order to supply 
affordable drugs to HIV/AIDS positive patients in the country. 
5.5.2 How Zimbabwe managed to effectively use a Compulsory License 
In 1999, UNAIDS considered Zimbabwe to be the country with one of the highest HIV/AIDS 
infection rates in the whole world.
244
 However, according to the 2012 statistics, the country had 
turned its fortunes and had achieved one of the sharpest declines in HIV prevalence in Southern 
Africa, from 27% in 1997 to just over 14% in 2010.
245
 Before this success story, it was estimated 
that 1, 5 million people were living with HIV/AIDS and only about 7% of that population had 
access to HIV/AIDS drugs.
246
 There were about 180 000 HIV/AIDS related deaths annually and 
more than 1, 1 million children had been orphaned due to HIV/AIDS.
247
  
 
Faced with a possible public health disaster of monumental proportions, the Zimbabwean 
government decided to invoke the government use of provisions in the Patents Act
248
 in order to 
ensure the availability of HIV/AIDS medication for its sick population.  
 
As has been previously discussed, Zimbabwean patent laws provide for government use of 
patents generally and during a state of public emergency.
249
 Such uses are sanctioned by the 
TRIPS Agreement for public non-commercial purposes
250
 and therefore, their inclusion in the 
relevant Zimbabwean law does have a textual basis in TRIPS. It is important to note that with 
specific reference to the ‘period of emergency’ in Zimbabwean patent law, the beginning and 
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end of the period is dependent entirely on the Minister’s discretion, hence he/she has wide 
discretion to issue a compulsory licence in times of emergency.
251
 
 
Because of patent protection, antiretroviral (ARV) drugs such as GlaxoSmithKline’s zidovudine, 
lamivudine, abacavir and nevirapine made by Boehringer-Ingelheim were very expensive and 
out of reach for many of Zimbabwe’s poor.252 In May 2002, Zimbabwe’s Minister of Justice, 
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs issued a notice declaring a six-month period of emergency on 
HIV/AIDS.
253
 This notice was later extended from January 2003 to December 2008.
254
           
The extension of the period was in accordance with the government policy to promote 
manufacturing and importing of generic HIV/AIDS drugs.
255
 
 
Very briefly, the notice was necessitated by the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS among the population 
of Zimbabwe, and within the six month period of the notice, the state or any person nominated 
by the Minister would be enabled “to make or use any patented drug, including any antiretroviral 
drug, used in the treatment of persons suffering from HIV/AIDS or HIV/AIDS related 
conditions”.256 Additionally, the Notice would enable the state or any person authorized by the 
Minister “to import any generic drug used in the treatment of persons suffering from HIV/AIDS 
or HIV/AIDS-related conditions”.257 According to Correa,258 this Notice, which was issued in 
terms of section 34 of Zimbabwe’s Patents Act, is sanctioned by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health, which provides that: 
Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency.
259
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 Upon close scrutiny, the notice reveals that the use of patented drugs would in all likelihood be 
confined to Zimbabwean made products or products put on the Zimbabwean market by the 
patentee while imports were to be confined to generic drugs.
260
  
 
Pursuant to the notice, Varichem, a local pharmaceutical manufacturing company, was 
nominated by the Minister and the company agreed to produce antiretroviral or HIV/AIDS drugs 
and to supply three-quarters of its produced drugs to State owned health institutions at fixed 
prices.
261
 The company, which also agreed to provide price differentials between its own drugs 
and those that are patented, introduced its generic drugs late in 2003.
262
 The introduction of 
generics into the market lowered the price of ARVs from US$1,168 to US$412 per patient per 
year due to increased competition and yielded positive results for access to medicines.
263
 
 
Despite the Zimbabwean government’s positive intervention outlined above, access to 
HIV/AIDS medications still remains a challenge in a country with unemployment rates quoted at 
more than 50%.
264
 Deaths from HIV/AIDS are still very high and this could be a pointer to the 
fact that it is futile to use a compulsory licence to lower prices of medicines while the majority of 
the population remains poor and unemployed;
265
 the medicines will remain cheap but 
unaffordable. 
5.5.3 Important Lessons for the SADC from the Zimbabwean Experience  
Notably, Zimbabwe was the first developing country and a SADC member to issue a 
governmental use compulsory licence post the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
health. While the Doha Declaration permits members to use government use orders to override 
patents in cases of national emergency, from the Zimbabwean experience, it is axiomatic that 
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such use must be sanctioned by the relevant enabling municipal legislation.
266
 Quite a number of 
SADC members have government use provisions in their laws and these could be used to 
improve access to medicines. While TRIPS flexibilities are spelt out in the relevant WTO 
Agreement, their availability for use by a member will depend on whether or not the relevant 
patent laws incorporate them.  
 
A couple of other lessons emerge for SADC members from the Zimbabwean experience. Firstly, 
the granting of the government licence to Varichem, spurred local pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacity, and through cooperation and assistance from generic manufacturers from India, a 
number of local players were licensed by the government to manufacture HIV/AIDS drugs.
267
 In 
addition, with effect from 15 September 2010, Varichem Pharmaceuticals’ antiretroviral drug 
manufacturing plant was certified by the World Health Organization (WHO) as fully compliant 
with rigorous international standards hence, the company will now be able to export the           
life-prolonging drugs to other countries in the region.
268
 The above is positive news for both 
Zimbabwe and the region and will in all likelihood inform the likely direction the region will 
take in pursuit of developing regional pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity for export, as 
sanctioned by Article 31 bis of TRIPS. 
 
On the mandate to nominate a person or company to import generic drugs on behalf of the 
government,
269
 two drug companies, namely Datlabs and Omahn were nominated by the 
government to import generic drugs from India. This resulted in local competition which in turn 
lowered the prices of drugs significantly.
270
 It is also important to write that from a TRIPS and IP 
perspective, the fact that patented drugs (not generics) were excluded from the importation 
mandate was a very wise approach by the Zimbabwean government in light of the furore that 
was likely to arise had the government provided for the importation of patented drugs in the 
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relevant notice.
271
 It is submitted that fellow SADC members should take this strategy into 
account when amending their laws to allow compulsory licences or parallel imports.  
 
The companies that were given the licence to import generics from India did not just do so in a 
vacuum, the government of Zimbabwe had to negotiate with Indian generic manufacturers and 
the importation was voluntarily sanctioned by the patentees. The lesson for SADC in this 
instance is premised on the importance of prior negotiations and the abundance of goodwill in 
some of the right holders especially the generic manufacturers from developing countries such as 
India and Brazil. Compulsory licences must always be viewed as a last resort since the mere 
presence of domestic legislation sanctioning them may be a very strong negotiating point for 
voluntary licences. This may be aptly illustrated by the fact that “on 30 May 2007, Roche, a 
Swiss drug manufacturer offered a voluntary licence to Varichem, for the production of a generic 
drug, saquinavir”.272 The extension of the voluntary licence by Roche in the above context may 
lead one to conclude that while Zimbabwe may not have the power to threaten the use of a 
compulsory licence like Brazil, the mere fact that there is a possibility of granting a compulsory 
licence may trigger the grant of a voluntary licence.
273
 Therefore, the availability of legislation 
on compulsory licensing may have an important effect, even if no compulsory licence is 
granted.
274
 
 
Therefore, despite the fact that Zimbabwe continues to grapple with the problem of access to 
HIV/AIDS medication for its citizens in an environment mired in poverty, high unemployment 
and a stagnating economy hamstrung by targeted sanctions, its 2002 Declaration of Emergency 
and its subsequent extension was a courageous and TRIPS compliant decision which fellow 
SADC members must emulate should the need arise.  
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In the following section, the effective use of one of TRIPS’ least used flexibilities namely, 
competition in law in the context of curbing anti-competitive behaviour that militates against 
access to medicines, is explored and lessons extracted for other SADC members.  
5.6 The South African Access to Medicines Experience 
Before discussing how competition law was used with positive results for access to medicines, it 
is necessary to give an expository account of the extent to which the relevant South African laws 
incorporate TRIPS flexibilities. 
5.6.1 Extent of the Incorporation of TRIPS Flexibilities in South African Patent Law 
It is common cause that the South African patent legislation is not without glaring weaknesses.
275
 
Major weaknesses have been attributed to the absence of an examination system, some TRIPS-
plus provisions, the absence of pre and post-grant opposition procedures for patent applications, 
a weak definition of novelty which allows ever greening and the absence of an express provision 
dealing with parallel imports in the relevant legislation.
276
 
In the specific context of access to medicines, ever greening, which is cited as the major 
contributor to high drug prices due to the fact that it prevents the entry of generics into the 
market, has been brandished as one of the major weaknesses of the Patents Act.
277
 Other 
weaknesses cited are weak provisions relating to parallel imports and compulsory licences. It has 
often been argued that should South Africa address these and other problems to be outlined 
below, South Africans will realize their right to health, succinctly spelt out in section 27 of the 
Constitution.
278
 
As far as the applicable legislation is concerned, the Patents Act,
279
 as amended by the 
Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act,
280
 the Patents Amendment Act,
281
 the Medicines 
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and Related Substances Control Act,
282
 as amended by the Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Amendment Act
283
 and the 2002 Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Act,
284
 
and the Competition Act,
285
 are the most relevant laws for access to medicines. In this section, 
the implications of the Patents Act, the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, the 
Competition Act and the provisions of the recent Draft IP policy will be discussed.  
As far as patents are concerned, the relevant provisions of the law that incorporate TRIPS 
flexibilities are those dealing with the requirements for patentability and the duration of patents, 
examination of patents, state use of patents, compulsory licences, the protection of test data and 
parallel imports. 
In South African patent law, patents are granted for 20 years
286
 for inventions that are new and 
they involve an inventive step and are useful in trade, industry or agriculture.
287
 This provision is 
seemingly in accord with the requirements laid down in the TRIPS Agreement
288
 which 
designates patentable subject matter as that which is new, involves an inventive step and is 
capable of industrial application. It may, however, be argued that the utility requirement in terms 
of South African law, is broader than “industrial application” in the TRIPS Agreement since it 
includes trade and agriculture alongside industry.
289
 
With specific reference to drugs or pharmaceuticals, it seems as though the Patents Act allows 
for the patenting of new uses of known substances in its provision that: 
..“the fact that the substance or composition forms part of the state of the art immediately before the 
priority date of the invention shall not prevent a patent being granted for the invention if the use of the 
substance or composition in any such method does not form part of the state of the art at that date”.290 
The above cited provision is patently TRIPS-plus because the TRIPS Agreement does not have 
explicit reference to the patenting of new uses of known substances. This, therefore, is a 
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weakness in the law which is likely to encourage evergreen patents and militate against access to 
medicines.  
With specific reference to exclusions from patentability, certain inventions are excluded on the 
basis of not satisfying the requirements for patentability or being against public interest. On the 
one hand, discoveries; scientific theories; mathematical methods; literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic works; schemes, rules or methods for performing a mental act, playing games or doing 
business; computer programs and the presentation of information are excluded from 
patentability.
291
 On the other hand, methods of medical treatment (surgery, therapy or diagnosis) 
are excluded because they are not capable of industrial, trade or agricultural application.
292
 
Additionally, plant or animal varieties, or essentially biological processes for the production of 
animals or plants, with the exception of a microbiological process or the product of such a 
process are not patentable.
293
 
With reference to common exceptions to patent rights, South African law permits the use of 
patented inventions on a non-commercial scale and in cases where early working is necessary 
(bolar exception) and compliance with regulatory requirements is contemplated.
294
 The use of a 
patented invention to obtain data for regulatory purposes will, therefore, be allowed in South 
African law provided that such use is on a non-commercial scale. The wording of the pertinent 
provision mimics the Canadian equivalent of a bolar exception.
295
 On a negative note, it does not 
seem that South African patent law provides for any other exceptions; and very disturbingly, the 
law does not ex facie provide for exceptions based on research, teaching or experimentation.
296
 
Compulsory licences are allowed in South African law where patent rights are abused,
297
 and 
where such abuse occurs, any interested person may apply for a licence. Patents are deemed to be 
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abused in four instances,
298
 namely when: the invention is not being worked in South Africa on a 
commercial scale;
299
 demand for the patented article is not being met adequately and on 
reasonable terms;
300
 refusal of the patentee to grant a licence on reasonable terms, prejudices the 
establishment of any new trade or industry or that it is in the public interest that a licence or 
licences should be granted;
301
 and the demand for the patented product is being met by 
importation and the price charged for the patented article by the patentee, his licensee or agent is 
excessive in relation to the price charged in the country of manufacture.
302
 Procedurally, a 
compulsory licence can be granted through formal application to the Commissioner of Patents, 
who will ordinarily be a judge of the high court sitting as a single judge in a High Court matter. 
The Patents Act does not give detailed guidelines as to how compensation can be determined, 
save to provide that the Commissioner must take into account ‘relevant facts’.303 
For access to medicines, it seems South Africa has very robust provisions that can enable the use 
of compulsory licences to tackle unjustifiably expensive medicines and improve access to 
medicines.
304
 Save for the sketchy detail around the determination of compensation, South 
Africa’s compulsory licence provisions are robust and far reaching enough to cater for any 
eventuality of a compulsory licence.  
Closely related to the issue of compulsory licensing is the often dreaded issue of government use 
of patents.
305
 From an access to medicines perspective, the relevant section of the Patents Act is 
generally understood to empower the Ministers to issue compulsory licences for public purposes, 
including ensuring access to a sustainable supply of affordable medicines. Although the pertinent 
provision does not expressly refer to “national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency” or to “cases of public non-commercial use” as eloquently provided for in the TRIPS 
Agreement,
306
 the wording in Section 4, which authorizes the use of patented inventions by the 
                                                          
298
 Section 56 (2) of the Patents Act. 
299
 Section 56 (2) (a). 
300
 Section 56 (2) (b). 
301
 Section 56 (2) (c). 
302
 Section 56 (2) (d). 
303
 Section 57 (6). Some of the relevant factors include risks taken by the licensee, the research and development 
costs incurred by the patentee, and the normal costs of licenses in patents in a similar field of technology.  
304
 See specifically section 56 (2) (d) of the Patents Act. 
305
 Section 4 of the Patents Act provides for government use of patents through the relevant Minister. 
306
 Article 31 (b) of TRIPS. 
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Government in the public interest, without the consent of the patent holder, is consistent with the 
pertinent provision of the TRIPS Agreement.
307
 
On the subject of data protection, the Patent Act does not refer to test data protection. However, 
the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, which regulates medicines in South Africa, 
does contain general confidentiality provisions related to medicines.
308
 There is a general 
protection of information submitted in respect of the regulation of medicines against unfair 
commercial use.
309
 However, the Director General of Health is permitted to disclose information 
relating to medicines where it is deemed “expedient and in the public interest”.310 The fact that 
the patent legislation does not deal with data protection is a weakness in the law which must be 
remedied for clarity.  
With reference to the issue of parallel importation and exhaustion of patent rights, it seems that 
South Africa has a national exhaustion regime for patent rights.
311
 To clarify the legal position 
regarding parallel imports in the context of pharmaceuticals, the South African government 
passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act in 1997.
312
 The relevant 
section of the law adopts the international exhaustion of patent rights and affords the Health 
Minister the power to prescribe the procedure and the conditions under which a patented 
medicine, once put on the market, can be imported in a parallel manner into South Africa.
313
 This 
law sparked a lot of controversy and resulted in acrimonious litigation against the South African 
government by big pharmaceutical companies. The case relating to section 15 (c) is discussed 
immediately below in 5.6.2. 
                                                          
307
 Oh above at 5. 
308
 See section 34B, read together with section 24B of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, No 101 of 
1965. 
309
 Section 34B of the Medicines Control Act. 
310
 Section 24B of the Medicines Control Act. 
311
 Section 45 (2) of the Patents Act provides that,  “The disposal of a patented article by or on behalf of a patentee  
or his licensee shall, subject to other patent rights, give the purchaser the right to use, offer to dispose of and dispose 
of that article”. 
312
 Section 15 (c) of the Act.  
313
 Section 15 (c) of the Act.  
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5.6.2 South Africa’s Infamous Access to Medicines Case: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' 
Association of South Africa v. The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
314
 
 
In response to the escalating HIV/AIDS pandemic against the backdrop of expensive and 
unaffordable medicines, South Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control 
Amendment Act (the Act).
315
 The amendment contained in section 15C thereof scared big 
pharmaceutical companies and led to the vilification of South Africa as a major violator of 
intellectual property rights.
316
 
The legislation introduced parallel importation and compulsory licensing as mechanisms to 
improve access by providing for the importation and manufacturing of cheaper medicines.
317
  
Even before it was enacted, the Act was severely criticized by the international pharmaceutical 
industry, the United States and the European Union, even before it was enacted.
318
 In February 
1998, 42 applicants (big pharmaceutical companies) brought a law suit against the South African 
government. In the case, it was argued on behalf of the pharmaceutical industry that the 
provisions of section 15C violated inter alia, the TRIPS Agreement and the South African 
constitution, in that they were too vague since they involved a restriction of patent rights; this 
being a prima facie violation of property rights in section 25 of the constitution. It was further 
argued that the impugned legislation violated Article 27 of TRIPS
319
 in that it discriminated 
against patent rights in the pharmaceutical field.
320
 The matter was viewed in a very serious light 
                                                          
314
 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa No v President of the Republic of South Africa, case 
No. 4183/98. 
315
 Act 90 of 1997. 
316
 Section 15C deals with measures to ensure a supply of more affordable medicines by allowing parallel 
importation of drugs and the issuance of compulsory licenses under specific conditions.   
317
 Although the South African government strenuously denied that the pertinent provision covered compulsory 
licenses, a literary reading of it clears shows that compulsory licenses were contemplated. See for instance Bombach 
KM “Can South Africa Fight Aids? Reconciling The South African Medicines and Related Substances Act with the 
TRIPS Agreement” (2001) 19 Boston University International Law Journal 274 – 305, Seeratan NN “The Negative 
Impact of Intellectual Property Patent Rights on Developing Countries: An Examination of the Indian 
Pharmaceutical Industry” (2000-2001) 3 Scholar 341 – 405 at 390. 
318
 See specifically, Bombach above, who wrote on the Act while it was still in Bill form. 
319
 Bombach above at 281 correctly submits that had litigation been pursued to finality, the pharmaceutical 
companies would have been found to be flawed in treaty law because the TRIPS Agreement provides for 
compulsory licensing in Article 31 and parallel imports in Article 6. 
320
 Ostergaard RL “The Political Economy of the South Africa-United States Patent Dispute” (2000) The Journal of 
World Intellectual Property at 880 – 881. 
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by the US government which put South Africa on a special section 301 watch list of countries 
that deny adequate and effective intellectual property protection.
321
 
The South African government on the other hand argued that under its constitution, it is obliged 
to protect its citizens’ rights to health. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a South African   
Non-Governmental Organisation representing people with HIV/AIDS joined the case as amicus 
curiae (friend of the Court). Soon thereafter, 300 000 individuals and 140 groups across 130 
nations signed a petition demanding the withdrawal of the case against the South African 
government, which had a lot of sympathy from the TAC and like-minded organisations. The 
Pressure later became too much to bear for the pharmaceutical companies which had launched 
the suit and after the United Nations secretary general’s mediation efforts, the pharmaceutical 
companies withdrew the suit.  
In 2001 the South African government and the pharmaceutical industry pledged to work 
together, with the government affirming its commitment to the TRIPS and its willingness to 
consult with the pharmaceutical industry in the formulation of regulations in respect of section 
15C. Subsequently, the US president issued an executive order forbidding the US from seeking a 
revision of intellectual Property laws of sub-Saharan African states that promote access to 
HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals but are TRIPS compliant.
322
 
The case put the TRIPS agreement and access to medicines on the international agenda, and it 
remained there due to more awareness about HIV/AIDS.
323
 So important was the topic of access 
to medicines that it was also discussed by WIPO at its commemoration of the 50
th
 anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1998.
324
 This case is, therefore, important in that it 
raised awareness about access issues to medicines from the developing countries’ perspective 
and exposed the duplicity of the pharmaceutical industry which sought to limit South Africa’s 
right to take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities despite the law expressly providing for compulsory 
licences and parallel imports.  
                                                          
321
 The US government justified South Africa’s placement on the list on the basis that the Act gave the Minister    
ill-defined authority to authorize parallel imports, issue compulsory licenses and potentially otherwise abrogate 
intellectual property rights. 
322
 Herstermeyer above at 16. 
323
 Herstermeyer above at 14. 
324
 See WIPO, “Intellectual Property and Human Rights” at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/hr/paneldiscussion/index.html 
(last visited 20/04/2012). 
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In addition to having been the pacesetter in access issues in the context of compulsory licences 
and parallel imports, South Africa also scored an access victory to medicines by using its 
competition legislation in 2002 to force pharmaceutical companies GlaxoSmithKline and 
Boehringer Ingelheim to stop their excessive pricing of ARVs to the detriment of consumers. 
The next section of this chapter focuses on this case.  
5.6.3 How South Africa used Competition Law to Improve Access to Medicines 
In terms of the relevant provision of the TRIPS Agreement,
325
 Patents may, therefore, be 
overridden and compulsory licences issued if it can be proved that the right holder is engaged in 
anti-competitive conduct, such as abusing dominance in a market by charging excessively high 
prices for pharmaceuticals.
326
 In this case, the need to correct anti-competitive behaviour may be 
taken into account in determining the amount of remuneration as compensation.  This remedy 
may be resorted to after going through the judicial or administrative process
327
 which a member 
seeking to rely on such a remedy must have in place. South Africa did rely on competition law to 
curb anti-competitive practices but a compulsory licence was never issued, as illustrated briefly 
below. 
5.6.3.1 Competition Law as TRIPS Flexibility in South Africa 
South Africa’s competition law is comparable to antitrust laws which obtain in developed 
countries’ jurisdictions and sets out rules and definitions on mergers, restrictive practices and 
abuse of their dominant position.
328
 With particular reference to access to medicines, the abuse of 
dominance rules in the Competition Act is relevant.
329
 Dominance is defined in terms of market 
share and market power, irrespective of how big or small a firm is.
330
 A firm is prohibited from 
abusing its dominance, with such dominance taking a variety of forms which are reproduced 
verbatim below: 
(a) charging an excessive price to the detriment of consumers;331  
 
(b) refusing to give a competitor access to an essential facility when it is economically feasible to do so;332 
                                                          
325
 Generally, compulsory licenses issued to remedy anti-competitive conduct are dealt with in Article 31 (k) of 
TRIPS. 
326
 Article 31 (k) of TRIPS. 
327
 Article 31 (k) of TRIPS. 
328
 Oh above at 8.  
329
 Section 8 of the Competition Act of 1998. 
330
 Section 7 of the Competition Act. 
331
 Section 8 (a). 
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(c) engaging in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph (d) of section 8, if the anti-
competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain;
333
 or 
 
(d) engaging in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm concerned can show technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effect of its act;
334
  
(i) inducing a supplier or customer not to deal with a competitor; 
 
(ii) refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor when supplying those goods is economically          
feasible; 
(iii) selling goods or services on condition that the buyer purchases separate goods or services unrelated to 
the object of a contract, or forcing a buyer to accept a condition unrelated to the object of a contract;  
(iv) selling goods or services below their marginal or average variable cost; or 
(v) buying-up a scarce supply of intermediate goods or resources required by a competitor. 
In the context of medicines, the cited section has the potential to provide a range of legal tools to 
challenge various anticompetitive practices such as unjustifiable refusals to license intellectual 
property and price gouging.
335
 
Section 8 of the Act has been used in two cases thus far with positive results for access to 
medicines. The first case, Hazel Tau and Others v GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim, 
dealt with antiretroviral (ARV) medicines for the treatment of HIV infection while the second 
one, Treatment Action Campaign v Bristol-Myers Squibb, dealt with an antifungal medicine used 
to treat cryptococcal meningitis, an AIDS related opportunistic infection. Both matters did not 
proceed to adjudication but were settled. In this section, I highlight for illustrative purposes, the 
main findings of only the first case.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
332
 Section 8 (b). 
333
 Section 8 (c). 
334
 Section 8 (d). 
335
 Avafia T, Berger J and Hartzenberg T The ability of select sub-Saharan African countries to utilise TRIPs 
Flexibilities and Competition Law to ensure a sustainable supply of essential medicines: A study of producing and 
importing countries (2006) at 35 Stellenbosch: TRALAC. 
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5.6.3.1 Highlights from the case of Hazel Tau and Others v. GlaxoSmithKline SA (Pty) Ltd and 
Others
336
 
The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), an NGO, filed a complaint at the Competition 
Commission against GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim (BI) on behalf of 11 
HIV patients and medical professionals in September 2002. 
 
The basis of the complaint was that the said companies had allegedly engaged in excessive 
pricing of ARVs to the detriment of consumers, and such a form of behaviour was prohibited by 
section 8(a) of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998. The complainants further alleged that the 
excessive pricing of ARVs was directly responsible for premature, predictable and avoidable 
deaths of people living with HIV/AIDS, including both children and adults.
337
 
 
The complainants asked the Commission to investigate and refer the matter to the Competition 
Tribunal for relief contemplated by section 58 of the Act, in the form of an Order against GSK 
and BI ordering them to stop their excessive pricing practices; a declaration to the effect that 
GSK and BI had conducted a prohibitive practice; and further, a fine of up to 10% of their annual 
South African turnover.
338
 
 
After investigating the matter for a year, the Competition Commission ruled that it was referring 
the case to the Tribunal because GSK and BI in their refusal to license their patents to generic 
manufacturers for a reasonable royalty, was in contravention of the Competition Act (GSK and 
BI had only entered into a licensing agreement with one generic producer, Aspen Pharmacare on 
royalty terms of 30% and 15%).
339
 The Commission further held that the defendants had abused 
their dominant positions in the market by excessive pricing to the detriment of consumers; 
denying a competitor access to an essential facility and engaging in an exclusionary act. 
 
                                                          
336
 See “Statement of complaint in terms of section 49b (2)(b) of the competition act 89 of 1998”, available at 
http://www.section27.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/TauvGSKevidenceAndLegalSubmissions.pdf (last visited 
19/11/2013). 
337
 See para 107 of the statement of complaint, available at available at 
http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/DrugCompaniesCC/HazelTauAndOthersVGlaxoSmithKlineAndOthersStatement
OfComplaint.doc  (last visited 17/11/2013).    
338
 Oh above at 10. 
339
 Ibid. 
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In addition to the above findings, the Commission also stated that it would ask the Tribunal to 
make an order authorizing the making of generic versions of the drugs in question. The case did 
not proceed to be heard by the Tribunal on its merits since in December 2003, GSK and BI 
conceded to settlement which saw the two companies agreeing to allow select generic companies 
to manufacture and sell some of their antiretroviral drugs in sub- Saharan Africa in return for a 
royalty that does not exceed 5% of net sales of the relevant antiretroviral drugs.
340
 This was a 
significant access victory to medicines, and for the first time, generic versions of patented drugs 
were to be commercially available in South Africa.
341
 
5.6.3.1 Lessons from Hazel Tau for Fellow SADC Members     
South Africa is the only SADC member to have successfully used competition law to deal with 
anti-competitive behaviour in the context of access to medicines. The way in which the matter 
was dealt with affords useful lessons to the SADC region.  
Firstly, this case was brought by the TAC, a civil society organization which took ‘big pharma’ 
on while the government watched. This illustrates the importance of empowering civil society 
organisations in the SADC region, as the honest evaluation of the Botswana context earlier 
showed. The case, therefore, shows that competition policy instruments can indeed be used to 
great effect, particularly in a context where other key role-players – such as developing 
countries’ governments and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers – are either unwilling or 
unable to act.
342
 
Secondly, this case shows that competition legislation may play a complementary role to the 
general patent law provisions dealing with compulsory licences. It has been reported earlier that 
Botswana’s competition Act does not apply to patents and such legislative self-emasculation is 
unfortunate. SADC members need not only have robust competition policies and laws, but also 
need to have law that can be applied in practice to curb all forms of anti-competitive conduct, 
like was aptly demonstrated in this case. 
                                                          
340
 The agreement, setting out the terms and conditions of the settlement, is available online: 
http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/DrugCompaniesCC/GARPP-BI-Settlement-20031209.pdf (last visited 
17/11/2013). 
341
 Avafia, Berger and Hartzenberg above at 40.  
342
 Avafia, Berger and Hartzenberg above at 40. 
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5.6.4 Recent Developments in South Africa: The Draft IP Policy and Its likely Implications for 
access to Medicines 
The weaknesses in the South African IP law generally and patent law in particular, were recently 
acknowledged by the South African government through the Draft Intellectual Property 
Policy.
343
 The most important provisions of the policy which are likely to have a positive impact 
on access to medicines are those dealing with: forms of IP;
344
 IP and public health;
345
 IP and 
indigenous knowledge;
346
 IP, Competition, Public Policy-making, compulsory licensing and 
technology transfer;
347
 patent reform;
348
 enforcement of IP;
349
 and overall recommendations.
350
 
There are a number of provisions in the draft IP Policy which are likely to impact directly or 
indirectly on access to medicines.
351
 Due to the specific limitations imposed by the scope of this 
study,
352
 this section focuses on patents and public heath provisions outlined in chapter 1 of the 
draft policy only.
353
 This is a major part of the policy dealing with patents and access to 
medicines and on the whole, reflects the spirit and purport of the policy on matters affecting 
patents and access to medicines.
354
 
Although the section dealing with patents in chapter 1 of the policy document offers a simplistic 
definition of a patent (“a patent is associated with technology transfer, public health and 
substantive search and examination”),355 the policy makes commendable recommendations that a 
substantive search and an examination process be followed in South Africa.
356
 This takes care of 
the incessant criticism of the South African patent system thus far. The fact that the current 
patent system promotes the lodging of ‘weak’ patents is also acknowledged and specifically 
                                                          
343
 See Department of Trade and Industry South Africa, “Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property 2013: 
Invitation for the Public to Comment on the National Policy on Intellectual Property 2013 (Notice 918 of 2013)”, 
published in Government Gazette no. 36816 on 4 September 2013 (hereafter Draft IP Policy), available at 
www.gov.za/documents/download.php?f=198116   (last visited 19/11/2013). 
344
 Draft IP Policy at 8 – 20. 
345
 Ibid at 21 – 22. 
346
 Draft IP Policy at 23. 
347
 Ibid at 23 – 29. 
348
 Ibid at 31. 
349
 Ibid at 42 – 44. 
350
 Draft IP Policy at 44. 
351
 The following chapters of the policy are glaringly relevant in this context: chapter 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10. 
352
 See the scope and limitations of this study in chapter One above. 
353
 At 8 – 14. 
354
 The ‘spirit and purport’ of the policy are captured succinctly in the objectives of the policy, outlined at page 4 of 
the policy document. 
355
 See chapter 1 (a) of the policy document at 8. 
356
 At 10 – 11. 
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singled out as an item to fix.
357
 This shows that the policy does identify real problems with the 
current patent law and the government should be applauded for this correct diagnosis.
358
  
The policy does acknowledge the country’s massive disease burden and acknowledges that as a 
member of the WTO, South Africa, like other developing countries, may take advantage of the 
flexibilities offered by the TRIPS Agreement to access medicines.
359
 The policy then correctly 
recommends that South Africa amends its patent laws to incorporate TRIPS flexibilities and 
reflect public health exceptions to patentability.
360
 
Bilateral trade agreements have been cited as obstacles to access to medicines in some instances 
when TRIPS-plus obligations are incorporated into them.
361
 The daft IP policy cites instances 
when certain developing countries are forced to concede and agree to renounce patent 
flexibilities allowed in TRIPS in exchange for economic benefits not related to intellectual 
property and public health.
362
 In response to such unfortunate occurrences, the policy 
recommends that South Africa must not enter into such agreements. Furthermore, it reiterates 
that South Africa must discourage other developing countries from concluding such agreements 
which undermine TRIPS.
363
  
It is heartening to note that in the current SADC/EU EPA negotiations and those that have been 
concluded, IP issues are not on the agenda but there is a possibility that they may be brought on 
board.
364
 The fact that bilateral trade agreements are singled out as an IP policy reform item is a 
                                                          
357
 At 11. However the drafters of the policy use a terminological in exactitude (“newness) to refer to the common 
term “novelty”, widely used in the law of patents to denote patents that are non-obvious.  
358
 However, the Policy was passed after incessant pressure from civil society and NGOs such as the TAC, Doctors 
without Borders and Section 27 through a campaign dubbed, “Fix the Patent Laws Campaign”. For details of the 
campaign and current goings on, visit http://www.fixthepatentlaws.org/?cat=7 (last visited 19/11/13). 
359
 See para 1 (a) (iii) of the policy at 9. 
360
 Chapter 1 paragraph (iii) of the policy and the accompanying recommendations. 
361
 See generally Phiri DS “Economic Partnership Agreements and Intellectual Property Rights Protection: 
Challenges for the Southern African Development Community Region” (2009) SAIA Occasional Paper No. 48 at    
1 – 36. 
362
 For a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the subject of TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral agreements and 
access to medicines, see Mitchell AD and Voon T “Patents and Public Health in the WTO, FTAs and Beyond: 
Tension and Conflict in International Law” (2009) 43 Journal of World Trade at 571 – 601. 
363
 Chapter 1 paragraph iv and the accompanying recommendations. 
364
 European Commission (2011) “Fact sheet on the interim Economic Partnership Agreements SADC EPA 
GROUP” at www.trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/142189.htm  (last visited 19/11/2013). 
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bold step for South Africa, a SADC member with a considerable amount of influence in the 
region.
365
  
It has been outlined above that the South African patent system does not provide for pre and 
post-grant opposition to patents. Other countries, for example, India,
366
 do provide for pre-grant 
and post-grant opposition to patents and the draft policy recommends that South Africa adopts 
such a form of opposition to patents.
367
 Adopting the procedure would ensure that only novel 
processes and products whose making involves an inventive step are granted patent status, as 
long as they satisfy the utility requirements. I embrace this policy proposal and opine that it will 
indeed augur very well for access to medicines in South Africa should the Patents Act be 
sympathetically amended. 
On the issue of world patent harmonization, the policy notes that the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) has abandoned its initial ill-informed proposal of a world patent modelled 
on the European Patent Office (EPO), US Patent and Trade Marks Office and the Japanese 
Patent Office.
368
 Had this proposal been allowed to see the light of day, it would have eroded 
countries’ sovereign rights to grant their own patents using their own laws.  
It is submitted that the TRIPS Agreement remains the ‘world patent system’ which takes into 
account individual countries’ sovereign rights to grant patents according to the minimal 
standards provided for in the TRIPS Agreement. The policy recommends that should the issue of 
a world patent be raised again, South Africa should resist it with all her might to preserve the 
patent granting policy space as guaranteed by the TRIPS Agreement.
369
 This recommendation is 
important and South Africa’s adherence to it will ensure that the country’s policy space to use 
TRIPS flexibilities is not compromised.  
On data protection, it has been said elsewhere
370
 that the TRIPS Agreement provides for data 
protection against unfair commercial use but does not provide for data exclusivity.
371
 The 
                                                          
365
 Saurombe A “The role of South Africa in SADC Regional Integration: The Making or Braking of the 
Organization” (2010) 5 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology at 124- 131. 
366
 Section 3(d) of the amended Indian Patents Act, 1970 as amended by The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005. See 
further, Chapter Six below. 
367
 Para 1 (a) (v) of the Draft IP Policy at 9. 
368
 Para 1 (a) (vi) of the policy at 10. 
369
 Ibid. 
370
 See the discussion on the ‘bolar exception’ above. 
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existence of this exception, which allows members to permit generic medicine manufacturers to 
undertake and complete the task of obtaining regulatory approval from national regulatory 
authorities for generic versions before original patents expire, was confirmed by the WTO in a 
panel ruling involving Canada and the European Union.
372
 The policy notes with concern the 
behaviour of some multinational pharmaceutical companies which lobby their governments to 
put pressure on developing countries to introduce laws that protect data exclusivity.
373
 This kind 
of behaviour does not augur well for access to medicines since it will in all likelihood delay the 
entry of generics into the local market since generic companies would not be able to conduct 
research and experiments before the patent expires. The policy, therefore, correctly urges South 
Africa to continue protecting data in terms of TRIPS prescripts
374
 but not allow data exclusivity. 
On the introduction of substantive search and the examination of patents processes, the positive 
aspects of this intervention have been discussed above. Suffice it to say at this stage that the 
policy recommendation on this point
375
 is noble and will have positive spin-offs for access to 
medicines. However, the introduction of this recommendation into the South African patents 
system will require that staff at the patents office be trained and capacitated to deal with 
examinations. This will entail using the little available local expertise in our research institutions 
such as science councils and universities before looking beyond our borders to countries such as 
India, who have made phenomenal success of this process. Further, the WIPO and other WTO 
members may be asked to help in terms of their mandate to provide technical assistance in that 
specific regard. 
The policy also comments and makes incisive recommendations on two new items which I 
regard as administrative rather than pure IP issues. The first issue is the harmonization of the 
database of the Medicines Control Council (MCC) and the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission (CIPC).
376
 While it is good that the two related government departments share 
information and access each other’s databases with relative ease, it is submitted that this should 
be done in a manner that does not delay the introduction of new medical products on the market.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
371
 Article 39 of TRIPS. 
372
 See WTO Panel Report on Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products WT/DS114/R 17 March 
2000 available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf (23/09/2013). 
373
 Para 1 (a) (vii) at 10. 
374
 In terms of the relevant provision of the Patents Act, section 69A provides for data protection.  
375
 Chapter 1 paragraph viii and the accompanying recommendations. 
376
 Para 1 (a) (ix) at 11. 
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The second issue relates to whether or not applicants for medical patents should be 
‘rewarded/appeased’ for delays in the approval of their medicines by granting them an extension 
to the 20 year patent term.
377
 While patent extension may be interpreted as TRIPS-plus, it is not 
per se illegal since the TRIPS Agreement grants 20 years as the minimum period.
378
 Patent 
extension will delay the entry of generics into the South African market and should be 
discouraged.
379
 
The Draft Policy also considers issues relating to parallel importation,
380
 compulsory licences,
381
 
disclosure of information on patent,
382
 generic medicines
383
 and patents affected by competition 
law.
384
 It is to be noted, nevertheless, that these issues are not elaborated upon because this was 
done earlier in this chapter, albeit in a different context. Suffice it to say here that with respect to 
the listed issues, should they be implemented in an amended Patents Act, access to medicines for 
South Africans will be enhanced. 
Finally, the draft policy should be commended for coming up with an important provision 
dealing with “alternatives to IP”.385 In terms of the draft two alternative mechanisms for 
promoting innovation are the ‘subsidy’ and the ‘prize’.386 The subsidy involves direct or indirect 
payment by the government to the innovator for pursuing new technologies. The risk of loss in 
this instance is to be shared by the government and the innovator. This approach is widely used 
by the US government in sensitive areas such as the military technologies and the development 
of vaccines to address bio-weapons threats. The subsidy approach is widely used by the South 
African government through the NRF system, for example, to train more PhD holders or improve 
qualifications of academics at universities. The only shortcoming of the system is that it is not 
usually targeted at obtaining patents. It is recommended that the government works with current 
subsidy programmes and target patents as outcomes. This will in all likelihood spur innovation in 
                                                          
377
 Para 1 (a) (x) at 11. 
378
 See Article 33 of TRIPS. 
379
 See chapter 1 paragraph x of the draft policy at 11. 
380
 See ‘recommendations’ at 21. 
381
 See ‘recommendations’ at 21 and detailed explanations of compulsory licensing models at 23 - 25. 
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 At 13. 
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385
 Chapter 1 paragraph J and accompanying recommendations at 19. 
386
 At 19. 
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all the fields of technology including pharmaceuticals. Such subsidies are allowed in the terms of 
the WTO Agreement as non-actionable R/D subsidies.
387
 
The ‘prize’ approach involves the establishment of a pre-determined award that innovators have 
to try to achieve. This is based on the premise that the person seeking the prize will expand 
his/her own resources to achieve it. Whether this approach encourages innovation is yet to be 
established beyond reasonable doubt but the draft policy recommends that this approach be 
explored as well.
388
  
Alternatives to IP are important and may be used to come up with innovative approaches that 
yield solutions that are directly relevant to South Africa’s peculiar circumstances. 
To sum up on South Africa’s Draft IP Policy, the document has its heart in the right place 
although it does not in any way refer to exceptions to patents based on research, experimentation 
and educational purposes. This weakness of the current patents legislation must be addressed and 
one hopes that public comments on the draft will be taken into account.
389
 If the public health 
provisions of the current Patents Act were to be amended in a manner that incorporates all of the 
policy proposals, its legal provisions would be enhanced and there will be little to criticize in the 
law. This would in all likelihood yield positive results for access to medicines in South Africa. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter must be read together with Chapter Four and be regarded as a sequel to and 
continuation of the issues addressed in Chapter Four. The main aim of this chapter was to give a 
critical expository account of the actual use of TRIPS flexibilities in the SADC region with 
                                                          
387
 The relevant WTO Agreement dealing with subsidies is the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf (last visited 
19/11/2013). In terms of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, two categories of subsidies are prohibited, namely export 
and local content subsidies. Export subsidies are subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether wholly or as one of 
several conditions, on export performance. On the other hand, local content subsidies are contingent, whether solely 
or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods. These two categories of 
subsidies are prohibited because they are designed to directly affect trade and thus are most likely to have adverse 
effects on the interests of other Members. Therefore, subsidies to spur innovation and boost patents will not be 
prohibited as long as they are applied in adherence to the national treatment and the most favoured nation principles. 
388
 Page 19 of the Draft IP Policy. 
389
 In response to the South African Minister of Trade and Industry (DTI), Rob Davies’ invitation for public 
comment on the Policy 30 days from 4 September 2013, I did submit a 30 page proposal to the DTI on the 29 of 
September 2013 responding to most issues in the Draft policy touching on public health matters. One of the points I 
raised was that the research and experimentation exception to patents must be included in the final policy and indeed 
in the mooted amendments to the Patents Act. 
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particular emphasis on the laws of three selected members, namely, Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. By and large, most SADC members including LDCs do incorporate most of the basic 
TRIPS flexibilities in their IP legislation.  
Botswana seems to have gone a step further by updating her IP laws and bringing them in line 
with the recent developments at the WTO level. Such developments include the domestication of 
some aspects of Article 31 bis of the TRIPS Agreement and a number of express references to 
importing generics. This is depicted by the country’s honest self-evaluation which identifies 
weaknesses in the law and suggests appropriate remedial action. The section of this chapter 
dealing with Botswana compliments the self-evaluation and adds value thereto by making further 
suggestions for improvement, such as amending or repealing provisions that criminalize patent 
infringement. Zimbabwe, on the one hand, does have very robust provisions on compulsory 
licenses and government use of patents which were applied in 2002 with positive local 
pharmaceutical production results. However, the country remains bedevilled by economic 
problems which diminish the access gains to medicines introduced by the local production of 
affordable HIV/AIDS drugs and the granting of WHO approved facility status to the local 
generic producer, Varichem. South Africa, on the other hand, does have good IP laws that are yet 
to be put to the test of litigation in the context of access to medicines. On a positive note, South 
Africa has shown that it can use competition law as an access tool to medicines and this may be a 
positive lesson for fellow SADC members. Additionally, South Africa, under immense pressure 
from civil society organizations recently published a Draft IP policy which will inform future IP 
law reform generally, and access to medicines in particular. While the Draft Policy may be 
labelled a belated response to a problem that has been glaring this long while, it has very apt 
recommendations that favour access to medicines.  
On the subject of the prevention of evergreen patents, it has been reported that most of the 
members except Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe do not have robust provisions in 
their patent laws to prevent ever greening. However, for the four countries mentioned, and in the 
context of pharmaceutical patents, the patenting of products that are ‘mere mixtures’ of known 
medical and food substances is expressly prohibited. While this reads as good law at face value, 
the specific mention of ‘food’ and ‘medicines’ as exceptions to patents in that context may lead 
 216 
 
to WTO litigation based on discrimination on the grounds of technology.
390
 The SADC members 
whose laws attempt to limit ever greening but only confining it to medicines and food should 
consider taking the cautionary step of reviewing their laws to cover ‘mixing’ in the other fields 
of technology.  
On a cautionary valedictory note, while I celebrate the acknowledgement and inclusion in 
Botswana’s IP law of Doha and Article 31 bis issues, I equally bemoan the fact that Botswana 
has not ratified the relevant amendment to the TRIPS Agreement. The implication is that as long 
as the non-ratification persists, Article 31 bis will remain a waiver that will not be applicable in 
Botswana. The same cautionary message applies to other SADC members, bar the Republic of 
Zambia and Mauritius.
391
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
390
 Article 27 (1) of TRIPS poignantly provides that, “Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall 
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, (my emphasis) provided 
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”.  
391
 At the time of writing, the only SADC members which had ratified the permanent amendment to the TRIPS 
Agreement were Zambia and Mauritius. See specifically WTO, “Members Accepting Amendment of The TRIPS 
Agreement” at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last visited 19/11/2013). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
LITIGATING ACCESS TO MEDICINES: THEMATIC LESSONS FOR THE SADC 
REGION FROM OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRY JURISDICTIONS 
6. Introduction 
In Chapter Five above, we outlined the use of TRIPS flexibilities in the SADC region by 
identifying the legal and policy instruments in individual countries that deal with access to 
medicines and the use of TRIPS flexibilities. Detailed expositions in three specific countries, 
namely, Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe revealed examples of good practice in different 
contexts of access to medicines. The Botswana experience showed a good example of an across 
the board incorporation of TRIPS flexibilities in all aspects of patent law, while the Zimbabwean 
experience showed the effective use of government use orders. The South African experience on 
the other hand showed that competition law can be used as an access to medicines tool in dealing 
with the abuse of patent rights; and at the same time, the country’s recent Draft IP Policy depicts 
a country that has learned from past mistakes wrought by procrastination around IP law reform.   
Very importantly, Chapter five highlighted the lessons the SADC can learn from individual 
country experiences in order to improve access to medicines in the region. The fact that these 
lessons come from within the region itself is a positive development despite this being limited in 
that it may be regarded by critics as inward looking. It becomes imperative, therefore, that 
lessons for improving access to medicines through taking maximum advantage of the TRIPS 
flexibilities be drawn from elsewhere. However, in identifying the source of lessons for SADC 
from outside the region, it is important to pick regional sources of lessons from countries with 
similar socio-economic conditions to SADC.  
In this chapter, therefore, a critical expository comparative account of the access to medicines 
litigation experiences in India, Thailand and Kenya is rendered with the view of ascertaining 
further thematic lessons for SADC (in addition to those learned in Chapter Five) from other 
developing country jurisdictions.  
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The Indian experience highlights in very simple terms how the legislative inclusion of TRIPS 
flexibilities around the requirements for patentability
1
 can be effectively used to curb incremental 
patenting and limit the proliferation of ever green patents.
2
 While the Indian legislative inclusion 
of the relevant TRIPS flexibility may be regarded as going slightly beyond the minimum 
prescribed by the TRIPS Agreement,
3
 such inclusions are TRIPS-compliant despite being 
TRIPS-plus. At the end of this chapter, it is recommended that SADC members embark on IP 
legislative reforms along similar lines as India and this legislative reform approach forms the 
crux of the recommendations in Chapter Seven. 
The Kenyan experience is very relevant for SADC IP law reform and the incorporation of TRIPS 
flexibilities in that it clearly spells out how not to legislate for border measures in the context of 
counterfeiting. The case also spells out unequivocally that the right to health should trump the 
right to IP, hence it illuminates the recommendation made in Chapter Seven that in order to 
improve access to medicines, SADC must adopt a different theoretical framework
4
 and use the 
rights-based approach.
5
 
It will be recalled that in chapters four and five above, we highlighted that very few SADC 
members have pre-grant patent opposition provisions in their laws and for those that have 
provisions on same, the Regulations do not clearly provide for the effective use of the procedure. 
The Thai experience highlights the importance of patent opposition procedures especially the 
pre- and post-grant procedures in access to medicines. In the Thai case study, the relevant law 
dealing with patent opposition is narrated before highlighting how the procedure was used in 
litigation. It is hoped that the SADC members will learn some useful things about patent 
opposition from Thailand and incorporate similar provisions in their own laws.
6
 
                                                          
1
 Generally provided for in Article 27 of TRIPS. 
2
 According to Eisenberg R “The Problem of New uses” (2005) 5 Yale Journal of Heath Policy, Law, and Ethics at 
717, ever greening is a practice consisting in the extension of the commercial life of a patent, through the filing of 
applications for new uses of the same product patent, or for marginally improved substances or derivatives.         
Ever greening if frowned upon because it has anti-competitive effects, delays the entry of generics on the market and 
negatively impacts on drug prices.  
3
 The specific legislative provision, which will be discussed in its proper context in ensuing paragraphs, is section      
3 (d) of the Indian Patents Act 39 of 1970, dt. 19-9-1970, amended by Patents Act 15 of 2005, dt. 4-4-2005. 
4
 See Chapter Two of this study and the recommendations in Chapter Seven. 
5
 See Chapter Three of this study and the recommendations in Chapter Seven. 
6
 SADC IP law reform in various areas allowed by the TRIPS Agreement including introducing pre- and post-grant 
patent opposition procedures is one of the main recommendations made by this study in Chapter Seven below. 
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6.1 Limiting ever greening and Incremental Patenting: Novartis AG v Union of India and 
Others
7
 
On 1 April 2013, the Indian Supreme Court delivered a very important
8
 judgment in Novartis AG 
v Union of India and Others (hereafter Novartis case) in an appeal that had been brought to it by 
Novartis, a Swiss-based pharmaceutical company with business presence in India, against 
rejection by the Indian Patent Office of a product patent application for a specific compound, the 
beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate.
9
 Novartis lost the case because the Supreme Court 
ruled that the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate failed both the tests of invention and 
patentability.
10
 
The crux of the matter was whether or not the appellant was entitled to a patent for the beta 
crystalline form of the compound Imatinib Mesylate, which is a therapeutic drug for chronic 
myeloid leukaemia and certain kinds of tumours and marketed under the name ‘Glivec’ or 
‘Gleevec’.11 
It is now appropriate to delve into the facts of the case before exposing what the pertinent legal 
provisions that the Supreme Court relied upon provide, which led to a rejection of Novartis’ 
case. 
6.1.1 The Pertinent Facts and other Background Information 
The drug Glivec, manufactured by Novartis Pharmaceuticals, was originally invented by Jurg 
Zimmerman, a medicinal chemist, who invented a number of derivatives of N-phenyl-2-
pyrimidineamine.
12
 The name Imatinib was given to one of the derivatives as a non-proprietary 
name by the World Health Organisation.
13
 The derivatives, including Imatinib are capable of 
inhibiting certain protein enzymes and have valuable anti-cancer properties, which makes them 
                                                          
7
 Civil Appeal No. 2706-2716 of 2013, Supreme Court of India, judgment delivered 1 April 2013. 
8
 The importance of this judgment and the case was highlighted by the Supreme Court’s remark at para 22 that,.. 
“but in the end all agreed that given the importance of the matter, this Court may itself decide the appeals instead of 
directing the appellant to move the High Court”. 
9
 Abbott FM “Inside Views: The Judgment in Novartis v. India: What the Supreme Court of India Said” (2013) 
Intellectual Property Watch at 1 available at http://www.ip-wathc.org/2013/04/04/the-judgement-in-novartis-v-
india-what-the-supreme-court (last visited 8/11/2013). 
10
 Novaris AG v India at para 195. The tests for invention and patentability are provided for in in section 2(1) (j) - 
(ja) and section 3 (d) of the Patents Act. 
11
 Novartis AG v India at para 3. 
12
 Ibid at para 5. 
13
 Ibid.  
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suitable for the treatment of warm blooded animals.
14
 Imatinib and other derivatives were 
submitted to the US Patent Office for the registration of a patent therein on 28 April 1994 and the 
patent sought was granted in 1996.
15
  
After further research revealed that the beta crystalline form of Imatinib
16
 is more stable, 
Novartis sought to patent this in the US as well and after initial opposition from the Patent 
Office, a patent was granted in the US.
17
  Novartis also applied for a patent in India for the same 
product in 1998,
18
 but the patent was only considered in 2005, when India became truly 
compliant with the TRIPS Agreement.
19
 
The basis for Novartis’ patent application for the beta crystalline form of Imatinib in India was 
an alleged inventive step that materialized when a two-stage invention process involving the 
introduction of a specified amount of beta crystals into the base form of Imatinib was embarked 
upon.
20
 Very specifically, the claims in the patent application alleged the following about the 
Beta crystalline form of Imatinib: 
(a) It had more beneficial flow properties;21 
(b) It had better thermodynamic stability;22 and that  
(c) It had lower hydroscopicity than the alpha crystalline form of Imatinib.23  
 
It was alleged that the above mentioned properties made the beta crystalline form of Imatinib 
‘new’ and superior due to its ability to store better and be processed easily, having ‘better 
                                                          
14
 Novartis AG v India at para 3. 
15
 The patent was granted under US Patent number 5 521 184. 
16
 Imatinib Mesylate marketed in India as Glivec.  
17
 US patent number 6 894051. 
18
 Application No. 1602/MAS/98. Novartis applied for a patent of Imatinib Mesylate in Beta crystal form at the 
Chenai Patent Office on 17 July 1998 (Novartis case at para 8). 
19
 From 1 January 2005, India allowed drug patent protection in order to comply with the requirements under 
TRIPS. See specifically Chauduri S “Multinationals and Monopolies: Pharmaceutical Industry in India after TRIPS” 
(2012) XLVII Economic and Political Weekly at 46. 
20
 Norvatis AG v India paras 6 – 7. 
21
 Ibid at para 8. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid. 
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processability of the methanesulfonic acid addition of a compound formula I’ coupled with the 
advantage of storing and processing.
24
  
Two important developments occurred before the patent application was considered by the 
Chennai Patents Office. Firstly, the Patents Act was amended and section 3 (d)
25
 was introduced. 
Secondly, before the patent application was considered, it had attracted five pre-grant 
oppositions.
26
 The most vocal oppositions came from rival pharmaceutical companies and patient 
groups, basing their opposition mainly on the fact that the alleged invention was anticipated, 
obvious and ran afoul of section 3 (d) of the Patents Act. 
The matter relating to the patentability of the beta crystalline form of Imatinib was heard by the 
Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs and the application was rejected.
27
 The Assistant 
Controller of Patents and Designs rejected the application on the basis that the invention was 
anticipated by reason of prior publication;
28
 lack of novelty and not meeting the acid test of 
section 3 (d).
29
 
Novartis appealed the decision of the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs to the High 
Court in Madras, in addition to asking for an order that section 3 (d) was unconstitutional and 
also fell afoul of the TRIPS Agreement.
30
 During that time, the Intellectual Property Appellate 
Body (IPAB) had not yet been formed. After the IPAB had been formed, the matter was remitted 
to it by the Madras High Court. Despite ruling in favour of Novartis by reversing the findings of 
the Assistant Controller on novelty and non-obviousness, the IPAB ruled that the patent could 
not be granted in light of the provisions of section 3 (d) of the Act, which, according to the 
IPAB, introduces a higher standard of inventive step and that what is patentable in other 
                                                          
24
 Novartis AG v India at para 8. 
25
 Section 3 (d) excludes from patentability “the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not 
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or 
apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant” (my 
emphasis). 
26
 Novartis case at para 13. Pre-grant opposition is provided for in section 25 of the Patents Act of 1970 as amended. 
27
 The matter was heard on 15 December 2005. 
28
 This was based on the fact that patents for the same subject matter had been granted under the Zimmerman 
patents. 
29
 Novartis case at para 14. 
30
 Ibid at para 15. 
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countries will not necessarily be patentable in India.
31
 The IPAB went a step further and 
observed that the specific section was particularly targeted at drugs/pharmaceutical substances.
32
  
Very peculiarly, the IPAB referred to the pricing policy of Novartis, which had exclusive 
marketing rights over Glivec, sold at 1 20000 Rupees per month
33
 per required dose and 
concluded that the patentability of the subject product would fall foul of section 3 (b) of the Act, 
which prohibits the granting of patents on certain inventions the exploitation of which could 
cause public disorder, among other social ills.
34
 
Novartis then appealed the decision of the IPAB to the Supreme Court of India, which was 
initially reluctant to hear the appeal but was swayed by the public interest in the matter
35
 and the 
delays that had accompanied the finalisation of the matter and judgment was delivered on 1 April 
2013. 
6.1.2 The Supreme Court Judgment 
Before delivering its judgment, the Supreme Court of India per Aftab Alam J reduced the issues 
at stake in the case to an enquiry into the true import of section 3(d) of the Act and how it 
interplays with clauses (j) and (ja) of section 2(1) of the Act.
36
 The key question to answer in the 
opinion of the Court was, “does the product which Novartis claims as a patent qualify as a new 
product?”37 As a corollary of the question, it was crucial to enquire into whether the product in 
question had a characteristic feature that involves a technical advance over existing knowledge 
that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art (emphasis added).
38
 After 
affirming that the meaning of an invention is delimited by clauses (j) and (ja) of section 2 (1) of 
the Patents Act, the Court went further and asked the rhetorical question of whether a product 
qualifying as an invention under the relevant clauses of section 2(1) could have its patentability 
                                                          
31
  Novartis AG v India at para at para 17. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 On the other hand, the price of generic equivalents was about 10 000 Rupees per person per month.  
34
 Novartis case at para 19. 
35
 Ibid at paras 21 – 22. 
36
 Ibid at para 3. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Novartis case at para 3. 
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status questioned under section 3 (d).
39
 The Court did answer the rhetorical question in the 
course of the judgment.  
Clauses (j) and (ja) deleted section 5 of the previous Patents Act, which prohibited product 
patents in India, and at the same time, amendments were effected to section 3, introducing 
section 3 (d).
40
 The Court opined that in order to understand the purport and objects of the 
amendments, it was important to identify the mischief parliament wanted to check.
41
 The object 
which section 3(d) sought to achieve was to prevent ever greening, provide easy access to      
life-saving drugs to citizens and realise the constitutional obligation to provide good health care 
to citizens.
42
 
After a detailed exposition of India’s legislative history43 relating to intellectual property 
generally and patents in particular, the Supreme Court concluded that the law was passed in 
order to protect India’s policy space to afford good health to its citizens while complying with 
the basic prescripts of the TRIPS Agreement.
44
 The Court opined that patent protection of 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products might have the effect of putting life –saving 
medicines beyond the reach of a very large section of the population,
45
 hence the amendments 
were justified. 
The Court clarified the pertinent legal provisions as follows.
46
 The 1970 Patents Act as amended 
in 2005 requires that inventions be new (not anticipated) and involve an inventive step
47
 and be 
capable of being made or used in an industry.
48
 The requirement that an invention must involve 
an inventive step implies that there must be a feature that involves a technical advance as 
                                                          
39
 Novartis AG v India at para 3.  
40
 Novartis case para 24 – 26. 
41
 Ibid at para 26. 
42
 The Supreme Court at para 18 cited with approval the object which was spelt out by the Madras High Court in 
earlier litigation in the matter.  
43
 Novartis case at paras 31 – 46. 
44
 Ibid at para 66. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 At paras 88 – 89. 
47
 Section 2 (1) (j) (i) – (iii) of the Act. 
48
 Section 2 (1) (ac) of the Act. 
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compared to existing knowledge or having economic significance or both.
49
 Further, this feature 
should be such that the invention is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.
50
 
With specific reference to section 3 (d), the Court first of all observed that section three provides 
for “what are not inventions”. Under section 3(d), the following are not inventions within the 
meaning of the Act,-- 
(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement 
of the known efficacy of that substance or (emphasis in the original) the mere discovery of any new 
property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus 
unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant. 
From the above cited provisions of section 3(d) of the current Patents Act, the words in bold 
were grafted onto the pre-2005 section 3(d) of the Patents Act of the 2005 amendment of the 
law.
51
 The new section 3(d) adds the words in bold at the beginning of the provision; deletes the 
word ‘mere’ before ‘use’ in the old provision,52 and adds an explanation at the end of the 
clause.
53
 Very importantly, section 3(d) does have a detailed explanation that fully contextualises 
the extent of the exclusions.
54
 Citing Indian Parliamentary Debates, the Supreme Court observed 
that section 3(d) is targeted at 80% drugs and pharmaceutical products and 20% at agricultural 
chemicals.
55
 This was a bold admission by the Court that section 3(d) targets specific fields of 
technology (pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals) since nothing arose in the context of the 
section in other fields of invention.
56
 
                                                          
49
 Novartis case at para 89. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Novartis case para 95. 
52
 The full text of the old section 3 (d) is hereby reproduced verbatim for information as follows:  “(d) the mere 
discovery of any new property or mere new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, 
machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant.” 
53
 Ibid at para 96. 
54
 The explanation provides that for the sake of the clause in section 3 (d), “salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, 
metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives 
of known substances shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly in properties with 
regard to efficacy”.  
55
 Norvatis case at paras 97 – 98. 
56
 Ibid. There is a likelihood that section 3 (d) may be impugned at the WTO dispute settlement level on the ground 
that it is discriminatory in terms of targeting patents in specific fields of technology; contrary to the TRIPS 
Agreement, which provides in Article 27.1 that patents shall be available in all fields of technology, and that patent 
rights must be enjoyable “without discrimination” as to “the field of technology”. However, see for a counter 
argument Lewis-Lettington R and Banda C A Survey of Policy and Practice on the Use of Access to Medicines- 
Related TRIPs Flexibilities in Malawi (2004) at 19, in which the authors convincingly argue that such discrimination 
should be characterized as addressing problem areas rather than technical fields. 
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It was submitted on behalf of Novartis that section 3(d) was not an exception to patentability. 
Hence once a substance satisfies the requirements in section 2(1) (j) and (ja), it satisfies the 
requirements of patentability, consequently, section 3(d) did not apply to the Novartis case.
57
 
This submission was made notwithstanding the concession by counsel for Novartis that the aim 
of section 3(d) was to prevent trifling change and ever greening while allowing and encouraging 
incremental patenting.
58
 With specific reference to public health and the use of TRIPS 
flexibilities, Novartis argued that the best route was to make use of compulsory licenses,
59
 
revocation proceedings
60
 and multiple stages of patent opposition procedures
61
 rather than use 
section 3 (d).
62
 
The Supreme Court dismissed the above submissions on a number of grounds.
63
 Firstly, the court 
held that section 3(d) is not a provision ex majorie cautela (out of abundant caution) as was 
submitted on behalf of Novartis when taking into account the totality of the historical 
development that led to the enactment of the provision.
64
 Secondly, the Court cautioned that the 
relevant provision was enacted to deal with chemical patents and pharmaceuticals by setting 
additional qualifications for the patentability of such products.
65
 Thirdly, and very importantly, 
the Court clarified the position by stating that the door was wide open for true inventions but 
closed by section 3(d) for repetitive patenting or the extension of patent terms on spurious 
grounds.
66
 In coming to the conclusion that section 3(d) applied to the case, the Court 
emphasized that different standards are set for things of different classes to qualify as inventions; 
and for medical drugs and other chemical substances, the invention threshold is set higher.
67
 
It was also argued on behalf of Novartis that the production of Imatinib Mesylate from Imatinib 
in a free base form was a result of a step involving a technical advance when compared to current 
knowledge, thus bringing into existence a new substance.
68
 The Supreme Court rejected this 
                                                          
57
 Novartis case para 99. 
58
 At para 100. 
59
 In terms of Chapter XVI of the Act. 
60
 As provided for in sections 63, 64 and 65 of the Patents Act. 
61
 In terms of section 25 of the Patents Act. 
62
 Novartis case at para 101. 
63
 See paras 102 – 104. 
64
 At para 102. 
65
 At para 103. 
66
 Ibid.  
67
 Novartis case at 104. 
68
 At para 106. 
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argument and ruled that the production of Imatinib Mesylate did not constitute an invention as 
contemplated in the current law of India.
69
 In dismissing the submission, the Supreme Court 
remarked thus: 
“…we firmly reject the appellant’s case that Imatinib Mesylate is a new product and the outcome of an 
invention beyond the Zimmerman patent”.70 
Therefore, the specific product did not satisfy the test of an ‘invention’ as laid down in section 
2(1) (j) and (ja) of the Patents Act.
71
 
With specific reference to the beta crystalline form of Imatinib, it was submitted on behalf of 
Novartis that section 3 (d) applies if a substance is a new form of a known product having known 
efficacy, and ‘known’ in the specific context meant proven and well established while ‘known 
efficacy’ meant “efficacy established empirically and proven beyond doubt”.72 Citing with 
approval the case of Monsanto Company v Caramandel Indag Products (P) Ltd,
73
 the Supreme 
Court disagreed and rejected the submission on the basis that it was wrong in both fact and law.
74
 
The court sealed the dismissal of the submission with the powerful observation that the beta 
crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate is a new form of a known substance, namely, Imatinib 
Mesylate, with well-known efficacy.
75
 Therefore, the fact that the beta form of Imatinib was a 
product that claimed to enhance the form of its old counterpart triggered the application of 
section 3 (d).
76
 
Very specifically, the Court observed that in its application for a patent, Novartis averred that all 
the therapeutic qualities of the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate were also possessed by 
Imatinib in free base form. This, therefore, raised the question of whether an enhanced efficacy 
over a known substance as demanded by section 3 (d) existed.
77
 The Court held that the correct 
‘efficacy’ to consider in section 3(d) is ‘therapeutic efficacy’ in the specific context of 
medicines.
78
 The Court further noted that the test for enhanced therapeutic efficacy must be 
                                                          
69
 At para 133. 
70
 At para 157. 
71
 Ibid.  
72
 Novartis case at para 158. 
73
 Monsanto Company v Caramandel  Indag Products (P) Ltd (1986) 1 SCC 642. 
74
 Novartis case at para 159. 
75
 At para 161. 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Novartis case at para 163. 
78
 At 179 -180. 
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applied strictly.
79
 The Court, therefore, concluded that the physico-chemical properties of beta 
crystalline Imatinib Mesylate
80
 may be beneficial but do not add anything to therapeutic 
efficacy.
81
 On the contention submitted on behalf of Novartis that the beta crystalline form of 
Imatinib had increased bioavailability, the Court held that an increased bioavailability, in the 
absence of compelling proof, may not necessarily lead to an enhancement of therapeutic 
efficacy;
82
 hence Novartis’ bid for a patent for the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate had 
to fail.
83
 
In conclusion, the Court firmly ruled that the impugned form of Imatinib failed the test of 
invention as provided for in section 2(1) clauses (j) and (ja) and section 3(d) and it did not have 
enhanced therapeutic efficacy and Novartis’ appeal had to inevitably fail.84 
In order to avoid doubt and a possible misinterpretation of its judgment in light of the 
overflowing public interest in the matter both in India and Internationally, the Supreme Court 
issued a valedictory note of clarity.
85
 The Court held quite correctly, in my view that the import 
of its judgment was not to outlaw incremental inventions of chemical and pharmaceutical 
patents; but that only those chemical and pharmaceutical inventions that did not lead to the 
enhancement of therapeutic efficacy were barred by the judgment.
86
 This clarification is 
welcome for jurisprudential certainty and puts Indian patent law on the subject in a positive light. 
As anticipated, the decision was warmly welcomed by access groups and patent organisations in 
India and beyond. Given India’s key role in the global supply of affordable medicines, both 
patented and generic, there is no gainsaying that the decision has worldwide,
87
 including SADC, 
implications. 
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6.1.3 An Evaluation of the case and Lessons for SADC 
From the above narration of facts and the outline of the decision of the Supreme Court of India, 
it is important to emphasize what the court said and did not say.
88
 The court did not say a new 
form of a known compound could not be patented; neither did it say that improving 
bioavailability characteristics of a drug may not result in enhanced efficacy.
89
 Rather, the court 
left open the issue of whether enhanced efficacy refers narrowly to the curative effect of the drug 
or more broadly to improved safety and reduced toxicity of the drug.
90
 This clarity is important 
for allaying the fears of the US and like-minded countries that always conceive of the contextual 
application of TRIPS flexibilities as an affront to IP rights.  
For SADC, the way in which the Indian Supreme Court dealt with the application of section 3 (d) 
in the specific context should be encouraging. SADC members must be emboldened by this 
decision and embark on IP law reform that takes into account each member’s individual social 
and other needs. As previously mentioned, section 3 (d) is TRIPS-plus but it does not follow that 
TRIPS-plus IP legislative provisions are WTO-illegal.
91
 South Africa has taken the lead and has 
boldly stated in its Draft IP Policy that it will not tolerate incremental patenting and a 
proliferation of ever green patents.
92
 
The decision in Novartis is also important for other reasons,
93
 which are very relevant for the 
context obtaining in the SADC. 
Although the rejection of  Novartis’ claims was met with criticism from the pharmaceutical 
industry as shifting the balance too much in favour of the protection of public health,
94
 the fact 
that the decision did give prominence to public health issues over IP must be celebrated as 
relevant to the current SADC situation crying for reform. In the judgment itself, the Supreme 
Court in the course of narrating the history of IP law in India said that the Committee under the 
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chairmanship of Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar “took a fresh look at the law of patents to 
completely revamp and recast it to best sub-serve the (contemporary) needs of the country”.95 
Patent systems are not created in order to satisfy the interests of the inventor but rather to take 
care of the interests of the economy.
96
 The above observation rings very true for the SADC 
region which should revamp its patent laws by taking advantage of TRIPS flexibilities in the 
context of regional priorities. Indeed, the rejection of Novartis’ application was widely regarded 
as victory for public health, which is always in constant clash with the pharmaceutical industry.
97
 
The debate over the patentability of pharmaceuticals has been intense and in the majority of 
instances emotional to the extent of becoming political when the right to patent exclusivity is 
pitted against the right to public health.
98
 The Supreme Court of India displayed sensitivity to the 
potential conflict, both for social and economic reasons.
99
 The Court did, in actual fact, show that 
it was better aware of the conflict when it clearly recognized that the current IP system seeks to 
promote both innovation and social economic welfare of India, thus making the benefits of the 
patented invention available at reasonably affordable prices to the public.
100
 
It is worth buttressing the observations in the foregoing paragraph that the decision in Novartis 
relating to the interpretation of section 3(d) was well reasoned and that similar decisions have 
been handed down in other parts of the developed world in similar contexts.
101
 The main aim of 
section 3 (d) as previously explained is to prevent ever greening and avoid the issuance of 
patents that are of a low quality and add insignificant improvements to the state of the art.
102
 The 
concern with evergreen patents is not unique to India.
103
 It is also important to note that the 
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patent which Novartis sought to register in India was initially rejected by the US patent 
authorities for lack of novelty and only granted on appeal in May 2005.
104
 Ever greening is 
compounded by weak patent examination systems and chokes technological progress.
105
 In the 
SADC region, it has been reported elsewhere that a number of member states do not provide for 
a patent examination system, hence ever greening is likely to proliferate.
106
  
Nowhere else in the SADC region is the problem better illustrated than in South Africa. 
According to the Treatment Action campaign (TAC) and Médecins sans frontiers (MSF), in 
South Africa, Novartis managed to register a patent for a ‘new use’ of Imatinib which does not 
expire until 2022, even though the original patent was set to expire earlier in 2013.
107
 To treat 
chronic myeloid leukaemia for one year in South Africa using Novartis’ Imatinib costs over 
R387,000, a price out of reach for most South Africans and medical aid schemes. The stark irony 
is that what Novartis lost in the Supreme Court of India was gained in South Africa through the 
registration of a secondary new use form of Imatinib. This should be a lesson for fellow SADC 
members to seriously consider patent law reform that takes care of the loopholes in their laws 
relating to the requirements for patentability and the absence of a patent examination system. 
Patent thickets around a single molecule are particularly perverse in the pharmaceutical drug 
industry when “minor modifications such as changes in size, colour, dosage, delivery 
mechanisms and compositions are either simultaneously or subsequently patented”.108 India 
should be applauded for nipping this practice in the bud in the Novartis case as has been 
highlighted above.  
On the other hand, when pharmaceutical companies seek to maximize profits by patenting 
incrementally despite the obvious lack of novelty and inventive step, such behaviour, as was the 
case with Novartis in this instance, may fairly be characterized as patent abuse aimed at 
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registering patents over minor insignificant changes in order to extend monopoly prices.
109
 It is 
submitted that in addition to having robust legislative provisions along similar lines to India’s 
section 3(d), SADC members may react to such forms of abuse through the deployment of 
compulsory licenses for abuse, as ably provided for in most IP legislations of the member states. 
The Novartis judgment delivers the clearest and loudest message that the problem of low quality 
patents continues, aided and abetted by low quality patent examinations in the absence of       
pre- and post-grant patent opposition. May be it is now time to have many third world 
emulations  of India’s section 3(d), and such emulation seems to have already started in all 
earnest in Argentina, China and Thailand.
110
 The decision in Novartis must be celebrated taking 
into account how it testifies to the “flawed project of global harmonization of intellectual 
property laws”,111 which currently remains a pipedream which SADC and the developing world 
can transform into context-specific reality through what Musungu, Villanueva and Blasetti 
characterize as ‘South-South cooperation’.112  
The Novartis decision demonstrates that TRIPS flexibilities are not a paper tiger and can be used 
despite the pressure from big pharmaceutical companies and the US government.
113
 From the 
precedent set by the Novartis case, it is now possible for governments in developing countries 
(including the SADC) to set stringent patentability criteria for pharmaceuticals in order to 
facilitate the early entry of life-saving, low cost generics.
114
  
Because countries like India, China, Brazil and Thailand bring political and economic resources 
to bear in their interactions with multinational pharmaceutical companies and governments in the 
US and Europe,
115
 such strength may be used collaboratively to the benefit of other developing 
countries through South-South cooperation.
116
 It will be recalled that pharmaceutical product 
patents were not recognized in India between 1972 and 2005, which is a situation that enabled 
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the generic drug industry to flourish in India.
117
 This enabled India to supply the domestic market 
and external markets (both developed and developing) with affordable generic drugs.
118
 For 
example, it is reported that the entry of Indian firms in the global drug supply market
119
 lowered 
the prices of first-line triple combination antiretrovirals (ARVs), used in the treatment of HIV, 
from US$15 000 per person per annum in the year 2000 to less than US$120 in 2012.
120
 While 
the drug in dispute in the Novartis case had nothing to do with HIV/AIDS, this disease is very 
important for SADC, and had the Supreme Court interpreted section 3(d) in favour of Novartis or 
struck it down completely, this would have had a devastating effect on access to medicines 
generally and HIV/AIDS drugs in particular. The importance of this decision in an HIV/AIDS 
context is aptly captured by Loon Gangte, president of the New Delhi Network of Positive 
People (DNP+), interviewed by William New on the eve of the decision on the Novartis case 
when he said, “We rely on the availability of affordable AIDS drugs and other essential 
medicines made by the Indian generic manufacturers to stay alive and healthy”.121 
In concluding the discussion of the lessons for SADC from the Novartis case, it is important to 
refer to the role that was played by civil society groups to highlight the high stakes and 
importance of access to medicines. It has been reported that the outcome is consistent with the 
pattern in the 1990s of a de facto coalition between health advocates, NGOs and some 
governments, including India, desirous of limiting the impact of IP on access to medicines.
122
 It 
needs to be recalled that various advocacy groups, such as Médecins sans frontiers, Health Gap 
in the US, Delhi Network of Positive People and the Swiss-based Berne Declaration took part in 
lobbying against the Novartis case.
123
 Additionally, leading up to the Novartis AGM, 
demonstrations were held in a number of US cities such as Boston, New York and Washington, 
while in India, more demonstrations were held as a way of drawing attention to the Novartis 
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case.
124
 The role of civil society in promoting access to medicines has been mentioned and 
emphasized elsewhere,
125
 and need not be repeated here, save to say that apart from South 
Africa, most SADC countries have limited civil society activity, or like in Zimbabwe, selectively 
criminalise civil society activities. In the Novartis case, there was a coalition of civil society 
groups from within India and beyond. The success of such a coalition should be an informative 
thematic lesson for SADC in the context of regional IP reform to improve access to medicines.  
The Novartis case is therefore very important in the context of this study because it clearly shows 
that with a government that is sensitive to the peculiar public health needs of its people, it is 
possible to take full advantage of the TRIPS flexibilities aided by an independent judiciary and a 
robust civil society that works well with its global counterparts. The decision scored a victory for 
the generic industry in India by arresting incremental patenting and ever greening. The victory 
was achieved through the deployment of patentability provisions and opposition procedures in 
the Indian Patents Act. 
It is now appropriate to look at the problem of incremental patenting and how it can be remedied 
through the use of patent opposition procedures in a comparative jurisdiction with a different 
patent legislative history than India. Once again, like we did with the case of Novartis, thematic 
lessons will be extracted for the SADC access to medicines law reform project.  
6.2 Effective use of Patent Opposition in Thailand 
Thailand, the only developing country in South East Asia that did not fall under colonial rule,
126
 
is moving very fast into globalisation and international trade.
127
 Because Thailand’s economy is 
highly export oriented, this makes it very vulnerable to foreign pressures and external economic 
dynamics.
128
 As an example of this foreign pressure, in 1992 the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) pressurized and forced Thailand to introduce product patents
129
 
and pipeline pharmaceutical patent protection together with market exclusivity under a Technical 
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Safety Monitoring Programme.
130
 This programme enhanced the increasing drug prices and 
reduced the accessibility of essential drugs.
131
  
The current Thai Patent Law provides for parallel imports, bolar-type exceptions and compulsory 
licenses, TRIPS flexibilities which are not easy to take advantage of due to the conditions 
imposed by the law, which has been labelled as TRIPS-plus.
132
 While the limitation on access to 
drugs has been noticeable in all therapeutic classes in Thailand, the situation has been made dire 
by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, with specific reference to the antiretroviral drugs.
133
 
In Thailand, more than 400 000 people lived with HIV/AIDS in 2013.
134
 In the year 2000, more 
than 1 million people were reported to be HIV-infected and there were more than 100 000 sick 
people with full blown AIDS.
135
 Additionally, it was estimated that less than 5% of the Thai 
HIV/AIDS patients could afford double antiretroviral therapy.
136
 While several antiretroviral 
products are registered in Thailand, only azidothymidine (AZT) and Didanosine (DDI) are 
classified as essential drugs.
137
 Generic versions of AZT were readily available as early as 1993 
while there were no generics for DDI. This led to litigation by Thai activist groups in the case of 
Access Foundation and others v Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. Ltd and Others,(Didanosine case)
138
 
in which a post-grant patent challenge was brought against Bristol-Myers Squibb with positive 
access to medicines results.
139
 Because the post-grant challenge was made possible through 
Thailand’s progressive patent laws allowing for such, it is appropriate to first give an outline of 
the patent opposition in Thailand before outlining the facts of the case and the subsequent 
decision of the court. 
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6.2.1 A Short Primer on Patent Opposition in Thailand 
In terms of Thailand’s Patents Act,140 patents may be granted for invention patents,141 design 
patents
142
 and petty patents.
143
 An invention is defined in the Patents Act as “any discovery or 
invention resulting in a new product or process, or any improvement of a product or process”.144 
A design on the other hand refers to “any configuration of a product or composition of lines or 
colours which gives a special appearance to a product and can serve as a pattern for a product of 
industry or handicraft”.145 Petty patents are utility model patents and are granted to ‘inventions’ 
that are new and industrially applicable but lack an inventive step and the term thereof is six 
years.
146
 
In general terms, patent opposition may be characterized as a general term which refers to the 
various ways in which challenges to the validity of a patent, either during the patent application 
review period or after the patent has been granted may be brought. In Thailand, the patent 
opposition procedure was introduced in 1979 and the country’s pre-grant opposition procedure 
has proved to be greatly useful, as evidenced by several decisions of the Thai Board of 
Patents.
147
 The patent opposition procedure prevents undeserving patents from dominating the 
market and stifling competition.
148
 This improves patent quality and in the context of access to 
medicines, it ensures that generic medicines are introduced unhindered by patent extensions 
based on minor modifications of the original patent as soon as the patent expires. Additionally, 
opposition creates an incentive for third parties and competitors to make the opposition 
application accurate and convincing, thus aiding the patents offices by lessening the patent 
examination burden.
149
 In an environment with a vibrant patent opposition culture, patent 
litigation may be reduced and social welfare enhanced.
150
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The patent pre-grant opposition procedure
151
 in Thailand allows an interested person to oppose 
the registration of a patent within 90 days after the patent application has been published.
152
 
There are a number of safeguards built into the Thai law to allow patent opposition to proceed in 
a fair and just manner. If an opposition is rejected by the Director General of the Department of 
Intellectual Property, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Board of Patents.
153
 If the Board of 
Patents rejects the appeal, then it is possible to take the matter up with the Central Intellectual 
Property and International Trade Court within 60 days of the Board’s rejection.154 It is still 
possible, if the Court rejects the appeal, to take the matter further to the Intellectual Property and 
International Trade Division of the Supreme Court of Thailand for further recourse.
155
 
From the above outline of the different appeal routes, it is evident that Thailand has a good 
systematic patent law and takes patent opposition, for which there are robust provisions, very 
seriously. Therefore, in the context of this study, the patent system is worthy of study
156
 as an 
example of a patent opposition system from which other countries, including the SADC region 
can learn.  
The patent opposition process as outlined by the Patents Act is summarized in the schematic 
diagram below which is by and large self-explanatory. 
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Flowchart of the Thai Patent Opposition Process (Source: Puasiri W (2013):134) 
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6.2.1.1 Brief Explanatory note on the Flowchart 
The Thai Department of Intellectual Property publishes a list of new patents in the gazette and 
online
157
 every month. After a patent application has been published, anyone wishing to oppose 
may make notification of the opposition on the ground that he is entitled to the patent or the 
application does not comply with specific sections of the Patents Act.
158
 The opposing party who 
wishes to submit evidence supporting his opposition may do so within 30 days of the filing of 
notice of opposition, upon payment of a fee.
159
 The applicant for a patent has an opportunity to 
oppose the notice of opposition within 90 days of receipt of the notice from the officer. The 
applicant can supply evidence to his opposition by submitting a counterstatement accompanied 
by a modest fee.
160
 The Director General will then make a determination and inform the parties 
accordingly, and any aggrieved party may appeal the outcome in terms of the procedure outlined 
in 6.2.1 above. 
6.2.2 Examples of Successful Pre-grant Patent Opposition in the Pharmaceutical context in 
Thailand 
The most important category of opposition involves medicine because patented medicines are 
sold at high prices which the majority of sick people in Thailand cannot afford.
161
 Such patents 
are likely to have negative effects on other pharmaceutical companies, inventors, NGOs and 
individual families.
162
 Therefore, successful pharmaceutical oppositions by individual patients, 
government organisations and NGOs have secured justice, social benefits and the right to life by 
making it possible for patients to access affordable life-prolonging medication.
163
 
 
 
                                                          
157
 The online version is published on the department’s website available at 
http://www.ipthailand.go.th/ipthailand/index.php?lang=en (last visited 06/12/2013). 
158
 Namely sections 5 (lack of novelty, inventive step and utility); 9 (specific exclusions from patentability, such as 
plants and animals); 10 (inventor not qualified to apply for a patent); 11 (patent applied for in the course of 
employment which should designate employer as the applicant) and 14 (applicant does not qualify on basis of 
nationality or membership of convention country). 
159
 At the time of writing, the fee was 250 Thai Baht, almost equivalent to R80. 
160
 The fee is 50 Thai Baht, equivalent to about R16. 
161
 Puasiri above at 245. 
162
 Ibid.  
163
 Ibid. 
 239 
 
6.2.2.1 The Case of Thai Mixed Herbal Medicines 
Chulalongkorn University applied for a patent for a mixed herb formula for the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS patients but the application was opposed on the basis that the formula was well 
known in Thailand traditional medicine circles.
164
 Additionally, the formula had been published 
in several journals and patent applications, hence it was alleged that it was part of the state of the 
art.
165
 In a decision that was delivered in 2004,
166
 the Director General rejected the application 
for the patent on the basis that the formula had no inventive step or no new healing results after 
the mixing, thus upholding the opposition. 
The University appealed the decision of the Director General to the Board of Patents, which 
upheld the Director General’s decision for the same reasons.167 The successful opposition 
yielded positive results for HIV/AIDS patients who continued to make use of inexpensive Thai 
traditional herbs in an open market uninhibited by patent thickets. This decision is important for 
SADC in the context of indigenous knowledge and traditional medicine as these are issues which 
are not uniformly regulated in member countries.  
In the next two decisions, it was a government department, namely the Government 
Pharmaceutical Organisation (GPO), which filed patent oppositions against foreign 
pharmaceutical companies. 
6.2.2.2 Thai Government Department Opposition against Intermune Inc.
168
 
In this case, Intermune Inc., a global biopharmaceutical company with its headquarters in the US 
town of Brisbane, applied for a patent in Thailand for a method of treating chronic hepatitis C in 
patients who had previously failed to use antiretroviral therapy.
169
 Thailand’s Government 
Pharmaceutical Organisation (GPO) opposed the application on the basis that it was a patent for 
a method of treatment of a disease or ailment, contrary to the provisions of existing patent law.
170
 
                                                          
164
 Puasiri above at 245 – 246. 
165
 Ibid.  
166
 Decision of Thai Board of Patents No. 10/2547. 
167
 Puasiri above at 246. 
168
 2010 Decision of the Thai Board of Patents N0. 1/2553. 
169
 Puasiri above at 247. 
170
 Section 9(4) of Thailand’s Patents Act prohibits the patenting of “methods of diagnosis, treatment or cure of 
human and animal diseases”. This provision seems to be based on Article 27 (3) (a) of the TRIPS Agreements which 
urges WTO members to exclude from patentability “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment 
of humans or animals”. 
 240 
 
While the Director General rejected the opposition, the Board of Patents upheld it and ruled quite 
correctly, in my view, that the specific application ran afoul of section 9(4) of the Patents Act. 
The pertinent section, which prohibits the patenting of methods of treating disease, was truly 
written for the public benefit.
171
 
6.2.2.3 Thai Government Department Opposition against Novartis’ Organic Compound 
In this case, Novartis International AG, applied for an invention patent in Thailand for the 
integration of an organic compound, but the GPO opposed the application on the basis that it did  
not relate to a new invention since it had been disclosed in a US patent application
172
 four years 
ago.
173
 
Although Novartis countered the opposition by saying that the invention had an inventive step 
and was different from the US patent, the Director General went ahead and rejected the 
application for a patent on the basis of the GPO opposition.
174
 Novartis appealed the decision of 
the Director General to the Board of Patents, arguing that the product for which the patent was 
applied for was unique in that its integration yielded unexpected results thus producing certain 
inhibitors that were very beneficial in combatting blood pressure.
175
 The Board of Patents ruled 
that in addition to the alleged invention not being new in light of an earlier US patent, the 
unexpected result claimed by Novartis did not exist since no improved result was found. For that 
reason, Novartis’ application for a patent had to fail and the opposition succeeded.  
In all the cases briefly outlined above, pre-grant patent opposition proved to be an effective tool 
with which to monitor patent quality. To sum up, the opposition process is necessary since it 
unearths patents of a poor quality and also protects social benefits, such as the right to health. It 
is appropriate to recommend that developing countries, particularly SADC members must adopt 
patent opposition procedures. Had the patents not been opposed and granted, this would have had 
a negative effect on access to medicines. Furthermore instituting revocation proceedings would 
have added more legal red tape and the usual frustrations that usually accompany litigation. The 
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lessons for SADC law reform in sympathy to access to medicines are axiomatic; it is now time to 
adopt post grant patent opposition in the same was as it was recently done in Botswana.
176
 
In the context of access to medicines, one major thing in common between Thailand and most 
SADC countries is the prevalence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Therefore, a detailed discussion 
of a successful patent opposition in the context of the pandemic is very appropriate in this 
chapter. The Didanosine case, decided by the Thai Central Intellectual Property and International 
Trade Court
177
 in 2002 is very important in the Didanosine case Thai HIV/AIDS struggle and has 
some useful lessons for SADC. Following is a discussion of the Didanosine case. 
6.3 Effective Post-grant Opposition: the Didanosine Patent Case
178
 
The most widely recognized case of patent opposition which was brought to Thailand’s Central 
Intellectual Property and International Trade Court in 1999 involved a suit against the 
department of Intellectual Property with respect to the grant of a patent to Bristol Myers Inc. for 
the antiretroviral drug Didanosine (DDI).
179
 
It is important to write that the original patent application by Bristol Myers for DDI did not 
attract any pre-grant opposition for unexplained reasons.
180
 
6.3.1 The Factual Background to the Dispute 
The plaintiffs were the AIDS Access Foundation, an NGO advocating for the rights of people 
living with HIV/AIDS in Thailand, and two people living with HIV/AIDS while the defendants 
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were Bristol Myers Inc. and Thailand’s Department of Intellectual Property, which was later 
summoned by the court as a co-defendant.
181
 
Bristol Myers Inc. applied for a patent for DDI,
182
 a reverse transcriptase inhibitor effective 
against HIV/AIDS and used in combination with other antiretroviral (ARV) drugs.
183
 The patent 
claim specified that the invention was a “better formula for oral use of Dydeoxy Purine 
Nuecleocide” and stipulated the dosage as “from about 5 to 100mg per dose”.184 The Department 
of Intellectual Property granted the patent with the specified dosage but later ‘conspired’185 with 
Bristol Myers Inc. to intentionally delete the phrase “from about 5 to 100 mg per dose” and left 
the patent claim widely encompassing.
186
 This deletion had the effect of allowing Bristol Myers 
to produce HIV/AIDS medication of whatever dosage, which negatively affected the rights of 
others to use the medicine.
187
  
6.3.2 The Parties’ Contentions 
The plaintiffs claimed that the amendment was unlawful and that the Court must compel Bristol 
Myers to revert to the old dosage stipulation.
188
 The plaintiffs further argued that without the 
stipulation, Bristol Myers’ patent would be too broad to the extent of severely restricting access 
to affordable medication in violation of the rights of HIV-positive people in Thailand.
189
 It was 
further submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that Bristol Myers must pay for the cost of 
publishing the amended patent claim in five daily newspapers for 10 days.
190
 
Bristol Myers in its defence argued that it had no legal relationship with the plaintiffs; hence the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to apply to the court for the amendment sought.
191
 The plaintiffs 
therefore, did not have the authority to take the legal action they sought to take and furthermore, 
they had no authority to force Bristol Myers to advertise the amended patent in the daily 
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newspapers as claimed.
192
 Bristol Myers claimed to have inverted a ‘better formula for oral use 
of Deydeoxy Purine Nuecleocide’ as categorized in the patent specification and that the 
invention had a positive effect on the treatment of HIV/AIDS.
193
 Bristol Myers argued that the 
improved product should be regarded as a positive contribution and advantage to people with 
HIV/AIDS, including the plaintiffs.
194
 Bristol Myers submitted that it had complied with the 
relevant Thai laws by submitting the application for a patent, advertising the application and 
submitting it for examination. Additionally, Bristol Myers had effected an amendment to its 
application, which amendment ought to be regarded as not being material to the invention.
195
 The 
fact that the amendment was accepted by the Department of Intellectual Property deemed the 
invention legal.
196
 Bristol Myers sought to rely on section 36 bis of the Patents Act, which 
provides that the scope of an invention shall be determined by the claims, and reasoned that the 
amendment did not adversely affect the plaintiffs because the portion for use must be in 
accordance with what is detailed in the claims.
197
  
The Department of Intellectual Property (DIP), which was cited as a co-defendant, argued that 
the plaintiffs had no locus standi in the matter because they were not manufacturers of 
medicines.
198
 The DIP further argued that the two other plaintiffs, both of them HIV/AIDS 
sufferers, could choose other medicines to cure HIV/AIDS without having to use DDI.
199
 The 
DIP also argued that the case did not fall into any of the class of cases stipulated in the law where 
certain categories of injured or interested parties are entitled to apply for an amendment of a 
defendant’s patent.200 The DIP also submitted that the fact that the dosage specification of ‘from 
about 5 to 100 mg per dose’ was removed from the specification did not imply that Bristol Myers 
was entitled to manufacture ARV medicine of any dosage as claimed by the three plaintiffs.
201
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The DIP argued that the defendant’s claims, as delimited by section 36 bis were narrow enough 
to show that only medicine prescribed in the details of the invention would be manufactured.
202
 
6.3.3 The Decision of the Court and Ratio
203
 
In the course of delivering its judgment, the court identified and settled the following issues 
which it characterised as in dispute:
204
 
 Whether the plaintiffs’ rights had been infringed, and whether they were interested 
parties entitled to make the claim; 
 Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to force the defendant to register the amendment to 
the patent claim and pay the cost of advertising the amendments in daily newspapers; 
 Whether the amendment to the patent claim by the defendant, which was sanctioned by 
the co-defendant ought to be regarded as material, and whether it was lawful; and 
 Whether rights of a patent holder are limited to those stipulated in the patent claim, or 
details of the invention must also be considered as part of the scope of such rights. 
 
With specific reference to the issue of locus standi, the court reasoned that the first plaintiff, 
AIDS Access Foundation was a juristic person in the category of a foundation with the objective 
of promoting physical and mental welfare of HIV/AIDS patients as well as to cooperate with 
other non-profit organisations.
205
 The other plaintiffs were categorized by the court as patients 
infected by HIV/AIDS. Having so characterised the plaintiffs, the court went further and 
reasoned that the defendant as the holder of the patent had an absolute power to prevent others 
from seeking to benefit from DDI, whether to manufacture, use, sell or import the medicine into 
the Kingdom of Thailand.
206
 The court, therefore, ruled that despite the plaintiffs not being in the 
business of manufacturing pharmaceuticals, they were interested parties to varying degrees and 
in appropriate contexts.
207
 Therefore, the plaintiffs were held to have locus standi in the matter.  
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The second issue that the court disposed of was the question of whether or not the amendment 
made to the patent specification by the defendant, which amendment was sanctioned by the     
co-defendant, was material and lawful. The amendment in question was the deletion from the 
specification of the words “from about 5 to 100 mg per dose”. Citing from the relevant provision 
of the Patents Act,
208
 which defines a product ‘invention’ as the creation or development that 
results in a new product, the court came to the conclusion that medicine which may be granted 
patent status may, therefore, be the invention of a new medicine product.
209
  
Having thus reasoned, the court came to the conclusion that the formula or the determination of 
dosage of the medicine is an essential part of the invention of medicine products.
210
 The court 
noted that amendments to patent claims are allowed by the law
211
 if such amendments are not 
material to the invention.
212
 The phrase “material to the invention” refers to both details of the 
invention and the patent claim, not only one of them.
213
 The court, therefore, reasoned that the 
deletion of the phrase “from 5 to 100 mg per dose” from the original patent claim changed the 
materiality of the claim resulting in the patentee receiving protection for an unlimited dosage, 
going beyond the scope originally stipulated.
214
 The amendment was therefore illegal and ran 
afoul of section 20 of the Patents Act, which provides that an applicant for such an amendment 
must comply with the rules and procedures stipulated in the Ministerial Regulations.
215
 
The final issue that fell for determination was whether the plaintiffs could force the defendant to 
register the amendment to the claim and pay the costs of advertising the amendment in the daily 
newspapers. The court ruled that in cases where the law does not prohibit a particular 
amendment, the plaintiffs are entitled to amend the patent claim and if the defendant fails to 
register the amendment, the co-defendant, the DIP, shall amend the patent claim of the defendant 
pursuant to the judgment of the court.
216
 The court, therefore, held that the request of the 
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plaintiffs that the phrase “from 5 to 100 mg per dose” be inserted in the defendant’s patent claim 
must be upheld.
217
 The reason for this decision was that members of the public were only aware 
of the dosage as per the phrase, in terms of the patent that was advertised; and that when the 
phrase was removed, this was not advertised and strictly speaking, was not in the public 
domain.
218
 
On the narrow question of whether or not the plaintiffs could force the defendant to advertise the 
amendment and pay for it in the local newspapers, the court held that such a request had no legal 
basis and could not be upheld.
219
 
Accordingly, the court ruled that Bristol Myers and the DIP were required to implement the 
amendment of the invention and reinstate the original dosage formula of “from 5 to 100 mg per 
dose”.220 
6.3.4 An Evaluation of the Case and Lessons for SADC  
It is important to note that in this case, patent opposition was used to protect the rights of      
HIV-positive Thai citizens to access affordable medicines. The right to health did triumph over 
patent monopoly which would have had deleterious effects on access to medicines due to the 
broad patent claims resulting from of the deletion of the phrase “from 5 to 100 mg per dose”.  
In the course of delivering its judgment, the court remarked that medicines are important for 
human beings and very distinct from other products which consumers may or may not choose for 
consumption.
221
 The rights to life and the health of the human being were cited as more 
important than any other property rights including IP.
222
 The court referred to the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
223
 and emphasized that the TRIPS Agreement must be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner which is supportive of public health, especially the 
promotion and access to medicines for all.
224
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By citing the Doha Declaration, the judgment shows that Thailand is not afraid of interpreting its 
law in a manner which is supportive of the country’s own enforcement of the right to health, and 
by extension access to medicines for all. This should be good news for the SADC region, which 
is urged to consider domesticating the Doha Declaration and other TRIPS flexibilities along the 
lines of Botswana’s Industrial Property Act. The reason why the Thai court in this case was able 
to apply the provisions of the Doha Declaration and come to an appropriate decision promoting 
access to medicines and the right to health was that the relevant municipal law incorporated the 
aspects of the Doha Declaration. The lesson for SADC in this context is short and simple – 
patent law reform incorporating TRIPS flexibilities and the Doha Declaration is long overdue.  
In resolving the issue of interested parties, it is important that the court ruled that those living 
with HIV/AIDS could be injured by a broad patent blocking access to affordable medicine; 
hence they qualified as interested parties.
225
 It is submitted that it is sound legal reasoning to rule 
that those in need of medicines as well as those who fight for their rights, such as the AIDS 
Access Foundation, are interested parties to the granting of a patent. This should encourage civil 
society organisations
226
 and people living with HIV/AIDS and other prevalent diseases in the 
SADC region to challenge the grant of patents limiting access to medicines at both the pre- and 
post-grant stages of the patent application process. 
From an access to medicines perspective, the court ruled that the amendment to the patent claim 
was unlawful because the removal of the dosage limitation expanded the scope of protection way 
beyond what was initially described and disclosed to the public in the original patent 
document.
227
 The ruling on this point is important in that by ordering that the defendant revert to 
the original dosage formula, this meant that non-patented DDI dosage forms could then be 
produced by generic manufacturers, with obvious positive outcomes for access to medicines. The 
decision is, therefore, very important, not just in the access to medicines fight in Thailand, but 
also in other developing countries as it affirms the fact that it is possible for public interest 
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groups to challenge patents.
228
 In Thailand, civil society groups have been very crucial in 
reaffirming the human right to health by challenging the actions of big pharmaceutical 
companies
229
 and the belligerent actions of powerful governments such as the US government.
230
 
It will be recalled that in 1996, the generic production of Didanosine was blocked by Bristol 
Myers against the background of a very expensive branded version of the drug.
231
 The US 
pharmaceutical industry had been complaining since 1975 that lack of product patent protection 
in Thailand was a market barrier to entry in Thailand, leading the US government to put pressure 
on Thailand to introduce stronger patent protection or face trade sanctions.
232
 Thailand 
capitulated and introduced a series of reforms which entrenched the rights of multinational 
pharmaceutical patent holders at the expense of public health and investment in the local 
pharmaceutical manufacturing market.
233
 In 1999, the Thai GPO, supported by several local 
NGOs,
234
 submitted a request for a compulsory license to the DIP for DDI.
235
 In addition, the 
activists submitted a letter in the year 2000 to the US government, asking it not to retaliate if a 
compulsory license was granted.
236
 Despite the US government’s indication in its response that it 
would not oppose a compulsory license issued in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, the 
fear of retaliation still lingered on and the use of a compulsory license was rejected.
237
 
The narrative outlined above relating to Thailand is very relevant to the SADC situation. In 
Chapter Seven below, one of the problems identified as militating against access to medicines is 
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the lack of political will on the part of SADC members to implement TRIPS flexibilities and use 
them effectively to access medicines. Secondly, due to the weak economies and an over 
dependence on donor money in some SADC countries, the fear of retaliation remains real in the 
region. The Thai experience shows that with a proactive civil society, the decision to actualize 
TRIPS flexibilities may have to be made by the judiciary which is an independent institution 
from government. If the courts are truly independent, the government can amend the laws which 
will be independently and contextually applied by the courts, thus neutralizing the fear of 
retaliation. In any event, the only envisaged form of retaliation would be a listing on the US 
government’s Section 301 Watch list; action which does not seem to be WTO-legal to start off 
with and may be actionable in terms of the dispute settlement process of the WTO.
238
  
The lesson for SADC, therefore, is that member states must, in addition to embarking on IP law 
reform in the context of making their laws TRIPS-compliant, also strengthen the judicial process 
so that courts can effectively protect the right to health by passing judgments whose net effect 
would be the achievement of access to medicines for all, as optimistically provided for in the 
Doha Declaration.  
By 2005, developing country WTO members were expected to be fully compliant with the 
TRIPS Agreement;
239
 and without generic competition, the cost of all new medicines would 
largely depend on the price set by the patent holder.
240
 This case highlights the problems faced 
by developing countries in the specific context and shows that intergovernmental organisations 
like WIPO should scale up their efforts of integrating developing countries into the TRIPS 
community by aiding them in implementing patent protection, including patent examination. 
This assistance must also address developing countries’ challenges emanating from using the 
Doha Declaration and other TRIPS flexibilities. 
Because Thailand has very clear provisions on pre- and post-grant patent opposition which have 
been applied in real disputes in the local courts, it is a good jurisdiction for SADC to learn from. 
The thematic lessons are similar to those drawn from India since patent opposition will in all 
likelihood lead to improved patent quality if successful. Just like in the case of Novartis AG v 
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India, weak patents with an incremental effect were stopped in their tracks and patent quality 
was enhanced in favour of access to medicines. 
6.4 Anti-Counterfeiting Laws as Access to medicines Barriers: The Kenyan Experience as 
Reflected in P.A.O and Others v Attorney General and Another
241
 
The case discussions and analysis relating to Indian and Thailand above touched on pertinent 
aspects of IP law reform in order to keep underserving patents out of the system. It was shown 
that underserving and weak patents can be barriers to access to medicines if requirements for 
patentability are not made stringent and patent opposition procedures are weak or non-existent.  
This section of the chapter focuses on a slightly different theme in that it deals with a case of law 
reform that initially had no direct bearing on traditional IP issues but was linked thereto by its 
effects on access to medicines. In this section, therefore, I discuss a Kenyan case that highlighted 
an impediment to access to medicines  in the form of anti-counterfeiting legislation whose full 
implementation was likely to have a negative effect on the right to life, human dignity and health 
by limiting access to medicines generally and generics in particular had the Kenyan High Court 
not intervened. The case is very relevant to the aims and objectives of this study because it 
highlights the link between the rights to life, human dignity and health in the context of access to 
affordable essential medicines with particular emphasis on generic drugs.  
6.4.1 The Factual and other Relevant Background to the case 
In 2009, three Kenyans living with HIV/AIDS, namely, Patricia Osero Ochieng (P.A.O), 
Maurice Atieno, and Joseph Munyi approached the Kenyan High Court with a petition 
expressing an apprehension that their rights to life, health and human dignity under the Kenyan 
constitution were threatened by the Anti-Counterfeit Act of 2008,
242
 specifically sections 2, 32 
and 34 thereof.
243
 The parties viewed the legislation as affecting or likely to affect their access to 
affordable and essential drugs including generic drugs thereby infringing their fundamental 
rights as categorized above.
244
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The Anti-Counterfeit Act was enacted to combat counterfeit trade and its objects are broadly 
spelt out as “to prohibit trade in counterfeit goods, to establish the Anti-Counterfeit Agency, and 
for connected purposes”.245 The Anti-Counterfeiting Agency came into being in 2010.246 The Act 
also provides for what constitutes counterfeiting offenses and lists the accompanying 
penalties.
247
 
The AIDS Law Project, an NGO registered in Kenya also joined in the proceedings as an 
interested party in support of the petition in 2010,
248
 while Mr Anand Grover, the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur for Health also joined in as an interested party in 2011 in the capacity of 
amicus curiae.
249
 The first respondent was the Attorney General of Kenya while Kenya’s       
Anti-counterfeit Agency, which was represented by its Board Chairman, Mr Allan George Njogu 
Kamau, joined in the petition as the second respondent.
250
  
The petitioners had won a temporary reprieve against the application of sections 2, 32 and 34 of 
the Act in 2010 when Justice Wendoh granted temporary orders to suspend the application of the 
relevant sections pending the finalisation of the matter on the return date.
251
 The final judgement 
in the matter was delivered by the High Court in Nairobi (per Justice Mumbi Ngugi) on 4 April 
2012 and this judgement is the subject of discussion in this section of the chapter. 
The petitioners sought orders on the following specific prayers:
252
 
 A declaration that the fundamental rights to life, human dignity and health as protected in 
Articles 26(1), 28 and 43 of the Kenyan Constitution encompass access to affordable 
essential medicines and drugs including generic drugs;
253
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 A declaration to the effect that in so far as the Anti-Counterfeit Act limited accessibility 
to affordable and essential drugs including generics for HIV/AIDS, it infringed on the 
petitioners’ right to life, human dignity and health;254 
 
 A declaration that the enforcement of the Act in as far as it affected access to affordable 
and essential medicines particularly generics was a breach of the petitioners’ right to life, 
human dignity and health as protected by the constitution;
255
 and 
 
 And any other orders, directions, declarations and remedies as the High Court could 
deem fit and just in the circumstances.
256
  
6.4.2 The Parties’ Contentions  
As an elaboration to the four items outlined above as specific prayers brought before the High 
Court, other specific averments were also made by the petitioners.
257
 Firstly, the petitioners had 
the apprehension that in the event of the Act being applied and enforced as it is, they would be 
denied their right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health because HIV/AIDS drugs 
would be expensive when generics are barred by the Act.
258
  
The petitioners alleged that the Anti-Counterfeit Act posed a serious danger to persons living 
with HIV/AIDS because of the potential negative effects likely to arise out of the application of 
sections 2,
259
 32
260
 and 34.
261
 They further alleged that the state had failed to acknowledge and 
exempt generic drugs and medicine from the definition in section 2, thus leaving generic drugs 
vulnerable to classification as counterfeit goods.
262
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Leaving the definition as it is effectively bans the manufacture and importation of generics into 
Kenya and does not take into account the state’s obligations in terms of the relevant 
legislation.
263
 It was also submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the state had not clarified the 
legal position availed by the Industrial Property Act, which allows for exceptions necessary to 
make generic drugs available in Kenya.
264
 The petitioners further argued that the application of 
the Act would infringe on their right to life, human dignity and health as guaranteed in the 
Kenyan Constitution.
265
   
The Aids Law project (ALP) as an interested party made submissions that sought to rely 
extensively on the constitution, namely that the Act infringed on the right to life, human dignity 
and health for persons living with HIV/AIDS. Additionally, the ALP argued that the legislation 
had the potential to violate the constitutional right to the protection of family life.
266
 The ALP 
also submitted arguments premised on the protection of the rights of the child wherein it argued 
that since the government relies heavily on generic drugs for its public health programmes, 
limiting access to generics would lead to more child-headed households.
267
 
The amicus curiae submitted his arguments in fulfilment of his mandate as the U.N Special 
Rapporteur on Health, who is enjoined to make recommendations on issues surrounding the right 
to health, particularly as it relates to laws, policies and practices that may be obstacles to the 
realisation of the right to health.
268
 The Special Rapporteur submitted that despite the Act’s noble 
objective of prohibiting trade in counterfeit goods, it was likely that in its current written form 
then, it would endanger the rights to life and health as protected in the Kenyan Constitution.
269
 
The definition of counterfeit goods in that Act
270
 encompassed generic drugs in Kenya and 
elsewhere and was likely to adversely affect the manufacture, sale, and distribution of generic 
drugs.
271
 Having submitted that the definition of counterfeit goods in the Act conflated generic 
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medicines with counterfeit medicines, the Special Rapporteur came to the conclusion that such 
conflation was likely to have a serious and adverse impact on the availability, affordability and 
accessibility of low-cost high quality medicines.
272
 The Rapporteur then concluded that such a 
situation could lead to the seizure and prohibition of medicines that have been approved by 
Kenyan regulatory authorities on the basis that they are counterfeit.
273
 This unjustified limitation 
on the use of generic drugs by Kenyans would amount to a violation of the right to health as 
guaranteed by the constitution and international treaties.
274
 The Rapporteur went further on to 
submit, on the basis of international obligations concerning IP law and otherwise that such a 
violation would be unjustifiable.
275
 
Following is a summary of the respondent’s case. By passing the HIV and Aids Prevention Act 
in 2006, the government of Kenya showed that it cared for its people and the term ‘generic 
drugs’ in the Anti-Counterfeiting legislation should not be construed as synonymous with 
‘counterfeit drugs’.276 In terms of the constitutional right to health, the duties of the state include 
inter alia ensuring that people attain the highest standard of health care, enjoy the right to life and 
the enactment of legislation such as the Act in dispute was one of the ways of fulfilling the 
duty.
277
 The petitioners’ fears were unfounded because the definition of counterfeit in the Act as 
it relates to medicines is very clear and specific and does not give rise to any form of 
ambiguity.
278
 There was no need to expressly provide for exemption of generic drugs in the Act 
because section 2 provides that nothing in it shall derogate from existing provisions in the 
Industrial Property Act, and that in the event of a conflict, the provisions of the Industrial 
Property Act would prevail.
279
 Finally, the respondent submitted that the application of the 
impugned provisions of the Act would not lead to a violation of rights and that granting the order 
as prayed for would lead to a breach and not the protection of the petitioners’ fundamental 
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rights.
280
 The respondent’s conclusion was that the petition was nothing more than an abuse of 
the court process and such abuse had to be dismissed.
281
 
6.4.3 Matters that fell to be decided by the Court 
After an extensive outline of the socio-economic context of the petition,
282
 the court summarised 
the crux of the matter and identified the issues that fell to be decided. The crux of the dispute was 
therefore, reduced to a determination of two crucial questions,
283
 namely: 
 Did the state, by enacting section 2 of the Anti-Counterfeiting Act in its present form, and 
by providing the enforcement provisions in sections 32 and 34, violate its duty to ensure 
that conditions are in place under which citizens can lead a healthy life? and 
 
 Will these provisions deny the petitioners’ access to essential medicines and thereby 
violate their constitutional rights under Articles 26(1), 28 and 43(1), as well as section 53 
with regard to the rights of children? 
6.4.4 The Judgment of the High Court 
The judge, taking into account the submissions and counter arguments of the parties, analysed 
the definition of the provisions of the Anti-Counterfeiting Act
284
 and came to the firm conclusion 
that the definition of ‘counterfeit’ in section 2 of the Act was likely to be read as including 
generic medication, thus agreeing with the submission of the amicus on the issue.
285
  
While noting that the respondents had argued that the intention of the Anti-Counterfeit Act was 
to safeguard the petitioners and similar situated rejoinders against the use of counterfeit 
medicines, the judge, however, concluded that a reading of the Act showed a different intention. 
Citing from sections 32,
286
 33
287
 and 34
288
 of the Act, the High Court observed that the tenor and 
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object of the Act is to protect the IPRs of individuals.
289
 The court reasoned that had the Act’s 
intention been to safeguard consumers from counterfeit medicine, then it would have laid greater 
emphasis on standards and quality.
290
 Therefore the court reasoned that the Act was not meant to 
protect the rights of the petitioners and members of the general public from substandard 
medicine, rather, it prioritised the enforcement of IP rights in dealing with counterfeit 
medicines.
291
 To buttress this point, the judge remarked that the protection of consumers “may 
have been a collateral issue in the minds of the drafters of the Act”.292 
Coming to the right to life, dignity and health, the judge remarked that securing these rights in 
situations like those faced by the petitioners who suffer from HIV/AIDS would not be possible 
using a vague proviso which may lead to the enforcement the law without having a clear 
understanding of the differences between generic and counterfeit medicine.
293
 The judge 
concluded on this point that it would be an abdication of responsibility on the part of the state, 
with specific reference to the right to life, human dignity and health to include in legislation 
ambiguous provisions impacting on the access to essential medicines, especially when the 
interpretation of the ambiguities remains squarely within the domain of IPR holders and customs 
officials.
294
 To drive the point home, the judge firmly held that there can be no room for 
ambiguity where the right to life and the health of the petitioners and many other Kenyans who 
are affected by HIV/AIDS are at stake.
295
  
The court disagreed with the respondent on the point of the applicability of the Industrial 
Property Act, namely that the Act would prevail over the Anti-Counterfeiting Act. The court held 
that because the Anti-Counterfeiting Act, having been promulgated later than the Industrial 
Property Act,
296
 and, therefore, being later in time, would prevail over the Industrial Property Act 
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in the event of a conflict, hence the proviso in section 2 would not be of much help to the 
petitioners.
297
 Therefore, should the Anti-Counterfeiting Act be implemented as it was, it would 
pose a danger to the right of the petitioners to access essential medicines which they require daily 
in order to live.
298
 The court, therefore, reasoned that the right to access essential medicines was 
of the greatest importance and more critical than the protection of intellectual property rights that 
the Act sought to protect. Therefore, the right to life, dignity and health of the petitioners in this 
case was held to take precedence over intellectual property rights.
299
 This pronouncement by the 
judge was precedent-setting and very relevant to the aims and objectives of this study, which 
sought to strike a balance between IPRs and access to medicines in the context of the right to 
health. As the cliché goes, “the Kenyan High Court has spoken”. 
Citing from General Comment N0.17,
300
 the judge went on to hold that while IPRs should be 
protected, their protection must not jeopardise fundamental rights such as the right to life.
301
 The 
judge was of the firm view that IPRs must give way to the fundamental rights of the citizens in 
the position of the petitioners.
302
 
The judge summarised the essence of her judgment by highlighting the following issues: Firstly, 
she ruled that sections 2, 32 and 34 of the Act threatened to violate the right to life, human 
dignity and the health of the petitioners as protected by the relevant laws.
303
 Secondly, she 
emphasised that the above specific rights encompass access to affordable and essential medicines 
including generic medicines.
304
 Thirdly, to the extent that the Act severely limited or threatened 
access to affordable medicines and essential drugs including generics for HIV/AIDS, it infringed 
on the right to life, human dignity and health.
305
 Fourthly, the judge ruled that the enforcement of 
the Act was a breach of the petitioners’ rights to life, human dignity and health in so far as it 
affected access to affordable medicines and generics.
306
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On a disappointing note, the court in its final analysis urged rather than ordered the state to 
reconsider section 2 of the Anti-Counterfeit Act in light of its constitutional obligation to ensure 
that citizens have access to the highest attainable standard of health and make appropriate 
amendments to ensure that the rights of the petitioners and others who depend on generic drugs 
are not put in jeopardy.
307
 
6.4.5 Analysis of the case and Lessons for SADC 
For purposes of the objectives of this study, this case is important in that it unequivocally states 
that IPRs are important but such importance must be subordinated to the rights to life, human 
dignity and health.
308
 It has been argued by some commentators
309
 that the decision effectively 
settles the debate about the supremacy of human rights over intellectual property rights and by 
extension private interests including commercial interest.
310
 
Many countries in the SADC region have constitutions providing for the right to health hence it 
would be easy for them to protect access to medicines basing such protection on the right to 
health. For example, in South Africa, the right to health is characterised as one of the 
fundamental rights, imposing an obligation on the state to take progressive steps to realise this 
right within its available resources.
311
 The Constitution of Zimbabwe also provides for very 
elaborate provisions on the right to health
312
 along similar lines to the constitution of South 
Africa, but goes a step backwards by specifying that the right may only be enjoyed by citizens 
and permanent residents.
313
 On the other hand, the same constitution progressively provides for 
the right to access to health care services for all persons with chronic illnesses.
314
 The decision in 
the POA case, therefore, reassures those SADC members that are reluctant to legislate 
progressively to access generic drugs that the rights to life, human dignity and health strongly 
favour derogation from patent rights in favour of patient rights. 
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The rights-based approach used in this case in the context of potential violations to the rights to 
life, human dignity and health augurs very well for this study. The court cited decisions of 
Kenyan courts,
315
 other African courts
316
 and International law
317
 and came up with a sound and             
well-reasoned judgment with useful lessons for other jurisdictions including SADC. The same 
rights-based approach is recommended as a solution to the SADC access to medicines problems 
in Chapter Seven below. Therefore, this case raises the important issue of access to medicines as 
a fundamental human right, against the background of universal consensus that access to 
medicines constitutes an integral part of the right to health.
318
 
The fact that the court ruled that ambiguous anti-counterfeiting legislation may lead to 
unfavourable results for access to affordable essential drugs must be applauded.
319
 While 
counterfeit medicines are bad from an IPR holder and the patient point of view, generic drugs are 
not necessarily fake drugs. Confusing generic drugs with fake drugs will surely lead to seizures 
of genuine generics with obvious negative implications for access to medicines.
320
 This 
apprehension is starkly illustrated by the seizure by customs officials in EU countries of over 20 
consignments of legitimate generic medicines transiting through the EU since late 2008.
321
 In the 
EU case, despite the medicines, destined for treatment sites in Africa and South America, being 
in ‘transit’, and thus not intended for domestic consumption in the EU, the consignments were 
still detained.
322
The apprehension on the part of the petitioners on this aspect did have a basis 
which the court agreed with. For the SADC region, the obvious lesson is that IP legislation, its 
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enforcement and the policies and procedures guiding the drug regulatory authorities must be 
transparent and not muddle generics with fake drugs.  
The TRIPS Agreement allows for the use of provisional measures including the seizure of goods 
infringing IPRs in certain circumstances and subject to specified conditions.
323
 For example, if 
the right holder has a reasonable suspicion that a counterfeit trademark (emphasis added) is 
about to be imported, he can write to competent customs authorities and ask them that such 
counterfeits must not be released into commerce.
324
 Such noble provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement may be abused by right holders to keep genuine competitors at bay and perpetuate 
monopoly prices. Should this happen in the context of access to medicines, the result will be bad 
for access to affordable medicines including generic drugs. The case highlights the importance of 
generic drugs for access to medicines with specific reference to HIV/AIDS. It is estimated that in 
2011, there were 1.6 million Kenyans living with HIV/AIDS and Kenya’s national HIV/AIDS 
treatment programme relies quite substantially on antiretroviral medicines from India.
325
 
The major lesson for SADC on the aspect of confusing generic drugs with counterfeits is 
illustrated by the case of South Africa’s Draft IP policy,326 which clearly states that generic 
medicines are important in that their presence is likely to lead to a reduction in prices. The policy 
correctly recommends that through education and awareness, law enforcement officers must be 
made to understand that generics are not counterfeit medicines.
327
 The policy further urges law 
enforcement agencies not to seize generic drugs or goods in transit under the pretext that they are 
counterfeit.
328
 There can be no better lesson than this for SADC members, and there is a strong 
possibility that this inclusion in South Africa’s Draft IP Policy of 2013 may have been inspired 
by the judgement in the POA case. 
This case reaffirms the importance and viability of public interest litigation in advancing social 
rights and justice. It has been argued that health rights litigation can be useful in holding a 
government accountable for its failure to realise the right to health within its jurisdiction.
329
 This 
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point is buttressed by the submission by Pieterse that social rights litigation including health 
rights litigation has the potential of advancing social and redistributive justice in society, 
especially to the poor.
330
 The TAC case in South Africa, decided in 2002, clearly illustrates the 
veracity of the foregoing observation. From the POA case, it is clear that the petitioners did have 
support from civil society and other interested stakeholders. The involvement of Kenya’s AIDS 
Law Project and the U.N special Rapporteur in the case was very illuminating and enriched the 
submissions before the court. Civil society organisations in the SADC, region, therefore need to 
be adequately empowered in order to bring IPRs challenges to domestic courts. This will yield 
positive results for social justice in the region. The outcome of this case did not yield positive 
results only for the petitioners, on the contrary, the implications went beyond Nairobi and Kenya 
into other African countries and developing countries in other continents because it is now 
possible to attack patent rights on the basis that they violate fundamental human rights. This is 
another positive spin-off of social rights litigation, which has tremendous potential for alleviating 
the suffering of vulnerable groups by ensuring that affirmative remedies satisfy their immediate 
vital needs within society.
331
 
When the POA case is interpreted broadly, it would seem that failure by a government to invoke 
and take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities in order to facilitate access to affordable and essential 
medicines for its citizens may be actionable as a violation of the obligation to safeguard the right 
to life and health as provided for in numerous international instruments.
332
 On the other hand, 
adopting measures that make the state unable to take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities may also 
be actionable.
333
 For example, LDCs have been given the latitude not to be TRIPS compliant 
until 2016 with respect to pharmaceutical products and until 2021 with respect to other fields of 
technology; yet some LDCs have passed IP laws and even signed economic partnership 
agreements which erode their ability to take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities.
334
 Public interest 
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litigation may be the only viable tool with which to address such transgressions in the interest of 
access to affordable essential medicines. Such a stance was confirmed by the reasoning of the 
African Commission in the case of Purohit v the Gambia,
335
 which seems to suggest that failure 
by African governments to provide access to medicines for vulnerable and marginalised groups 
such as people living with HIV/AIDS would amount to a violation of the right to health and 
constitute an act of discrimination in contravention of Articles 2 and 3 of the Charter. The above 
observation should serve as a warning to SADC member states, some of which have signed 
TRIPS-plus trade agreements, while others have prematurely embraced the TRIPS Agreement, to 
the obvious detriment of access to medicines.
336
 
Despite the above outlined celebratory aspects of the judgment in the PAO case, some 
commentators
337
 have expressed reservations about the outcome on a number of grounds. Firstly, 
despite finding that the impugned provisions of the Anti-Counterfeiting Act were bad law and 
deserved amendment, the court did not order but rather urged the state to change the law.
338
 Due 
to the importance of the matter of access to medicines, the expectation was that the court ought 
to have given a more definite and precise order to the state.
339
  
The case did not refer to non-discrimination despite the fact that the Anti-Counterfeit Act may 
jeopardise access to medicines for HIV/AIDS patients, thus implying that the state indirectly 
discriminated against people living with HIV/AIDS.
340
 It is submitted that while it is 
acknowledged that the provisions of the Anti-Counterfeiting legislation are likely to adversely 
affect access to HIV/AIDS drugs, especially generics, there was no need to allege discrimination 
because the negative effects of the legislation were likely to impact on other health spheres 
beyond the HIV/AIDS theme. 
                                                          
335
 Purohit and Another v The Gambia (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003, African Communication No. 241/2001 
(2003). 
336
 Malawi and Zambia would squarely fit into this class, since they have gone ahead and legislated for product 
patents including pharmaceuticals despite their LDC status.  
337
 Namely Durojaye and Murugi-Mukundi above at 42 – 45. 
338
 Durojaye and Murugi-Mukundi above at 42. 
339
 Ibid.  
340
 Citing from the case of Legal Resources Centre v Zambia [2000] AHLRP 84 (ACHPR 2001] para 63, Durojaye 
and Murugi-Mukundi argue that the principles of non-discrimination in Articles 2 and 3 of the African Charter are 
fundamental for the enjoyment of other rights guaranteed in the Charter. 
 263 
 
While the judge in the case did cite international legal instruments and jurisprudence of the U.N 
Human Rights system on the right to health and even referred to other jurisdictions, namely, 
South Africa, no direct reference was made to the jurisprudence of the African Commission. 
Such an omission is unfortunate given the fact that Kenya has ratified the African Charter.
341
 
Therefore, the failure to cite or even refer to the jurisprudence of the African Commission must 
be regarded by SADC members as an unfortunate exception rather than the norm.
342
 
Despite the above criticism of the judgement, this case is important because it is one of the few 
cases in Africa where a court has had the opportunity to decide the difficult matter of the state’s 
obligation with regard to IP and the right to health. The decision does clarify the duty of the state 
using a revolutionary, progressive, rights-based approach which is precedent-setting, timely and 
contemporaneous. The judgement may, therefore, be regarded as significant victory for people 
living with HIV/AIDS and others in need of life-saving medicines in Kenya, Africa and the 
SADC region. A discussion of the decision therefore adds a lot of value to the aims and 
objectives of this study, and largely illuminates the recommendations made in Chapter Seven 
below.  
Conclusion  
It is appropriate to conclude this chapter by summarising the highlights from the discussions of 
the jurisprudence in the three countries under focus. Firstly, the Indian experience highlights that 
a country can tighten the requirements for patentability in specific fields of technology in line 
with its own unique problems, such as the prevalence of diseases. In the Novartis case, the court 
used existing IP law principles, namely, the requirements for patentability
343
 and prevented the 
granting of a patent that was not new and was likely to perpetuate patent monopolies. The patent 
for the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Meyslate was declined because it did not have an 
enhanced efficacy as a ‘new drug’.  
The Thai experience highlights the importance of both pre- and post-grant patent opposition 
procedures in order to keep undeserving patents out of the system, improve patent quality and 
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facilitate the early entry of generic drugs into the health system. The Didanosine case clearly 
illustrates that in the absence of good laws and an active civil society community that keeps the 
activities of government officials and big pharmaceutical companies under check, some patents 
may be granted with unlimited rights thus making it impossible to introduce competition in the 
form of generic drugs. In the Didanosine case, the patent claims were initially amended, in 
collusion with officers in the Thai Patents Office, to cover limitless dosage forms. Had the 
amendments seen the light of day through no opposition, it would have been impossible for 
anyone to manufacture generic forms of Didanosine in Thailand, despite the legislation allowing 
for such. 
The Kenyan case study is slightly different from the others in that it deals with counterfeiting, a 
subject that is usually covered in most jurisdictions by drug regulatory policies and not IP law. 
Using the rights-based approach, the Kenyan High Court ruled that Anti-Counterfeit legislation 
that is ambiguous and has the potential of leading to conflating generic drugs with counterfeits 
may lead to a violation of the rights to life, human dignity and health. Furthermore, the Kenyan 
case study highlights the fact that human rights are superior to IPRs, which must give way as and 
when the need arises. Poorly drafted laws, whose interpretation and application may lead to the 
curtailment of the rights to life, human dignity and health must be avoided in order not to 
frustrate the goal of access to affordable essential medicines and drugs, particularly generic 
drugs.  
The SADC region has many lessons to learn from the case studies if it seriously intends 
improving access to medicines for SADC citizens. The lessons hover around IP law reform, the 
right to health, the role of civil society in public interest litigation and other collaborations 
beyond civil society. Except for the Indian case, most access to medicines concerns canvassed by 
the case studies were on the issue of HIV/AIDS medication, a sensitive subject for the SADC 
region, which faces increasing HIV/AIDS infection rates. Civil society organisations were active 
in all the three case studies, thus highlighting an important lesson for SADC in that specific 
context. In light of the above reasons, this chapter is an important cog in the wheel of the rest of 
this work. It clearly shows that the access to medicines problem for the developing countries and 
the SADC region in particular may be resolved through a third world/south-south approach. 
Solutions lie in the WTO instruments that SADC members signed, which instruments allow 
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member states to adopt measures that will ensure access to medicines for their citizens, guided 
by the local and regional conditions which obtain in each member state. It will, therefore, be 
possible for SADC members to curb incremental patents through adopting patent opposition 
procedures like is currently the case in Thailand; to prevent the patenting of minor variations to 
drugs, such as colour or shape, which does not enhance efficacy like what happened in India and 
not to confuse generic drugs with counterfeit drugs, like what almost happened in Kenya. In all 
the three case studies discussed in this chapter, existing national, regional and international IP 
laws and policies were used in order to safeguard and preserve the right of citizens of the 
respective countries to access affordable essential medicines in order to live in a dignified 
manner and fully enjoy the right to health without any illegal limitations.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
7. Introduction  
What has been examined in the preceding chapters engages the subject of access to essential 
medicines under the WTO TRIPS Agreement from a comparative SADC perspective. However, 
what is recapitulated in this chapter is a broad overview of the dimensions of access to medicines 
in the SADC region under the TRIPS Agreement accompanied by proposed solutions, in the 
form of recommendations to ameliorate the access to medicines problem in developing countries 
generally, and the SADC region in particular.  
It must be emphasised as part of the recommendations that the SADC as a region has many 
institutional deficiencies;
1
 and in order to ensure that such deficiencies do not militate against the 
goal to take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities and access to essential medicines, a common 
approach to the recommendations outlined below must be adopted.
2
  
The proposed recommendations on their own would be inadequate in resolving the access to 
medicines problem in the SADC region. Therefore, areas for further research are also suggested 
as an additional complimentary step to take in the direction of improving access to medicines. 
Four objectives are intended to be accomplished by this chapter. 
First, the chapter begins with a brief summary and discussion of the principal findings of the 
study. Second, the chapter attempts to explore the importance of the theories of intellectual 
property rights and the rights-based approach as possible solutions to the SADC access to 
medicines problem. Third, the chapter explores the prospects of regional pharmaceutical 
manufacturing in the SADC region, in light of current  capacity, aided by pooled procurement 
and the permissive provisions of Article 31 bis of the TRIPS Agreement and a possible South-
                                                          
1
 See generally Zenda F The SADC Tribunal and the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes (2010), LLD 
thesis submitted to the University of South Africa at 19 – 25.  
2
 This common approach resonates with other recommendations in other different areas of regional integration such 
as those suggested in the context of the harmonisation of trade laws by Dlagnekova P “The Need to Harmonise 
Trade-Related Laws within Countries of the African Union: An Introduction to the Problems Caused by Legal 
Divergence” (2009) 15 Fundamina 1 – 37. 
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South cooperative approach. Fourth, it seeks to explain specific shortcomings in the law and 
proposes recommendations for law reform alongside the strengthening of the capacity of regional 
civil society groups in order to spur access to medicines litigation. Finally, the chapter suggests a 
tentative future regional research agenda which will bolster access to medicines in the SADC 
member states. 
This chapter, therefore, is organised under the following headings: (1) A brief Restatement of the 
Research Problem, Aims and Objectives; (2) Summary and discussion of the Main Findings; (3) 
Theories of Intellectual Property; (4) Prospects of the Rights-based Approach; (5) Prospects of 
Regional Pharmaceutical Manufacturing of Drugs and Pooled Procurement; (6) Suggestions for 
Law Reform and Enhanced Role of Civil Society Groups; (7) Research Agenda for the Future. 
7.1 A brief Restatement of the Research Problem, Aims and Objectives 
Brevity requires that a restatement of the research problem begins on the note that, taken 
together, TRIPS flexibilities and human rights lie at the heart of access to medicines in the 
SADC region. The court cases analysed in the case studies in Chapter Six do attest to the fact 
that access to medicines is indeed a human right which must inform the jurisprudence seeking to 
enquire into the relationship between intellectual property and human rights.  
While the TRIPS Agreement gives WTO members the leeway to protect patents and other forms 
of intellectual property in a manner that takes care of each member’ unique problems by 
resorting to TRIPS flexibilities, in practice in the pharmaceutical context, SADC members have 
been reluctant to take full advantage of these flexibilities. The reluctance may be attributed to a 
number of factors, such as the lack of domestic research and pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacities; insufficient technical and infrastructural capacities for medicines regulation; 
inefficient pharmaceutical procurement systems, bilateral and other political pressures against 
the use of TRIPS flexibilities; lack of capacity to address anti-competitive practices and abuse of 
patents; and difficulties in accessing pricing and other patent status information.
3
 Limited 
                                                          
3
 Munyukwi E and Machedze R “Implementation of the TRIPS Flexibilities by East and Southern African 
Countries: Status of Patent Law Reforms by 2010” (2010) 80 Equinet Discussion Paper at 22. 
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purchasing power of the citizens of the developing countries is also often cited as an impediment 
to taking full advantage of TRIPS flexibilities.
4
 
It is appropriate to posit that in order to improve access to essential medicines by SADC 
countries, there is a need to actualise the flexibilities provided for in the TRIPS agreement, the 
Doha Declaration, the August 2003 Decision and the subsequent proposed amendment, 
introduced in 2005, which brought in Article 31 bis of TRIPS relating to compulsory licences.  
The envisaged actualisation will require a paradigm shift in legal policy in the form of 
amendments to existing intellectual property laws in the member states and, a reinterpretation of 
the relevant WTO provisions, which have been the subject of litigation in disputes involving 
pharmaceuticals and access to medicines in other jurisdictions.  
Only scant attention has been given to the potential of regional trading blocs and developing 
country solutions to the problem of access to medicines. Few studies have in fact examined          
in-depth the extent of incorporation and the use of TRIPS flexibilities in the SADC region 
beyond lamenting the fact that the flexibilities are currently not being taken advantage of by 
SADC member states. This study, therefore, proffers home-grown solutions to the SADC access 
to medicines problem through the aid of jurisprudence from other developing countries. 
 
It is in view of such shortcomings in the literature that this study specifically focused on the 
following aims and objectives: 
 
Three main aims were targeted by this study. The first aim was to analyse WTO legal 
instruments and ascertain their adequacy in balancing the rights to health and intellectual 
property in the context of pharmaceutical patents. The second aim, which was closely related to
 
the first one, was to show through an examination of international human rights legal documents 
and other instruments that there is potential for conflict between intellectual property rights and 
the right to health in the context of access to essential medicines in general and for the SADC 
region in particular. Through an analysis of selected SADC members’ intellectual property 
legislations, comparative law and the rights-based approach, the third aim of the study was to 
propose viable solutions to the SADC access to medicines problem. 
                                                          
4
 Zaheer M and Riaz AS “Flexibilities under TRIPS: Implementation Gaps between Theory and Practice” (2013) 1 
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law at 3. 
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In order to achieve the above stated aims, the study focused on the following pertinent 
objectives, which were to a large extent achieved, namely: 
 
(a)To outline basic tenets of WTO and IP law through an exploration of theories of 
intellectual property and legal historical origins; 
 
(b) To outline and discuss the tenets of the rights-based approach and explain how it 
can be applied to the problem of access to medicines as a human right in order to 
humanise it; 
 
(c) To critically analyse specific regional instruments and SADC Policy documents 
relating to access to medicines and establish the extent of incorporation of TRIPS 
flexibilities in SADC member states’ legislation; 
 
(d)To analyse selected SADC members’ intellectual property policies and legislation 
and expose how each country used some of the flexibilities to improve access to 
medicines for its citizens; 
 
(e) Extract thematic lessons for other SADC members’ from the practice of selected 
SADC members and other developing countries, namely India, Thailand and Kenya; 
and 
 
(f)To propose solutions to SADC access problems to medicines through making 
recommendations and suggesting areas for further research.  
The above aims and objectives were achieved through a critical expository account of the issues 
relating to the law of patents, the TRIPS Agreement, the evolution of the access debate to 
medicines and theories of intellectual property; access to medicines as a human right; an 
exposition of the TRIPS flexibilities; the actual use of TRIPS flexibilities in the SADC region 
and comparative litigation regarding access to medicines. In the next section immediately below, 
a summary of each of the above topics and the main findings thereon are rendered. 
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7.2 Summary and discussion of the Main Findings 
In addition to Chapter One above, Chapter Two focussed on concepts, theories, and legal 
historical issues relating to access to medicines. The chapter established that the common forms 
of intellectual property identified as such by many WTO members including non-members 
include patents, designs, trademarks and copyright. Other forms of intellectual property such as 
geographical indicators and integrated circuits were identified in their specific context. From a 
WTO TRIPS perspective, the chapter established that members are enjoined to respect 
intellectual property rights and adhere to the principles of national treatment and most favoured 
nation treatment. With specific reference to pharmaceutical patents, the chapter clearly showed 
that traditionally, many current WTO members did not provide patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals due to their role of preserving lives. However, the TRIPS Agreement mandates 
WTO members to provide intellectual property right protection to all products irrespective of the 
field of technology and subject to specifically listed exceptions, such as the protection of human 
health and the environment. The chapter established that patents are an impediment to access to 
medicines and the rights therein must be sensitively enjoyed subject to the listed TRIPS 
exceptions (flexibilities). 
In the African context, problematic issues relating to access to medicines started when South 
Africa sought to amend its Medicines Control Act to introduce parallel imports and compulsory 
licences. The opposition to South Africa’s law by big pharmaceutical companies clearly showed 
that access to medicines is a political issue disguised in the law of patents. The South African 
case in 1998 was the very first attempt by a SADC member to domesticate TRIPS flexibilities, 
namely compulsory licences and parallel imports. This chapter further showed that access issues 
to medicines regarding the use of compulsory licences or threats to use them did also become a 
topical issue in the developed world in light of the anthrax scare case in 2001. Bayer had to 
supply its drug, Cipro, to the US and Canadian governments at very cheap prices because an 
Indian generic company had offered to supply the drug at half the cost. 
It is ironic that in the Cipro case, the US position starkly contrasts with its pro patent rights 
approach in the South African medicines case and thus smacks of duplicity. Despite the Cipro 
case, the US has stridently remained an ardent defender of stringent patent protection in 
sympathy with its pharmaceutical industry. This chapter established that there is a tug of war 
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between patent rights of pharmaceutical companies and the rights of the poor in the developing 
and the least developed countries to access affordable medicines. 
In a bid to unravel the effect of patents on medicines, the chapter examined some theories of 
intellectual property and attempted to strike a balance between the justification of intellectual 
property rights and the right to access medicines. The chapter concluded that the theory of 
rewards is important for innovation and technological development but must be used to reward 
innovation that targets diseases that matter in developing countries and the LDCs. 
Chapter Two, therefore, established the conceptual and theoretical background to the study and 
affirmed that while fidelity to the tenets of the TRIPS Agreement by WTO members is 
important, the same agreement gives members a lot of leeway to derogate from patent rights in 
sympathy with access to medicines, and the developing countries, including SADC members 
must take advantage of this leeway. The chapter affirms the truism that taking full advantage of 
TRIPS flexibilities such as parallel imports and compulsory licensing will ensure that the rights 
to life, human dignity and health are realized for the world’s poor.  
Chapter Three explored the issue of access to medicines as a human right and established that 
despite the alleged conflict between patents and human rights, access to medicines is indeed a 
human right backed by regional and international instruments. The chapter established that in 
order for people in the developing countries and the LDCs to enjoy access to affordable 
medicines, there is a need to engage in a balancing act which weighs intellectual property rights 
against human rights especially the right to health. After an examination of the SADC 
instruments, namely, SADC Protocol on Health, SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan and the 
Strategy for Pooled procurement, the chapter concluded that human rights values are imbued in 
the instruments. Because not being able to access affordable essential medicines, which are 
invented as ‘benefits of scientific progress’, violates the right to life, human dignity and health, 
chapter three concluded that human rights must trump patent rights in certain circumstances. 
This trumping can be effected through the employment of the rights-based approach, which was 
discussed and appropriately contextualized in this chapter. The main conclusion of Chapter 
Three is that the rights-based approach must be employed to hold the state accountable for 
violating the right to health, which is a fundamental right identified in the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights, Declaration of Alma Ata; UN General Assembly documents and African and 
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other regional instruments. The overall conclusion of the chapter is that human rights must trump 
intellectual property rights.  
Chapter Four provided an overview of the WTO TRIPS flexibilities and attempted to gauge the 
extent of incorporation of the flexibilities in the SADC members’ IP legislation. The main 
findings of this chapter may be summarised as follows. Firstly, not all SADC members must 
comply with the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement since more than half of them are LDCs 
which should not bother providing for pharmaceutical patents until 2016, and other forms of 
intellectual property until 2021. Despite this, all SADC members have patent laws protecting 
product patents including pharmaceuticals. In a snap survey of SADC patent laws, the chapter 
established that all SADC members provide for compulsory licences and government use of 
patents while the incorporation of other TRIPS flexibilities was not as systematic with each 
country cherry picking the flexibilities that it desires at any given time. This is a major weakness 
and this chapter recommended that all SADC members incorporate minimum TRIPS flexibilities 
in their IP legislation. Three SADC members, namely Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe exclude 
the patenting of new use forms of patents relating to food and medical products while the rest do 
not expressly prohibit new use patents. This promotes weak patents that are minor 
embellishments to previously patented products which is a practice pejoratively known as ever 
greening. On the whole, SADC members have incorporated TRIPS flexibilities in their laws 
despite being reluctant to take advantage of the legal provisions in practice. 
Most SADC members have not taken advantage of TRIPS exceptions to patentability in order to 
introduce patent examinations, patent oppositions and strengthen provisions around novelty and 
the requirement that a patent must involve an inventive step. This makes it easy for patent 
holders to invent around a patent and extend its lifespan thus frustrating the early entry of 
generics. The chapter recommends that SADC members engage in patent law reform that will 
see each member taking more advantage of the flexibilities. However, the chapter noted that 
there are some SADC members namely, Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe which have 
taken the patent law reform project quite further than the rest, hence their experiences must 
inspire other members. 
In Chapter Five, a detailed discussion of the Botswana, South African and Zimbabwean 
experiences with the actual use of TRIPS was rendered. Botswana, which is chosen as an 
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example of good practice has the most recent patent law which incorporates Article 31 bis of 
TRIPS by reference. This was lauded in this chapter as a good start from which other SADC 
members can learn. However, there are three problems with Botswana’s recent patent law which 
this chapter highlighted. Firstly, the new law criminalises patent infringement to the detriment of 
generic drug production and innovation. Secondly, while the law provides for pre-grant patent 
opposition, the process is not actualised by the regulations to the Act, and this omission does not 
augur well for access to medicines. Finally, Botswana is currently in negotiations which will 
culminate in it acquiring membership of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with 
TRIPS-plus provisions, to the obvious detriment to access to medicines. The chapter 
recommended that Botswana must remedy the impugned provisions and reconsider its position in 
the EPA negotiations. 
Zimbabwe’s patent laws have good provisions on parallel importation, government use of 
patents and compulsory licensing. This chapter also focused on how Zimbabwe managed to issue 
a government licence to manufacture ARVs in 2002 after declaring a state of emergency due to 
HIV/AIDS. The matter is important to other SADC members, especially those that have never 
invoked any of the TRIPS flexibilities for access to medicines despite the high disease burden. 
This chapter also focussed on the use of TRIPS flexibilities for access to medicines in South 
Africa by focusing on the 1998 Medicines and related Substances Control Amendment Act 
litigation, the use of competition law and South Africa’s recent Draft IP Policy, which has 
extensive proposals on TRIPS and public health. Again, like with the discussions of the 
Botswana and Zimbabwean experiences, this chapter identified specific lessons that fellow 
SADC members could learn from South Africa in the context of access to medicines.  
Chapter Six explored the access theme to medicines for SADC further by looking at other 
developing countries’ jurisdictional experiences with the use of TRIPS flexibilities in the context 
of access to medicines. The chapter focused on using exceptions to patentability in the Indian 
case of Novartis AG v Union of India and others; using patent opposition procedures in favour of 
access to medicines in Thailand; and fixing anti-counterfeit legislation so that it does not 
compromise access to medicines in Kenya.  
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From the case discussions, the chapter extracted thematic lessons for SADC countries covering 
such issues as the importance of civil society in the access battle for medicines, the role of the 
state in protecting the right to life, human dignity and health in the context of access to 
medicines, the differences between counterfeit medicines and generics, preventing evergreen 
patents through strict legislative requirements for patentability such as India’s section 3(d), and 
improving patent quality through effective opposition like was the case in Thailand. Chapter Six, 
like all the other chapters preceding it, knitted all the objectives of the study together and showed 
that the human rights approach may be used to favour access to medicines if civil society and 
other non-governmental groups are vigilant enough to keep the government on its toes.   
Finally, Chapter Seven concluded the study very well by bringing all the issues discussed in the 
previous six chapters together. The chapter made six recommendations and suggested three areas 
for further research in order to improve access to medicines. The recommendations, most of 
which are likely to yield positive access results to medicines if implemented, emphasise among 
other things, law reform, and the rights-based approach, using a hybrid theoretical framework to 
improve access to medicines and empowering civil society groups in the SADC region to deal 
with the technical and legal aspects of access to medicines. 
The recommendations are regarded as an important part of this study because their 
implementation will in all likelihood take care of the lacuna identified in the statement of the 
problem in chapter one above and deal with most of the gaps in the SADC members’ legal and 
policy frameworks as identified  in chapters four to six above. It is now appropriate to conclude 
this study by rendering an account of its recommendations and suggested areas for further 
research. This is done in the section immediately below. 
7.3 Recommendations  
From the above narration of the findings in the pertinent chapters of this study, it is evident that 
the proposed recommendations would canvass the following cross-cutting issues:  
(a) Theories of intellectual property; 
(b) Human rights and the rights-based approach; 
(c) Prospects of regional manufacturing of pharmaceutical products; 
(d) The prospects of pooled procurement of pharmaceuticals in the SADC region; 
(e)  SADC IP patent law reform; and  
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(f) Alternative approaches including the role of civil society. 
 
This discussion of the recommendations, which forms a very important part of this study, is 
crucial in that it shows the study’s contribution to the body of knowledge in the subject area 
under focus. 
7.3.1 Theories of Intellectual Property  
Taking a retrospective look at Chapter Two, one may safely conclude that from the history of 
access to medicines, it is evident that the problem is not unique to the developing countries. As 
such, developed countries also have a share of the access to medicines problem. However, the 
problem becomes more acute when it comes to the developing countries generally and the SADC 
region in particular. The chapter discussed some of the theories of intellectual property namely, 
utilitarian theories,
5
 natural rights theories, incentives theories, rewards theories, prospect 
theories and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s social contract theory. The study suggested that a hybrid 
theoretical approach to intellectual property may be useful in resolving the access  to medicines 
problem for SADC. 
It has been argued in terms of the incentives theory that intellectual property law provides the 
creators thereof with incentives to produce new knowledge which solves the underproduction 
problem likely to materialise if knowledge was non-excludable.
6
 However, IP law is unjust 
because current consumers finance the inventor’s efforts (by paying monopoly prices) to the 
benefit of future consumers, who will enjoy innovation at marginal cost.
7
 Overreliance on the 
incentive theory leads to the unjust result that drugs for baldness are more important than those 
for malaria,
8
 tuberculosis, dengue fever, HIV/AIDS and cholera, diseases that largely affect poor 
people in the developing and the least developed countries. Patients in the developing countries 
and the LDCs lack the ability to pay while drugs for baldness enjoy a multibillion dollar market.
9
 
                                                          
5
 See generally Morrissey M An Alternative to Intellectual Property Theories of Locke and Utilitarian Economics 
(2012) unpublished MA dissertation submitted to Louisiana State University at 1 – 56. 
6
 Belleflame P “How Efficient is the Patent System? A General Appraisal and Application to the Pharmaceutical 
Sector” in Gosseries A, Marciano A and Strowel A Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice (2008) at 213. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Sunder M “Review of Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice, co-edited by Axel Gosseries, Alain Marciano 
and Alain Strowel. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 296 pp.” (2010) 3 Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and 
Economics at 116. 
9
 Ibid.  
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Understanding intellectual property in terms of incentives creates the wrong impression that the 
ability to pay is not an important consideration.
10
 
Pharmaceutical companies are against compulsory licences because the industry argues that they 
undermine patent protection and reduce the incentive to invest in the development of new and 
innovative medicines.
11
 This argument may be appealing for other classes of pharmaceuticals but 
with regard to drugs for HIV/AIDS treatment, whose development is largely financed through 
research fellowships and public funds to universities, the argument is not that attractive.
12
 
Rewards should, therefore, be for genuine cases commensurate with the services rendered and 
not to provide for astronomical profits for some minor additions to drug efficacy which is a 
notorious activity known in pharmaceutical circles as ever greening. 
To deal with the unjust effects of the rewards theory, a number of mitigating approaches, such as 
differential pricing, use of parallel imports and the introduction of an alternative reward system 
for specific medical research are hereby proposed for the SADC region. The alternative reward 
approach will entail the government identifying specific diseases and incentivising research 
therein by rewarding pharmaceutical companies to produce and sell at marginal costs to 
anyone.
13
 South Africa does acknowledge the possible efficacy of such a rewards approach in its 
Draft IP Policy (2013) discussion dealing with alternatives to IP. 
Some theoreticians have argued that the access to medicines problem can be resolved to a large 
extent by resorting to the principle of justice in the distribution of social health needs.
14
 The 
justice-based approach to patents must surely consider social and economic inequalities by 
focusing on health needs (needs principle) than the ability to pay.
15
 This is because patents are 
barriers to affordability and only generate investment where profitable markets exist and they do 
not work for drugs needed to address diseases that prevail in developing countries
16
 and the 
SADC region. Therefore, some form of unique pharmaceutical justice, which draws from but 
                                                          
10
 Ibid.  
11
 Bombach KM “Can South Africa Fight Aids? Reconciling the South African Medicines and Related Substances 
Act with the TRIPS Agreement” (2001) 19 Boston University International Law Journal at 282. 
12
 Bomback above at 282. 
13
 Belleflame P above at 223. 
14
 See for instance, Dietsch P “Patents on Drugs – the Wrong Prescription?” in Gosseries A, Marciano A and 
Strowel A Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice (2008) at 230 – 231. 
15
 Dietsch above at 233. 
16
 Smith RD, Correa C and Oh C “Trade, TRIPS and Pharmaceuticals” (2009) 373 The Lancert at 686. 
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modifies John Rawls’ theory of justice for all regardless of social position, income and talent,17 
must be introduced to benefit the least advantaged in the developing countries and SADC. This 
form of justice can work very well with distributive justice because ‘certain scarce commodities 
should be distributed less unequally than the ability to pay for them’.18 
Therefore, the rewards aspect of patents in the context of access to medicines in the SADC 
region should be inspired by the social environment because while claiming robust patent 
protection may create short term benefits for the patent holder, in the longer term, it is likely to 
create social inequities and imbalances.
19
 In the same vein, Gold et al cited by Odusei aptly 
observe that: 
“…the recognition that innovation is a social, collaborative phenomenon changes the way 
that policy makers, researchers, industry and technology consumers ought to view and 
appreciate IP: as something to be shared and built upon rather than something to accumulate 
for its own sake.”20 
Elaborating on his needs principle, Dietsch in total agreement with Gold above emphasises that 
accepting the principle implies that the invention of certain drugs, namely those that result in the 
maximal reduction of the global disease burden, is more important than inventing others.
21
 
Consequently, placing innovation and invention in a social context implies that a theoretical 
compromise which tries to address both people’s health needs and rewards inventors to some 
extent is imperative.
22
 
To actualise the needs principle in the SADC context, it is hereby recommended that         
TRIPS-based solutions hinging largely on contextual SADC law reform as elaborated in 7.4.4 
below are seriously considered. The forms of envisaged reforms that easily come to mind are the 
strengthening of novelty and inventive step requirements, not awarding patents for minor 
embellishments to drugs, introducing patent opposition and using compulsory licences as 
discussed in various sections of this study. The rewards theory, which currently favours 
                                                          
17
 Dumitru S “Are Rawlsians Entitled to Monopoly Rights” in Gosseries A, Marciano A and Strowel A Intellectual 
Property and Theories of Justice (2008) at 57 – 93. 
18
 Dumitru above at 93. 
19
 See for this incisive observation Odusei P “Exploiting Patent Regulatory ‘Flexibilities’ to Promote Access to 
Antiretroviral Medicines in Sub-Saharan Africa” (2011) Journal of World Intellectual Property at 5. 
20
 Gold et al (2008) Toward a New Era of Intellectual Property: From Confrontation to Negotiation, A Report from 
the International Expert Group on Biotechnology, Innovation and Intellectual Property available at 
http://www.theinnovationpartnership.org/data/ieg/documents/report/TIP_Report_E.pdf (last visited 10/10/2009). 
21
 Dietsch above a 238. 
22
 Dietsch above at 237. 
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pharmaceutical companies, can in actual fact be realigned to better serve access to medicines if 
SADC members consider giving rewards to pharmaceutical companies according to the impact 
of a particular drug on saving lives.
23
 Other possible approaches to the reward theory could take 
the form of incentivising pharmaceutical companies by SADC members to conduct research and 
development in the public interest and then license the invention to the state.
24
 Another 
alternative approach to the traditional rewards theory would be for SADC countries to introduce 
tax incentives in combination with threats to use compulsory licences
25
 such that producing 
previously unprofitable drugs can be financially rewarding for pharmaceutical companies.
26
 In 
terms of this tax incentive, pharmaceutical companies not doing research and development on 
diseases of the poor would have to be taxed heavily. While this version of the rewards theory 
may sound attractive, it is likely to be effective to SADC members with more disposable 
financial resources and would not be possible to apply in other poorer members, unless donor 
assistance can be procured. After all, there is some veracity in the submission that “poverty, not 
patent policies, more often inhibits access to essential medicines in the developing world”.27 
To summarise the recommendation based on theories of intellectual property, it is important to 
reiterate that patents are supposed to provide rewards for innovation but in countries like India, 
patents are awarded to big multinational companies which strategically restrict competition.
28
 
SADC members are urged to use the social argument and reinvent the rewards theory so that 
only inventions that contribute to the alleviation of the disease burden peculiar to the region are 
deliberately incentivised through subsidies and tax schemes. This recommendation can easily be 
implemented alongside the rights-based approach which is discussed immediately below.  
7.3.2 Prospects of the Rights-based Approach 
In Chapter Three, the relationship between access to medicines and human rights was 
contextualised and potential areas of conflict exposed. Many human rights activists allege that 
TRIPS provisions on pharmaceutical patents violate basic human rights by compromising the 
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 Pogge TW “Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Programme” (2005) 36 Metaphilosophy at 189. 
Admittedly, such a proposal is attractive but quite difficult to implement.  
24
 Dietsch above at 241. 
25
 Threats to use compulsory licenses may rattle some big drug companies to lower drugs prices but this is likely to 
happen with powerful developing countries with a big market for drugs and the purchasing power. 
26
 Dietsch above at 242. 
27
 Attaran A “How do Patents and Economic Policies Affect Access to Essential Medicines in Developing 
Countries?” (2004) 23 Health Affairs at 155. 
28
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ability of poor countries to access essential medicines.
29
 The TRIPS Agreement purports to 
reflect the needs of the developing countries such as the protection of public health.
30
 Hence, the 
developing countries found it easy to accede to the agreement. Therefore, the TRIPS Agreement, 
specifically Article 8 thereof, must be used by the developing countries and the SADC members 
to demand that there be an essential right to health, and thus essential medicines should be made 
available, regardless of patent laws.
31
 Additionally, the TRIPS Agreement provides for public 
health exceptions to patentability which should allow countries with legitimate health concerns 
to deny a patent on a particular drug or even all drugs.
32
 Therefore, the TRIPS Agreement should 
not act as an impediment to the public health of developing countries,
33
 including SADC. 
Under international human rights law, access to medicines is a matter of rights, with human 
rights providing an alternative way of understanding issues relating to the distribution and 
availability of drugs, as well as providing a workable framework for adjudication of rights.
34
 
Governments do not only have a moral and humanitarian obligation to provide access to 
medicines, but also have a legal obligation, which enjoins them to make budgetary provisions for 
access to medicines.
35
 The legal obligation implies accountability when a state has not met its 
obligations.
36
 A human rights framework imposes obligations on states to interpret treaties, trade 
rules and intellectual property laws in a manner that fully advances public health interests.
37
 
Because states are the primary bearers of human rights responsibilities, they should take actions 
to ensure that activities of private actors, such as pharmaceutical companies, do not obstruct the 
realisation of human rights.
38
 
Although Articles 7, 8 and 27 of the TRIPS Agreement do not give WTO Members an unlimited 
room for exceptions to pharmaceutical patents, the implication, nevertheless, is that TRIPS 
                                                          
29
 Seeratan NN “The Negative Impact of Intellectual Property Patent Rights on Developing Countries: An 
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norms are not meant to over-run the pre-existing human rights obligations of WTO Members.
39
 
Article 27 recognises that certain innovative medical procedures may be excluded from 
patentability because of their value to the global community in saving lives.
40
 
For SADC countries, it is important that each provision of the TRIPS Agreement, whether it is 
used in the context of TRIPS flexibility or not, be read in light of the objectives of the TRIPS 
Agreement.
41
 Such an interpretive approach has a textual basis in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties,
42
 which establishes that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its 
objects and purpose”.43 Just like the recommendations made under the theories of intellectual 
property above, Article 7 of TRIPS clearly shows that IP rights do not exist in a vacuum since 
they are supposed to benefit society as a whole and not merely protect private rights. There is no 
better way of making IP rights ‘benefit society’ as a whole than providing affordable essential 
medicines for all as a human right. Therefore, patent rights should be exercised coherently with 
the objectives of mutual advantage to right holders and the users of patented medicines, in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare and to balance rights and obligations.
44
 
In this study, apart from Chapter Three, the rights based approach was echoed in many places 
particularly in Chapter Six. A violation of the right to health was explicitly alleged and litigated 
in the Kenyan case of P.O.A and Other v Attorney General and the Court ruled that the 
government of Kenya does have an obligation to protect the right to health in the context of 
access to medicines by adopting measures and policies that facilitate access to affordable 
essential medicines. The Kenyan High Court went further and ruled unequivocally that 
intellectual property rights are subordinate to human rights, specifically the right to health. In the 
Indian case of Novartis AG v Union of India and Others, citing from the historical development 
of patent law in India, the Supreme Court cited submissions made by Justice Ayyangar (as he 
                                                          
39 Saxlin-Hautamäki E “Establishing Coherence: The Right to Access to Medicines, Pharmaceutical Patents and the 
WTO Medicines Decision” (2010) 1 Nordic Journal of Commercial Law at 7. 
40
 Specifically Articles 27 (2) and 27 (3) of TRIPS. See further and on a related note, Manne C “Pharmaceutical 
Patent Protection and TRIPS: The Countries that Cried Wolf and Why Defining ‘National Emergency’ will save 
them from themselves”. 
41
 The objectives are spelt out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
42
 Concluded in Vienna on 23 May 1969. 
43
 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.  
44
 Elbeshbishi AN “TRIPS and Public Health: What Should African Countries Do?” (2007) 49 ATPC Work in 
Progress at 14. 
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then was) that patent systems must be modelled according to the conditions obtaining in the 
country, hence the effects of patents on the right to health can only be effectively assessed in the 
context of the unique needs of the country.
45
 Like in all other instances when the right to health 
is contextualised to the TRIPS Agreement, the Indian Supreme Court referred to the nature and 
scope of obligations,
46
 national treatment,
47
 objectives,
48
 principles,
49
 patentable subject matter
50
 
and the rights conferred.
51
  
To conclude this recommendation on the use of the rights-based approach by SADC, it is 
important to emphasise that it is only by using the language of human rights that it would be 
possible to carve out and use exceptions to patents that fully take into account access to 
affordable medicines.
52
 Additionally, rights-based approaches do not only call for the availability 
of medicines at lower prices but also put pressure on states to provide funds for research and 
development of drugs that affect the people in the particular country or region.
53
 Notably, 
therefore, the rights approach can work as a ‘double edged sword’54 in that private 
pharmaceutical companies can be called to ‘human rights order by the state’, while at the same 
time benefitting from increased government funding aimed at actualising the right to health. 
In closing, the SADC region including civil society groups is hereby urged to adopt a human 
rights approach because it “offers an alternative vision of the purpose and requirements of 
intellectual property as well as a set of obligations that place intellectual property in a wider 
context”.55 
This human rights approach may be used as a justification for embarking on the development of 
local pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity and using compulsory licence provisions 
                                                          
45
 Novartis AG v Union of India and Others at paras 36 – 37. 
46
 Article 1 of TRIPS. 
47
 Article 3 of TRIPS. 
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 Article 7 of TRIPS. 
49
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 Gupta A “Patent Rights on Pharmaceutical Products and Affordable Drugs: Can TRIPS Provide a Solution?” 
(2004) 2 Buffalo Intellectual Property Law Journal at 152. 
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introduced by Article 31 bis of the TRIPS Agreement. The next two recommendations deal with 
these two important issues. 
7.3.3 Prospects of Regional Pharmaceutical Manufacturing of Drugs   
This study highlighted the fact that while drugs for the treatment of diseases common in the 
developing countries and the SADC region do exist, most of them are patented and expensive. 
This is so notwithstanding the fact that most of the imported and generic versions of the drugs 
have to be imported using scarce foreign currency resources.  
Poverty, which results in an inability to pay for even the cheapest medicines, including 
generics,
56
 imposes a heavy burden on most SADC governments to procure and subsidise drugs 
for the poor. In addition, there are other problems unique to developing countries and the SADC 
region, such as under investment in health infrastructure which leads to the lack of clinics and 
hospitals, poor distribution networks, low numbers of trained health personnel and high levels of 
patient illiteracy.
57
 Other factors that are attributable to government action may be high taxes and 
tariffs which raise prices.
58
  
To deal with the problem of high drug prices, it is hereby recommended that SADC explores the 
possibility of manufacturing some essential drugs in the region, using existing pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacity as a starting point. 
One major constraint in solving the access to medicines problem in the SADC region is that 
medicine production capacity is weak.
59
 The African heads of state and government adopted the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa (PMPA) in May 2007 in order to ensure a 
sustainable supply of affordable medicines and to improve public health and promote industrial 
and economic development in Africa.
60
 The PMPA lists six priority areas,
61
 including developing 
a pharmaceutical manufacturing agenda and addressing IP issues. Equally, SADC has elaborate 
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 See GlaxoSmithKline “Intellectual Property and Access to medicines in Developing Countries” at 
http://www.gsk.com/responsibility/index.htm (last visited 16/12/2013). 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 See Machemedze R, Munyuki E and Mulumba M “Literature Review on Cooperation in Essential Medicines 
Production and Procurement between East and Southern Africa (ESA) Brazil, India and China” (2013) 96 
EQUINET Discussion Paper at 2. 
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 Ibid.  
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 The priority areas are mapping productive capacity, situation analysis, developing a manufacturing agenda, 
addressing intellectual property issues, political and geographical matters, economic considerations and financing. 
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plans for pharmaceutical self-sufficiency, elaborately spelt out in the Pharmaceutical Business 
Plan
62
 and the Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential Medicines and Health 
Commodities.
63
 Therefore, within Africa and the SADC region, the policy goal is to create and 
sustain reliable pharmaceutical industries whose operations are relevant to local economies and 
responsive to the disease burdens.
64
  
While developing local pharmaceutical manufacturing has advantages for employment, skills, 
foreign currency savings and developing drugs that are suited for the local environment,
65
  the 
SADC the reality on the ground is that few countries in the region, with the exception of South 
Africa, have domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing plants.
66
 There are a number of constraints 
in the local pharmaceutical production within SADC member states inclusive of the following 
items on the list:
67
 
(a) Weak policy environment and limited governmental support for the local production 
of drugs; 
(b) High tariffs on imported inputs, high interest rates on credit, unreliable energy 
supplies, water and transport infrastructure; 
(c) Lack of qualified personnel such as scientists and industrial pharmacists; 
(d) Limited international linkages and mechanism to overcome IP constraints in 
technology       transfer and the acquisition of active pharmaceutical ingredients; 
(e) Gaps in the pharmaceutical regulatory frameworks which do not ensure quality, safe 
and efficacious medicines; 
(f) Small markets within individual countries; and  
(g) Weak or non-existent capacities for pharmaceutical research and development. 
 
It is axiomatic that most of the above mentioned barriers are non-IP ones which can be resolved 
without resorting to the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore, this makes it easy and 
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 SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan 2007 – 2013, published by the SADC Secretariat in June 2007. 
63
 Draft SADC Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential Medicines and Health Commodities 2013 – 2017, 
published by the SADC Secretariat in September 2012. 
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 Machemedze, Munyuki and Mulumba above at 2. 
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practical to recommend local production as a possible solution to the access to medicines 
problem in the SADC region.  
A range of regional and national measures are, therefore, needed for the SADC region to 
overcome the above outlined barriers towards the manufacturing of drugs locally. Firstly, the 
governments must set an enabling policy environment that will facilitate investment in and 
support of domestic production, such as using tax exemptions, lowering tariffs on imported 
active ingredients and providing government guarantees on credit applied for by pharmaceutical 
companies desirous of manufacturing drugs to cure diseases of the poor.
68
 
Secondly, there is a dire need for governments to invest in skills development in areas cutting 
across pharmacology, regulatory functions, management of pharmaceutical manufacturing and 
negotiation with international firms and governments such as the United States which favours 
patent protection at all costs.
69
 
The third possible solution is legal and administrative in that SADC member states must pass 
good laws and strengthen enforcement capacities within medicines regulatory bodies. This could 
work well with well-equipped laboratories staffed with technically competent personnel.
70
 
Finally, it is important to negotiate regional and international agreements in order to widen the 
market size and access technology and investment opportunities while at the same time investing 
in research and development capacities.
71
 
It is recommended that should the SADC region consider the above problem-solving approach 
the issue of regional pharmaceutical manufacturing may see the light of day. To complement the 
proposals above, there is another dimension to possible regional pharmaceutical production 
dubbed South-South cooperation.
72
 
In line with the current thinking around South-South cooperation, SADC members are urged to 
consider partnering with fellow developing countries such as India, Brazil, Thailand and China 
                                                          
68
 Equinet above at 3. 
69
 Machemdze, Munyuki, Mulumba above at 3. 
70
 Ibid.  
71
 Machemedze, Munyuki and Mulumba above at 3. 
72
 See generally Musungu SF, Villanueva S and Blasetti R Utilising TRIPS Flexibilities for Public Health Protection 
through South-South Regional Frameworks at 35 -79. 
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in order to develop local pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity and markets expansion.
73
 These 
South-South cooperative frameworks are likely to significantly help developing countries 
including SADC members to devise ways of effectively dealing with constraints around TRIPS 
flexibilities.
74
  
Good examples of these South-South collaborations are to be found in Mozambique and Uganda. 
The government of Mozambique is currently in partnership with the government of Brazil to 
build a plant to produce generic drugs for HIV/AIDS and other diseases.
75
 The initial investment 
in the project was estimated at about $23 million
76
 in 2008, when the local office was opened in 
Mozambique. In 2007, a $38 million pharmaceutical plant to manufacture antiretroviral and anti-
malaria drugs was set up in Kampala, Uganda by Cipla, an Indian pharmaceutical company, 
upon request for technical assistance by the Ugandan government.
77
 In terms of the cooperative 
arrangement, Cipla will extend technical assistance to Uganda through a joint venture with a 
local partner; Quality Chemicals Ltd. Cipla provided the technology and expertise to set up the 
plant,
78
 which now provides an outlet for Cipla to produce the specific medicines for the African 
market. 
The two examples above reflect different approaches to the South-South approach – the first is 
largely through government to government development aid while the second is done through 
the private sector which supports distribution and sale. There are, therefore, prospects of the 
expansion of pharmaceutical markets in Africa through South-South cooperation and it is hereby 
strongly recommended that the SADC region explores this possibility vigorously using the 
Mozambique experience as a starting point.   
The foregoing recommendation highlights the importance of the local production of drugs aided 
either by investments in local pharmaceutical manufacture from within the region or using 
resources from other sources in the south, in the form of development aid or private joint 
ventures. The overall aim is to realise the local production of drugs that are suited for the reality 
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of disease in the region. Another opportunity for a regional solution to the access to medicines 
problem in the SADC region is presented by Article 31 bis of TRIPS. The next recommendation 
investigates the possibility of using Article 31 bis.  
7.3.4 Use of the Paragraph 6 System and Article 31 bis of TRIPS 
From a holistic reading of various sections of this study, it is not in dispute that WTO members 
can issue compulsory licences for domestic production as well as importation.
79
 Impediments to 
the use of compulsory licences may be the unavailability of sources of supply and the fact that by 
virtue of the principle of territoriality of patents, members cannot grant a compulsory licence 
directly to a foreign manufacturer.
80
 The last mentioned of the two concerns is no longer relevant 
in light of the August 2003 Decision and the 2005 TRIPS waiver which introduced Article 31 
bis, thus taking care of the ‘paragraph 6 problem’ identified by the Doha Declaration in 2001.81 
The Paragraph 6 problem has now been solved and developing and least developing countries, 
including SADC members can now take full advantage of compulsory licences under TRIPS for 
both domestic use and export subject to certain conditions. Paragraph 6, now Article 31 bis of 
TRIPS, is very relevant for regional trade blocks like SADC.
82
 
Paragraph 6 permits developing countries or LDCs that are part of a regional bloc 50 % of whose 
membership are LDCs to produce or Import products under compulsory licensing both for 
domestic use and for export to other members with similar health problems.
83
 Since Paragraph 6 
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 The pertinent provision provides as follows: 
“With a view to harnessing economies of scale for the purpose of enhancing purchasing power for, and facilitating 
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provides that if half of the members of a Regional Trading Agreement (RTA) is made up of 
LDCs, the requirements of Article 31(f) of TRIPS shall be waived,
84
 the SADC region, which 
qualifies as a targeted RTA in terms of the specified criteria, should make use of the paragraph 6 
window of opportunity.
85
 
It is hereby strongly recommended that SADC members ratify Article 31 bis of the TRIPS 
Agreement in order to be able to effectively issue compulsory licences for the manufacture and 
export of generic drugs within the region, at least the enabling provisions, namely, the August 
2003 Decision waiver and Article 31 bis of TRIPS allow such conduct. Using a compulsory 
licence to reduce the disease burden in the SADC region can be used in conjunction with the 
local regional pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity building proposal outlined above together 
with South-South collaborations. This is a very viable proposal which is very TRIPS-compliant 
but is currently unused due to unexplained reasons.  
It is conceded that the paragraph 6 solution will not be easy to implement.
86
 It is  also noted that 
viewed from a broad developing country perspective, it is not an equitable solution because out 
of all RTAs in which developing and LDC WTO members are members, only the SADC region 
and other African RTAs would qualify.
87
 The fact that the SADC region is the only RTA 
qualifying in terms of the criteria set by Article 31 bis does not imply that the solution is not 
viable. The SADC region faces the largest disease burden than all other regions of the world and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (L/4903), at least half of the 
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question…” 
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Affordable HIV/AIDS Medicines” (2008) Monitoring Regional Integration Yearbook at 19.  
85
 The SADC region qualifies because 8 out of 15 member countries (about 53%), namely, Angola, Malawi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are LDCs. There are 
strong opinions in the region that Zimbabwe, which has been dogged by political and economic instability since the 
late 1990s, should also be included on the LDC list. 
86
 For example, countries that qualify will have to overcome administration impediments, such as coordination of 
the system, distribution to associate members and avoiding diversion and corruption that industrialised countries like 
the United States fear so much. See for this and other specific impediments Gumbel M “Is Article 31 bis Enough? 
The Need to Promote Economies of Scale in the International Compulsory Licensing System” (2008) 22 Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal at 181.   
87
 Gumbel above at 189. 
 288 
 
if the waiver favours it, then it is only equitable and just that SADC takes full advantage of the 
waiver.  
Practically speaking, the situation on the ground supports the use of Article 31 bis in the SADC 
region. South Africa has very good and advanced pharmaceutical manufacturing infrastructure, 
while Zimbabwe has a WHO-approved drug manufacturing plant. Additionally, through     
South-South collaboration with the government of Brazil, Mozambique, an LDC SADC member, 
will soon have pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity that may be very useful to the region. 
What, therefore, is required is that the SADC region identify which of the LDC members will do 
what according to present factor endowments and then proceed to pool resources together and 
organise regional production of generic drugs using a compulsory licence issued in terms of the 
permissive provisions of Article 31 bis. 
Because the use of regional compulsory licences implies regional solidarity in dealing with 
access to medicines, it is appropriate to continue with this theme of pooling resources together 
for the SADC regional good by focusing on a recommendation that urges the use of pooled 
procurement. The next recommendation, therefore, appropriately proposes that SADC must 
actualise its Strategy on Pooled procurement in order to improve access to medicines.  
7.3.5. Prospects of Pooled Procurement in the SADC Region 
Pooled procurement, also known as joint procurement or procurement cooperation occurs when 
part or all of the procurement processes of different procurement entities are jointly executed by 
one of those procurement entities or a third party procurement entity.
88
 
The reason why the SADC region decided to embark on the strategy on pooled procurement was 
that studies conducted in the region between 2009 and 2011 found considerable differences in 
pharmaceutical procurement practices of member states as well as in the application of 
regulations and other procedures such as quality assurance.
89
 
The region, therefore, agreed that through the establishment of the SADC Pharmaceutical 
Procurement Services, pooled procurement will be used as a vehicle to improve sustainable 
availability and access to affordable, quality, safe, efficacious medicines (emphasis in the 
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 SADC Draft Strategy for Pooled Procurement of Essential Medicines and Health Commodities 2013 – 2017 
(2012) at viii. 
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original).
90
 The Strategy includes sharing information and work among member states, so that 
countries can learn and benefit from each other.
91
 The Strategy is one of the options for reducing 
the costs of medicines by creating economies of scale
92
 through collaboration in procurement by 
SADC members.
93
 Should the Strategy be fully operationalized, there will be harmonisation in 
pharmaceutical registrations to the benefit of the members who will adopt similar approaches in 
future, theoretically cutting costs in registration and inspection of pharmaceutical facilities, thus 
creating savings across the region.
94
 
With savings made through information and work sharing by procurement agencies in member 
states, more funds will become available for procurement, which will in turn increase availability 
of and access to essential medicines and health commodities.
95
 
In August 2011, the Southern African Regional Programme on Access to Medicines and 
Diagnostics (SARPAM) which is funded by DFID and managed by Re-Action (South Africa) 
was appointed by the SADC Secretariat on a consultancy basis to help the region with among 
other things, the development of a Pooled Procurement strategy.
96
 
The goal of SARPAM is to increase access to affordable essential medicines in the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC) region through supporting the development of a more 
efficient and competitive regional pharmaceutical marketplace.
97
 
While pooled procurement is strictly speaking not an IP issue, its scope for improving access to 
affordable essential medicines is very high, hence it is highly recommended that the SADC 
region actualises its implementation in line with the broad objective of ensuring access to 
medicines for all. Using pooled procurement would complement local pharmaceutical production 
and the use of regional compulsory licences in terms of Article 31 bis. Pooled procurement is 
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therefore recommended for the SADC region because it will protect the right to life, human 
dignity and health by ensuring that members benefit from economies of scale and mitigate the 
impact of medicines prices on access.  
This study focussed on how SADC members can take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities without 
falling foul of the tenets of IP law, especially the law of patents. The common thread running 
through this study is that some SADC patent laws require fixing in order for them to be 
conducive for the accessing of affordable essential medicines. It is now appropriate to focus on 
the last but not least recommendation that touches on law reform.   
7.3.6 Suggestions for Law Reform and Enhanced Role of Civil Society Groups 
In chapters four and five of this study, TRIPS flexibilities, including compulsory licences, 
parallel imports, bolar exceptions, research and experimentation exceptions, the use of           
anti-competitive procedures, government use of patents, exceptions to patentability, the Doha 
Declaration and the 2003 August Decision/Article 31 bis were discussed and contextualised to 
the situation obtaining in the SADC. 
In the discussion of TRIPS flexibilities, recommendations relating to the specific TRIPS 
flexibilities were discussed in Chapter Four and Five above in the proximate context. It is 
important to reiterate that with specific reference to compulsory licensing, it is recommended 
that the provisions be expanded and clarified in the individual countries’ legislation.  
In the context of IP law reform, it is important to repeat here, that the lessons learned from the 
Indian, Thai and Kenyan experiences in Chapter six must be heeded. The SADC member states 
must seriously consider introducing robust patent examination systems and patent opposition in 
amended IP legislation. Incremental patenting and evergreen patents are a major problem in the 
region because they delay the entry of generic drugs. India’s section 3(d) is very informative in 
this specific regard and it is recommended that no SADC IP law reform project must ignore the 
importance of provisions similar to section 3 (d) in the context of pharmaceutical patents. IP law 
reform must, therefore, be given a priority list status on the SADC legislative reform agenda in 
the future. 
Apart from IP issues and TRIPS flexibilities, this study revealed that civil society organisations 
are important partners in the quest for access to medicines in the developing world and in the 
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SADC region in particular. Except for South Africa, there is not robust civil society activism in 
the SADC region and this does not augur well for access to medicines and the holding of 
governments and pharmaceutical companies to account. In the case studies/cases discussed in 
Chapter Six above, civil society groups and NGOs enriched the arguments submitted to the 
courts in the respective jurisdictions. For example, in the P.A.O Kenyan case, the judge thanked 
the parties for the well-researched submissions
98
 while at the same time acknowledging that the 
petition revolved around critical issues of great public interest and, therefore, there was no need 
to make an order as to costs.
99
 Similarly, in Novartis AG v Union of India and Another, the court 
did acknowledge the illuminating and refreshing contributions of all the parties including 
interested parties.
100
 The Thai Didanosine case is set apart from the other two by the fact that the 
complaint was brought by HIV/AIDS sufferers and a foundation fighting for their rights. 
In all the three cases discussed in Chapter Six above, the importance of an empowered civil 
society was highlighted and it is, therefore, recommended that SADC countries must involve 
members of civil society in policy formulation in the context of using TRIPS flexibilities to 
improve access to medicines. Some civil society groups will have to be empowered with 
knowledge relating to the TRIPS Agreement and public health matters, while some of them, such 
as the Treatment Action Campaign, MSF and Section 27 in South Africa are more empowered 
than government departments and may in actual fact bring experts to help the relevant 
government departments deal with IP and public health matters.  
7.4 Areas for Further Research 
This study only explored the extent of the domestication of TRIPS flexibilities in the SADC 
region and the possible benefits for the region should each member state incorporate the 
minimum flexibilities in its laws. The premise of the study was that patents negatively affect the 
prices of drugs and using the rights-based approach in the context of a hybrid theoretical 
framework that contextually applies the rewards theory, exceptions to patents may actually be 
used to improve access to medicines. However, the study did not examine in any meaningful 
detail the likely impact of non-IP issues and other political matters allied to the SADC countries’ 
membership to WIPO and the WTO. Most importantly, the South African experience showed 
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that civil society organizations have an important role to play in access issues but the true extent 
of this role is currently not very clear. In light of the above observations, the subjects categorized 
below are suggested as areas for further research and possible empirical exploration.  
To complement and strengthen the findings and recommendations of this study, it is hereby 
proposed that a follow up study, in the form of a research project covering the issues outlined 
below be conceived, followed up and executed. 
7.4.1 Why have SADC members whose laws incorporate TRIPS Flexibilities been unable or 
reluctant to use them for access to medicines? 
It must be axiomatic from the findings in this study that incorporating all the TRIPS flexibilities 
will not necessarily result in improved access to medicines. If that was the case, then India and 
Thailand would deal with HIV/AIDS better than any other developing country in the world. 
India has the most developed generics industry in the world, and yet it is grappling with access to 
ARVs for those who need them, in a manner that is arguably more desperate, and probably no 
better than in Africa. There is, therefore, a need for an empirical investigation into the reasons 
for not using TRIPS flexibilities by SADC members with relatively good IP laws, such as 
Mauritius, South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
7.4.2 What is the role of non-IP matters in access to Medicines?  
While this study did acknowledge that non-IP matters, such as drug regulatory activities, 
discordant coordination between government departments, bureaucracy, lack of economic 
development, political factors and poor infrastructure influence access to medicines negatively, 
from the information gleaned while researching for the study, there is no clear ranking of the 
influence of these factors when weighed against IP issues, especially in the SADC context. These 
non-IP matters are likely to provide fertile ground for the propagation of a research topic on the 
role of non IP-matters. This is closely related to the issue canvassed immediately below. 
7.4.3 What is the extent and Influence of other forms of IP such as trademarks, designs and 
copyright on access to medicines? 
This study focussed on access to medicines and the use of TRIPS flexibilities with particular 
reference to patent law in the SADC context. Except in the discussion of the Kenyan case in 
Chapter Six, wherein there was a veiled reference to copyright law, no reference was made to 
other forms of IP and how they influence or are likely to influence access to medicines. The 
other IP forms must surely be important and will in all likelihood influence access to medicines. 
This may be an interesting follow up study area. 
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7.5 Valedictory Note on Recommendations 
Admittedly, if some or all of the above recommendations are implemented, the current access to 
medicines legal regime in the WTO, SADC region and in the individual countries may be 
subjected to a culture shock since some of the proposed reforms may appear to be contentious 
and revolutionary. Since the intention in this study is to introduce orderly reform in sympathy 
with access to medicines in the SADC region, the reform process must be marshalled to generate 
a momentum for the transformation of SADC law and pharmaceutical policy reform that will 
usher in an era of access to affordable essential medicines coupled with a culture of respect for 
the right to life, human dignity and health. Therefore, it follows that there must be a focal point 
for the management of reforms in the region and the SADC Secretariat will be the most suitable 
driver of such reforms. The buy in from influential SADC members such as South Africa will of 
course be a prerequisite.  
7.6 Chapter Summary 
Perhaps the best way to begin summing up this chapter is to revive the question of how SADC 
countries can take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities to their mutual advantage without falling foul 
of WTO and TRIPS tenets. Although a complete impact analysis of the human rights 
implications of TRIPS flexibilities in the context of SADC access to medicines may call for a 
multi-disciplinary project of titanic proportions, this study has attempted to address the 
weaknesses in current SADC IP law practice against a comparative perspective from within the 
region and other comparable developing countries.   
The study did show that human rights approaches and a SADC context-specific application of IP 
theories may yield positive results for access to medicines in the region. In the final analysis, the 
study recommends that in addition to adopting the rights approach, and revolutionising the 
rewards theory, the region must consider manufacturing essential drugs locally and also take 
advantage of pooled procurement. Further, the study recommends that IP law reform efforts 
currently going on in the SADC region, some of them at the behest of civil society organisations 
and NGOs must be complimented by reforms in the specific areas of patent examination, 
tightening requirements for patentability and introducing meaningful pre- and post-grant 
opposition to patents. Apart from the specific recommendations, this study does also suggest 
three areas of further research along the lines of examining the role of non-IP matters and other 
forms of IP on access to medicines in addition to enquiring into why those SADC members with 
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laws incorporating almost all the TRIPS flexibilities have been reluctant to take advantage of 
these. 
As a parting shot, one must repeat the point that the recommendations outlined here are 
important and the SADC member states must seriously consider implementing them in the 
medium to long term. However, to implement the recommendations would require many 
adjustments in members’ policies and other practices relevant to access to medicines. These 
changes cannot materialise as soon as the researcher would like them to. A lot of planning, 
consultation and evaluation of financial and other resources will have to be factored in before 
any SADC wide legal and policy reform is embarked upon in order to improve access to 
affordable essential medicines. As the adage goes, only time, the magician will tell.  
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